(Prayer: This writ petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying to writ of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 01.10.2022, passed on interim application no.5 filed under order i rule 10(2) of the civil procedure code, by the petitioners and respondent nos.4 and 5 herein, in o.s.no.351/2011, pending before the Hon’ble court of the principal civil judge and jmfc, at devanahalli and consequently allow the same (vide annexure-a herein).)

Oral Order:

1. The present petition seeks to challenge an order dated 01.10.2022 in O.S.No.351/2011 passed by the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, at Devanahalli [hereinafter referred to as the 'Impugned Order']. By the Impugned Order, an application by the proposed applicants filed under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to implead them as necessary parties was dismissed.

2. None appears for the respondents despite service.

3. Given the pendency of the matter and the fact that an order directing stay of proceedings before the learned Trial Court was granted by this Court on 17.11.2022, this Court deems it apposite to hear and decide the matter today.

4. Briefly the facts of the case are, that a suit for specific performance was filed by the respondent No.1/plaintiff against respondent Nos.2 and 3/defendant Nos.1 and 2 before the learned Trial Court in respect of a title to the property bearing No.34/3, Bilmaranahalli Village, Jala Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk, Bengaluru [hereinafter referred to as the 'suit property']. It was set out in the suit that the defendants are the absolute owners of the suit property having purchased the same by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 06.06.1966. However, being in need of money, the defendants had sold sell the suit property to the family of respondent No.1/plaintiff for a sale consideration of Rs.2.25 Lakhs by virtue of an Agreement to Sell along with the General Power of Attorney both dated 09.01.1997. 4.1. During the pendency of the suit, an application was filed by the petitioners seeking to implead themselves as parties to the present suit. It is the case of the petitioners [impleading applicants] that respondent Nos.2 and 3/defendant Nos.1 and 2 are neither owners nor in possession of any part of the suit schedule property and have in collusion with the respondent No.1/plaintiff filed this frivolous suit with a view to obtain orders qua this alleged sale.

5. As stated above, the learned Trial Court however dismissed the application filed by the petitioners giving a finding that the petitioners are neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit and thus cannot be impleaded in the present suit.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are the owners and in possession of the suit schedule property having obtained the same by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 02.09.2006. He further submits that the petitioners have produced the entire title chain before the learned Trial Court to evidence their ownership. The details are set out in I.A.No.V filed by the applicants before the learned Trial Court.

                  6.1. Learned counsel further submits that sometime in the year 2011, a collusive suit was filed between the plaintiff and the defendants seeking rights in the suit schedule property which they in fact did not possess. Learned counsel further submits that the Impugned Order suffers from an infirmity inasmuch as the learned Trial Court has wrongly held that petitioners were not necessary and proper parties.

                  6.2. Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sumtibai and others vs. Paras Finance Co.Regg. Partnership Firm Beawer(Raj) through Mankanwar (Smt) w/o Parsmal Chordia (dead) and others, (2007) 10 SCC 82 to submit that in a situation where the petitioner owns rights to the property, such as the present case, the Impugned Order which does not implead the petitioner as a party, cannot be sustained.

7. The petitioners in their application have set out the entire title chain qua the suit schedule property. As stated above, the property has exchanged several hands. However, concededly, the property has been transferred to the petitioners by virtue of a registered sale deed. It is apposite to set out paras 4 and 5 of the application filed by the petitioners which sets out that originally, the property was owned by one Kumaiah, his wife Muniyamma and Muthamma w/o Lakshmaiah and they were in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. They sold it to meet the family necessity by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 08.10.1997 to one N.Gangaram S/o Nanumal and he was put in possession of the said property. Subsequently, the said N.Gangaram gifted the property to Smt.Ambika Krishna under the registered Gift Deed dated 21.09.2001. Thereafter the said Smt.Ambika Krishna sold two items of the property to K.Rajashekara Reddy under the registered sale deed dated 11.04.2005 and Rajashekara Reddy sold it in turn under a registered sale deed dated 13.03.2006 to Ravi Kumar Vempalle. It is these persons who then sold the property to the petitioners by virtue of a registered sale deed(s) in the year 2006/2007. In addition, it is contended by the petitioners that after the purchase in 2006/2007, the petitioners constructed a house and are in possession of the suit schedule property. The relevant extract is as under:

                  '4. I submit that that one Kumalah, his wife Muniyamma @ Sheekalamma and Muthamma wife of Lakshmaiah were the owners in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property and another adjacent land measuring 23 guntas in Sy. No.34/4. To meet their family legal necessities above said Kumaiah, his wife Muniyamma @ Sheekalamma and Muthamma wife of Lakshmaiah had sold suit schedule property along with above said 20 guntas of land in favour N. Gangaram son of Nanumal under a registered sale deed dated 8-10-1997 and put him in possession of the same. The said sale deed was registered in the Office of the Subregistrar, Yalahanka as document No.BNG(U) YLNK/4977/1997-98. As on the date of the execution of the sale deed in favour N. Gangaram the said two item of properties were converted from Agricultural use to Non-agricultural residential use. Based on the said sale deed, the N. Gangaram got the revenue entries pertaining to the said properties changed to his name and he had been in possession of the same. Subsequently the said N. Gangaram gifted the said two item of the properties to Smt. Ambika Krishna wife of N. Krishna under a Gift deed dated 21-09-2001 and put her in possession of the same. The said Gift deed was registered in the Office of the Sub-registrar, Yalahanka as document No. BNG(U) YLNK/14437/2001-02. Based on the said Gift deed Smt. Ambika Krishna got the revenue entries pertaining to the said properties transferred to her name from the name of her Donor N. Gangaram. Later the said Smt. Ambika Krishna sold the said two items of the properties to K. Rajashekar Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 11-4-2005 and on the same day the said K. Rajashekar Reddy was put in possession of the same. In the said sale deed dated 11-42005, the earlier sale deed number was wrongly mentioned and by executing the registered rectification deed dated 20-9-2005 the said Ambika Krishna rectified the same. Based on the said sale deed and rectification the revenue entries pertaining to the properties were made over to the name of K. Rajasekar Reddy.

                  5. Later the said K. Rajasekar Reddy in turn sold the said two properties to meet his legal necessities to Ravikumar Vempalle, Udayakumar Dommarju and Bommireddy Narasimha Reddy herein under a registered sale deed dated 13-32006. Since the Ravikumar Vempalle and Udayakumar Dommarju were in U.S.A. this defendant being their Special Power Attorney purchased the suit schedule properties on their behalf. Based on the said sale deed the Ravikumar Vempalle, Udayakumar Dommarju and 2nd defendant got the revenue entries pertaining properties changed to their names. Thereafter the Ravikumar Vempalle, Udayakumar Dommarju and Bommireddy Narasimha Reddy formed residential layout in the said two properties and Bommireddy Narasimha Reddy and Dommaraju Ravindranath being the General Power of Attorney of the Ravikumar Vempalle, Udayakumar Dommarju sold the sites formed in the schedule properties to various persons including me and other applicants herein under various registered sale deeds. They are (a) Smt. Kotreddi Pallavi under a registered sale deed dated 2-9-2006, 2400 Sq.ft, (b) Smt. Kotreddi Praveena Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 2-9-2006, 2640 Sq.ft, (c) Sri Chittamuru Venkatasubba Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 2-9-2006, 2400 Sq.ft, (d) Sri Poreddy Hanumantha Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 2-9-2006, 2400 Sq.ft, (e) S. Madineni Ramanatham under a registered sale deed dated 2-9-2006, 2400 Sq.ft, (f) Smt. Basutkar Nagarathna bai and Sri Lakona Nagaprasada Rao under a registered sale deed dated 2-9-2006, 2374 Sq.ft, (g) Sri Sreekanta Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 18-012007, 2694 Sq.ft, (h) Sri T. Krishnamohan Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 18-01-2007, 2694 Sq.ft, (i) Smt. N. Padmavathi under a registered sale deed dated 18-01-2007, 2213 Sq.ft, (j) Sri Suresh Kumar Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 18-01-2007, 1555 Sq.ft, (k) Sri D. Mohan Kumar under a registered sale deed dated 18-01-2007, 2400 Sq.ft, (l) Smt. M. Lakshmi Devi under a registered sale deed dated 18-01-2007, 2400 Sq.ft, (m) Smt. Chukkaluru Bharathi under a registered sale deed dated 25-01-2007, 2855 Sq.ft (n) Sri Chukkaluru Vasudeva Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 25-01-2007, 2015 Sq.ft. and (o) to me under a registered sale-deed dated 21-112007, 6 Guntas. Based on the sale deeds purchasers including me and other applicants got the revenue records changed to their names to their respective extents and ever since the date of purchase we have been in possession of the same till today. After the purchase I have constructed a house in my property and same is in my possession and enjoyment. Plaintiff has filed this suit deliberately against the former owners of the suit schedule properties only to obtain the order from this Hon'ble court behind the back of the present owners and on the guise of the same the plaintiff intended to dispossess the present owners from the suit schedule property. '

                  [Emphasis Supplied]

                  7.1. The petitioners thus claim rights as the owners of the property. The petitioners also contend that all these transactions are reflected in the revenue records and all are pursuant to registered instruments of sale.

8. The question of whether a party is necessary or a proper party in terms of the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court has, in Mumbai International Airport Private Limited Vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and Others, (2010) 7 SCC 417 while discussing as to who a necessary party and who a proper party is, has held that a necessary party is a person in the absence of whom no effective decree could be passed, while a proper party is a person whose presence would enable the Court to effectively adjudicate proceedings, in the following manner:

                  '14. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party.

                  15. A 'necessary party' is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a 'necessary party' is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A 'proper party' is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.

                  [Emphasis supplied]

9. The Supreme Court in the Sumti Bai case, has held that normally, in a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale of property, a stranger or a third party to the contract cannot be added as a defendant. However, where the third party has rights as a purchaser of the suit schedule property, his presence would become necessary. The relevant extract is set out below:

                  9. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal and others - (2005) 6 SCC 733. He has submitted that in this case it has been held that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of property a stranger or a third party to the contract cannot be added as defendant in the suit. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision can only be understood to mean that a third party cannot be impleaded in a suit for specific performance if he has no semblance of title in the property in dispute. Obviously, a busybody or interloper with no semblance of title cannot be impleaded in such a suit. That would unnecessarily protract or obstruct the proceedings in the suit. However, the aforesaid decision will have no application where a third party shows some semblance of title or interest in the property in dispute. In the present case, the registered sale deed dated 12.8.1960 by which the property was purchased shows that the shop in dispute was sold in favour of not only Kapoor Chand, but also his sons. Thus prima facie it appears that the purchaser of the property in dispute was not only Kapoor Chand but also his sons. Hence, it cannot be said that the sons of Kapoor Chand have no semblance of title and are mere busybodies or interlopers.                            XXX XXX XXX

                  14. In view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the opinion that Kasturi case is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit. In our opinion, if C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment. To take a contrary view would lead to multiplicity of proceedings because then C will have to wait until a decree is passed against B, and then file a suit for cancellation of the decree on the ground that A had no title in the property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot be countenanced.

                  [Emphasis Supplied]

10. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in J.N.Real Estate vs. Shailendra Pradhan and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1015 where after relying on the decisions in Mumbai International Airport case and the judgments of Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733 and Sumtibai case, it was reiterated that the Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the CPC does not pertain to the rights of a non-party to be impleaded but deals with judicial discretion to strike out or add parties at any stage of proceedings. It was further held that the Court will chose not to exercise the discretion if the Court is of the view that the impleadment will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action. The relevant extract is set out below:

                  '25. In Kasturi (supra), the respondent nos. 1 and 4 to 11 respectively therein, based their claim to be added as party defendants on an independent title and possession of the contracted property. In such a backdrop, while rejecting the applications for impleadment, this Court had expounded the scope of Order I Rule 10(2) CPC and laid down certain tests for determining whether a person is a 'necessary party' for the purpose of impleadment in a suit for specific performance as follows:

                  (i) First, that a bare reading of Order I Rule 10(2) clearly indicates that the necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale or an agreement to sell, are the parties to the contract or, if they are dead, their legal representatives, as also persons who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor....'

                  (Emphasis supplied)

                  10.1. It was further held in the J.N.Real Estate case as under:                   '27. While distinguishing Kasturi (supra), it was held in Sumtibai (supra) that if a third party can show a fair semblance of title or interest, he can file an application for impleadment in the suit for specific performance. The relevant observations read thus:

                  '13. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani [(2004) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778] a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also observed : (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12)

                  '9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [[1951] A.C. 737 (HL)] (AC at p. 761) Lord MacDermott observed : (All ER p. 14 CD) [...]'                                              ---xxx---

                  14. In view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the opinion that Kasturi case [(2005) 6 SCC 733] is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit. In our opinion, if C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment. To take a contrary view would lead to multiplicity of proceedings because then C will have to wait until a decree is passed against B, and then file a suit for cancellation of the decree on the ground that A had no title in the property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot be countenanced.'

                  [Emphasis supplied]

                  28. This Court in Mumbai International Airport (supra) was also of the view that different situations require the application of different facets of Order I Rule 10(2) and consequently, held that there was no conflict between the decisions of this Court in Kasturi (supra) and Sumtibai (supra). It was reiterated that that Order I Rule 10(2) CPC did not pertain to the 'right' of a non-party to be impleaded as a party but deals with the 'judicial discretion' of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of the proceeding. In exercising this judicial discretion, courts must act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice.

                  29. It was observed that the court may exercise discretion in impleading a person who is a 'proper party' upon an application by a non-party to the suit for specific performance. If the court is of the view that the impleadment of such a proper party will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may either refuse to implead such person or order for his impleadment on certain conditions. However, even otherwise, the court would not be precluded from impleading a 'proper party' unconditionally in its discretion.

                  [Emphasis Supplied]

11. The learned Trial Court however, relying on the judgment of the Mumbai International case has non-suited the petitioners/applicants.

12. In the case, the applicants are not third parties interlopers but persons who are stated to be the owners of the suit schedule property by virtue of a registered instrument(s). It was thus incumbent on the learned Trial Court to allow the application and implead them as parties with a view for an effective adjudication of the suit for a specific performance filed by the plaintiffs.

13. In view of the aforegoing discussion, this Court proceeds to pass the following directions:

                  ORDER

                  (i) The petition is allowed;

                  (ii) The impugned order dated 01.10.2022 passed in I.A.No.V in O.S.No.351/2011 on the file of the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, at Devanahalli is set aside.

                  (iii) Consequently, the application-IA No.V filed by the petitioners stands allowed.

14. All pending applications stand disposed of.