B. Sasi Mahendran, J.

The Petitioner, inter alia, seeks a Writ of Prohibition restraining the 1st Respondent from continuing to publicise factually incorrect and derogatory comments concerning the Petitioner, and restraining the 2nd Respondent from disseminating false and defamatory information about the Petitioner through any media or platform operated under Ada Derana 24/7. The Petitioner, by petition dated 24th February 2026, has sought inter alia the following reliefs from this court;

                     a. Issue notice on the Respondents;

                     b. Grant an Interim Order prohibiting the 2nd Respondent from broadcasting or circulating any statement made by the 1st Respondent derogatory of the Petitioner in whatever form of media, until the conclusion of the hearing of this application;

                     c. Issue a Writ in the nature of Writ of prohibition permanently prohibiting the 1st Respondent from continuing to publicize factually incorrect and derogatory comments about the Petitioner;

                     d. Issue a Writ of Prohibition permanently prohibiting the 2nd Respondent from disseminating false and derogatory information of the Petitioner through any media or medium,

                     e. Grant costs to the Petitioner for damages caused to his reputation by the 1st and 2nd Respondents;

                     f. Grant such other and further relief as Your Lordships' Court shall seem meet.

On 12.03.2026, when this matter was taken up for support, the learned President’s Counsel appearing for the 2nd Respondent and the learned Deputy Solicitor General representing the 1st Respondent raised a preliminary objection to the application. The objections advanced by them touch upon a fundamental issue. They argued that, on the facts pleaded by the Petitioner, the act of broadcasting or circulating any statement made by the 1st Respondent through his channel does not fall within the scope of judicial review by way of prerogative writs.

Counsel for the 2nd Respondent submitted that the 2nd Respondent functions as an Executive Director of Derana Macro Entertainment (Pvt) Ltd, a private company incorporated under the Companies Act and operating under a license issued pursuant to the Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation Act No. 6 of 1982 and the Telecommunication Regulatory Commission.

It was contended that the 2nd Respondent’s actions do not amount to the exercise of governmental or statutory authority of a public character, but rather constitute the exercise of private rights in his capacity as a company director. Accordingly, his conduct does not fall within the scope of administrative law or prerogative remedies. Counsel further argued that any challenge to such actions must properly be pursued through a private civil suit before a competent court by a party possessing the requisite cause of action.

On the other hand, Counsel for the Petitioner drew attention to the fact that, in recent decisions, our courts have interpreted private television broadcasting stations as falling within the scope of a “public authority” under Section 43(g) of the Right to Information Act No. 12 of 2016. In support of this contention, Counsel for the Petitioner cited a relevant case to reinforce the argument. It is therefore pertinent to refer to the specific portion of the judgment relied upon.

In the case of M.J.K. Dissanayake v. Asia Broadcasting Corporation (pvt) Ltd, RTI-03/2024, Decided On 05.03.2026, His Lordship Dr. Sumudu Premachandra, J. held that;

                     “However, the legal basis for "Public Authority" Classification under section 43(g) Right to Information Act, No. 12 of 2016 cannot be lightly ignored. It enacts;

                     “43(g) a private entity or organisation which is carrying out a statutory or public function or service, under a contract, a partnership, an agreement or a license from the government or its agencies or from a local body, but only to the extent of activities covered by that statutory or public function or service”

                     Thus, private entity or organization which is carrying public function or service under a license from government or its agencies subjected to Right to Information Act, can be considered as public authority. Though the Petitioner is a private broadcaster under the above definition it could be treated as "public authority" which functions under Section 43(g) of the Act. Section 43(g) of the Act is based on the rationale that broadcasters perform a "public function or service" by utilizing public frequencies licensed by the State (Ministry of Mass Media/Telecommunication Regulatory Commission)”

It is pertinent, at this stage, to set out the facts of the case before addressing the contention advanced by Counsel.

The Attorney General filed two indictments against the Petitioner before the High Court of Colombo bearing case No. HC 6428/2013 and No. HC 8152/2016 for possession and trafficking of narcotic substances, and in both cases, the Petitioner was acquitted of all charges preferred against.

According to the petition, on or about 30.01.2026, he became aware that regarding the broadcast featured an address delivered by the 1st Respondent on 09.11.2025, telecast on ADA DERANA 24/7, in which the 1st Respondent, attired in a police uniform and speaking at a public function, alleged that the Petitioner was engaged in the trafficking of narcotic substances and had amassed considerable wealth.

The Petitioner further states that, in addition to broadcasting the full news bulletin, the 2nd Respondent extracted and separately published a shortened clip of the said segment on YouTube, with a duration of approximately 4 minutes and 50 seconds and the said video has also attracted a substantial number of views, presently amounting to approximately 7.3K views and, which continues to increase daily.

Further, subsequently, it was uploaded to the official Facebook page administered by the 2nd Respondent, gaining views around 5.6K on 18.02.2026. According to the Petitioner, the said false and untruthful news report and the related Facebook Reel were telecast on or about 09.11.2025 on the said news channel operated by the 2nd Respondent.

According to the Petitioner, the said news telecast by the Ada Derana is false and baseless. Further, he has stated that this continuous telecasting has caused grave and irreparable prejudice to the Petitioner’s reputation, business standing, and mental well-being, particularly in view of the permanent and global accessibility of such content on digital media platforms.

Counsel further submitted that the impugned conduct of the 2nd Respondent amounts to a continuing and wrongful abuse of public power. On that basis, the Petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by way of a writ application, seeking the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition restraining the 2nd Respondent from broadcasting the statement made by the 1st Respondent. In addition, the Petitioner has sought an award of damages against both the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

Counsel for the Respondents objected on the basis that writs, being public law remedies, fall within the scope of administrative law, which is concerned with regulating the exercise of governmental or statutory powers by public authorities. In contrast, the Petitioner’s principal grievance appears to be that the broadcasting of the impugned statement has caused injury to his reputation. Thus, in substance, the matter is one of defamation, a cause of action governed by private law rather than administrative law.

In the case of Weligama Multi Purpose Co-Operative Society Ltd. V. Chandradasa Daluwatta 1984 1 SLR 195, At Page 199, Sharvananda, J. (as he was then) held that;

                     “The Writ will not issue for private purposes , that is to say for the enforcement of a mere private duty stemming from a contract or otherwise. Contractual duties are enforceable by the ordinary contractual remedies such as damages, specific performance or injunction. They are not enforceable by Mandamus which is confined to public duties and is not granted where there are other adequate remedies . Perera v. Municipal Council of Colombo .”

The distinction between the private law and the public law was considered by S.N.Silva J, (as he was then) in Mendis V. Seema Sahitha Panadura Janatha Santhaka Pravahana Sevaya and Others, 1995 2 SLR, Page No – 284 at page 290,

                     “The distinction between Public Law and Private Law in Roman Law (being the genus of our Common Law) Jus Publicum and Jus Privatum - is clearly stated in his Institutes (1.1.4) by Justinian - R. W. Lee in his work on the Elements of Roman Law (4th Edition page 35) states as follows with regard to the division of Roman Law to branches as Public Law and Private Law:-

                     "This is the division which the Roman lawyers take as the primary line of cleavage in the legal system. "Public Law has regard to the Constitution of the Roman State. Private Law is concerned with the interest of individuals." The classification is intelligible and convenient, though there are points at which the two overlap. The first included constitutional law, administrative law, criminal law and procedure and the jus sacrum. The second comprises those branches of law which regulate the relations of citizens to one another, family law, property, obligations and succession. The institute is mainly concerned with private law. It ends with one Title on criminal law. which belongs to the jus publicum."

Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition are instruments of Public Law to quash and restrain illegal governmental and administrative action.”

The principal argument advanced by the Petitioner is that the 2nd Respondent’s institution, Derana Macro Entertainment (Pvt) Ltd, qualifies as a “Public Authority” within the meaning of Section 43(g) of the Right to Information Act No. 12 of 2016.

Prerogative remedies are a distinctive feature of public law. Their central purpose is not the enforcement of private rights but ensuring that the machinery of government functions correctly. A petition for certiorari, for instance, is a proceeding that requires a public authority to justify its actions in law and to explain any excess or misuse of power.

In this juncture, it is pertinent to refer to the dictum of Lord Atkin.

                     “The dictum [of Lord Atkin] has been analyzed as laying down four conditions which must be satisfied for certiorari or prohibition to issue:-

                     ‘Whenever anybody of persons (firstly) having legal authority, (secondly) to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, (thirdly) having the duty to act judicially, (fourthly) act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction exercised by these writs.’ (In Sunil F.A. Coorey’s, ‘Principles of Administrative Law in Sri Lanka’ (supra) at page 911, the learned author notes, )

As Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edition, Vol. 1, para. 6, p. 9) observes: “A public authority may be described as a person or administrative body entrusted with functions to perform for the benefit of the public and not for private profit.

The concept of ‘Public Authority’ was considered in the following judgments;

Lord Goddard, C.J., in R. v. National Joint Councils for the craft of Dental Technicians and others, 1953 1 QB, page 704 at 707, defined the ambit of the writs as follows:

                     "But the bodies to which in modern times the remedies of these prerogative writs have been applied have all been statutory bodies on whom Parliament has conferred statutory powers and duties which, when exercised, may lead to the detriment of the subjects who may have to submit to their jurisdiction. Where aststute, for instance, gives power for the compulsory acquisition of land, and an arbitrator is setup by parliament to asset the compensation, or where, as in Rex x. electricity Commissioners Ex parte, London electricity joint Committee Co. (1920) Ld., the Tribunal were a body on whom many powers had been conferred by Act of parliament; it is essential that the courts should be able to control the exercise of their jurisdiction strictly within the limits which Parliament has conferred upon them."

In Trade Exchange (Ceylon) Ltd. V. Asian Hotels Corporation LTD. 1981 - Volume 1, Page No – 67 at page 76, Sharvananda, J (as he was then) held that;

                     “An important aspect of prerogative remedies is that they belong exclusively to public law, their primary object being to make the machinery of Government work properly rather than to enforce private rights.”

Further held that;

                     “In my view, Mr. de Silva's contentions cannot be sustained. The respondent is an independent body corporate carrying on commercial activities. It is not performing any Government functions and is not an agent, department or organ of the Executive Government. Hence, the writ jurisdiction of a superior Court cannot be availed to question the respondent's decision as to how it is to conduct its business, with whom it should have business relationship, and who should be its tenants or licencees of its premises.”

                     The activities of private persons, whether natural or juristic, are outside the bounds of administrative law. A public commercial company like the respondent, incorporated under the Companies Ordinance in which the Government or a Government-sponsored Corporation holds shares, controlling or otherwise, is not a public body whose decisions, made in the course of its business, can be reviewed by this Court by way of writ.”

The above judgments were considered by S.N. Silva, J. (as he was then) in Mendis V. Seema Sahitha Panadura Janatha Santhaka Pravahana Sevaya and Others (supra)

                     “It is thus seen that prerogative remedies such as Certiorari and Prohibition lie in situations where statutory authorities wielding power vested by Parliament exercise these powers to the detriment of a member of the Public. The essential ingredient is that a member of the public who is affected by such a decision has to submit to the jurisdiction of the authority whose action is subject to review. In other words, there is an unequal relationship between the authority wielding power and the individual who has to submit to the jurisdiction of that authority. The principles of Administrative Law that have evolved such as the doctrine of ultra vires, error on the face of the record, rules of natural justice, requirement of procedural fairness and the reasonableness of decisions, coupled with the remedies by way of prerogative Writs, lie to correct any illegality or injustice that may emanate from this unequal relationship. It is in this context that the view has been firmly held that relationships that are based on contract, without any statutory underpinning and actions of companies and private individuals and bodies, are not subject to judicial review by way of the Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition.”

In light of the judicial literature discussed above, the issue arises as to whether Derana Macro Entertainment Pvt. Ltd., a private entity, qualifies as a ‘Public Authority. In order for the 2nd Respondent to operate as a private broadcaster, a license was issued by the Minister under Section 28(2) of the Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation Act No. 06 of 1982, which provides as follows:

Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation Act No 6 of 1982

                     “28 (1) No person other than the Corporation established under this Act shall maintain a television broadcasting station unless such person has obtained a licence from the Minister.

                     (2) The Minister may in consultation with the Corporation issue to any person a licence for the establishment and maintenance of a private television broadcasting station.”

It is true that the particular company obtained a license from the Telecommunication Regulatory Commission, under the Sri Lanka Telecommunications Act, No. 25 of 1991, as amended, to utilize public frequencies.

The question is, by utilizing the public frequency, whether their activities are covered by any statutory body. According to the judgment relied on by the counsel for the petitioner, any private entity or organization that could be classified under public authority in accordance with Section 43(g) of the Right to Information Act No. 12 of 2016, that private entity,

                     A. It should carry out a statutory or public function

                     B. Under a contract, partnership, agreement, or license

                     C. Obtained from the government, agency, or local body

Provided that the activities in question fall within statutory or public functions or services.

This principle is discussed in Wade and Forsyth’s Administrative Law, Twelfth Edition, at page 361.

                     “The courts presume that parliament, when it grants powers, intends them to be exercised in a right and proper way. Where why powers of decision-making are conferred by statutes Lord Brown Wilainson has observed “ 'it is presumed that Parliament implicitly requires the decision to be made in accordance with the rules of natural justice'?”

The 2nd Respondent, Derana Macro Entertainment Pvt. Ltd., operates a private television broadcasting station under a government license issued pursuant to the Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation Act. The pivotal issue is whether the activities of this private entity fall within the scope of powers and duties conferred by Parliament under the Act. Only where such activities are expressly covered by statutory functions can they be subjected to judicial review through the issuance of writs.

A similar question was considered in the following judgment.

R (Liberal Democrats; SNP) v ITV [2019] EWHC 3282, Lord Justice Davis and Justice Warby held that,

                     “The position is that the activities of ITV are purely commercial: that is so, even though it broadcasts to the public at large. The source of its powers and functions derives from its Memorandum and Articles of Association, not from statute. Nor are its activities monopolistic. The function of commercial broadcasting is not intrinsically a governmental or quasi-governmental function: and it does not become so even when the broadcasting is directed at major political or industrial issues or takes place during a General Election. It is significant that a commercial broadcaster is under no obligation to broadcast any debates at all (as is conceded); nor does anyone have any public law right to appear on television. It is true that ITV has obligations, under its licences, to comply with the Code established by Ofcom pursuant to the statutory requirements of the 2003 Act. But that its activities are regulated by Ofcom, a public body, does not mean that it is itself performing a public function. There are indeed many private commercial undertakings offering services to the public at large which are regulated, but who no one could realistically suggest are exercising a public function. Ultimately, in our view, the activities in question of ITV are of such character; and therefore its broadcasting decisions in this context are not amenable to judicial review.” [emphasis added]

In other words, “to the extent of activities covered by that statutory or public function or service” means that if a law or regulation gives someone (like a government body, agency, or official) certain powers or responsibilities, they can only act within the boundaries of those specific functions.

For example:

                     1. If a local council has a statutory duty to provide waste collection, then any powers or permissions they exercise apply only to activities connected with waste collection, not to unrelated matters.

                     2. If a public health authority has a statutory function to run vaccination programs, its authority extends only to activities necessary for that program, not to other areas outside its legal remit.

In the present case, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the 2nd Respondent’s company qualifies as a public authority entrusted with functions performed for the benefit of the public. It is my considered view that the 2nd Respondent is an independent corporate entity engaged in commercial activities through private broadcasting. It does not discharge any governmental function, nor is it a statutory body. Under the relevant Act (Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation Act), no powers are extended to the 2nd Respondent.

The principles established in the cited judgments make clear that writ jurisdiction applies where an entity derives authority from Parliament and its actions directly affect individuals, thereby subjecting such actions to judicial review. In this instance, however, the 2nd Respondent is neither a statutory body nor vested with statutory powers or duties. Accordingly, this Court cannot interfere with or question how the 2nd Respondent conducts its business operations.

For the above-mentioned reasons, I am disinclined to issue notice to the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

Amal Ranaraja, J.

I AGREE