Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The petitioners who are the applicants 1, 2, 5 to 7, 10, 11, 15 to 17, 20 to 27 and 29 in O.A.No.768 of 2021 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (the ‘Tribunal’ for short) filed this original petition invoking supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 11.02.2025 passed by the Tribunal in that original application.

2. Going by the averments in the original application, out of the 30 applicants in the original application, Serial Nos. 1 to 25 are working in the Scheduled Tribes Development Department as Tribal Development Officers, Assistant Tribal Development Officers, Special Extension Officers and Senior Superintendents, etc and serial numbers 26 to 30 are retired employees of the Scheduled Tribes Development Department who worked in various categories while in service. As per the 9th pay Revision order bearing G.O (P) No. 85/2011/Fin, dated 26.02.2011, the Government had decided to implement the recommendations of the pay revision commission ratio/percentage based grade promotion scheme for various categories of Government employees with effect from 01.02.2011. As per the scheme in all departments, 25% of the senior Superintendents and equated posts like Manager will be on higher grade and 25% of the posts of Junior Superintendents and equated posts like Manager will be on Higher Grade. But in the Scheduled Tribes Development Department, this scheme has not been implemented by the 2nd respondent. Umpteen number of representations were made before the 2nd respondent by the applicants, but to no avail. All other departments, including the Scheduled Castes Development Department under the 1st respondent has implemented the scheme. At last, on the compulsion of the employees, the 2nd respondent implemented the scheme in 2016 by sanctioning Higher Grade to 24 employees as per proceedings dated 18.05.2016. But after that, to date, no steps have been taken by the 2nd respondent for the implementation of the scheme as provided in the pay revision order. As per the 10th pay revision order, 25% Higher Grade to the post of Senior Superintendents and equated posts are to be continued, and the scheme of granting Higher Grade to Junior Superintendents and interchangeable posts has been enhanced from 25% to 1/3. But, the 2nd respondent has not taken any steps to implement the schemes as provided in the 9th and 10th pay revision orders, whereas similarly placed persons in all other departments have benefited from this scheme. Aggrieved by this, one Rajesh Kumar, Senior Superintendent of the Scheduled Tribes Development Department, filed O.A.No.1630 of 2018 before the Tribunal, praying that Higher Grade may be sanctioned to him. The Tribunal disposed of that O.A. on 15.10.2018, directing the 1st respondent to consider and pass appropriate orders on the representation pending before the 1st respondent within three months. The 1st respondent issued an order on 30.11.2020 rejecting the claim of Rajesh Kumar. Thereafter, on 05.10.2020, some of the applicants submitted a representation before the 1st respondent. But no action has been taken by the 1st respondent on this matter till date. With these pleadings, the applicants filed the original application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs:

                  “(i) The Hon'ble Tribunal may quash G.O. (Rt) No. 990/2020/SC/ST  Development  Department  dated 30.11.2020 issued by the 1st respondent (Annexure -A15) which adversely affect the legitimate legal rights of the applicants.

                  (ii) This Hon'ble Tribunal may declare that the applicants are entitled to get the benefits of ratio/percentage based Grade promotion sanctioned in 9th pay revision of 2011 and 10th pay revision of 2016 taking into account the facts that similarly placed persons in other departments are enjoying the benefits of ratio / percentage grade promotion scheme.

                  xxx xxx xxx

                  (v) To award 9% interest to the applicants for delayed payment of legally entitled benefits sanctioned by the government”.

3. In the original application, on behalf of the 1st respondent, a reply statement dated 15.12.2021 was filed opposing the reliefs sought for. To that reply statement, the applicants filed a rejoinder dated 21.06.2022. On behalf of the 2nd respondent, a reply statement dated 03.07.2024 was filed in the original application, producing therewith Annexure R2 (a) document. To that reply statement, a rejoinder dated 09.08.2024 was filed by the applicants.

4. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of materials on record, the Tribunal, by the impugned Ext.P1 order dated 11.02.2025, dismissed the original application; however, making it clear that the dismissal of the original application will not stand in the way of the applicants approaching the statutory authorities by filing appropriate representations in future. Being aggrieved, the petitioners are now before this Court with this original petition.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Senior Government Pleader.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the Tribunal lost sight of the fact that the petitioners worked as Junior Superintendent and Senior Superintendent for a lengthy period, the details of which are stated in the original petition. The scheme grants higher grade to Junior Superintendent, Senior Superintendent and equated categories. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to get ratio based higher grade at least for their tenure as Junior Superintendent and Senior Superintendent, though the reliefs sought in the original application are for the benefits of ratio/percentage-based grade promotion, sanctioned in the 9th pay revision of 2011 and 10th pay revision of 2016.

7. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that in the 10th pay revision order, the post of Junior Superintendent under the common category has been defined as Junior Superintendent and interchangeable posts as per Special Rules. Therefore, the benefits available to the post of Junior Superintendent are also eligible for the interchangeable post. But in pursuance of Annexure A5 Government Order, in execution of Annexure A13 order of the Tribunal, the post of Junior Superintendent is a general post belonging to Ministerial Subordinate Service and applicable to all departments. As per government order dated 15.05.1993 bearing G.O.(P)29/93/P & ARD, the posts of Junior Superintendent/Tribal Extension Officer are not provided as an interchangeable post in the Special Rules, even if the pay scales of the posts are equal. But they cannot be treated as similar posts where the mode of appointment is not the same. The method of appointment as per the Special Rules for the Kerala Scheduled Tribes Development Subordinate Service is stated in the reply statement dated 03.07.2024 filed on behalf of the 2nd respondent in the original application. The petitioners are not ministerial staff. Their claim is highly belated. It is noting all these aspects that the Tribunal passed the impugned Ext.P1 order, which warrants no interference by this Court.

8. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

9. In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd [(2001) 8 SCC 97], the Apex Court held thus;

                  "The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the fact of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to."

10. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

11. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

12. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

13. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

14. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

15. We have carefully gone through the impugned Ext.P1 order of the Tribunal and the materials placed on record in the light of the arguments addressed at the Bar. As found by the Tribunal, Annexure A1 Government order dated 26.02.2011, relied by the petitioners to claim the benefit of the scheme extended to Junior Superintendent and Senior Superintendent in the matter of ratio/percentage-based grade promotion, does not extend that benefit to all interchangeable /equated posts. In Annexure A4 order, it is stated that the benefits are to be extended only to those posts which are treated as interchangeable in the Special Rules. The posts held by the petitioners are not interchangeable posts under the Special Rules. Though the petitioners now raised a contention that the benefits ought to have been extended to them at least for the period during which they worked as Junior Superintendent and Senior Superintendent, respectively, the period during which they worked in those posts described in the original petition shows that the claim of the petitioners is highly belated. As found by the Tribunal, there was serious laches and delay on the part of the petitioners in raising their claim before the appropriate authorities.

                  Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, in the light of the judgments referred to supra, we find no ground to hold that the impugned order of the Tribunal is perverse or patently illegal, which warrants interference by exercising supervisory jurisdiction.

                  In the result, the original petition stands dismissed.