1. Leave granted.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

3. The appellant-s husband, namely Thiru. Ramaiah[Detenue], was served with a Detention Order No. T.K. Aa. No. 08/2025, dated 22.02.2025, issued by District Metropolitan Magistrate and District Collector, Pudhukottai under Section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act No. 14/1982)[ "1982 Act"].

4. On the date the detention order was passed the detenue was already in jail (i.e., judicial custody) in connection with Case Crime No. 01/2025. Moreover, his bail prayer in connection with the said case had already been dismissed on 07.02.2025 and no fresh application for bail was filed by the detenue.

5. The grounds of detention accompanying the detention order discloses awareness of the detaining authority about detenue being in jail, yet it chose to pass the order of detention for reasons stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the grounds of detention, which are extracted below:

                   "4. From the above said materials placed before me, I am satisfied that Thiru. Ramaiah has committed brutal murder and is also acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Peace and Public Order and as such he is a "Goonda" as contemplated under Section 2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982. By committing the above described crimes in a public place, he has created fear, alarm and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the public and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public peace and public order. If such dangerous person is allowed to wander freely among public there will be a danger to the life and property of peace-loving citizens. As dutiful District Magistrate and District Collector, I have full responsibility to protect innocent people's life and belongings from this dreadful person. Hence, it was decided in public interest to place him under preventive detention act.

                   5. I am aware that Thiru. Ramaiah who is in remand in Pudukkottai District Crime Branch Criminal Investigation Department Cr. No. 01/2025. He has filed bail petition before the Principal District and Sessions Court, Pudukkottai in case Cr. M.P No. 412/2025 and the same was dismissed on 07.02.2025. In a similar case in K. Pudupatti Police Station Cr. No. 12/2024 u/s 171 Code of Criminal Procedure @ 302, 201 Indian Penal Code, 1860, bail was granted to the accused Mohanraj in 37 days, who was remanded on 15.01.2024 by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Pudukkottai in Cr. M.P. No. 1353/2024 dated 21.02.2024. Hence, I infer that there is a real possibility of his (Ramaiah) coming out on bail by filing another bail petition before the appropriate court for the above case. If he comes out on bail, he will indulge in such further activities, which will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public peace and public order. Further recourse to the normal criminal law will not have the desired effect of effectively preventing him from indulging in such activities, which are prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Peace and Public Order. On the materials placed before me, I am full satisfied that the said Ramaiah is a "Goonda" and there is a compelling necessity to detain him under the prevention of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982."

6. The aforesaid detention order was questioned before the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court[The High Court] through Habeas Corpus Petition No.375 of 2025 which was dismissed vide order dated 28.10.2025. Aggrieved therewith this appeal has been preferred, by special leave.

7. The short submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that it is a well-settled law that a person already in jail in connection with a criminal case can be preventively detained if the following three conditions are fulfilled:

                   (i) the detaining authority is aware that the detenue is in jail;

                   (ii) the detaining authority is satisfied with reference to cogent material on record that there is imminent possibility /likelihood of detenue being released, either on bail or otherwise, in near future; and

                   (iii) the detaining authority is satisfied, based on detenue-s antecedents / activities, that if the detenue is not preventively detained, on being so released, he is likely to indulge in activities which shall be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or such other interest which the statute seeks to protect.

8. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that since the bail prayer of the detenue was already dismissed and no fresh bail application was filed, there was no cogent material for the detaining authority to be satisfied that there is likelihood of the detenue being released on bail in near future. It is submitted that apparently the detaining authority drew such satisfaction on the basis of a bail order passed in respect of a person who was neither a co-accused nor involved in a case in which the detenue was under judicial custody. Therefore, such satisfaction is vitiated.

9. In support of the above submissions, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the following decisions of this Court:

                   (i) Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu Through Secretary to Government and Anr.[(2011) 5 SCC 244; paras 7, 11, 26, 27 and 30];

                   (ii) Huidrom Konungjao Singh vs. State of Manipur and Ors.[(2012) 7 SCC 181; paras 12 and 15]; and

                   (iii) Rajesh Gulati vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Anr.[(2002) 7 SCC 129; para 13]

10. Per contra, the learned counsel for the State-respondent has submitted that the detenue is involved in serious crimes and has previous criminal antecedents. Though, he may not have presented his bail application at the time when the detention order was passed, but there was every likelihood of him being released on bail as in a similar case bail prayer was accepted as has been mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Grounds of detention.

11. We have considered the rival submissions and have perused the materials available on record.

12. There is no dispute that on the date when the detention order was passed, the detenue was in jail in connection with a murder case registered as Case Crime No. 01/2025. Further, there is no dispute that on the date the detention order was passed, the bail prayer of the detenue stood rejected vide order dated 07.02.2025 and no other application for bail was pending.

13. Besides that, it is not the case of the detaining authority that any co-accused of the detenue, similarly situated, was granted bail in the crime in connection with which the detenue was in jail.

14. Having noticed the admitted position, we may now consider the observations of this Court in some of the decisions cited before us.

15. In Rekha (supra), this Court, in paragraphs 7 and 27, observed:

                   "7. A perusal of the above statement in para 4 of the grounds of detention shows that no details have been given about the alleged similar cases in which bail was allegedly granted by the court concerned. Neither the date of the alleged bail orders has been mentioned therein nor the application number nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect to the co-accused on the same case, nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect of other co accused in cases on the same footing as the case of the accused. All that has been stated in the grounds of detention is that in similar cases bails were granted by the courts. In our opinion, in the absence of details this statement is mere ipse dixit, and cannot be relied upon. In our opinion, this itself is sufficient to vitiate the detention order.

                   27. In our opinion, there is a real possibility of release of a person on bail who is already in custody provided he has moved a bail application which is pending. It follows logically that if no bail application is pending, then there is no likelihood of the person in custody being released on bail, and hence the detention order will be illegal. However, there can be an exception to this rule, that is, where a co-accused whose case stands on the same footing had been granted bail. In such cases, the detaining authority can reasonably conclude that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail even though no bail application of his is pending, since most courts normally grant bail on this ground. However, details of such alleged similar cases must be given, otherwise the bald statement of the authority cannot be believed."

16. In Huidrom Konungjao Singh (supra), this Court was pleased to observe that grant of bail to some other person in some other case cannot be a ground to believe that the detenue, who is involved in some other case, is likely to be released on bail. Relevant paragraphs of this decision are extracted below:

                   "12. In Rekha v. State of T.N., this Court while dealing with the issue held:

                   "7. A perusal of the above statement in Para 4 of the grounds of detention shows that no details have been given about the alleged similar cases in which bail was allegedly granted by the court concerned. Neither the date of the alleged bail orders has been mentioned therein, nor the bail application number, nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect of co-accused on the same case, nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect of other co-accused in cases on the same footing as the case of the accused....

                   10. In our opinion, if details are given by the respondent authority about the alleged bail orders in similar cases mentioning the date of the orders, the bail application number whether the bail order was passed in respect of the co-accused in the same case, and whether the case of the co-accused was on the same footing as the case of the petitioner, then of course, it could be argued that there is likelihood of the accused being released on bail, because it is normal practice of most courts that if a co-accused has been granted bail and his case is on the same footing as that of the petitioner, then the petitioner is ordinarily granted bail... A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored.

                   27. In our opinion, there is a real possibility of release of a person on bail who is already in custody "provided he has moved a bail application which is pending." It follows logically that if there is no bail application pending, then there is no likelihood of the person in custody being released on bail, and hence the detention order will be illegal. However, there can be an exception to this rule, that is, where a co-accused whose case stands on the same footing had been granted bail. In such cases, the detaining authority can reasonably conclude that there is likelihood of the detenue being released on bail even though no bail application of his is pending, since most courts normally grant bail on this ground."

                   Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid judgment that it is not the similar case i.e., involving similar offense. It should be that the co-accused in the same offense is enlarged on bail and on the basis of which the detainee could be enlarged on bail.

                   "15. In the instant case, admittedly, the said bail orders do not relate to the co-accused in the same case. The accused released in those cases on bail had no concern with the present case. Merely, because somebody else in similar cases had been granted bail, there could be no presumption that in the instant case had the detenu applied for bail could have been released on bail. Thus, as the detenu in the instant case had not moved the bail application and no other co-accused, if any, had been enlarged on bail, resorting to the provisions of the Act was not permissible. Therefore, the impugned order of detention is based on mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention and cannot be sustained in the eye of the law."

17. In Rajesh Gulati (supra), this Court held that if the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that detenue, already in jail, is likely to be released on bail is vitiated for lack of cogent material to draw such satisfaction, subsequent grant of bail is not a ground to sustain the detention order which stood vitiated for lack of material on the date when the order of detention was passed.

18. In Union of India v. Paul Manickam and another[(2003) 8 SCC 342] it was held that even if a person is in custody, a detention order can be validly passed (i) if the detaining authority is aware of the fact that the detenue is in actual custody; (2) if the detaining authority has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing[See also Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128].

19. In the present case, we find from the Grounds of detention that the bail prayer of the detenue had already been rejected by the Court of Session and there was no fresh bail application filed by the detenue. Further, there is nothing on record to indicate that co-accused of the case in which the appellant was under judicial custody was admitted to bail on the date the detention order was passed. Detaining authority though, in the Grounds of detention referred to some other person being admitted to bail in some other case, did not disclose the facts of that case to demonstrate that it was so similar that a reasonable satisfaction could be drawn that detenue is likely to benefit from it and be released on bail. In such circumstances, having regard to the decisions of this Court considered above, in our view, there was no cogent material on record basis which the detaining authority could have drawn its satisfaction that the detenue was likely to be released on bail.

20. In such circumstances, the satisfaction of the detaining authority stood vitiated for lack of cogent material to infer that there was likelihood of the detenue being released on bail.

21. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court dismissing the Habeas Corpus petition of the appellant is set aside. The detention order is hereby quashed.

22. The appellant shall be released forthwith unless he is in custody in connection with any other case. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the prosecution case in connection with which the appellant is in jail.

23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.