Common Order

1. These Criminal Petitions are filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNSS’) (previously Section 482 of Cr.P.C.) by the petitioners-accused Nos.1 to 5, seeking to quash the proceedings against them in C.C.No.185 of 2024 pending on the file of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge- cum-Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Medak, registered for the offences under Sections 420 and 504 r/w. 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’).

2. Since all the three criminal petitions are arising out of C.C.No.185 of 2024, they are heard together and disposed of by way of this common order.

3. Heard Mr. Avinash Desai, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. Vimal Varma Vasireddy, learned counsel for the petitioners in Crl.P.Nos.13763 and 13740 of 2024 and Mr. Appasani Ram Dheeraj, learned counsel for the petitioner in Crl.P.No.13735 of 2024; Mr. P.Raja Sripathi Rao, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. Ramavaram Chandrashekar Reddy, learned counsel for respondent No.2-de facto complainant in Crl.P.Nos.13763 and 13740 of 2024 and Mr. L.Preetham Reddy, learned counsel for respondent No.2-de facto complainant in Crl.P.No.13735 of 2024; and Mr. M.Ramachandra Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1-State.

4. The facts of the case:

               4.1. The de facto complainant is engaged in real estate business and is the Managing Partner of Ira Infrastructure and Developers Company.

               4.2. The de facto complainant, petitioners-accused Nos.1 to 5 and M/s. Yellow Stone Estates Private Limited and 15 others are the owners and possessors of land admeasuring Ac.52.08 guntas in Sy.Nos.209, 210, 211, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242 and 243 of Kallakal Village, Manoharabad Mandal, Medak District. They have jointly obtained permission from HMDA and developed a layout in the name of ‘Green Hub’.

               4.3. Thereafter, a Partition Deed bearing document No.672 of 2022, dated 12.12.2022 was entered into by the 19 partners, in which, M/s. Prathipati Estates Private Limited represented by its authorized signatory petitioner-accused No.4, M/s. Yellow Stone Estates Private Limited represented by its authorized signatory petitioner-accused No.5 and petitioner-accused No.3, were allotted 17,765 square yards in Plot Nos.1, 83, 84, 85 and 104 in Sy.Nos.209/P, 210/P, 211/P, 231/P, 233/P, 234/P, 235/P, 236/P, 237/P, 238/P, 239/P, 240/P, 241/P,242/P and 243/P situated at Kallakal Village, Manoharabad Mandal, Medak District. The petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 are the Directors of M/s. Yellow Stone Estates Private Limited and M/s. Prathipati Estates Private Limited respectively and the petitioners-accused Nos.4 and 5 are their representatives.

               4.4. The petitioners-accused Nos.1 to 5 agreed to sell their entire share of 17,765 square yards to the de facto complainant for a sale consideration of Rs.19,49,00,000/-. Accordingly, the de facto complainant’s Company has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, dated 08.02.2023 with M/s. Prathipati Estates Private Limited represented by its authorized signatory petitioner-accused No.4, M/s. Yellow Stone Estates Private Limited represented by its authorized signatory petitioner-accused No.5 and petitioner-accused No.3 (hereinafter referred to as ‘First Party’), for the said extent, in the presence of elders.

               4.5. As per the terms of the MOU, upon payment of the amount in five tranches, within (60) days, with a grace period of (15) days from the date of MOU, the plots of equal value shall be registered in favour of the de facto complainant. Additionally, it was also confirmed that amount of Rs.19,49,00,000/- was excluded from the amounts to be paid with regard to the land admeasuring Ac.02.15 gts. in Sy.No.255 of Kallakal Village, Manoharabad Mandal, Medak District. It was further agreed by the First Party that the said land should be surveyed by a Government Surveyor and physical possession shall be handed over to the de facto complainant in the presence of adjacent land owners in order to avoid future disputes on the 75th day of the MOU.

               4.6. In accordance with the terms of the MOU, the de facto complainant paid Rs.15,00,00,000/- in four tranches and got registered the plots of equal value. The timelines in the MOU were extended by both the parties and based on the revised timelines the entire transaction must be concluded on or before 21.08.2023.

               4.7. When the de facto complainant arranged the amount for the fifth tranche, the petitioners-accused Nos.1 to 5 and accused No.6 produced a two year old land map pertaining to Ac.02.15 gts. in Sy.No.255 on the 75th day and forced the de facto complainant to buy the said land, according to that outdated map. When the de facto complainant insisted on adherence to the terms of the MOU, the accused, in violation of the agreed terms, refused to conduct the survey and forced the de facto complainant to purchase the said land according to their convenience.

               4.8. Subsequently, the de facto complainant came to know that the petitioners-accused Nos.1 to 5 and accused No.6 were not the original owners of Ac.02.15 guntas in Sy.No.255 of Kallakal Village, and that they had criminally trespassed into adjacent land, altered the boundaries, and erected new boundaries with an intention of including that land into their land. As such, the original owners of the said land lodged a complaint against the accused, leading to registration of Crime No.179 of 2023 of Manoharabad Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 447, 427 and 504 r/w. 34 of IPC.

               4.9. Furthermore, five plots bearing Nos.1, 83, 84, 85, and 104, which were to be registered in favour of the de facto complainant as per the terms of the MOU, were registered in the name of accused No.6 and another. When the de facto complainant questioned the petitioners about the same and asked them to register the said plots in his name, they demanded an additional amount of Rs.5,00,00,000/-. By doing so, the petitioners committed criminal breach of trust and cheated the de facto complainant without registering the plots and land in accordance with the agreed terms under the MOU.

5. Following are the submissions of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners:

               5.1. The petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 are the Directors of the Companies i.e., M/s. Yellow Stone Estates Private Limited and M/s. Prathipati Estates Private Limited respectively. The petitioner- accused No.3 owns a share of land sought to be sold to the de facto complainant. The petitioners-accused Nos.4 and 5 are the authorized signatories of the Companies i.e., M/s. Prathipati Estates Private Limited and M/s. Yellow Stone Estates Private Limited respectively. The petitioners-accused Nos.1 to 3 and 5 are the family members.

               5.2. The petitioners are innocent and have been falsely implicated in the case. They are in no way concerned with the offences alleged. Clauses (5) and (6) of the MOU clearly stipulate that the de facto complainant shall make a payment of Rs.19,49,00,000/- to the petitioners within (60) days with a grace period of (15) days. It further stipulates that, in the event the de facto complainant fails to make payment within the agreed period of (75) days, the petitioners shall have the absolute right to hold and sell the plots to third parties, to which the de facto complainant agreed. Even as per the complaint the de facto complainant had paid Rs.15 crores in four tranches and obtained registration of plots equivalent to the said amount.

               5.3. As per Clause (5) of the MOU, it is evident that the sale of Plot No.1 by the petitioners to the de facto complainant is subject to his purchasing Ac.2.15 gts. in Sy.No.255 and upon the survey to be conducted by the petitioners. Clause (4) of the MOU makes it clear that the survey pertains only to the land admeasuring Ac.2.15 gts. in Sy.No.255, and not to any other extent. In compliance with the said clauses, the petitioners have performed their part of the contract by conducting the survey through a private surveyor and measured the land in the presence of representatives of the de facto complainant’s Company. Despite this, the de facto complainant’s Company failed to purchase the said land. Therefore, as per Clause (5) of the MOU, the petitioners are under no obligation to sell Plot No.1 to the de facto complainant.

               5.4. Alleging non-compliance of the terms of MOU, the de facto complainant filed O.S.No.34 of 2023 before the Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge at Medak, against the petitioners-accused Nos.1 to 3, M/s. Yellow Stone Estates Private Limited, M/s. Prathipati Estates Private Limited and accused No.6 on 25.09.2023, seeking specific performance of MOU, dated 08.02.2023; perpetual injunction restraining the defendants therein and cancellation of Agreement of Sale-cum-General Power of Attorney documents bearing Nos.3595 and 3596 of 2023, dated 01.09.2023 and 02.09.2023 respectively. Notably, the de facto complainant has not sought any relief in respect of land in Sy.No.255. Since no interim order was granted in his favour, the de facto complainant resorted to initiation of the present criminal proceedings on 13.10.2023, in order to arm-twist them and only to settle civil disputes.

               5.5. The third party by name Mr. Surya Narayana Keriya has lodged a complaint against the petitioners-accused Nos.1, 2 and 5 herein and another, which was registered as a case in Crime No.179 of 2023 for the offences punishable under Sections 447, 427 and 504 r/w. 34 of IPC. After completion of investigation, the Police filed charge sheet against the accused therein before the Court concerned. The same was taken cognizance of and numbered as C.C.No.27 of 2024. The accused therein have filed quash petitions before this Court and this Court, vide order, dated 24.01.2025 in Crl.P.Nos.356 and 357 of 2025 granted stay of all further proceedings against them, holding that the petitioners have purchased the land in Sy.No.255 after due diligence by getting the land demarcated.

               5.6. The sale deeds bearing document Nos.909, 910 and 914 of 2004, dated 31.01.2004 clearly reflects that the Company i.e., M/s. Prathipati Estates Private Limited is the absolute owner and possessor of the land admeasuring Ac.0.13¾ gts., Ac.1.07½ gts. and Ac.0.13¾ gts. in Sy.No.255/3. The sale deed bearing document No.4162 of 2005, dated 30.06.2005 reflects that M/s. Sri Janahitha Estates, represented by Mrs. P.T.Venkayamma, who is the mother of petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 herein, is the owner and possessor of land admeasuring Ac.0.10 gts. in Sy.No.255/3/E and Ac.0.10 gts. in Sy.No.255/3/EE.

               5.7. All the allegations pertain to the Companies i.e., M/s. Prathipati Estates Private Limited and M/s. Yellow Stone Estates Private Limited. The MOU was also entered into by the Companies. As such, the said Companies were arrayed as defendants in the civil suit. However, without arraying the said Companies as accused in the present criminal case, the de facto complainant has chosen to array the petitioners-accused Nos.1, 2, 4 and 5 as accused, who are merely the Directors and authorized signatories of the Companies, against whom no specific or individual allegations are levelled. In the absence of Companies being arrayed as accused, the proceedings against the petitioners are not maintainable. In support of this contention, learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat and others ((2008) 5 SCC 668), drawing attention of this Court to paragraph No.13, which is as follows:

               13. Where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind. The Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company when the accused is the Company. The learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the correct question viz. as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, would lead to the conclusion that the respondents herein were personally liable for any offence. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability.

               5.8. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 420 of IPC are wholly absent in the present case. There is no false or misleading representation on the part of the petitioners, nor is there any inducement that led the de facto complainant to part with the property. It is well settled that dishonest intention from the inception is an essential ingredient for constituting the offence of cheating. However, a careful reading of the complaint as well as the charge sheet does not disclose any such misrepresentation. If the petitioners had any dishonest intention to cheat the de facto complainant, they would not have registered plots in his favour for the equivalent amount of Rs.15 crores.

               5.9. The core grievance of the de facto complainant appears to be that, although he was willing to make the payment of fifth tranche, the petitioners have sold the lands pertaining to last tranche in favour of a third party. Even assuming that the petitioners have violated the terms of MOU, it does not amount to cheating, but comes under criminal breach of the terms of the MOU, which may give rise to civil consequences. A breach of contractual terms cannot be elevated to the level of criminality in the absence of inducement or fraudulent intention from the inception.

               5.10. In support of the above contention, learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in International Advanced Research Centre for Powder Metallurgy and New Materials (ARCI) and others v. Nimra Cerglass Technics Private Limited and another ((2016) 1 SCC 348), wherein, at paragraph Nos.15 and 16, it is held as follows:

               “15. The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 IPC are: (i) cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being converted into a valuable security; and

               (iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. The making of a false representation is one of the essential ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC. In order to bring a case for the offence of cheating, it is not merely sufficient to prove that a false representation had been made, but, it is further necessary to prove that the representation was false to the knowledge of the accused and was made in order to deceive the complainant.

               16. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the cheating would depend upon the intention of the accused at the time of alleged inducement. If it is established that the intention of the accused was dishonest at the very time when he made a promise and entered into a transaction with the complainant to part with his property or money, then the liability is criminal and the accused is guilty of the offence of cheating. On the other hand, if all that is established is that a representation made by the accused has subsequently not been kept, criminal liability cannot be foisted on the accused and the only right which the complainant acquires is the remedy for breach of contract in a civil court. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown at the beginning of the transaction. In S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, this Court held as under: (SCC p. 250, para 21)

               “21. … In order to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was made. It is necessary to show that a person had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise, to say that he committed an act of cheating. A mere failure to keep up promise subsequently cannot be presumed as an act leading to cheating.”

               The above view in Palanitkar case [(2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] was referred to and followed in Rashmi Jain v. State of U.P. [(2014) 13 SCC 553 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 751]”

               5.11. In support of the above contention, he also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma and others v. State of Bihar and another ((2000) 4 SCC 168), wherein, at paragraph No.15, it was held as follows:

               “15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed.”

               5.12. He also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vesa Holdings Private Limited and another v. State of Kerala and others ((2015) 8 SCC 293), and drawn attention of this Court to paragraph Nos.12 and 13, wherein, it was held as follows:

               “12. From the decisions cited by the appellant, the settled proposition of law is that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In other words for the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. Even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable intention at the time of making initial promise being absent, no offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860 can be said to have been made out.

               13. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be available to the complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating or not. In the present case there is nothing to show that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC. In our view the complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. The criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and the High Court committed an error in refusing to exercise the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceedings.”

               5.13. The dispute between the parties is purely civil in nature however the present complaint was lodged by the de facto complainant giving a cloak of criminal offence. He relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited and others ((2006) 6 SCC 736), wherein, the paragraph No.8 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sagar Suri v. State of Uttar Pradesh ((2000) 2 SCC 636) was referred to, which is as follows:

               “8. It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

               5.14. He also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shailesh Kumar Singh alias Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others(2025 INSC 869) and drawn attention of this Court to paragraph No.11, which is as follows:

                                  “11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh” reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said decision, the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust respectively has been exhaustively explained. It appears that this very decision was relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High Court. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand, why the High Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made out. Why should the High Court make an attempt to help the complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the accused. It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be to look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or in any other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016.”

               5.15. Neither the complaint nor the charge sheet contains any specific abusive words uttered by the petitioners against the de facto complainant, hence, the ingredients of the offence under Section 504 of IPC are not made out.

               5.16. Relying on the said judgments, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners prayed to quash the proceedings against the petitioners.

6. Following are the submissions of learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No.2-de facto complainant:

               6.1. It is alleged that the petitioners have induced the de facto complainant to purchase the land admeasuring Ac.2.15 gts. in Sy.No.255, situated at Kallakal Village, Manoharabad Mandal, Medak District, despite the fact that the said land did not have properly demarcated boundaries. Though the petitioners initially assured the de facto complainant that the said land would be registered in his name, they have failed to honour their promise after collecting substantial amounts from him. Thereafter, the petitioners began to blackmail the de facto complainant by coercing him to purchase the said land on the terms dictated by them. The petitioners failed to register plot Nos.1, 83, 84, 85 and 104 in favour of the de facto complainant even after receipt of considerable amounts from him and sold the same to accused No.6 and another, who knowingly have entered into such sale transactions. The petitioners-accused Nos.4 and 5 are the representatives of accused Nos.1 to 3, who always acted on their instructions, being fully aware of the consequences, for the reasons best known to them.

               6.2. At the time of payment of the fifth tranche, the de facto complainant expressed his willingness to purchase all the plots mentioned in the last tranche and requested to conduct a Government Survey in Sy.No.255. However, the petitioners failed to produce any document evidencing the latest survey with proper demarcation, as was agreed in the MOU, and further threatened him with dire consequences. Since no survey was conducted by the petitioners, the de facto complainant was not under an obligation to purchase the land in Sy.No.255. Despite this, the petitioners immediately sold the plots in the last tranche to the third parties through Agreement of Sale-cum- General Power of Attorney documents bearing Nos.3595 and 3596 of 2023, dated 01.09.2023 and 02.09.2023 respectively, thereby breaching the trust reposed in them and cheating the de facto complainant.

               6.3. A third party, namely Mr. Surya Narayana Keriya, lodged a complaint against the petitioners-accused Nos.1, 2 and 5 herein and another on 06.10.2023, which was registered as a case in Crime No.179 of 2023 for the offences punishable under Sections 447, 427 and 504 r/w. 34 of IPC. Following the completion of investigation, the Police filed a charge sheet against the accused therein. Although the petitioners have produced certain documents showing that they are the owners and possessors of land in Sy.No.255/3, the MOU does not specify any bye-numbers.

               6.4. Clause (5) of the MOU clearly stipulates that the final sale of Plot No.1 by the petitioners to the de facto complainant was conditional upon the latter purchasing the land admeasuring Ac.2.15 gts. in Sy.No.255, subject to conducting proper survey. Hence, it is clearly established that the petitioners have misrepresented from the inception and attempted to fraudulently sell the land over which they did not have valid right and title.

               6.5. In support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine v. State (Delhi Administration) and another ((2009) 5 SCC 528), wherein, at paragraph No.9, it was held as follows:

               9. Indisputably, in a given case, a civil proceeding as also a criminal proceeding may proceed simultaneously. Cognizance in a criminal proceeding can be taken by the criminal court upon arriving at the satisfaction that there exists a prima facie case.”

               6.6. Serious allegations are levelled against the petitioners herein. All the allegations levelled in the complaint as well as in the charge sheet are subject matter of trial, and hence, this is not a fit case to quash the proceedings at this stage.

               6.7. Hence, he prayed to dismiss the petition.

7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, contended that specific allegations are levelled against the petitioners, which is a subject matter of trial. Hence, he prayed to dismiss the petition.

8. ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:

               8.1. Upon careful consideration of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel on both sides and the material placed on record, it is evident that the dispute between the parties arises purely out of contractual obligations and is essentially civil in nature. It is an admitted fact that the petitioners and the de facto complainant have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, dated 08.02.2023. It is not in dispute that the de facto complainant paid Rs.15,00,00,000/- to the petitioners in four tranches, pursuant to which land equivalent to the said value was registered in his favour.

               8.2. The allegation against the petitioners is that they have induced the de facto complainant to purchase land admeasuring Ac.2.15 gts. in Sy.No.255 of Kallakal Village, Manoharabad Mandal, Medak District, which does not belong to them, and that they failed to fulfill their obligations under the MOU by registering Plot Nos.1, 83, 84, 85 and 104 in favour of the de facto complainant. Instead, they sold the same in favour of accused No.6 and another. However, it is also an admitted fact that the de facto complainant had already instituted a civil suit questioning the alleged non-performance of the contractual terms in the MOU by the petitioners. The said suit is pending adjudication, and no interim relief has been granted in favour of the de facto complainant.

               8.3. It is to be noted that the registration of plots in the final tranche was expressly made subject to purchase of land admeasuring Ac.2.15 gts. in Sy.No.255. The civil suit, which is the appropriate forum for resolution of contractual disputes, does not contain any claim, relief, or issue in respect of the said land, although there is a reference to the same in the pleadings. Despite being the main allegation in the present complaint, its conspicuous absence from the prayer in the civil suit casts a serious doubt on the genuineness of the allegations made by the de facto complainant in the complaint. If the de facto complainant had genuinely believed that the petitioners lacked title over the land in Sy.No.255 and had deceived him, he would have sought appropriate declaratory or consequential relief in that regard in the civil proceedings. The failure to do so suggests that the present complaint has been made as an attempt to give a criminal colour to what is essentially a civil dispute arising out of alleged non- performance of contractual obligations. Significantly, even though the registration of plots in the final tranche was subject to purchase of land in Sy.No.255, the de facto complainant, without seeking any relief whatsoever in respect of the said land has confined his claim solely to the registration of plots in the final tranche.

               8.4. The petitioners have placed on record the registered sale deeds bearing document Nos.909, 910, 914 of 2004 and 4162 of 2005, which reveals that the petitioners are the lawful owners and possessors of land admeasuring Ac.0.13¾ gts., Ac.1.07½ gts., Ac.0.13¾ gts., Ac.0.10 gts. and Ac.0.10 gts., aggregating to Ac.2.15 gts. situated in Sy.No.255/3. These registered documents, being public documents carrying a statutory presumption of validity, prima facie establish the petitioners’ lawful title and possession over the land admeasuring Ac.2.15 gts. in Sy.No.255/3. It is also pertinent to note that the MOU, dated 08.02.2023 does not contain any reference to sub-divisions or bye-numbers of land admeasuring Ac.2.15 gts. in Sy.No.255, nor does it indicate any specific extent allegedly not owned by the petitioners. Since the MOU itself does not stipulate any sub- numbers or disputed extents, the petitioners’ ownership, as supported by the registered sale deeds, cannot be discredited on the basis of vague and unsubstantiated allegations made by the de facto complainant. Therefore, the allegation that the petitioners have induced the de facto complainant by misrepresenting their ownership over the land in Sy.No.255 cannot be accepted.

               8.5. Significantly, when the material on record demonstrates prima facie lawful title in favour of the petitioners and does not disclose any misrepresentation as to ownership from the inception, the ingredient of dishonest intention, which is a sine qua non for the offence of cheating, is conspicuously absent. From the inception if such dishonest or fraudulent intention truly existed, the petitioners would not have registered equivalent land in favour of the de facto complainant for the amount paid by him.

               8.6. It is the contention of the de facto complainant that the obligation to purchase land in Sy.No.255 would arise only after the petitioners conducting a proper survey, but without conducting such survey, the petitioners compelled him to purchase the said land by showing an outdated map. In contrast, it is the contention of the petitioners that a survey was indeed conducted, and as per the terms of MOU, the purchase of land in Sy.No.255 was a condition precedent for the de facto complainant to secure registration of plot No.1 in the final tranche. As the de facto complainant failed to purchase the said land within stipulated time, it was sold to accused No.6 and another, strictly in accordance with the terms of the MOU.

               8.7. Even assuming that the petitioners sold the lands relating to the last tranche to third parties, such conduct would, at the highest, amount to breach of contractual obligations under the MOU, which falls squarely within the domain of civil law and does not attract criminal liability. A mere breach of contract, in the absence of material establishing dishonest or fraudulent intention from the inception, does not constitute an offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC. These matters require adjudication in a civil forum and cannot be converted into criminal proceedings in the absence of the basic ingredients of the offence of cheating. A mere allegation that the petitioners threatened the de facto complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 504 of IPC, as no specific abusive words have been mentioned in the complaint. In the absence of such explicit averments, the essential ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 504 of IPC are not made out. The judgments relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.

               8.8. Furthermore, alleging criminal trespass and mischief over the land in Sy.No.255, third parties have lodged a complaint against the petitioners-accused Nos.1, 2 and 5 herein and another, resulting in registration of Crime No.179 of 2023 for the offences punishable under Sections 447, 427 and 504 r/w. 34 of IPC. The said crime was taken cognizance of and numbered as C.C.No.27 of 2024. Upon the petitioners filing quash petitions, this Court, by order, dated 24.01.2025, granted stay of all further proceedings, holding that the petitioners are the owners and possessors of the land in Sy.No.255.

               8.9. A perusal of the charge sheet further reveals that the MOU was executed by the Companies i.e., M/s. Prathipati Estates Private Limited and M/s. Yellow Stone Estates Private Limited. Specific allegations are levelled against the Companies and their Management. However, the present complaint was lodged only against the petitioners-accused Nos.1, 2, 4 and 5, who are the Directors and authorized signatories, in their individual capacity, without arraigning the Companies as accused and without attributing any specific role to the petitioners-accused Nos.1, 2, 4 and 5. In such circumstances, no vicarious liability can be fastened upon the petitioners, without the Companies being arrayed as accused.

               8.10. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that there was no dishonest or fraudulent intention on the part of the petitioners from the inception, particularly when they were having valid title over the land in Sy.No.255. The allegations, even if taken at face value, disclose a dispute relating to breach of contractual obligations and do not satisfy the essential ingredients of cheating. Significantly, a civil suit has already been instituted by the de facto complainant against the petitioners and is pending adjudication. The dispute between the parties is, therefore, purely civil in nature, which has been given a criminal complexion with a view to settle civil disputes through criminal proceedings.

               8.11. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand ((2013) 11 SCC 673), at paragraph No.7, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

               “7. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of court.”

               8.12. Applying the above principle to the present case, I am of the considered view that this case is a fit one to exercise the inherent powers under Section 528 of BNSS, in order to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and to meet the ends of justice.

9. Accordingly, all the Criminal Petitions are allowed, quashing the proceedings against the petitioners-accused Nos.1 to 5 in C.C.No.185 of 2024 pending on the file of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Medak.

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.