(Prayer: This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India praying to direct the respondent no.4 to consider the petitioner's complaint effectively made on 29.09.2025 to register the fir against the proposed accused as per complaint for the offence punishable under Section 318(1), 318(2), 318(3), 318(4), 319(2), 324(2), 336(2), 336(3), 316(2), 314, 351(1) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 as per annexure-a and etc.)

Cav Order:

Suraj Govindaraj, J.

1. The Petitioner is before the Court seeking for the following reliefs:

                  a. Direct the Respondent No.4 to consider the Petitioner's complaint effectively made on 29.09.2025 to register the FIR against the proposed accused as per complaint for the offence punishable under section 318(1), 318(2), 318(3), 318(4), 319(2), 324(2), 336(2), 336(3), 316(2), 314, 351(1) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 as per ANNEXURE-A.

                  b. Issue any other writ, order or direction and such other order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deems fit to grant in the facts and circumstances of the case.

2. The Petitioner and Respondents No.5 and 6 were partners of a partnership firm by name M/s. Mithila Land Developers, registered under the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act. Respondent No.5 is the brother of the Petitioner and Respondent No.6 is the wife of Respondent No.5, and consequently the sister-in-law of the Petitioner. For the purpose of conducting the business of the firm, a bank account was opened at Canara Bank, Madanayakanahalli Branch, Bengaluru. The Petitioner had executed a registered General Power of Attorney dated 15.02.2018 in favour of Respondent No.5, B.H. Kemparaju, before the Sub-Registrar, Dasanapura, Bengaluru.

3. In the year 2023, the partnership firm undertook development of land bearing Survey No.29, measuring 4 acres and 39 guntas, situated at Kammasandra, Bengaluru, in which the Petitioner was also actively involved. It is the specific case of the Petitioner that despite the development activities generating profits, none of the amounts that were required to be credited to the bank account of the partnership firm were deposited therein. Upon making enquiries with Respondents No.5 and 6 in this regard, the Petitioner did not receive any satisfactory explanation.

4. Subsequently, the Petitioner came to know that Respondents No.5 and 6, without his knowledge or consent, had constituted another partnership firm under the very same name and style, M/s. Mithila Land Developers, and had opened a separate bank account, into which all the amounts arising from the development were being remitted. According to the Petitioner, this parallel and purportedly bogus partnership firm was created while he continued to remain a partner in the original firm, without any concurrence on his part.

5. It is further stated that when the Petitioner attempted to raise these grievances, Respondent No.5 assaulted their father, in respect of which an FIR came to be registered in Crime No.663/2024 on 07.08.2024 for offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 504 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Thereafter, the Petitioner submitted a complaint dated 29.09.2025 before Respondent No.4 - Police, alleging the creation of a parallel partnership firm and siphoning of funds. Since no action was taken on the said complaint, the Petitioner has approached this Court seeking the reliefs prayed for.

6. Sri. H. Pavana Chandra Shetty, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner, would submit as follows:

                  6.1. That the complaint dated 29.09.2025 discloses commission of a cognizable offence and, therefore, Respondent No.4 was under a statutory obligation to register a case and proceed with investigation in accordance with law. In support of this contention, learned counsel places reliance on the definition of 'cognizable offence' as contained in clause (g) of Section 2 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'BNSS, 2023').

                  6.2. He further submits that in terms of Section 2(g) of BNSS, 2023, any offence for which a police officer is empowered to effect arrest without warrant would qualify as a cognizable offence, and once such disclosure is made in a complaint, registration of a First Information Report is mandatory, leaving no discretion with the police authorities to decline or defer such registration.

                  6.3. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 and submit that if an information discloses commission of a cognizable offence, the police are duty bound to register the FIR and investigate matter and in this regard, he relies upon Para 120, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

                  120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:

                  120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.

                  120.2. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.

                  120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.

                  120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.

                  120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence.

                  120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:

                  (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes

                  (b) Commercial offences

                  (c) Medical negligence cases

                   (d) Corruption cases

                  (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.

                  The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.

                  120.7 [Ed.: This correction is based on para 120.7 as corrected vide order in Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2023) 9 SCC 695.]. While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time-bound and in any case it should not exceed fifteen days generally and in exceptional cases, by giving adequate reasons, six weeks' time is provided. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry.

                  120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above.

                  6.4. Learned counsel would submit that in the present case, Respondent No.4 - the Station House Officer, has not applied his mind to the contents of the complaint dated 29.09.2025 at all. The complaint has neither been enquired into nor acted upon in any manner, thereby leaving the Petitioner without any effective redress.

                  6.5. It is further submitted that the Petitioner along with Respondents No.5 and 6 had formed two residential layouts at Ravathanahalli and Pillahalli in Bangalore North Taluk, wherein 104 sites and 130 sites respectively, of varying measurements, were carved out. Approximately 80% of the sites were sold in favour of third-party purchasers on behalf of the partnership firm by Respondent No.5, who was acting as the General Power of Attorney holder of the Petitioner. Under the original partnership deed dated 14.03.2017, each of the partners was entitled to one-third share in the profits and losses of the firm. A General Power of Attorney had been executed in favour of Respondent No.5, the brother of the Petitioner, to enable him to carry out day-to-day transactions and activities of the partnership firm.

                  6.6. It is specifically alleged that Respondent No.5 remitted only the guidance market value of the sale consideration to the firm and misappropriated substantial amounts received in cash directly from purchasers. When the Petitioner demanded audit of the firm's accounts and his due share, neither the accounts nor any amounts were furnished, compelling the Petitioner to cancel the General Power of Attorney granted in favour of Respondent No.5.

                  6.7. Learned counsel would further submit that Respondent No.5 diverted funds from the original partnership firm to the duplicate partnership firm, thereby misappropriating the monies of the firm and causing substantial financial loss both to the Petitioner and to the partnership. Apart from amounts being received in the bank account of the newly created firm, even the monies lying in the bank account of the original firm were transferred to the new account. Thus, Respondent No.5 is alleged to have misappropriated the entire sale proceeds, whether received through banking channels or in cash. These specific allegations having been set out in the complaint, it is contended that the complaint clearly discloses cognizable offences, mandating registration of an FIR, investigation and further action in accordance with law by Respondent No.4.

                  6.8. Learned counsel submits that once the complaint, on the face of it, discloses commission of cognizable offences, the obligation of the police is to register an FIR and investigate the matter, and it is not open to the police to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute or refuse registration on a prima facie appreciation of facts.

7. Sri. S. Hemanth Bhandary learned counsel for Respondent 5 and 6 would submit that

                  7.1. The Petitioner has alternative remedies available under law. In the event of refusal by the Station House Officer to register an FIR, the Petitioner is entitled to approach the superior officers of the concerned police station, and in the event of continued inaction, to initiate proceedings by way of a private complaint, which under the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure was under Section 200, and under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is now traceable to Section 173(4).

                  7.2. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sakiri Vasu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2008) 2 SCC 409, more particularly, Paras 11, 13, 15, 16 and 25 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

                  11. In this connection we would like to state that if a person has a grievance that the police station is not registering his FIR under Section 154 CrPC, then he can approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC by an application in writing. Even if that does not yield any satisfactory result in the sense that either the FIR is still not registered, or that even after registering it no proper investigation is held, it is open to the aggrieved person to file an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the learned Magistrate concerned. If such an application under Section 156(3) is filed before the Magistrate, the Magistrate can direct the FIR to be registered and also can direct a proper investigation to be made, in a case where, according to the aggrieved person, no proper investigation was made. The Magistrate can also under the same provision monitor the investigation to ensure a proper investigation.

                  13. The same view was taken by this Court in Dilawar Singh v. State of Delhi [(2007) 12 SCC 641 : JT (2007) 10 SC 585] (JT vide para 17). We would further clarify that even if an FIR has been registered and even if the police has made the investigation, or is actually making the investigation, which the aggrieved person feels is not proper, such a person can approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, and if the Magistrate is satisfied he can order a proper investigation and take other suitable steps and pass such order(s) as he thinks necessary for ensuring a proper investigation. All these powers a Magistrate enjoys under Section 156(3) CrPC.

                  15. Section 156(3) provides for a check by the Magistrate on the police performing its duties under Chapter XII CrPC. In cases where the Magistrate finds that the police has not done its duty of investigating the case at all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can issue a direction to the police to do the investigation properly, and can monitor the same.

                  16. The power in the Magistrate to order further investigation under Section 156(3) is an independent power and does not affect the power of the investigating officer to further investigate the case even after submission of his report vide Section 173(8). Hence the Magistrate can order reopening of the investigation even after the police submits the final report, vide State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha [(1980) 1 SCC 554 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 272 : AIR 1980 SC 326] (SCC : AIR para 19).

                  25. We have elaborated on the above matter because we often find that when someone has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered at the police station and/or a proper investigation is not being done by the police, he rushes to the High Court to file a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 CrPC. We are of the opinion that the High Court should not encourage this practice and should ordinarily refuse to interfere in such matters and relegate the Petitioner to his alternating remedy, first under Section 154(3) and Section 36 CrPC before the police officers concerned, and if that is of no avail, by approaching the Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3).

                  7.3. By relying on Sakiri Vasu's case, his submission is that if a person has a grievance that the police station is not registering his FIR under section 154 of CrPC, then he can approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154 (3) of CrPC by an application in writing and even if that does not yield any satisfactory results, it is open to the aggrieved person to file an application under Section 156 (3) of CrPC before the learned Magistrate. When the Magistrate can direct the FIR to be registered and proper investigation to be made.

                  7.4. His submission is that it is only under subsection (3) of Section 156 of CrPC that the exercise of powers by the Magistrate provides a check for the exercise of powers by the police. His submission is also that if a FIR has not been registered at the police station, a writ petition under Section 482 of CrPC would not be maintainable. This Court should not encourage the practice.

                  7.5. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Velji Raghavji Patel vs. State of Maharashtra, 1964 SCC Online SC 185, more particularly Paras 8 and 9 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

                  8. Mr Chatterjee who appears for the respondent sought to show that here was special agreement in this case. According to him, by virtue of certain decisions taken at a meeting of the partners held on January 7, 1959 the appellant had been entrusted with the duty of making recoveries of monies from the debtors of the firm and, therefore, this was a case of specific entrustment. All that he could point out was Item 15 in the minutes of that meeting which runs thus:

                  'Shri Veljibhai agrees to recover the monies due by Shri Kablasingh immediately and shall deposit the same with the Bankers of the firm.'

                  He has, however, not been able to explain the next item in the minutes, the relevant portion of which runs thus:

                  '(16) If in future any further moneys are required to be spent the same shall be spent out of the recoveries of the firm and no partner shall be bound or responsible to bring in any further moneys..."

                  Reading the two together the meaning seems to be only this that as working partner the appellant should carry on the work of recovery of the dues of the partnership and that in respect of the dues from one Kablasingh it was decided that they should be deposited in the bank. It does not follow from this that any of the other partners was precluded from making the recoveries. Further, even if this is said to be a mandate to the appellant Item 16 authorises him to spend the money for the business of the partnership. That is to say, if the money was required for the business of the partnership it was not obligatory upon the appellant to deposit it in the bank. In our opinion, therefore, the appellant cannot be said to have been guilty of criminal breach of trust even with respect to the dues realised by him from Kablasingh and in not depositing them in the bank as alleged by the prosecution.

                  9. Mr Chatterjee finally contends that the act of the appellant will at least amount to dishonest misappropriation of property even though it may not amount to criminal breach of trust and, therefore, his conviction could be altered from one under Section 409 to that under Section 403. Section 403 runs thus:

                  'Whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own useany movable property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term, which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. '

                  It is obvious that an owner of property, in whichever way he uses his property and with whatever intention will not be liable for misappropriation and that would be so even if he is not the exclusive owner thereof. As already stated, a partner has, undefined ownership along with the other partners over all the assets of the partnership. If he chooses to use any of them for his own purposes he may be accountable civilly to the other partners. But he does not thereby commit any misappropriation. Mr Chatterjee's alternative contention must be rejected.

                  7.6. By relying on Velji Raghavji Patel's case, his submission is that the dispute being in civil nature, criminal proceedings cannot be initiated. There is no dishonesty on part of the Respondents No.5 and 6.

                  7.7. The Petitioner, having filed proceedings before civil courts, more particularly arbitration proceedings having been filed which are pending, the arbitral tribunal would be deciding the matter. The Petitioner is trying to shortcircuit the process by availing of dual remedies, one by approaching this Court for initiation of criminal proceedings and other for recovery of money before the arbitrator. Arbitration proceedings have been commenced by the respondent by filing the proceedings under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, (for short, 'A and C Act, 1996').

                  7.8. An arbitrator has been appointed by this Court on an application filed under Section 11. Claim petition has also been filed before the Arbitral Tribunal. His submission is that the Arbitral Tribunal now being seized of the disputes, a parallel criminal proceeding cannot be initiated in respect of a civil wrong relating to a partnership dispute between the parties.

                  7.9. Further, there is several distinctions that he seeks to make as regards various properties, by contending that these properties were individually acquired by Respondents No.5 and 6. They are not joint family properties as alleged otherwise. His submission is that all the allegations which have been made by the Petitioner against the Respondent is only in relation to the business ventures. None of them can be said to make out a criminal offence. There is no mens rea on part of the Respondents No.5 and 6 to try and cheat the Petitioner. Arbitration proceedings having been filed, the said proceedings would decide the lis between the parties, this Court ought not to exercise the discretion by directing the Respondent police to investigate the matter.

8. Sri Pavana Chandra Shetty, learned counsel for the petitioner in reply submits that:

                  8.1. He once again relies on the judgment of Lalita Kumari's case, more particularly Para 93 of the said judgment which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

                  93. The object sought to be achieved by registering the earliest information as FIR is inter alia twofold : one, that the criminal process is set into motion and is well documented from the very start; and second, that the earliest information received in relation to the commission of a cognizable offence is recorded so that there cannot be any embellishment, etc. later.

                  8.2. By relying on para 93, his submission is that the criminal process is required to be set into motion at the earliest point of time so as to enable efficient and proper investigation.

                  8.3. His submission is that subsection (4) of Section 173 deals with refusal on the part of the officer in charge of a police station to record the information and only in such a situation, the complainant would have to send the substance of such information to the Superintendent of Police, who if satisfied that it discloses cognizable offence can either investigate the case by himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him failing which the party can make an application to the Magistrate.

                  8.4. His submission is that subsection (4) of Section 173 only provides for refusal of registration, whereas in the present case, the complaint made by the Petitioner has been rejected.

                  8.5. Subsection (4) of Section 173 does not contemplate rejection, but only contemplates refusal. There being serious allegations which have been made which give rise to a cognizable offence, the father of the Petitioner and Respondent No.5 having been assaulted by Respondent No.5, the father suffering from serious injuries on the head requiring multiple stitches, Respondent No. 5 has used his good office with the police authorities not to reject the complaint filed by the Petitioner. The Petitioner can exercise rights both under the civil law remedy as also the criminal law remedy.

                  8.6. Insofar as arbitral proceedings and other civil proceedings are concerned, they relate to recovery of monies due to the Petitioner. Apart therefrom, there being offences made out under criminal enactments, it is for the jurisdictional police to investigate those matters. On that ground, he submits that the petition is required to be allowed and Respondent No.4 be directed to register a complaint and investigate the matter.

9. Learned A.G.A. would submit that the police authorities would abide by any orders passed by this Court.

10. Heard Sri.H.Pavana Chandra Shetty, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri.B.Ravindranath, learned AGA for Respondents No.1 to 4, Sri.D.R.Ravishankar, learned Senior counsel for Sri.Hemanth Bharadwaj, learned Counsel for Respondents No.5 and 6. Perused papers.

11. The points that would arise for determination are:

                  1) Whether subsection (4) of Section 173 of BNSS, 2023 deals with rejection of a complaint or is only restricted to refusal to register a complaint?

                  2) Whether rejection of a complaint would also require the complainant to follow the procedure under subsection (4) of Section 173 of BNSS, 2023 requiring the complainant to take up the matter with the Superintendent of Police and thereafter with the Magistrate if not satisfied with the decision of the Superintendent of Police?

                  3) Whether the Petitioner has been able to make out a cognizable offence vide his complaint which has been rejected by the respondents?

                  4) Whether any criminal offences have been made out or would the parties be required to agitate their rights in the pending arbitral proceedings?

                  5) What order?

12. I answer the above points as follows:

13. Answer to point No.1: Whether subsection (4) of Section 173 of BNSS, 2023 deals with rejection of a complaint or is only restricted to refusal to register a complaint?

                  13.1. Subsection (4) of Section 173 of BNSS, 2023 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

                  173. Information in cognizable cases. (4) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1), may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Sanhita, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence failing which such aggrieved person may make an application to the Magistrate.

                  13.2. A plain reading of sub-section (4) of Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 would indicate that any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of the officer in charge of a police station to record information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence may, in writing and by post, approach the Superintendent of Police concerned, setting out such grievance. Upon such representation, if the Superintendent of Police is satisfied that the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, he may either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be carried out by any police officer subordinate to him. In the event the Superintendent of Police also does not exercise jurisdiction or grant relief to the complainant, the aggrieved person is entitled to approach the jurisdictional Magistrate by way of a private complaint, invoking the statutory remedy provided under law.

                  13.3. Sri. Hemanth Bharadwaj, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.5, would submit that the Petitioner could not have directly invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court merely on account of inaction or refusal by the Station House Officer. According to learned counsel, the statutory scheme under Section 173(4) of BNSS, 2023 mandates that the Petitioner must first approach the Superintendent of Police and, if still aggrieved, avail the remedy of a private complaint before the jurisdictional Magistrate. Per contra, Sri. Pavana Chandra Shetty, learned counsel for the Petitioner, seeks to draw a distinction between a refusal to register a complaint and a rejection thereof. It is his submission that where there is a mere refusal or inaction, the remedy under Section 173(4) would be attracted; however, where the complaint is consciously rejected by the police on the premise that no criminal offence is made out and that the dispute is purely civil in nature, sub-section (4) of Section 173 would not be applicable, and the Petitioner would be entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court.

                  13.4. This Court finds considerable substance in the submission advanced by learned counsel for the Petitioner. A refusal by an officer in charge of a police station to record information, without application of mind or without taking a conscious decision, stands on a materially different footing from a rejection of a complaint after forming an opinion that the allegations do not disclose any cognizable offence and pertain only to civil disputes. In the former situation, the statutory remedy under Section 173(4) of BNSS, 2023 would ordinarily require the complainant to approach the Superintendent of Police. However, where the complaint is rejected outright on jurisdictional or substantive grounds, thereby foreclosing the statutory process at the threshold, such rejection cannot be equated with a mere refusal, and the complainant cannot be non-suited on the ground of availability of an alternate remedy.

                  13.5. The details of the complaint filed by the Petitioner have been stated supra. The endorsement which has been issued on the said complaint is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

                 

                  13.6. A perusal of the endorsement issued by Respondent No.4 would indicate that the complaint was initially received and taken on record, whereafter the Station House Officer formed an opinion that the dispute between the parties was civil in nature and, on that basis, directed the Petitioner to approach the jurisdictional civil court. Consequently, registration of a criminal case was declined. It is therefore evident that the present case does not involve a mere refusal to receive or register the complaint, but a conscious rejection of the complaint after it was taken on record, by characterising the allegations as giving rise only to a civil dispute.

                  13.7. Paragraph 93 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari, which has been extracted hereinabove, mandates that where information discloses commission of a cognizable offence, registration of an FIR is mandatory and the criminal law must be set into motion at the earliest. Though reliance has been placed on Sakiri Vasu, it is to be noted that Sakiri Vasu was decided on 07.12.2007, whereas Lalita Kumari is a subsequent judgment of a Constitution Bench rendered on 12.11.2013, and would therefore hold the field.

                  13.8. The decision in Sakiri Vasu proceeded on the premise of providing a system of checks and balances against police inaction. It held that where an FIR is not registered, or where even after registration a proper investigation is not carried out, the aggrieved person may avail the statutory remedies under Section 154(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by approaching the Superintendent of Police, and thereafter invoke Section 156(3) before the jurisdictional Magistrate.

                  13.9. Sakiri Vasu dealt with a situation where the police had failed or refused to register an FIR. At paragraph 25 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that ordinarily the High Court should not encourage the practice of entertaining writ petitions in such matters and should relegate the complainant to the alternate statutory remedies available under Sections 154(3) and 156(3) of the Code. However, as noticed hereinabove, that was a case of non-registration simpliciter and not one where the complaint was rejected by a reasoned endorsement. In the present case, Respondent No.4 has rejected the complaint after recording a finding that the dispute is civil in nature. Thus, the situation before this Court is not a mere refusal to register an FIR and squarely falls within the category of rejection of a complaint.

                  13.10. Accordingly, I answer Point No.1 by holding that the statutory scheme governing nonregistration applies to cases of refusal and not to cases of rejection of a complaint by a reasoned order.

14. Answer to Point No.2: Whether rejection of a complaint would also require the complainant to follow the procedure under subsection (4) of Section 173 of BNSS, 2023, requiring the complainant to take up the matter with the Superintendent of Police and thereafter with the Magistrate if not satisfied with the decision of the Superintendent of Police?

                  14.1. The scheme of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, insofar as it relates to registration of information and remedies against police inaction, makes a clear and deliberate distinction between refusal to record information and a decision taken upon such information. Sub-section (4) of Section 173 is designed as a corrective mechanism in situations where the officer in charge of a police station fails or declines to perform the ministerial act of recording information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The legislative intent underlying the provision is to provide an internal supervisory remedy against inertia, apathy, or arbitrary non-registration by the police.

                  14.2. A refusal contemplated under Section 173(4) is thus one where the police officer either does not receive the complaint at all, or having received it, chooses not to record it as required under law, without entering into any adjudicatory assessment of the allegations. In such circumstances, the statute obligates the complainant to first approach the Superintendent of Police, and only thereafter, if the grievance remains unredressed, to invoke the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

                  14.3. Rejection of a complaint, however, stands on a fundamentally different footing. Rejection presupposes that the complaint has been received, taken on record, and consciously considered by the police authority, culminating in a decision that the allegations do not warrant registration of a criminal case. Such rejection is not a failure to act, but an exercise of decision-making power, albeit one that is subject to judicial review. Once the police authority proceeds to classify the dispute as civil in nature and declines to set the criminal law in motion, the grievance of the complainant shifts from one of administrative inaction to one of jurisdictional overreach or erroneous exercise of discretion.

                  14.4. In the present case, the endorsement issued by Respondent No.4 clearly reflects that the complaint was examined and rejected on the premise that the dispute between the parties is civil in nature. The Station House Officer has thereby assumed unto himself the role of adjudicating the nature of the dispute at the pre-registration stage, a function which is neither contemplated nor sanctioned by the statutory framework governing registration of FIRs. This conscious rejection transforms the character of the grievance and removes it from the ambit of Section 173(4).

                  14.5. To insist that a complainant must still traverse the remedies under Section 173(4) even after a reasoned rejection would amount to conflating refusal with rejection, thereby rendering the distinction meaningless. Such an interpretation would not only dilute the statutory scheme but would also permit the police to effectively insulate their decisions from judicial scrutiny by the mere issuance of an endorsement, however erroneous or unsustainable it may be.

                  14.6. The remedy under Section 173(4) is neither intended nor structured to function as an appellate mechanism over a police officer's decision that a complaint discloses no cognizable offence. It is a remedy against nonperformance of duty, not against wrongful performance. Where the complaint is rejected on merits, the complainant is entitled to challenge the legality of such rejection directly, including by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court, without being compelled to exhaust remedies that are inapposite to the nature of the grievance.

                  14.7. Further, relegating the complainant to the remedy of a private complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as a matter of course, in cases of rejection would have the effect of bypassing the mandatory obligation cast upon the police to register an FIR where cognizable offences are disclosed. Such an approach would invert the statutory hierarchy, transforming an exception into a norm and undermining the constitutional mandate of access to justice.

                  14.8. It is also to be borne in mind that a private complaint entails procedural burdens, including examination of the complainant and witnesses, which are neither intended nor required at the stage where the law mandates automatic registration of an FIR. Compelling a complainant to undertake such a course despite disclosure of cognizable offences would impose an unwarranted and disproportionate procedural barrier.

                  14.9. In light of the aforesaid analysis, I'am of the considered opinion that where a complaint is rejected by the police after being taken on record and upon forming an opinion that no criminal offence is made out, the complainant is not required, as a condition precedent, to invoke the remedies under sub-section (4) of Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, nor is the complainant bound to initiate proceedings by way of a private complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

                  14.10. Accordingly, I answer Point No.2 by holding that the procedure prescribed under Section 173(4) of BNSS, 2023 applies exclusively to cases of refusal to record information and does not extend to cases of rejection of a complaint by a reasoned endorsement.

15. Answer to Point No.3: Whether the Petitioner has been able to make out a cognizable offence vide his complaint which has been rejected by the respondents?

                  and

                  Answer to Point No.4: Whether any criminal offences have been made out or would the parties be required to agitate their rights in the pending arbitral proceedings?

                  15.1. A comprehensive examination of the complaint lodged by the Petitioner, produced at Annexure-A, reveals that the allegations levelled against Respondents No.5 and 6 are specific, detailed, and structured, and are not in the nature of bald assertions or general accusations. The complaint sets out a clear factual narrative relating to the constitution of the partnership firm, entrustment of authority, execution of a registered General Power of Attorney, handling of partnership funds, development and sale of immovable property, and the eventual diversion of funds to the exclusion of the Petitioner.

                  15.2. The allegations are supported by admitted foundational facts. Even before this Court, there is no serious dispute with regard to the existence of two partnership firms bearing the identical name and style, namely M/s. Mithila Land Developers. The registration of two such firms, the operation of separate bank accounts, and the conduct of transactions through the second firm stand acknowledged. The controversy pertains not to the existence of these entities, but to the circumstances, intent, and consequences surrounding the creation and operation of the second partnership firm.

                  15.3. The Petitioner asserts that while he continued to be a one-third partner in the original partnership firm, Respondents No.5 and 6, acting in breach of fiduciary duty and without his knowledge or consent, constituted a second partnership firm with the same name and style, opened a separate bank account, and channelled all revenues arising from the development and sale of sites into the said account. The gravamen of the allegation is not merely exclusion from profits, but deliberate diversion of partnership assets and income through a parallel entity.

                  15.4. The principal defence raised by Sri. Hemanth Bharadwaj, learned counsel for Respondents No.5 and 6, is that the dispute is essentially civil in nature and that the Petitioner, having participated in arbitral proceedings, must confine himself to remedies before the Arbitral Tribunal. It is further contended that execution and cancellation of various documents negate any element of criminality and that criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of process.

                  15.5. I find the said submission to be misconceived both on facts and in law. At the outset, the record unmistakably discloses that the arbitral proceedings were initiated by Respondents No.5 and 6 themselves, by invoking Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, pursuant to which an arbitrator has been appointed by this Court. The Petitioner is a respondent in those proceedings and has raised counterclaims therein.

                  15.6. A perusal of the statement of claims filed by Respondents No.5 and 6 before the Arbitral Tribunal reveals that they have sought extensive reliefs, including appointment as receivers of the partnership firm, authority to complete pending transactions, defend litigation, receive amounts payable to the firm, declaration of properties as partnership properties, and closure and settlement of accounts. Correspondingly, the Petitioner has raised counterclaims seeking rejection of the said claims, audit and rendition of accounts from 2017 to 2024, and payment of amounts due to him.

                  15.7. Thus, the subject-matter of the arbitral proceedings predominantly concerns civil consequences flowing from partnership relations, such as accounting, ownership of assets, authority to manage the firm, and inter se rights and liabilities of partners. These are matters squarely within the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.

                  15.8. However, it is a settled principle of law that the existence of civil or arbitral remedies does not bar criminal prosecution, where the allegations disclose ingredients of criminal offences. Civil liability and criminal culpability operate in distinct fields and are governed by different considerations. The mere fact that a transaction gives rise to civil consequences does not efface its criminal character, if the factual allegations disclose dishonest intention, misappropriation, or abuse of trust.

                  15.9. In the present case, the complaint alleges that Respondents No.5 and 6, while occupying a position of trust as partners and as a General Power of Attorney holder, dishonestly diverted funds, created a parallel firm with an identical name to camouflage such diversion, and deprived the Petitioner of his lawful share. The alleged acts involve entrustment, dominion over property, dishonest intention, and conversion to one's own use, which are the core elements of cognizable offences such as criminal breach of trust and cheating.

                  15.10. The contention that execution or cancellation of documents nullifies criminality is untenable at the threshold stage. Whether such documents were executed bona fide or as part of a larger design to exclude the Petitioner is a matter that can only be determined after investigation. At the stage of registration of an FIR, the police are not expected to weigh defences or adjudicate upon disputed facts.

                  15.11. The existence of two partnership firms with the same name, the diversion of funds to the second firm, and the exclusion of the Petitioner from the financial stream are not natural commercial acts, but are circumstances which, taken cumulatively, prima facie indicate mens rea sufficient to attract criminal law. These are not matters that can be conclusively labelled as 'civil' without investigation.

                  15.12. The allegation of assault by Respondent No.5 on the father of the Petitioner, resulting in multiple stitches on the head and registration of a criminal case, though arising from a separate incident, provides contextual corroboration of the deteriorated relationship and the intensity of the dispute. While the said incident by itself does not determine the present issue, it cannot be wholly ignored while assessing the plausibility and seriousness of the allegations.

                  15.13. The endorsement issued by Respondent No.4 discloses no analysis of these material aspects. The Station House Officer has proceeded on a broad and impermissible assumption that the dispute is civil in nature, without examining whether the allegations, if taken at face value, disclose cognizable offences. Such an approach amounts to premature adjudication and abdication of the statutory duty to register an FIR where cognizable offences are disclosed.

                  15.14. The function of the police at the pre-registration stage is not to determine culpability, but merely to ascertain whether the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. By rejecting the complaint outright, Respondent No.4 has effectively foreclosed the criminal process at inception, contrary to settled law.

                  15.15.I 'am therefore of the considered opinion that the Petitioner has clearly made out, on a prima facie reading of the complaint, the commission of cognizable offences by Respondents No.5 and 6. The pendency of arbitral proceedings does not operate as a legal bar to initiation of criminal proceedings, and both remedies are entitled to proceed independently in their respective spheres.

                  15.16.I answer Point No. 3 by holding that the Petitioner has been able to make out a prima facie case disclosing cognizable offences in the complaint rejected by Respondent No.4.

                  15.17.I answer Point No. 4 by holding that that the disputes between the parties are not confined exclusively to the realm of civil or arbitral adjudication, and that the pendency of arbitral proceedings does not preclude initiation and continuation of criminal proceedings arising out of the same factual matrix.

16. Answer to Point No.5: What order?

                  16.1. In view of my findings to Points No.1 to 4 above, I pass the following:

                  ORDER

                  i) The Writ Petition is allowed.

                  ii) Respondent No.4 is directed to register the complaint filed by the Petitioner on 29.9.2025 within 7 days of receipt of a copy of this order and investigate the alleged offences independently without being influenced by any part of this order. The said investigation to be completed within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.