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CDJ 2026 GHC 113 print Preview print Next print
Court : High Court Of Gujarat At Ahmedabad
Case No : R/Special Civil Application Nos. 582, 584 of 2018
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DIVYESH A. JOSHI
Parties : Manojbhai Kalabhai Lathia Versus State Of Gujarat & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: Nishit P. Gandhi(6946), Advocate. For the Respondents: Siddharth Desai, Ld. Asst. Government Pleader.
Date of Judgment : 02-04-2026
Head Note :-
Constitution of India - Article 226 -
Summary :-
1. Statutes / Acts / Rules / Orders Mentioned:
- Article 226 of the Constitution of India
- Section 108(6) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972
- Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972
- Section 30 of the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act
- Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act
- Gujarat Land Revenue Code
- Section 166‑B of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 F (1907)
- Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act
- Section 27 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act
- Section 43 of the Act (referred to in judgment)
- Rule 108(5) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972
- Rule 108(6) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972

2. Catch Words:
limitation, suo‑motu, mutation, land ceiling, new tenure, old tenure, unauthorized occupant, breach of condition, conversion, revocation, delay, laches, natural justice, bona‑fide purchaser, ex‑facto permission, revisional power

3. Summary:
The writ petition challenges the Collector’s 05‑01‑2015 order cancelling Mutation Entry No. 1093 and the subsequent confirmation by the Additional Secretary. The land, originally non‑restricted and later converted to old tenure, was purchased by the applicant in 2011 with a registered deed. The Collector invoked suo‑motu powers under Rule 108(6) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, alleging breach of Section 30 of the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act. The Court held that the revenue authority’s action was delayed, arbitrary, and beyond its jurisdiction, as the land was not shown to be new tenure and the applicant was a bona‑fide purchaser. Citing Supreme Court and High Court precedents, the Court emphasized that revisional powers must be exercised within a reasonable time and cannot annul a registered sale deed. Consequently, the orders of 05‑01‑2015 and 04‑09‑2017 were quashed.

4. Conclusion:
Petition Allowed
Judgment :-

CAV Judgment

1. Since the issues involved in both the captioned writ applications are the same, those were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.

2. For the sake of convenience, Special Civil Application No.582 of 2018 is treated as the lead matter.

3. By this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ applicant has called in question the legality and validity of the orders dated 05.01.2015 passed by the respondent No.2-Collector, whereby the Mutation Entry No.1093 dated 04.05.2011 was ordered to be cancelled, as also the order dated 04.09.2017 passed by the respondent No.3-Additional Secretary, Revenue Department (Appeals), Ahmedabad, confirming the order dated 05.01.2015.

4. Facts, giving rise to the filing of the present writ application, may be summarized as under;

          4.1 Land bearing Survey No.32 paiki 13 and 32 paiki 25 of village: Mota Mansa, Taluka: Jafrabad, Dist: Amreli was initially belonging to one Makbai Dhana Wd/o. Varu Punjabhai Sidad.

          4.2 At that relevant point of time, the land was not of bid nature, and Makbai Dhana was given the said land without any restriction by order of the Ld. Mahalkari Saheb, Jafrabad in Case No.1692 dated 05.04.1961, and the name of the Government was deleted from the revenue record, and an entry to that effect also came to be made in Form No.6, more particularly, Entry No.95 dated 07.01.1961, which was certified on 10.01.1962. At that point of time also, there was no restriction or nature of the land being of Bid.

          4.3 Thereafter, the said land was partitioned between the two daughters of Makbai, namely, Amarbai and Ladubai, and an entry to that effect also came to be made in Form No.06 vide Entry No.194, which was certified on 25.01.1971.

          4.4 Out of the entire parcel of land, land admeasuring 34 acres and 36 gunthas was declared as excess under the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, and an entry to that effect was made on 01.10.1984.

          4.5 After the death of Amraben, the names of her legal heirs viz. Bavkubhai, Takubhai, Nankabhai, Pratapbhai, Bhupatbhai, Babubhai and Induben were entered in the revenue record in respect of the land of her share, and an entry to that effect also came to be mutated in the revenue record vide Entry No.281.

          4.6 Thereafter, the land out of Revenue Survey No.32 paiki 13 of Village: Mota Mansa, Taluka: Jafrabad, which was declared as excess, was given on Santhani basis, and the same was given by order of the Deputy Collector, Rajula dated 30.01.1986 to different persons, out of whom, Nanjibhai Baghabhai was given the said land on Santhani basis, but at the same time, it was not mentioned in the village record that the land in question is new tenure land or consisting of bid nature and thus, the land was running in the revenue record as old tenure land, more particularly, the land of Survey No.32 paiki 25 was not mentioned nor was mentioned as excess land under the Ceiling Act.

          4.7 On 05.01.1995, the owners and occupants of the land bearing Survey No.32 paiki 25, namely, Bavkubhi, Takubhai and others, sold their share of land to the extent of 2 acre and 6 gunthas by executing a registered sale deed dated 05.01.1995, and an entry to that effect also came to be mutated in the revenue record being Entry No.712 dated 03.02.1999, which was certified on 09.04.1999 after verifying the record.

          4.8 Thereafter, the person in possession of the land bearing Survey No.32 paiki 13 one Jogdiya Nanjibhai Baghabhai died on 27.10.1998 and the heirs of deceased Jogadiya Nanjibhai were entered into revenue record on 07.02.2006 and an entry to that effect also came to be mutated in the revenue record vide entry No.885, which was certified on 17.03.2006.

          4.9 The owners of the land bearing Revenue Survey No.32 paiki 13 had applied for conversion of land into old tenure and the same was ordered to be converted into old tenure by order of the Additional Collector, Rajula in Ganot Case No.Vashi/34/1995, dated 19.08.2006.

          4.10 Thereafter, one Vanja Devchandbhai Bachubhai purchased the land bearing Survey No.32 paiki 13 from its original owners Deviben Nanjibhai, Vimlaben Nanjibhai and others by way of a registered sale deed dated 12.06.2006 and its mutation entry No.927 was made on 07.11.2006 and the same was certified by the revenue authorities.

          4.11 The land bearing Survey No.32 paiki 25 was also purchased by Vanja Devchandbhai Bachubhai by registered sale deed dated 06.01.2007, and its mutation entry No.933 was made in the revenue record on 20.04.2007, and the same was certified on 30.06.2007.

          4.12 Thereafter, the owner of both the aforesaid lands bearing Survey Nos.32 paiki 13 and 32 paiki 25 Vanja Devchandbhai Bachubhai sold the said lands by way of registered sale deed to the respondent No.4-Bariya Jivabhai Jadavbhai on 09.06.2010, and its mutation entry No.1077 was made in the revenue record on 14.09.2010, which was certified on 06.12.2010.

          4.13 Thereafter, the writ applicant purchased the above said lands from its earlier owners Bariya Jivabhai Jadhavbhai by way of a registered sale deed dated 04.05.2011, and its Mutation Entry No.1093 was posted on 04.05.2011 in the revenue record, and the same was certified on 06.07.2011.

          4.14 Thereafter, the Collector, Amreli initiated suo motu proceedings under exercising powers under Section 108(6) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972 (for short 'the Rules, 1972') in respect of the land in questions purchased by the writ applicant, wherein the writ applicant appeared and filed his reply and produced documentary evidences.

          4.15 The Collector, Amreli, vide its order dated 05.01.2015 cancelled the Mutation Entry No.1093 dated 04.05.2011, further directing the Collector, Rajula to make inquiry under Section 30 of the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act.

          4.16 The aforesaid order dated 05.01.2015 passed by the Collector, Amreli was challenged by the writ applicant before the Secretary (Appeals) in Revision No.12 of 2015, and the Secretary (Appeals) dismissed the revision vide its order dated 04.09.2017, and thereby upheld the order passed by the Collector, Amreli dated 05.01.2015.

          4.17 Being aggrieved, the writ applicant is here before this Court with the present writ application.

5. Learned advocate Mr. Nishit Gandhi appearing for the writ applicant has reiterated the facts narrated herein above and submits that the impugned orders passed by the SSRD, confirming the order of the Collector, Amreli is unjust, arbitrary, perverse, illegal, unreasonable and contrary to law, and as such, deserves to be quashed and set aside. He further submits that the respondent No.3-SSRD has grossly erred in rejecting the revision application filed by the writ applicant solely on the ground that the land in question is of new tenure and the same was purchased by the writ applicant without obtaining the permission from the competent authority. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi also submits that the impugned orders passed by both the revenue authorities below are contrary to the record and facts. He submits that originally the land in question was in the name of one Makbai Dhana which was a non-restricted land and was not of bid nature. and therefore, there is no question of taking permission from the respondents-authorities to purchase the land, and as such, there is no breach of condition or illegality being committed by the writ applicant. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi also submits that the first entry in respect of the purchase of the land in question was made in the year 1999, and thereafter, from the erstwhile owner, the land in question was purchased by the writ applicant by a registered sale deed in the year 2011, and the suo motu proceedings were initiated by the respondent No.2-Collector in the year 2013, and as such, there is an inordinate delay of almost 02 years from the date of purchase of the land by the writ applicant and 14 years from the mutation of entry of the first purchase in initiating the suo motu proceedings, which is quite huge and unexplained, and it is a settled legal position that suo motu action taken after reasonable period of time is null and void. He also submits that three registered transactions had already been taken place prior to the purchase of the land in question by the writ applicant, and those transactions have not been challenged by anybody till date.

6. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi further submits that the respondent No.3-SSRD has erred in not appreciating the documents made available on record. He submits that it is not specifically mentioned in any of the revenue documents whether the land is of old tenure or the new tenure or of a bid nature, and as such, on this ground also the impugned orders passed by both the revenue authorities deserve to be quashed being suffered from vice of non-application of mind. Moreover, in the absence of any such specific remark in the revenue record, the land was deemed to be considered to be of old tenure. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi also submits that thus it appears that only on assumption and presumption, the respondents authorities have come to the conclusion that the land in question is of a new tenure. He further submits that the respondent No.3-SSRD has also erred in not appreciating the fact that the writ applicant is in possession of the land in question since 2011, and since then he is invested huge amount of money towards the development of the land in question, and therefore also, on this ground also, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside.

7. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi further submits that the land in question has been erroneously and arbitrarily treated as new tenure land, and the proceedings under Rule 108(6) of the Rules, 1972 have been initiated after an unexplained delay of 02 years from the purchased by the writ applicant and 14 years from the first transaction, culminating in an order of forfeiture/vesting of land, despite the admitted legal position that Rule 108(6) does not confer any such power. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi further submits that considering the language of Rule 108(6) of the Rules, 1972, it only empowers the Collector to exercise suo-motu revisionary powers to call for, examine, and revise records of inquiries or proceedings held by subordinate revenue officers (such as Mamlatdars) regarding mutation entries., and does not confer, in any manner, confiscation or forfeiture of the land, or annulment of a registered sale deed, or vesting or resumption of land in the Government or divesting lawful title or possession of a bona fide purchaser. He further submits that it was never mentioned in the earlier revenue record that the lands in question is subject to the permission under Section 30 of the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, nor it was mentioned in any of the revenue records that the land in question is a new tenure lands and/or of a bid nature in view of the fact that the Deputy Collector, Rajula by its order dated 19.08.2006 in Case No. Ganot/Vashi/3495 has passed an order to convert the land bearing Survey No.32 paiki 13 into old tenure land, which was also attained finality being not challenged till date.

8. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi further submits that the Deputy Collector, Rajula had already passed an order converting the land in question into an old tenure land on 19.08.2006, and considering the effect of the said order, the writ applicant had purchased the land in question by way of a registered sale deed upon payment of total sale consideration, and as such, the writ applicant is a bona fide purchaser. He also submits that none of the earlier sale transactions had ever been questioned by any of the revenue authorities at any point of time, rather they were being mutated and certified by the said revenue authorities after verifying the record. Thus, the impugned orders passed by both the revenue authorities are further illegal in view of the fact that when the earlier sale transactions are not questioned by any of the revenue authorities, coupled with the fact that the mutation entries in respect to the earlier transactions have been certified and not challenged till date, the mutation entry made in favour of the writ applicant in respect of the land in question on the basis of a registered sale deed, could not have been cancelled as per the settled law, and thus, both the impugned orders are required to be quashed and set aside. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi further submits that the authorities below have totally ignored the decisions cited before it, including the decision of a similarly situated person, and as such, by not referring to, discussing and/or dealing with the ratio of the decision cited before it, the orders in question amount to committing breach of principles of natural justice. He also submits that there was nothing on record to show that, in fact, the land was given on Santhani basis. Thus, it appears that the impugned orders are passed without verifying their own record. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi further submits that, even otherwise, without admitting, even if it is believed that the land in question was sold without the permission under Section 30 of the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, then also, the same are required to be regularized by giving expo-facto permission as per the law declared by this Court.

9. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi further submits that the mutation entry in favour of the writ applicant was certified in the year 2011, and surprisingly, the revenue authorities have exercised and initiated suo motu proceedings in the year 2013, and as such, there is a delay of 02 years in initiating the said proceedings from the date of purchase of the land by the writ applicant as also 14 years from the mutation of entry of the first transaction, which is wholly unexplained. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi also submits that so far as exercise of suo motu power after unreasonable delay is concerned, this Court in the case of Devjibhai Kalabhai Patel vs. Collector, Rajkot in Special Civil Application No.21269 of 2017, has very categorically held that 'suo motu powers must be exercised within a reasonable period. A delay of 11 years without explanation is wholly unreasonable and vitiates the proceedings.' It has been further held and observed that 'the authority cannot suddenly awaken after more than a decade and unsettle vested rights'. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi further submits that the aforesaid view taken by the Single Judge in Devjibhai Kalabhai Patel (supra) has now attained finality, having been confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.4963 of 2025, decided on 21.04.2025. He submits that the Division Bench has also very categorically held that the suo motu action initiated after 11 years suffered from gross and unexplained delay, and that such delay itself was fatal, rendering the Collector's order liable to be set aside. He also submits that this authoritative pronouncement of the Division Bench directly supports the case of the writ applicant, both on facts and on law, and as such, the present proceedings stand vitiated per incuriam, both for jurisdictional error and for gross and unexplained delay. He also submits that the ratio laid down in the above referred case law, are directly applicable to the facts of the present case, as the revenue authority has furnished no explanation whatsoever for this inordinate delay. Therefore, the entire proceedings are liable to be quashed solely on the ground of delay and laches.

10. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi further submits that apart from the settled legal position with regard to initiation of proceedings under Rule 108(6) at a belated stage, even on merits, the writ applicant, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be an 'unauthorized occupant', so as to attract proceedings under Rule 108(6) of the Rules, 1972. He also submits that the writ applicant is a lawful purchaser of the land in question under a duly registered sale deed, which continues to remain valid, operative and wholly unchallenged till date. He further submits that it is well-established principle of law that unless a registered conveyance is set aside, cancelled, annulled, or declared void by a competent civil court exercising plenary jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and allied statutory provisions, the titled conveyed there under remains absolute, binding, and enforceable. He also submits that in the absence of any civil proceedings, challenging the writ applicant's title or seeking cancellation of the registered sale deed, the revenue authorities could not have assumed jurisdiction to declare the writ applicant an 'unauthorized occupant'. Learned advocate Mr. Gandhi further submits that the suo motu exercise of powers under Rule 108(6) of the Rules, 1972 is wholly inapplicable, arbitrary, and bad in law where the person is a bona fide purchaser holding title under a subsisting, unassailed registered document. He submits that the very assumption of jurisdiction is thus fundamentally flawed, and on this ground alone, the impugned order deserves to be quashed.

          (i) In the case of Arunbhai Laljibhai Gadhiya vs. State of Gujarat, 2016 JX(Guj) 1235;

          (ii) In the case of Dadbhai Amrubhai Varu vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., Special Civil Application No.8841 of 2014, decided on 19.02.2026;

          (iii) In the case of Manjulaben Jivrajbhai Pathak vs. State of Gujarat, 2022 (0) JX (Guj) 432;

          (iv) In the case of Thakorbhai Tribhovandas Rao & Ors. vs. The State of Gujarat & Ors., 1995 (1) GLH 758;

          (v) In the case of Laxmi Associates vs. Collector, Vadodara, 2006 (3) GLR 1982;

11. In such circumstances, referred to above, learned advocate Mr. Gandhi prays that there being merit in the present application, the same be allowed, and the relief, as prayed for, be granted.

12. On the other hand, the present application has been vehemently opposed by learned AGP Mr. Siddharth Desai appearing for the State-respondents. He submits that, no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by both the revenue authorities in passing the impugned orders. He further submits that none of the fundamental rights of the writ applicant have been violated because of any action or inaction on the part of the respondents. Learned AGP Mr. Desai also submits that the Collector, Rajula has exceeded its jurisdiction while passing the order of conversion of the land in question into old tenure land as there was specific bar for certain categories of properties, as they cannot be converted from agricultural land to non- agricultural land. Learned AGP Mr. Desai has produced on record a Government Resolution dated 05.08.2005, directing the concerned revenue authorities not to convert the agricultural land into non-agricultural land, other than for agricultural purposes, as also subject to the procedure as prescribed under the provisions of Section 30 of the Act, however, despite the said resolution, the Deputy Collector, Rajula, through oversight, has passed the order of conversion of the land in question, which is against the prevailing policy of the Government, and as such, the said order of Deputy Collector is required to be treated as non est. He also submits that the record reveals that the Government had initiated proceedings under the Gujarat Land Ceiling Act, whereupon certain parcels of land were found to be excess, and as such, the same was vested in the Government, and then were given to number of individuals on Santhni basis.

13. Learned AGP Mr. Desai relies upon one judgment in the case of Hanshrajbhai Mohanbhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat, Special Civil Application No.13775 of 2014, wherein it has been held that "A 'santhani' land owned by the Government cannot be transferred to any other person otherwise the very purpose for which the land is allotted is frustrated. If the applicants found it difficult to cultivate a huge parcel of land admeasuring 11-acres, they could have surrendered the land to the State Government. They not only tried to derive profit out of it but a third party also derived the profit out of the same. A transfer does not mean transfer only by way of a registered sale-deed. Strict interpretation of the term transfer is not required to be given in this type of matters. The Court is expected to take a practical view of the matter keeping in mind the object of allotment in view of the policy of the State Government." He submits that the findings recorded by both the revenue authorities are concurrent in nature, and therefore, they are not required to be disturbed. Hence, he prays that the present application be rejected.

14. Heard the learned counsel for both parties, and examined the record.

15. The question involved in the present case is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of JOINT COLLECTOR RANGA REDDY DISTRICT & ANOTHER Vs. D.NARSING RAO AND OTHERS, (2015) 3 SCC 695, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with exercise of suo- motu revisional powers after nearly 5 decades and has ruled that unexplained and inordinate delay in invoking such power would itself tantamount to fraud upon statute apart from being arbitrary and opposed to rule of law. Useful reference can be made to the observations made in paragraphs 14, 16 & 17 which read as under:

          "14. Admittedly, the names of the predecessors-in- title of the respondents are found mentioned in the khasra pahani of the year 1954-1955 pertaining to Survey Nos.36 and 37 of Gopanpally Village. The purchase of the said lands by the respondents from them under registered sale deeds are also not seriously disputed. The further fact is that they have been regularly paying land revenue continuously since the year 1954. The appellants herein issued impugned notice dated 31-12-2004 under Section 166-B of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 F (1907) for cancellation of entries in the khasra pahani of the year 1953- 1954, by fixing the date of inquiry as 5-2-2005 and that notice is the subject- matter of challenge here.

          16. No time-limit is prescribed in the above section for the exercise of suo motu power but the question is as to whether the suo motu power could be exercised after a period of 50 years. The Government as early as in the year 1991 passed an order reserving 477 acres of land in Survey Nos.36 and 37 of Gopanpally Village for house sites to the government employees. In other words, the Government had every occasion to verify the revenue entries pertaining to the said lands while passing the Government Order dated 24-9-1991 but no exception was taken to the entries found. Further the respondents herein filed Writ Petition No. 21719 of 1997 challenging the Government Order dated 24-9-1991 and even at that point of time no action was initiated pertaining to the entries in the said survey numbers. Thereafter, the purchasers of land from Respondents 1 and 2 herein filed a civil suit in OS No. 12 of 2001 on the file of the Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District praying for a declaration that they were lawful owners and possessors of certain plots of land in Survey No. 36, and after contest, the suit was decreed and said decree is allowed to become final. By the impugned notice dated 31-12-2004 the suo motu revision power under Section 166-B referred to above is sought to be exercised after five decades and if it is allowed to do so it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties over immovable properties.

          17. In the light of what is stated above we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court was right in affirming the view of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the suo motu revision undertaken after a long lapse of time, even in the absence of any period of limitation was arbitrary and opposed to the concept of rule of law. "

16. Reiteration of this aspect is again found in paragraphs 30 and 31, where the Apex Court refers to the decision in the case of DEHRI ROHTAS LIGHT RAILWAY CO. LTD. Vs. DISTRICT BOARD, BHOJPUR, (1992) 2 SCC 598 and in paragraph 31 where principal of law is laid down as under:

          "31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority."

17. In the present case also there is delay of 02 years in initiating suo-motu proceedings after the certification of Entry No.1093 in the year 2011 in favour of the writ applicant and 14 years from the date of first transaction. Therefore, facts in the present case and facts of the aforequoted decisions of the Apex Court are similar in nature so far as the nature of the dispute and the extent of delay are concerned. Hence, even in this case, it can safely be said that exercise of power by the Collector, Amreli tantamounts to arbitrary and illegal exercise of such power.

18. Moreover, when the question of delay comes, then all other issues including breach of any of the provisions would not have much relevance in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Patel Raghav Natha, reported in 1969 (2) SCC 187. Similarly, in a judgment reported in the case of Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil & Ors. v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale & Ors., reported in (2009) 9 SCC 353; 2009 AIR SCW 6305, it has been observed that such power cannot be exercised beyond a reasonable period. It has been observed thus;

          "...Having regard to the fact that the proceedings came to be initiated after delay of more than about three years and that the petitioner is not guilty of fraud or suppression, the impugned proceedings and order cannot be said to have been initiated within reasonable time inasmuch as undisputedly the notice under the Act was issued in 2005. The proceedings and the order are hit by the vice of delay..."

19. Further, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in a judgment reported in 2013(2) GLR 1788 in the case of Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya and Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. had considered this aspect with reference to the delay in exercise of such powers and the reasonable period. It has been observed as under;

          "It must be fairly said that if the statute does not prescribe time- limit for exercise of revisional powers, it does not mean that such powers can be exercised at any point of time even if there is a breach of Section 43 of the Act, which is a provision which relates to a new tenure land, rather it should be exercised within a reasonable period of time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. It is clear from various judgments of the Supreme Court that where a statutory provision for exercise of any suo motu powers of revision does not prescribe any limitation, the powers must be exercised within a reasonable period of time even in the case of transaction which would be termed as void transaction."

20. Thus, the moot question is what could be considered to be "reasonable time" when the statute does not provide for any time-limit for exercise of such powers. The Division Bench of the High Court in the aforesaid judgment in the case of Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya (supra) has observed in para 38 referring to an earlier judgment reported in (2003) 4 SCC 488, "As observed in Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal, 2002(1) SCC 134, it is "looking at all the circumstances of the case, a "reasonable time" under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as it is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than 'directly; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonable be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea".

          Further, it has been observed, "That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the rights and advantages he possesses and protects each party from losses that he ought not to suffer (Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn., 2005"

21. Moreover, in the present case, suo motu proceedings were initiated by the Collector under the provisions of Rule 108(6) of the Rules, 1972 alleging breach of Section 30 of the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, and it is a settled legal proposition that the cross utilization of powers by the revenue authority under different enactment is not permissible. It has been held by this Court in Evergreen Apartment Co Operative Housing Society Limited versus Special Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department Special Civil Application No. 5505 of 1990, decided on 16.08.1990, more particularly, in para-12 thereof, as under;

          "12. There is much substance in the second submission of Mr. Hawa also. Ordinarily when a transfer of property takes place by a registered account an entry is effected in the revenue record and it is certified by the mamlatdar after making necessary inquiries. If there is any dispute regarding mutation, the dispute has to be entered in the register of the disputed cases and then such disputes are to be disposed of by the Mamlatdar. Under subrule (5) of Rule 108 of the Rules, the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal within 60 days from the date of the service of the order. The State Government has power to call for and examine the record of any enquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate revenue officer and to review the same under sub-rule (6) of the rules. It is to be noted in the present case that no appeal had been presented within 60 days from the date of Mamlatdar's order certifying the initial entry. the Assistant Collector, Surat took the said entry in suo motu revision, even though he had no such power under the provisions of Rule 108. It, therefore, appears that the Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue Department remanded the proceeding to the Collector for treating the same as an appeal. This was done after a period of 4 years after certification of the entry. It was only the State Government which had the power to call for a record of inquiry or proceeding under sub-rule (6) of Rule 108. Even the State Government was empowered to satisfy itself "as to the regularity of such proceedings and as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed in such proceedings". So the entire inquiry and revisional power has to proceed under the Bombay Land Revenue Rules and not under any enactments like the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act or Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act. It is quite possible that an officer of the Revenue Department may be occupying different capacities under different enactments. That, however, would not empower him to exercise any powers under one enactment while proceeding under another enactment. So far as the proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules, popularly known as RTS proceedings, are concerned, it is well settled that the entries made in the revenue records have primarily a fiscal value and they do not create any title. Such mutations have to follow either the documents of title or the orders passed by competent authorities under special enactments. Independently the Revenue Authorities, as mentioned in Rule 108 of the Rules, cannot pass orders of cancelling the entries on an assumption that the transaction recorded in the entry are against the provisions of a particular enactment. Whether the transaction is valid or not has to be examined by the competent authority under the particular enactment by following the procedure prescribed therein and by giving an opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties likely to be affected by any order that may be passed. Thus on this second ground also the orders of the Collector and the Additional Chief Secretary appear to be beyond their jurisdiction. The Additional Chief Secretary has held that the sale by auction was not consistent with the provisions of Section 27 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. Section 27 relates to prohibition of transfer of any urban land with a building thereon. Apart from the legal position that Section 27 has been struck down as ultra vires, it is quite obvious that no such question of transferring urban land with a building thereon has ever arisen in the present case. Thus, the order of the Revisional authority has proceeded on a misconception of relevant legal provisions also. "

22. That apart, the principles laid down in the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the writ applicant also apply to the facts of the present case on all fours.

23. Thus, in view of the submissions made by both the sides coupled with aforesaid decisions and the material placed on record, it is an undisputed fact that the land in question belonged to the heirs of one Makbai Dhana, and then came in the shares of her legal heirs, and was then purchased by one Vanja Devchandbhai Bachubhai, who then sold the land in question to the respondent No.4, which was then purchased by the writ applicant from the respondent No.4 by way of a registered sale deed. way back in the year 2011, and an entry to that effect was also certified. Aforesaid entry came to be taken into revision by the respondent No.2- Collector, Amreli after delay of almost 02 years from the purchase by the writ applicant and 14 years from the dat of the first transaction. It reveals from the record that the ground raised is that there is a breach of condition. However, it appears that no proceedings had been initiated to declare the sale deed to be null and void, and the same has remained unchallenged all throughout. It also appears that mutation entry remained on record for a long period of time and that entry was never challenged, though the revenue authorities were within the knowledge of the said entry. The impugned orders came to be passed in the RTS proceedings, vesting the land to the State Government solely on the ground that there is a breach of condition while entering into the sale transaction of the land in question. Thus, exercise of power by the Collector, Amreli in RTS proceedings is beyond the scope of power and authority available under the Gujarat Land Revenue Code or the Rules. Moreover, a perusal of the record indicates that since inception when the first entry was mutated in the revenue record in the name of the original owner and then in favour of the subsequent purchasers of the land in question and their heirs and then in the name of the writ applicant, nowhere it is mentioned that the land in question is a new tenure land. Furthermore, none of the previous sales transactions had ever been challenged by any of the revenue authorities till date. Thus, as usual, the writ applicant has also purchased the land in question after verifying the revenue record, which does not reflect anywhere that the land in question is a new tenure land, as also after finding the previous transactions to be valid being not challenged by any of the authorities, and as such, no breach of condition can be said to have been committed by the writ applicant. On the contrary, the revenue authority ought to have verified the record before certifying the entry.

24. Further, exercise of suo motu powers by the revenue authority or authorities, after an unreasonable, long delay is legally contentious, particularly because it can disrupt settled positions and create third-party rights for individuals who acted in good faith based on the previous state of affairs. While suo motu powers are essential for delivering justice in public interest, judicial precedents highlight that they cannot be exercised at any time, but rather within a reasonable period to protect these third-party interests. Ordinarily, when a long delay occurs, subsequent transactions often happen, such as property sales, acquisitions, or career developments, which are valid when made. A belated suo motu decision might revoke these, causing irreparable loss to innocent parties. Then revenue authority cannot exercise the revisional powers in a casual manner whenever it wants to be, irrespective of the period of limitation, which even otherwise, not vested to it. Exercise of any such power should be within the realm of the provisions of the statute.

25. Further, the entry was mutated in the revenue record in the name of the writ applicant on the basis of an entirely legal and valid sale deed being executed upon payment of amount of total sale consideration. Thus, ordering the land of an individual being purchased by executing the registered sale deed, to be vested to the Government by the concerned revenue authority would ultimately, amount to annulment of the sale deed. It is a settled law that the revenue authorities, cannot unilaterally annul sale deeds even if fraud is alleged; such matters must go to a civil court.

26. For all the foregoing reasons, and having regard to the aforesaid settled position of law, both the writ applications deserve to be allowed and accordingly stand allowed. The impugned orders dated 05.01.2015 and 04.09.2017 are hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.

 
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