1. By the present Civil Revision Application, the Applicants have challenged the order dated 4th July 2025, passed by the Learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Panaji in Regular Civil Suit No. 100/2022 (F).

2. After hearing the parties, the Learned Judge has allowed the Application filed by the Respondent to bring the legal representative of the deceased Plaintiff on record. The Learned Judge has followed the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uma Mahesh Bandekar & Another Vs. Vivek Marathe & Others, (2019) 20 SCC 728. The Learned Judge has held that, ‘Whether such relief can be granted to such heir or not can be dealt with at the time merit.’

3. The main contention of the Applicants is that a married daughter residing separately cannot inherit tenancy rights under the Goa Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (the Act). Therefore, there is no right to sue in favour of the Respondent (the original Plaintiff ’s daughter). The submission of the Applicants is that the suit was filed by the mother of the Respondent, and there is no statement in the plaint that the Respondent was residing with her mother. On that basis, it is submitted that the impugned order is contrary to the provisions of the Act and consequently, the provisions of Order XII Rule 1 and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This submission is made by citing the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Puran Singh & Others Vs. State of Punjab & Others, (1996) 2 SCC 205. Mr. Gaonkar submitted that the impugned order is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Francisco Joaquim Mesquita Vs. Laxmibai Pandurang Kamat, Writ Petition No. 258 of 2011 vide Order dated 12.06.2018. Further, the impugned order is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Devi Anand Vs. Jeevan Kumar & Others, (1985) 2 SCC 683. It is further submitted on behalf of the Applicants that the judgment relied upon by the Respondent in Uma Bandekar (supra), is in respect of inventory proceedings and therefore ought not to have been applied by the Learned Judge in the Civil Suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

4. Mr. Monteiro on behalf of the Respondent submitted that the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uma Bandekar (supra) is binding on the Learned Judge as well as this Court. The position of law is well settled. Therefore, it is submitted that the impugned order has been passed by the Learned Judge in consonance with the well-settled principles of law. In any case, it is submitted that the issue involves a mixed question of law and fact.

5. I have heard the rival submissions and have perused the record.

6. It is an admitted position that the original Plaintiff, the mother of the Respondent, was declared as a tenant of the structure in dispute vide the Judgment and Order dated 11th November 2010 passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 534/2000/B (New). Therefore, the tenancy of the Respondent’s mother is not in dispute.

7. The suit against the Applicants was filed on 16.09.2022 under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, by the original Plaintiff during her lifetime. The suit was instituted by the Respondent in the capacity as constituted attorney of the original Plaintiff. The original Plaintiff passed away on 18th September 2024. The Respondent, being the sole surviving legal heir of the original Plaintiff, filed an Application in the suit to bring the legal heir on record of the suit and sought leave of the Court to amend the cause title of the suit. It is the case of the Respondent that the right to sue survives, and therefore, the Application should be allowed.

8. Section 2(o) of the Act defines ‘tenant’, which reads as follows:-

                   “ "Tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any building is, or but for special contract would be, payable and includes [in the event of his death the surviving spouse, or any son, or unmarried daughter or father or mother who had been living with him as a member of his family upto the date of his death and] a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, but shall not include any person against whom any order, or decree for eviction has been made.”

                   (emphasis supplied)

9. This Section, apart from the surviving spouse, any son, unmarried daughter, father or mother, who had been living with him as a member of his family up to the date of his death, and a sub-tenant includes any person continuing in position after the termination of his tenancy.

10. After reading the plaint as a whole, I find that the original Plaintiff has not stated in the plaint that the Respondent was not staying with the original Plaintiff and did not continue in possession of the structure. On the contrary, the statements in the plaint show that the Respondent noticed dispossession from the structure and the steps taken by the Respondent to regain possession thereof. The survival of a right to sue cannot be decided on the basis of the Applicant’s presumption. Therefore, I reject the submission of the Applicants that a right to sue does not survive because the Respondent does not fall within the definition of ‘tenant’ of the Act. Consequently, I reject the submission of the Applicants that the Application of the Respondent was not maintainable by virtue of the provisions of Section 2 (o) of the Act and Order XII Rule 1 and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

11. The facts in Francisco Mesquita (supra) are totally different. In that case, the deceased did not leave behind any of the family members as named in Section 2(o) of the Act. Therefore, even Francisco Mesquita (supra) cannot be of any help to the Applicants.

12. Therefore, Puran Singh (supra) has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In Puran Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that whenever a party to the suit dies, the first question that is to be decided is whether the right to sue survives or not. In the present case, the right to sue survives in view of the definition 2(o) of the Act.

13. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uma Bandekar (supra) has held that:-

                   “5.1. The short question which is posed for consideration before this Court is, right of a married daughter by way of succession in the “lease premises” and whether with respect to “lease premises”, a married daughter shall have a right of succession, vis-à-vis, the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012 or not?

                   9. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that the dispute was neither under the provisions of the Goa Rent Act nor between the landlord and the tenant and therefore both, the Inventory Court as well as the High Court have erred in considering the provisions of the Goa Rent Act, more particularly Section 2(o) of the Goa Rent Act. The only question which was before the Inventory Court and the High Court was in respect of the rights of succession of a married daughter in the “lease premises” under the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code and subsequently under the provisions of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012. Therefore, what is required to be considered is whether under the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code and on enactment of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012, whether the married daughter would have a right of succession in the “lease premises” or not?

                   11. Even, as admitted by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, so stated in the additional written submissions, it is not disputed to the proposition, whether the Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 makes no distinction as to the gender of the child or as to the order of birth or as to the status of being single or married to discriminate in matters relating to succession. It is also admitted that this legal position has not been changed pursuant to the enactment and enforcement of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012, brought into force with effect from 19- 9-2016. Even otherwise, as per Section 68 of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012, all the children and their descendants succeed to their respective parents and other ascendants, without distinction of sex or age. Thus, under the provisions of the erstwhile Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 and/or under the provisions of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012, there is no further classification between a daughter married or unmarried and son. Therefore, considering the scheme and the provisions of the erstwhile Portuguese Civil Code and as per the provisions of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012, which has come into effect with effect from 19-9-2016, even the married daughter would have a right of succession in the “lease premises”. As observed hereinabove, Section 399 of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012 provides for list of assets which includes movable and immovable assets including mortgages, easements, leases and other encumbrances.

                   12. From the impugned orders passed by the Inventory Court and the High Court, it is not in dispute that both the courts below have held against the appellants, more particularly Appellant 1 — married daughter, mainly relying upon and considering Section 2(o) of the Goa Rent Act, which, as observed hereinabove, ought not to have been considered and has no relevance while considering the right of succession of a married daughter in the “lease premises” under the provisions of the erstwhile Portuguese Civil Code and subsequently on enactment of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012. The sum and substance of the above discussion would be that a married daughter would have a right of succession in the “lease premises” also.

                   (emphasis supplied)

14. Further, in view of the provisions of Section 2(o) of the Act, the ratio of Uma Bandekar (supra) is applicable to the present case; I reject the submissions made on behalf of the Applicants. Whether the daughter continued in possession of the structure is a matter of trial, and at this stage, it cannot be presumed that the daughter did not continue in possession. The Respondent cannot be non-suited at this stage. Therefore, I reject the submission of the Applicants that the ratio of Uma Bandekar (supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.

15. In view thereof, the reliance placed by the Applicants on the Constitutional Bench Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Devi Anand (supra) is totally out of place. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the ratio of Gian Devi Anand (supra) is not applicable.

16. Therefore, the Learned Judge has rightly allowed the Application of the Respondent and has rightly held that it is a matter of trial in which the rights of the Respondent shall be decided. The impugned order is in accordance with the settled principles of law and therefore, no interference is called for.

17. The present Civil Revision Application is dismissed.

18. Consequently, the pending Civil Application No. 3250 of 2025 (F) is also dismissed.

19. Cost in the cause of the pending suit. The cost shall be determined at the final hearing of the pending suit.

20. This order will be digitally signed by the Private Secretary/ Personal Assistant of this Court. All concerned will act on production by fax or email of a digitally signed copy of this order.