Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The applicant in O.A.No.2162 of 2023 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (the ‘Tribunal’ for short) filed this original petition invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P1 order dated 28.11.2025 passed by the Tribunal in that original application.

2. Going by the averments in the original application, the petitioner is a member of the Scheduled Caste community. While working as Assistant Sub Inspector (Grade) at the Kollam East Police station, he was arrayed in Crime No.687 of 2011 of Kollam East Police station registered under Sections 324, 326, 302, 201, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was placed under suspension, and an oral enquiry was ordered. After oral enquiry, Annexure AI PR minutes was submitted by the enquiry officer, who found the petitioner to be at fault. Thereafter, the petitioner was removed from service vide Annexure A3 order dated 07.08.2012 of the 2nd respondent. Annexure A4 appeal filed by the petitioner was rejected by the appellate authority through Annexure A5 order dated 20.06.2013. In the criminal case registered against the petitioner, he was acquitted by the Sessions Court as per the judgment dated 31.10.2017, after a full trial. The petitioner submitted Annexure A7 review petition before the 1st respondent, which was directed to be decided by the Tribunal, vide order dated 24.10.2018 in O.A.No.1956 of 2018. The 1st respondent issued Annexure A8 Government Order dated 22.03.2019, rejecting the review petition filed by the petitioner. The petitioner moved the Tribunal, which pronounced Annexure A9 order dated 26.05.2022 in O.A.No.1729 of 2019, whereby Annexure A8 Government Order was set aside, and the Government was directed to consider the review petition afresh with particular attention to the contentions of the petitioner. Upon reconsideration, the 1st respondent has now issued Annexure A10 order dated 05.07.2023, rejecting the review petition of the petitioner. The reasons stated in Annexure A10 are illegal and liable to be set aside in judicial review. Rule 10 of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules and Section 101(8) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011 are mandatory provisions and cannot be ignored by any authority. With these pleadings, the petitioner approached the Tribunal with the original application filed under section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs;

                  “1. Call for the records leading up to Annexure A10 and quash it.

                  2. Call for the records leading up to annexures A3 and A5, and quash them.

                  3. Declare that the removal of the applicant from service is illegal.

                  4. Direct the respondents to regularise the period from 07.08.2012 to 30.05.2016 wherein the applicant was kept out of service, as duty for all purposes, and grant notional promotion to the post of Sub Inspector of Police from the date of his eligibility.

                  5. Direct the respondents to grant all consequential benefits including seniority, salary arrears, pension, commutation of pension, DCRG, earned leave surrender etc. within a firm time limit.

                  6. Direct the 6th respondent to authorise payment of the terminal benefits due to the applicant within a firm time limit”.

3. In the original application, on behalf of the 1st respondent, a reply statement dated 24.05.2024 was filed, opposing the reliefs sought for. Similarly, on behalf of the 3rd respondent, a reply statement dated 28.12.2023 was filed in the original application opposing the reliefs sought for. The 2nd respondent adopted the reply statement filed by the 3rd respondent by filing a memo dated 09.02.2024. After hearing both sides, the Tribunal, by the impugned Ext.P1 order, dismissed the original application.

4. Being aggrieved, the petitioner is now before this Court with this original petition.

5. On 02.02.2026, when this original petition came up for admission, we directed the learned Senior Government Pleader to make available for perusal of this Court the entire files relating to the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner. Pursuant to the said direction, on 02.03.2026, the learned Senior Government Pleader made available the entire files pertaining to the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and on perusal of the said file, we notice that the charges against the petitioner are serious in nature. The Enquiry Officer conducted a detailed enquiry and, on the basis of evidence of the witnesses recorded by him, found the charges against the petitioner as proved. The Tribunal also re-appreciated the evidence adduced in the disciplinary proceedings as well as the findings in the Sessions Case, while dismissing the original application. It would be appropriate to extract paragraphs 6 to 13 and the last paragraph of that order for better appreciation of the reasoning given by the Tribunal for dismissal of the original application, which read thus;

                  “6. Learned Government Pleader reiterated the contention that the Memorandum of Charges and the Statement of Allegations have not been produced but they are independent of the criminal charges and the PR Minutes in which the charges are proved has also not been challenged in this OA. The applicant cannot claim the benefit of acquittal from the criminal charges for pleading innocence in the disciplinary proceedings as the acquittal was due to several failures of the prosecution to prove the charges. One Ajithan was examined as PW6 in the oral enquiry and he had proved that the applicant was a resident of Quarters No.6, but he was not arrayed as a witness in the criminal case is one such example.

                  7. Rajasekharan Nair who was working as Sub Inspector of Police at the AR Camp Pathanamthitta died at the hospital on 15.06.2011, due to grievous injuries suffered by him on 14.06.2011. The incident took place in Quarters No.6 of the Police Quarters. Rajasekharan Nair was a resident of Quarters No.4. The applicant was arrayed as first accused in the criminal case and one Shajilal @ Shaji was the second accused and he passed away before the trial. The applicant contends that no witnesses have seen Rajasekharan Nair entering his house, the finger print experts had recovered only the finger print of Shaji from the scene of occurrence, none of the witnesses saw the incident and it was not proved that the Quarters wherein the incident occurred was occupied by the applicant. The Sessions Court acquitted him.

                  8. The applicant himself has admitted in Annexure A4 that he was the occupant of the quarters wherein the incident occurred. It is true that the Sessions Court had acquitted the applicant from the criminal charges.

                  Relevant portions of the observations made in the Judgment are the following :

                  XXXX

                  24. Though the prosecution cited and examined so many witnesses before this court, there is no direct evidence to prove the alleged offences committed by the accused.

                  xxxxx

                  26. Though a police official died in this case at 11.20 AM on 15.06.11 in an incident happened at about the midnight of 15.06.11 the police officials registered the FIR only at 1 PM on 15.06.11 and reached the place of occurrence only after 5.10 PM on 15.06.11. Even the Investigating Officer, PW15 the then Circle Inspector visited the place of occurrence at 5.10 PM on 15.06.11 he did not take any steps to preserve the scene of occurrence by taking necessary steps to guard the scene of occurrence. Though he had taken a spade and other material objects which were alleged to be used for committing the crime there is no scientific report in respect of those articles.                   XXXX

                  31. Though blood stain and teeth were recovered from the sit out and hall room of the first accused the scientific evidence is not supporting that the blood, teeth, gum etc. belong to Rajasekharan Nair. The scientific evidence produced before this court is not sufficient to come to a conclusion that deceased Rajasekharan Nair sustained injuries from the quarters of the first accused ........

9. It was thereafter that the court came to the conclusion that the circumstantial evidence collected and produced by the prosecution were very week and on the basis of the available evidence then came to a conclusion that the prosecution could not succeed in proving the alleged offence was committed by the applicant. The applicant was acquitted granting the benefit of doubt.

10. Evidently the investigation was not fool-proof and this has contributed to the acquittal of the applicant. It is a settled legal position that in a disciplinary proceedings, preponderance of probabilities is adequate as against the rigorous standard of beyond reasonable doubt required in a criminal proceedings

11. While disposing the earlier OA No.1729 of 2019 filed by the applicant, this Tribunal had made the following observations:

                  11. But the learned counsel for the applicant relies on the findings arrived at by the Sessions Court that there is no material to connect the applicant with the alleged incident. He relied on paragraph 31 of Annexure A6 judgment wherein it has been stated that "Except the oral testimony of PWs 2 and 3 there is nothing before this court to show that the first accused was in that quarters along with the second accused and deceased Rajasekharan Nair. Though the prosecution succeeded in proving the finger prints in the material objects recovered from that quarters they could not produce any evidence to show that any of the materials recovered contain the finger print of the first accused." The Sessions Court concluded that the circumstantial evidence collected and produced by the prosecution are very weak and on the basis of the available evidence it can be concluded that the prosecution could not succeed in proving the alleged offence committed by the 1st accused. Merely for the reason that the Sessions Court ultimately ordered that the first accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt, the review authority should not discard the entire evidence before the Sessions Court.

                  12. Having considered the totality of the situation, I find that the contentions raised by the applicant that there were no evidence against him either in the criminal case or in the disciplinary proceedings and his further contention that the order of dismissal from service was issued in violation of Rule 10 of KPDIP & A Rules have not been properly considered by the review authority.

12. Though the Memorandum of Charges is not produced before us, the PR Minutes, Show Cause Notice and the Final Orders in the disciplinary proceedings would indicate that it was not the criminal case per se that was the subject matter of the disciplinary proceedings. Dereliction of duty and misconduct were the subject matters of the disciplinary proceedings, which was proved in the PR Minutes. The applicant had availed all opportunities to defend his side, as part of disciplinary proceedings as well as by way of Appeal and Review Petitions. The contention of the applicant that the criminal case and disciplinary proceedings are on the same set of facts is not found to be sustainable. Protection of Rule 10 under KPDIP&A Rules is available to the accused only when the matter is sub judice. In this case the criminal case was charged before the Sessions Court much after the disciplinary proceedings were finalised. Therefore the applicant cannot get the benefit of this Rule.

13. The leaned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the judgment in Ramlal v. State of Rajasthan [2023 KHC 1018]. Paragraph 26 and 27 of that judgment read as follows;

                  26. We are satisfied that the findings of the appellate judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, "not proved" - in fact the charge even stood "disproved" by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be "disproved" when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non - existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be "not proved" when it is neither "proved" nor "disproved" (See Vijayee Singh and Others v. State of U.P.[(1990) 3 SCC 190].

                  27. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The changes were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M.Tank (supra).

                  Evidently the facts and circumstances of this case are different from that of the above case.

                  In the light of the above findings we do not find the contentions in this Original Application is sustainable.

                  Accordingly the Original Application is dismissed”.

6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior Government Pleader.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that, as per Annexure A6 judgment dated 31.10.2017, the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case registered against him for the offences punishable under Sections 324, 326, 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. From the findings arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge in Annexure A6 judgment, it is discernible that the acquittal of the petitioner was not merely by giving the benefit of doubt alone, but it is, in effect, an honourable acquittal. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought in the original application in view of the principles laid down by the Apex court in Ramlal [2023 (7) KHC SN 21]. The learned counsel further submitted that one of the witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer is involved in several other criminal cases, and another witness was the wife of the deceased. It was relying on the evidence of these witnesses, the Enquiry officer gave a finding against the petitioner, and consequently, the disciplinary authority took action against him.

8. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that the disciplinary proceedings as well as the criminal proceedings stand on a different footing. After the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case, giving him the benefit of doubt, and it was not an honourable acquittal. The petitioner had purposefully not produced the charge memo issued to him in the disciplinary proceedings before the Tribunal, as it would enlighten the Tribunal regarding the seriousness of the offence alleged against the petitioner. According to the learned Senior Government Pleader, there is no illegality in the impugned order of the Tribunal.

9. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

10. In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd [(2001) 8 SCC 97], the Apex Court held thus;

                  "The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the fact of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to."

11. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

12. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

13. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

14. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

15. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

16. In Ramlal [2023 (7) KHC SN 21], the allegation against the delinquent was that he altered his date of birth in his 8th standard mark list with a view to projecting himself as having attained majority at the time of recruitment. After finding him guilty in the departmental proceedings, the delinquent was dismissed from service. Though in the criminal trial initially he was punished for the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, the Additional District and Sessions Judge allowed the criminal appeal and acquitted the delinquent. Subsequently, he filed a writ petition for quashing the dismissal order when his representation for reinstatement was rejected by the authority concerned. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by holding that the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding and a departmental proceeding is different. The writ appeal filed by the delinquent was also ended in dismissal, confirming the finding of the learned Single Judge. The aforesaid judgments were challenged by the delinquent before the Apex Court. Paragraphs 26 and 27 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Ramlal [2023 (7) KHC SN 21] are extracted by the Tribunal in the impugned order.

17. In G. M. Tank v. State of Gujarat [(2006) 5 SCC 446] which was relied in Ramlal [2023 (7) KHC SN 21], the Apex Court while considering the Special Leave Petition filed by the appellant therein against the judgments of the learned Single Bench and the Division Bench of the High Court confirming the dismissal of the appellant therein from service on finding him guilty in a departmental proceedings on the charges of accumulation of disproportionate income and whereas the appellant therein was honourably acquitted by the Special Judge for the offence under Section 5(l)(e) read with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 held thus;

                  “20. It is thus seen that this is a case of no evidence. There is no iota of evidence against the appellant to hold that the appellant is guilty of having illegally accumulated excess income by way of gratification. The respondent failed to prove the charges levelled against the appellant. It is not in dispute that the appellant being a public servant used to submit his yearly property return relating to his movable and immovable property and the appellant has also submitted his return in the year 1975 showing his entire movable and immovable assets. No query whatsoever was ever raised about the movable and immovable assets of the appellant. In fact, the respondent did not produce any evidence in support of and / or about the alleged charges levelled against the appellant. Likewise, the criminal proceedings were initiated against the appellant for the alleged charges punishable under the provisions of the PC Act on the same set of facts and evidence. It was submitted that the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar (verbatim) set of facts and evidence. The appellant has been honourably acquitted by the competent court on the same set of facts, evidence and witness and, therefore, the dismissal order based on the same set of facts and evidence on the departmental side is liable to be set aside in the interest of justice.

                  xxxx xxxx xxx

                  30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr V. B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand.

                  31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case (1999 (3) SCC 679) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.

                  32. In the instant case, the appellant joined the respondent in the year 1953. He was suspended from service on 8-2- 1979 and got subsistence allowance of Rs 700 p.m. i.e. 50% of the salary. On 15-10-1982 dismissal order was passed. The appellant had put in 26 years of service with the respondent i.e. from 1953-1979. The appellant would now superannuate in February 1986. On the basis of the same charges and the evidence, the department passed an order of dismissal on 21-10-1982 whereas the criminal court acquitted him on 30-1-2002. However, as the criminal court acquitted the appellant on 30-1-2002 and until such acquittal, there was no reason or ground to hold the dismissal to be erroneous, any relief monetarily can be only w.e.f. 30-1-2002. But by then, the appellant had retired, therefore, we deem it proper to set aside the order of dismissal without back wages. The appellant would be entitled to pension”.                   (underline supplied)

18. It is trite that the departmental proceedings and the criminal proceedings initiated against a delinquent employee stand on a different footing. Mere acquittal by a Criminal Court will not confer on the employee a right to claim any benefit, including reinstatement. Only if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the Criminal Court are identical or similar and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter requires a different dimension. When the delinquent is acquitted in the criminal proceeding merely on the ground of the benefit of doubt, since the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the delinquent beyond reasonable doubt, the same cannot be equated with that of the departmental proceedings, to give the benefit of acquittal in the criminal proceedings, to the delinquent. The proof that is required in a criminal trial is more onerous than that of the departmental proceedings. In departmental proceedings, it is the preponderance of probabilities that will lead to the decision in favour or against the delinquent employee. While going through Annexure A6 judgment of the Sessions Court in S.C.No.952 of 2014, the acquittal of the petitioner cannot be said as honourable acquittal. In the Sessions Case the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence against the petitioner. Since the circumstantial evidence was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, or in other words, without any break in the chain of circumstances, the Sessions Court acquitted the petitioner. As discussed above, the facts of Ramlal [2023 (7) KHC SN 21] and G. M. Tank [(2006) 5 SCC 446] are entirely different and hence not applicable to the case.

                  Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar in the light of the judgments referred to supra, we find no ground to hold the impugned order of the Tribunal is perverse or patently illegal, which warrants interference by exercising supervisory jurisdiction.

                  In the result, the original petition stands dismissed.