Debangsu Basak, J.

1. I.A. No. GA/5/2023 is an application at the behest of the defendant no. 1 seeking relief with regard to drawing up and completion of the decree dated May 22, 1997 passed in a suit for declaration and cancellation of “Mittal Settlement” by the Division Bench.

2. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant no. 1 submits that, in a suit a consent decree was passed by the Division Bench on May 22, 1997. He submits that, the consent decree was on the basis of a “Mittal Settlement” which formed part of the decree. The “Mittal Settlement” records certain properties and the allotment thereof amongst the parties to the suit. He contends that, although the parties to the suit know about the properties involved in the settlement, nonetheless since, the detailed description of such properties were not provided in the decree, the Collector was unable to assess the stamp duty payable for the registration of the decree. He refers to the report of the Collector in this regard dated November 28, 2025. He submits that the supplementary affidavit affirmed by the defendant no. 1 dated February 10, 2026 contains such details on the basis of which, the stamp duty can be assessed. He submits that the Collector should be directed to assess the stamp duty on the basis of details given in the supplementary affidavit affirmed by his client on February 10, 2026.

3. Referring to the supplementary affidavit affirmed on February 10, 2026 by the defendant no. 1, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant no. 1 draws the attention of the Court to pages 7 to 10 thereof. He submits that, the technical details of the properties together with the supporting title deeds are made available in the supplementary affidavit.

4. Referring to the various orders of the Court passed from time to time, learned Senior Advocate for the defendant No.1 submits that, initially an application under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was turned down by a Division Bench. He contends that, such order of the Division Bench is not an impediment in the defendant no. 1 furnishing the details of the properties involved and, the Collector assessing the stamp duty on the basis of such particulars. In any event, he submits that the parties are governed by the judgment and order dated April 3, 2019. He refers to such judgment and order and submits that, the Division Bench held that, the decree was passed by the Court. A party to the suit cannot be left remediless without being able to enjoy the fruits of the decree.

5. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant no. 1 submits that, other parties to the suit are enjoying the fruits of the decree dated May 22, 1997. The opposing parties are purposefully stalling the drawing up and completion of the decree dated May 22, 1997 on specious pleas.

6. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant no. 3 submits that the issue as to whether the decree can be modified or anything can be added to such decree dated May 22, 1997 stands finally decided. He refers to the sequence of events including the orders passed from time to time right up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He principally relies upon the order dated August 30, 1999 passed by the Division Bench. He submits that a Special Leave Petition (SLP) was carried against the judgment and order dated August 13, 1999 which was admitted. The Civil Appeal was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by an order dated August 12, 2009. Therefore, according to him none of the parties can add to or alter or modify the decree dated May 22, 1997.

7. Referring to the pleadings filed from time to time, before the High Court as also before the Hon’ble Supreme Court learned Senior Advocate for the defendant No.3 submits that, the data given in the supplementary affidavit affirmed by the defendant no. 1 on February 10, 2026 were available before the High Court as also before the Supreme Court. Despite the same the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not permit modification or addition to the decree dated May 22, 1997. Application filed for such purpose by the defendant no. 1 stood rejected right up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In order to reemphasize such point he refers to the order of the Division Bench dated August 30, 1999 and the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Civil Appeal directed against the order dated August 12, 2009.

8. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant no. 2 refers to the judgment and order dated April 3, 2019. He submits that, the description of the immovable property can only be culled out from the various orders which formed basis of the decree. He contends that neither the pleadings nor the orders passed by the High Court from time to time gives the particulars which now sought to be introduced by the defendant no 1.

9. Relying upon (2000) 6 SCC 359 (Kunhayammed & Ors. Vs State of Kerala & Anr.) learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant no.2 submits that, in view of the doctrine of merger, the judgment and order dated August 30, 1999 of the Division Bench merged into the judgment and order dated August 12, 2009 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Civil Appeal.

10. Once a similar relief as prayed for by the defendant no.1 was rejected, the same cannot be reopened. In support of such contention, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant No.2 relies upon (2001) 1 SCC 73 (State Bank of India Vs. Ram Chandra Dubey & Ors.)

11. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant no.3 submits that, the defendant no.1 is essentially trying to improve upon the prayers made in the application. He refers to the application under consideration. He also refers to the supplementary affidavit. Relying upon (2003) 4 CompLJ 333 (Cal) (Bharat Bhari Udyog Nigam Ltd. & Ors. vs. Jessop and Co. Ltd. Staff Association & Ors.) learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant no.3 submits that, the case of the defendant no.3 cannot be improved by way of a supplementary affidavit. Learned advocate appearing for the defendant no.3 adopts the submissions made on behalf of the defendant no.2.

12. Learned senior advocate appearing for the appellant also adopts the submissions made on behalf of the defendant no.2.

13. The civil suit in which ultimately the decree dated May 22, 1999 was passed, was initially dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by the learned Trial Judge. In an appeal carried therefrom, the suit was decreed by consent on May 22, 1997.

14. Consent decree contemplates that, the properties involved will be divided between the parties to the suit on the basis the “Mittal Settlement”. Mittal Settlement gives a brief description of the properties involved. Technical details of such immovable properties, however, are not provided in the “Mittal Settlement”.

15. On the Department finding it difficult to draw up and complete the decree since the such details were not provided, defendant No. 1, , applied under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for alteration of the decree. Such application was dismissed by the judgment and order dated August 30, 1999 by the Division Bench. Special Leave Petition directed against the judgment and order dated August 30, 1999 was admitted and the Civil Appeal was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on August 12, 2009.

16. Primary ground for rejection of the request of the defendant no.1 by the Division Bench on August 30,1999 as affirmed on August 12, 2009 is that the request was not falling within the parameters of Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

17. Refusal to invoke Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to alter the decree as error within the meaning of Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was involved would not prevent the parties to enjoy the fruits of the decree. Consequently the defendant no.1 applied for drawing up and completion of the decree.

18. The issue of failure of the Department to draw up and complete the decree came up for consideration before another coordinate Bench which disposed of the same by a judgment and order dated April 3, 2019. Parties informed the Court that such judgment and order dated April 3, 2019 was not challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

19. Relevant portion of the judgment and order dated April 3, 2019 is as follows:

                     “13) We have considered the submissions made from the Bar, the judgments relied upon and the facts of the case in details. Admittedly there is a judgment dated 22nd May, 1997. The judgment in its last paragraph has clearly set out the reliefs granted after thread bare discussion on each of the issues raised by the parties. The last paragraph of the judgment, therefore, fulfils the requirements as to the "contents of decree" as prescribed in Rule 11 of Chapter 16 of the Original Side Rules of this Court. This also fulfils the requirements of Order 20 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Rule 1 of Chapter 16 of the Original Side Rules of this Court as also Rule 6A of Order 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 mandates the drawing up of the decree on the judgment being pronounced if a decree follows. Rule 11 of Chapter 16 of the Original Side Rules of this Court also provides that the decree shall not contain any recitals other than such short ones as the Registrar or the Master may think necessary. The judgment dated 22nd May, 1997 in Clause 3 under the heading reliefs clearly holds that a decree is passed in terms of orders dated 15.09.1993,14.10.1993,18.11.1993,17.12.1993 and 20.12.1993 in partial modification of the Mittal Settlement being Annexure-G to the plaint. The said orders clearly indicate which property is to go to whom. The suit was primarily one inter alia for declaration and cancellation in respect of a document being Annexure-G to the plaint (Mittal Settlement). In such a suit, the question of putting in the description of immovable properties in the plaint did not arise as the document (Mittal Settlement) was annexed. A description of the immovable properties can only be curled out from the various orders which formed the basis of the decree. It is not known as to why the Master in his minutes dated 16th March, 1998 wanted the plaintiff's advocate to include a consolidated list of properties mentioned in Annexure-G to the plaint. The applicant (defendant no. 1/respondent no. 1) had made an attempt to include such consolidated list which has turned down right up to the Apex Court. As such, there is no opportunity left to improve upon the particulars of the immovable properties mentioned in the judgment dated 22nd May, 1997. The applicant has made all endeavours as directed by the learned Master but has failed providing better particulars of the immovable properties. The applicant, therefore, cannot be hauled up for any fault. It is the Court which has passed the judgment and applicant had no control over the contents of the same. A party cannot, in such a situation, be left to be remediless without being able to enjoy the fruits of the decree. The Original Side Rules and also the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 mandates the drawing up of a decree. The judgment has been pronounced and as such, the decree in terms thereof has to be drawn up. A decree cannot be left undrawn once a judgment has been pronounced as the last paragraph of judgment is allowed to be treated as the operative part of the decree till the decree is drawn up. The department, therefore, should make all endeavour to draw up and complete the decree in terms of the judgment and order dated 22nd May, 1997. The department can add on short recitals as permissible under the Rule 11 of Chapter 16 of the Original Side Rules of this Court by collecting particulars from the pleadings and materials on record. Parties before us, therefore, accepted the judgment and order dated April 3, 2019 which recognized that the department can add on short recitals as permissible under Chapter XVIA Rule 11 of the Original Side Rules by collecting particulars from the pleadings and materials on record.”

20. As noted above, parties to the suit settled their disputes on the basis of the consent decree dated May 22, 1997 which, inter alia, partially modified the “Mittal Settlement”. Again as noted above, the description of the properties involved in the settlement are available in the Mittal Settlement. Technical details of the properties involved in the Mittal Settlement were not appearing on the face of the Mittal Settlement and, therefore, prevented initially the drawing up and completion of the decree and, thereafter the assessment of the stamp duty payable.

21. Consent decree is essentially a decree for partition which also involves immovable property. Stamp duty leviable on the aspect of registration of such a decree will necessarily involve the issue as to the value of the immovable property concerned in the suit. In order to assess the valuation of the immovable property concerned in the suit, the Department requested the Collector to assess the value of the stamp duty payable for the purpose of preparation of the final decree. The Collector submitted a report to the High Court dated November 28, 2025 where he expressed his helplessness to assess the stamp duty payable in view of the technical particulars of the immovable property not being made available to him.

22. In the supplementary affidavit filed before as the technical details of the immovable properties involved are provided. It is not in dispute that such technical details do not relate to the immovable properties involved in the Mittal Settlement. The technical details in our view can be considered sufficient by a Collector to assess the valuation of the immovable property concerned.

23. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the contention of merger raised on behalf of the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and the appellant is of no consequence since in earlier the ground of litigation, the coordinate Bench held that the decree was not amenable to any change in terms of Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Another coordinate Bench referring to the judgment and order dated April 3, 2019 between the same parties and in the same suit holding that the Department can add the short recitals as permissible under Chapter XVIA Rule 11 of the Original Side Rules by collecting particulars from the pleadings and materials on record, directed the Department to draw up and complete the decree. Therefore, in the factual matrix governing the present case, Kunhayammed & Ors. (supra) is not attracted.

24. The application is for drawing up and completion of a decree. In order to support such prayer, supplementary affidavit disclosed the technical details of the immovable properties involved in Mittal Settlement. Such technical details are not new as they already existed in the pleadings filed by the parties earlier. Such supplementary affidavit cannot be construed to mean an improvement on the initial prayers made in the application. Therefore, ratio laid down in Bharat Bhari Udyog Nigam Ltd. & Ors. (supra) is not attracted.

25. In State Bank of India (supra) a prayer initially made and which was rejected was sought to be revived. Such conduct was disallowed. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, initially the decree passed on May 22, 1997 was sought to be corrected in terms of Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which failed. Today, the prayer is for drawing up and completion and registration of the decree concerned.

26. In such circumstances, it would be appropriate to permit the parties to the suit to file requisite form No.1 as noted in the letter of Collector dated November 28, 2025 afresh within a period of a fortnight from date. On receipt of such Form No.1 by the Collector, he will proceed to assess the stamp duty payable thereon and submit a report to the High Court within four weeks from date.

27. List the application five weeks hence.

28. Prayer for stay made on behalf of the appellant, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are considered and rejected.

29. I agree.

(MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, J.)