1. The Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief:

                  “…to issue a Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly, one in the nature of Mandamus, declaring the action of the Respondent no. 3, respondent no. 5 and 6 in asking the petitioners to go to their offices and agree for a settlement with R7 and asking the petitioners to put signatures on some blank stamp and white papers regards the settlement of the house property with R7 situate in an extent of 3/4 kunta that is in an extent of 55.76 sq. yards in syno.701 bearing d.no.16/517, Jayasree colony, B.kothakota town annamayya district admeasuring east to west 27 1/2 feet and north to south 18 1/4 feet without conducting any enquiry and not to insist the petitioners to vacate the subject house property without prior notice to the petitioners and without following the due process of law as illegal arbitrary and unconstitutional and consequently direct the authorities R3, R5 and R6 to not call for the petitioners to their offices and not to insist the petitioners to go for a settlement with R7 for the above house property and not to force them to sign stamp papers and empty white papers and not to ask them to vacate from the said house and not to damage the civil rights and claims of the petitioners in the subject property which are standing on the name of the R7 detrimental to the rights and interests of the petitioners…”

2. Sri S.S.Bhatt, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the very substratum of the present Writ Petition rests upon the arbitrary and unconstitutional interference of the respondent authorities into what is essentially a civil dispute. The Petitioners, being lawful residents of the subject house property, have been coerced and summoned by Respondent Nos.3, 5 and 6 without issuance of any statutory notice, without adherence to due process, and without jurisdictional competence. Such coercive measures, undertaken at the behest of Respondent No.7, who is none other than the mother of Petitioner No.1, amount to a blatant transgression of Articles 14 and  21 of the Constitution of India, thereby infringing upon the Petitioners’ civil liberties and proprietary rights.

3. It is further contended that the genesis of the dispute lies in the subject house property situated at Jayasree Colony, B. Kothakota town, which was constructed exclusively from the ancestral nucleus and agricultural income of Petitioner No.2. The documentary evidence, including pattadar passbooks and sale deeds of ancestral lands, unequivocally establish that the financial contributions emanated solely from Petitioner No.2 and Petitioner No.1, while Respondent No.7’s contribution was nil. The mere fact that the house was registered in the name of Respondent No.7, as a measure of convenience to avoid familial bickering, does not ipso facto confer absolute ownership upon her. The settled principle of law is that title must be traced to the source of funds, and not merely to the nominal holder of the document.

4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that Respondent No.7, instead of availing herself of the remedies available under civil law, has chosen to invoke the machinery of the police and revenue authorities, thereby converting a civil dispute into purported criminal enquiry. The Respondents herein, by compelling the Petitioners to attend their offices, by threatening them with dire consequences, and by insisting upon signatures on blank papers, have acted in excess of jurisdiction and in derogation of the rule of law.

5. It is submitted that the Petitioners are not mere trespassers or strangers to the property, but lawful heirs with vested rights in the estate of Petitioner No.2. The attempt of Respondent No.7 to alienate the subject house in favour of her daughter, to the exclusion of Petitioner No.1, amounts to deprivation of legitimate inheritance. Such deprivation, if permitted, would render Petitioner No.1 destitute and pauperized, thereby violating his right to livelihood and dignity under Article 21. This Court, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, is empowered to protect such fundamental rights from arbitrary executive interference.

6. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submits that the conduct of Respondent No.6, who has been using abusive and unparliamentary language while summoning Petitioner No.1, is wholly unbecoming of a public servant and constitutes malice in law. The threat to foist false cases upon the Petitioners if they fail to attend the so-called enquiry is a clear manifestation of colourable exercise of power.

7. It is therefore urged that the present Writ Petition is the only efficacious remedy available to the Petitioners, as no other suit or proceeding has been instituted for the same relief. The Petitioners seek not merely protection of their proprietary rights but also safeguarding of their civil liberties against unwarranted intrusion by executive authorities. The relief sought in mandamus is squarely maintainable, as the Respondents have acted without jurisdiction, without authority of law, and in violation of constitutional guarantees.

8. Sri S.S.Bhatt, learned Counsel for the Petitioners urges that this Court may be pleased to declare the actions of Respondent Nos.3, 5, and 6 as illegal, arbitrary, and unconstitutional, restrain them from coercing the Petitioners into attending their offices or signing blank papers, and direct them not to interfere with the Petitioners’ peaceful possession and enjoyment of the subject house property. Such intervention of this Court is imperative to uphold the majesty of law, to protect the sanctity of civil rights, and to prevent the abuse of executive power in matters which are purely civil in nature.

9. Sri David, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for Respondent No.6, has submitted that on the representation given by Respondent No.7 to the District Collector/Respondent No.4concerned, the same was in turn forwarded to the Police Department at the behest of Respondent No.7. Counselling was conducted on 24.12.2025 and 26.12.2025. The grievance of Respondent No.7 resulted in that she was given mental support by Respondent No.6 through the One Stop Centre, Women Development and Child Welfare Department, Rayachoty, Annamayya District. It is mentioned in the written instructions from Respondent No.6 that, to lessen the issues from both sides, to ventilate them, and to sort out the issue, counselling was conducted. However, as some of the petitioners did not attend the counselling sessions, Respondent No.7 addressed a letter from the One Stop Centre stating that she would make her issues legal.

10. Sri P.Ajay Babu, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for Respondent Nos.1 to 4 submits that Respondent No.7 is the wife of Petitioner No.2; Respondent No.7 is the mother of Petitioner No.1; and Petitioner No.3 is the mother-in-law of Respondent No.7. It appears that there are certain civil disputes regarding the immovable property between the petitioners and the Respondent No.7. The learned Assistant Government Pleader further submits that the respondent/police called the Petitioners only for a preliminary enquiry on PGRS petition submitted by the Respondent No.7.

11. Learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that the present Writ Petition is misconceived and devoid of merit. The Petitioners have sought to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, alleging arbitrary interference by Respondent Nos.3, 5, and 6. However, the factual matrix clearly demonstrates that the Respondents acted only upon a complaint lodged by Respondent No.6 before the District Collector through the PGRS mechanism, which was duly endorsed to the Station House Officer for preliminary enquiry. The role of the police was confined to conducting a preliminary enquiry and advising the parties to approach the competent Civil Court, as the dispute pertains to property rights, a matter purely civil in nature.

12. It is further submitted that the allegations of coercion, threats, and use of unparliamentary language attributed to Respondent No.6 and the officials are wholly baseless, invented solely to sustain the present Writ Petition. The Respondent/police, in discharge of their statutory duties, merely called the Petitioners for preliminary enquiry based on the complaint received. At no point did the Respondent No.3 compel the Petitioners to sign blank papers or force them to vacate the subject property. The settled principle of law is that police authorities cannot adjudicate civil disputes, and in the present case, they have scrupulously adhered to that principle by advising both parties to seek redress before the Civil Court.

13. Sri P.Ajay Babu, learned Assistant Government Pleader further submits that the One Stop Centre, functioning under the Department of Women and Child Welfare, was involved only to provide temporary shelter and counselling services to Respondent No.7, who approached the police department seeking protection. The Centre Administrator, upon referral, assigned the matter to a Psycho-Social Counsellor, who interacted with Respondent No.7 and provided counselling and mental support. The record unequivocally establishes that the counsellor did not use any abusive or unparliamentary language but merely attempted to facilitate dialogue between the parties. The Petitioners’ refusal to attend the counselling sessions cannot be construed as coercion or illegality on the part of the authorities.

14. It is contended that the Writ Petition seeks to convert a private family dispute into a constitutional grievance against the State machinery. Such an attempt is impermissible in law. The Petitioners’ apprehensions of being dispossessed are unfounded, as no coercive steps have been initiated by the Respondents. The entire narrative of threats and arbitrary action is a figment of imagination, designed to malign the Respondent authorities.

15. Learned Assistant Government Pleader eventually prays that this Court may be pleased to dismiss the Writ Petition as against the Respondent police and the One Stop Centre, holding that the Respondents have acted strictly within the bounds of law, without any arbitrariness or mala fides. The Petitioners, if aggrieved, have adequate remedies before the competent Civil Court to ventilate their claims. The invocation of Article 226 in the present circumstances is wholly unwarranted, and dismissal of the Writ Petition would serve the ends of justice and uphold the sanctity of constitutional remedies.

16. In this regard it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Roshina T. v. Abdul Azeez K.T((2019) 2 SCC 329)wherein at paragraph Nos.14, 17 & 19 it is held as under:

                  “14. It has been consistently held by this Court that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of the disputes relating to property rights between the private persons. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of statutory authority is alleged. In such cases, the Court has jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions to the authority concerned. It is held that the High Court cannot allow its constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies under the general law, civil or criminal are available. This Court has held that it is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a civil suit or application available to an aggrieved person. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution being special and extraordinary, it should not be exercised casually or lightly on mere asking by the litigant.

                  17. In our opinion, the High Court, therefore, while so directing exceeded its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution. Indeed, the High Court in granting such relief, had virtually converted the writ petition into a civil suit and itself to a civil court. In our view, it was not permissible.

                  19. We do not agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for Respondent 1 for the reasons that first there did exist a dispute between the appellant and Respondent 1 as to who was in possession of the flat in question at the relevant time; second, a dispute regarding possession of the said flat between the two private individuals could be decided only by the civil court in civil suit or by the criminal court in Section 145 CrPC proceedings but not in the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

17. Further the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria (Smt.)( (1992) 4 SCC 61), at paragraph No.6 held as under:

                  “6. Mr Arun Jaitley, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent 1 has supported the impugned judgment on the ground that prayer for issuing a direction against Delhi Administration and Commissioner of Police who were respondents 1 and 2 was also made. It has to be appreciated that the present appellants were respondents 3 and 4 before the High Court; and the High Court has by the impugned order, considered it fit to allow the prayer of the respondents against them for removal of the grills for access to the backyard. According to the stand of the landlord-respondent, since the police were taking a partisan attitude against her, the filing of a writ petition became necessary. We are unable to follow this argument. There is no doubt that the dispute is between two private persons with respect to an immovable property. Further, a suit covering either directly a portion of the house- property which is in dispute in the present case or in any event some other parts of the same property is already pending in the civil court. The respondent justifies the step of her moving the High Court with a writ petition on the ground of some complaint made by the appellants and the action by the police taken thereon. We do not agree that on account of this development, the respondent was entitled to maintain a writ petition before the High Court. It has repeatedly been held by this Court as also by various High Courts that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of disputes relating to property rights between private persons and that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of a statutory authority is alleged. And in such a case, the Court will issue appropriate direction to the authority concerned. If the real grievance of the respondent is against the initiation of criminal proceedings, and the orders passed and steps taken thereon, she must avail of the remedy under the general law including the Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies, under the general law, civil or criminal, are available. It is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit or application available to a litigant. The jurisdiction is special and extraordinary and should not be exercised casually or lightly. We, therefore, hold that the High Court was in error in issuing the impugned direction against the appellants by their judgment under appeal. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside and the writ petition of the respondents filed in the High Court is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.”

18. A learned single Judge of this Court also in S. Masthan Saheb v. P.S.R. Anjaneyulu(2002 SCC OnLine AP 1212), at paragraph No.14 held as under:

                  “14. The various provisions to which a brief reference is made would show that the power of the police to collect: intelligence regarding any design to commit cognizable offences and prevent commission Of cognizable offences is considered to be the inherent power of the police organization. Whether or not there is a special enactment, the police are expected to perform its functions; namely, maintenance of peace and public order and prevention of cognizable offences. When all these statutes dealing with police in Andhra Pradesh deal with duty of the police relating to cognizable offences, a Police Officer would not be justified in saying that he/she is looking into a complaint made by a person which has, ex facie, trappings of the civil dispute. Indeed, under sub-section (1) of Section 154 of Cr. P.C., it shall be within the power and duty of the police officer to register only a cognizable offence. Though under Section 155 of Cr. P.C. a police officer can make an entry in the appropriate register about the information as to non-cognizable offence, such police officer shall not investigate a non-cognizable offence without the order of the Magistrate. As a necessary corollary, it must be concluded that any effort on the part of the police „to look into‟ any complaint by any person which does not contain allegations of commission of cognizable offences would not only violate the various provisions of the Andhra Act, as in this case, but also would violate Section 155(2) of the Cr. P.C. Any such action would be ex facie illegal, whatever be the ipse dixit of the police. There is no presumption in law that every rift in human relations would lead to a civil dispute and civil dispute would likely to result in clashes, resulting in offences against human body. Any such effort on the part of the police to look into the complaints regarding civil disputes is not even the part of the Code of Conduct of the Police, which was communicated by the Government of India in 1987 which reads as under:

                  Code of Conduct for the Police in India [ Union Ministry of Home Affairs Letters No. VI-24021/97/84-GPAI, dated 4-7-1985 and 10-7-1985.]

                  1. The Police must bear faithful allegiance to the Constitution of India and respect and uphold the rights of the citizens as guaranteed by it.

                  2. The Police should not question the propriety or necessity of any law duly enacted. They should enforce the law firmly and impartially, without fear or favour, malice or vindictiveness.

                  3. The Police should recognize and respect the limitations of their powers and functions. They should not usurp or even seem to usurp the functions of the judiciary and sit in judgment on cases to avenge individuals and punish the guilty.

                  4. In securing the observance of law or in maintaining order, the Police should as far as practicable, use the methods of persuasion, advice and warning. When the application of force becomes inevitable, only the irreducible minimum of force required in the circumstances should be used.

                  5. The prime duty of the Police is to prevent crime and disorder and the Police must recognize that the test of their efficiency is the absence of both and not the visible evidence of Police action in dealing with them.

                  6. The Police must recognize that they are members of the public, with the only difference that in the interest of the society and on its behalf they are employed to give full time attention to duties, which are normally incumbent on every citizen to perform.

                  7. The Police should realize that the efficient performance of their duties will be dependent on the extent of real co-operation that they receive from the public. This, in turn, will depend on their ability to secure public approval of their conduct and actions and to earn and retain public respect and confidence.

                  8. The Police should always keep the welfare of the people in mind and be sympathetic and considerate towards them. They should always be ready to offer individual service and friendship and render necessary assistance to all without regard to their wealth or social standing.

                  9. The Police should always place duty before self, should remain calm in the face of danger, scorn or ridicule and should be ready to sacrifice their lives in protecting those of others.

                  10. The Police should always be courteous and well mannered; they should be dependable and impartial; they should possess dignity and courage; and should cultivate character and the trust of the people.

                  11. Integrity of the highest order is the fundamental basis of the prestige of the Police Recognizing this, the Police must keep their private lives scrupulously clean, develop self-restraint and be truthful and honest in thought and deed, in both personal and official life, so that the public may regard them as exemplary citizen.

                  12. The Police should recognize that their full utility to the State is the best ensured only by maintaining a high standard of discipline, faithful performance of duties in accordance with law and implicit obedience to the lawful directions of commanding ranks and absolute loyalty to the force and by keeping themselves in a state of constant training and preparedness.

                  13. As members of a secular, democratic State, the Police should strive continually to rise above personal prejudices and promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people in India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities and to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women and disadvantaged segments of the society.”

19. Furthermore,the very same learned Single Judge of this Court also in J. Lakshmi v. Commissioner of Police(2004 SCC OnLine AP 29), at paragraph No.4 held as under:

                  “4. It is well settled that Police cannot interfere in civil disputes. In W.P. No. 12737 of 2003 disposed of on 21-11-2003, I have considered the question regarding the power of Police to interfere in civil disputes and coerce people to compromise civil disputes. After referring to my earlier judgment in S. Masthan Saheb v. P.S.R. Anjaneyulu 2002 (2) An. W.R. 582 (A.P.) as well as the code of conduct for the Police prescribed by Union of India vide Ministry of Home Affairs Letters No. VI-24021/97/84- G.P.A. I, dated 4-7-1985 and 10-7-1985, summarized the legal position as under.

                  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when the dispute is purely of civil nature, the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution cannot be exercised. The Supreme Court also repeatedly laid down that when the dispute between the two citizens is of civil nature and no crime is registered, police have no jurisdiction to interfere in the civil dispute. Further, when there is a civil litigation either before the court of law or before the tribunal, the police have no jurisdiction to interfere in the civil disputes. Further, when there is a civil litigation either before a court of law or before a tribunal, the police cannot interfere and even if a complaint is made in relation to such dispute pending in a civil court, the citizens have to be advised to resolve the dispute through a duly constituted court of law.

                  In the scheme of the Constitution of India, the duty to resolve civil disputes is entrusted to judiciary. Police have no such power. Any interference by police in a pending civil dispute or a potential civil dispute between two citizens or two groups of citizens is not within the province of the police. Furthermore, if a cognizable offence is reported to the police, it is the duty of the police to register the crime under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. P.C.) and take up investigation immediately. In a given case, even if a civil dispute, to say a land dispute, is pending before a civil court and if the quarrel between the two warring parties has a potential of resulting in a law and order problem posing threat to the society at large, the police can always take up the case only after registering the crime under Section 154 Cr. P.C. Without registering the crime and without any reason the police cannot interfere.”

20. Indeed, once a petition is submitted by Respondent No.7 concerning issues relating to immovable property, Respondent No.6 or Respondent No.2 his police officers oг even Respondent No.4 is not competent to entertain or initiate any form of conciliation, as such matters fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. However, the District Collector or the Superintendent of Police may, at their discretion, forward the said representation of Respondent No.7 to the District Legal Services Authority or the Mandal Legal Services Committee concerned, as the case may be or to the Mediation Centre.

21. It is a settled principle of law that the police machinery cannot intrude into disputes which are, on the face of the record, purely civil in character. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly affirmed that when the lis pertains to rights over immovable property between private individuals, the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked as a substitute for the remedies available under ordinary civil law. In matters where no cognizable offence is disclosed, the police have neither jurisdiction nor statutory authority to summon parties, coerce them into compromise, or assume an adjudicatory role. The scheme of the Constitution entrusts resolution of civil disputes exclusively to the judicial forum competent to determine questions of title, succession, and possession, and the police cannot usurp that function under the pretext of enquiry.

22. Consistent with these principles, even when a complaint is lodged before the police during the subsistence of a civil dispute, the jurisdiction of the police is limited to registering a cognizable offence where the statutory ingredients exist. The police cannot enlarge their role to undertake fact-finding in a civil dispute, initiate counselling, compel attendance, or insist upon compromise between family members in matters relating to proprietary rights. Any such attempt amounts to overreach and stands in direct violation of the statutory limitations contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) or the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’) and reiterated by judicial precedent. Unless the complaint prima facie discloses a cognizable offence, the police are duty-bound to refrain from interference and to advise the complainant to seek redress before the competent Civil Court.

23. When viewed in the context of the present Writ Petition, the allegations brought by Respondent No.7 do not even remotely suggest the commission of a cognizable offence but relate solely to intra-familial conflict concerning ownership and possession of the subject house property. The attempts of Respondent Nos.3, 5, and 6 to summon the Petitioners, call them for counselling, or persuade them to settle their civil dispute fall far outside the boundaries of lawful police authority. Their actions, therefore, cannot be sustained in the eye of law. The appropriate remedy for both sides lies before the Civil Court, which alone is vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate such disputes, and the police are expected to remain within the confines of their statutory function without interfering in a matter that is essentially civil in nature.

24. Although Section 173(3)(i) of ‘the BNSS’ empowers the Station House Officer to undertake a preliminary enquiry into the alleged commission of a cognizable offence, subject to obtaining prior approval of the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, such authority is circumscribed by its very object, namely, the ascertainment of the existence of ingredients constituting a cognizable offence. The statutory mandate does not extend to matters devoid of criminal complexion. In the present case, a bare and prima facie evaluation of the complaint submitted by Respondent No.7 unmistakably reveals that the dispute pertains exclusively to competing civil claims over immovable property and inheritance. Thus, the invocation of police machinery under the guise of a preliminary enquiry stands wholly without jurisdiction, being ultra vires the contours delineated under ‘the BNSS.’

25. Consequently, in controversies such as the one at hand, where the substratum of the allegations arises solely from familial discord and proprietary entitlements, the police authorities are denuded of any competence to initiate, entertain, or continue proceedings under the pretext of enquiry. Their role is confined to a minimal procedural referral. The only legally permissible course available to them is to relegate the disputing parties to the forums recognised under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for brevity, ‘the Act’) or Mediation Act, 2023, which are vested with the statutory framework for conciliation, mediation, and amicable settlement of civil disputes. Any endeavour by the police to traverse beyond this limited remit would amount to an unwarranted encroachment into the adjudicatory domain of civil courts, which exclusively possess jurisdiction to resolve issues pertaining to title, ownership, and succession.

26. The Mediation Act, 2023 provides a structured statutory framework for mediation in India, formalising it as a primary mode of resolving civil and commercial disputes. It mandates under Section 5 of the Mediation Act, 2023, pre-litigation mediation to encourage settlement and reduce judicial burden, andempowers Courts and competent authorities to refer parties to mediation, recognising that property and family-related disputes are better resolved through structured dialogue rather than police intervention. Under this Act, mediation service providers and Legal Services Authorities are authorised to facilitate mediation, offer counselling, and assist parties in arriving at lawful settlements in line with Section 19 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. The Act also ensures confidentiality, mediator neutrality, enforceability of mediated settlement agreements, and recognises community mediation for maintaining local harmony. Accordingly, disputes arising from intra-familial discord over immovable property must be channelled to mediation or legal services forums, as police authority is confined only to procedural referral and cannot extend to adjudicatory functions. Thus, the Mediation Act, 2023 reinforces the Court’s view that, in cases of this nature, mediation before legally recognised bodies is the only lawful and non-coercive route for resolution.

27. Further under Section 19 of ‘the Act’, Andhra Pradesh State Legal Services Authority or District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee or High Court Legal Services Committee or, Mandal Legal Services Committee, as the case may be,are empowered to provide legal aid, conduct Lok Adalats even at pre-litigation stages, and facilitate amicable settlement of disputes. In matters such as the present, where familial discord has culminated in litigation over immovable property, the DLSA or the Mandal Legal Services Committee concerned may, upon reference by the District Collector or Superintendent of Police, endeavour to mediate between the parties, provide counselling, and assist them in accessing appropriate legal remedies. Such statutory bodies are vested with the jurisdiction to promote conciliation and settlement in a manner consistent with law, thereby reducing the burden on regular courts and ensuring that vulnerable parties, particularly women, are afforded legal protection and support.

27. Upon meticulous consideration of the pleadings and submissions advanced by both the counsel, this Court is constrained to observe that the lis between the Petitioners and Respondent No.7 is quintessentially civil in nature, arising out of competing claims to immovable property. The record discloses that the subject house property was constructed from the ancestral nucleus and agricultural income of Petitioner No.2, though registered in the name of Respondent No.7. The Petitioners allege coercion and arbitrary interference by Respondent Nos.3, 5, and 6, whereas the official Respondents contend that their role was confined to conducting a preliminary enquiry upon receipt of a representation of Respondent No.7 through the PGRS mechanism. It is trite law that Police and Revenue Authorities cannot adjudicate civil disputes in general nor compel parties to execute documents in respect of proprietary rights.

28. The allegations of coercion, threats, and use of unparliamentary language remain unsubstantiated by cogent material. The Respondents have categorically denied such imputations and have placed on record that counselling was conducted only to provide temporary shelter and psycho- social support to Respondent No.7, who had approached the One Stop Centre under the Department of Women and Child Welfare. The apprehension of dispossession voiced by the Petitioners is speculative, as no coercive steps have been initiated by the Respondents. The proper remedy for the Petitioners or for Respondent No.7 lies before the competent Civil Court, which alone, in general, has jurisdiction to determine title, ownership, and succession rights in respect of immovable property.

29. Considering the above, this Court holds that the Respondents had not acted within the confines of their statutory authority, and no arbitrariness or mala fides can be attributed to them. However, to obviate further apprehensions and to ensure that the petitioners’ civil rights are not jeopardized, this Court deems it appropriate to direct Respondent Nos.2 to 5 not to summon the Petitioners for any preliminary enquiry in respect of the dispute pending between them and Respondent No.7 concerning immovable property. The Petitioners and Respondent No.7 are at liberty to ventilate their grievances before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, which shall adjudicate the matter uninfluenced by any observations herein.

30. In the result, the Writ Petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.