(Prayer: Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 115 of CPC, to set aside the fair and decreetal order passed in I.A.No.3 of 2023 in O.S.No.1355 of 2019 on the file of XVI Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai.)

1. The plaintiffs are the revision petitioners, aggrieved by the order passed by the trial Court in I.A.No.3 of 2023, which was an application filed by the 1st respondent/2nd defendant seeking condonation of delay of 217 days.

2. I have heard Ms.J.Divya, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr.S.Chandrasekaran, learned counsel for the 1st respondent and Mr.V.Ramesh, learned Government Advocate for the respondents 2 and 3.

3. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners would submit that the 2nd defendant attempted to set aside the ex-parte decree passed in O.S.No.1355 of 2019, along with an application to condone the delay of 217 days. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the delay is not 217 days, but much more. She would further submit that the decree was passed by the trial Court on 09.01.2020 and the application for condonation of delay was filed only on 05.01.2023 and the 1st respondent was not entitled to even the indulgence shown by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in suo motu W.P.No.(C).No.3 of 2020, granting extension of limitation for the period 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 and the additional grace period of 90 days from 01.03.2022.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the petitioners have not substantiated the delay from the date of decree, till 15.03.2020 and even thereafter, from 01.03.2022, up to the date of filing the application on 05.01.2023. She would therefore state that the 1st respondent has arbitrarily fixed his own delay period as 217 days and has come to Court with a false case. She would further submit that the trial Court has erroneously exercised discretion, by condoning the delay, without noticing the fact that the delay was much more and no sufficient cause has been shown for explaining each and every days delay. She would therefore pray for the revision being allowed.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent would first and foremost contend that the trial Court had allowed the condone delay application on payment of costs and the costs have been received by the revision petitioners and in such view of the matter, the revision petition itself is not maintainable, as the petitioners are estopped from challenging the order, allowing the application, condoning the delay on payment of costs, after having received the costs. He would therefore pray for dismissal of the revision petition.

6. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel on either side.

7. It is not in dispute that the decree came to be passed on 09.01.2020 and the application to set aside the ex-parte decree was filed only on 05.01.2023, along with an application to condone the delay of 217 days. The trial Court, finding that the delay is not minimal and being encroachment on the Government property, the 2nd defendant had to spend considerable time and tracing old records and in order to effectively defend the suit and in such circumstances, an opportunity ought to be granted and placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N.Balakrishnan Vs. N.Krishnamoorthy, reported in 1998 AIR SC 3222, has imposed a cost of Rs.5,000/- to be paid to the plaintiffs, as a condition for condoning the delay.

8. Firstly, as regards the maintainability of the revision petition, subsequent to having received the costs imposed by the trial Court, I had an occasion to deal with a similar matter in Dhanraj N.Kochar Vs. Hemant Raj and others, reported in 2025 SCC Online Mad 5381. I had relied the decision of this Court in Fast Cool Services by Partners Vs. P.Shanthakumari, reported in (2000) 3 CTC 257, as well as the judgment of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Amar Singh Vs. Perhlad, reported in AIR 1989 P & H 229, where this Court following the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, held that there was no compulsion for acceptance of costs ordered by the Court as a condition to allow an application. The Division Bench of the Culcatta High Court held that cost was imposed only to compensate the petitioner for the inconvenience caused and by acceptance of costs, the petitioner has accepted the order as correct and therefore, he cannot turn around and challenge the order subsequently.

9. This Court, in fact, went a step further in Fast Cool Services's case held that even if the costs were received without prejudice to challenge the order, it would not make the case any different and the principle of estoppel would still apply. In such view of the matter, having received the costs admittedly, the revision petitioners are estopped from challenging the order condoning the delay in filing the application to set aside the ex-parte decree filed by the 1st respondent/2nd defendant.

10. In the light of the said legal position, I am unable to hold that the revision petition is maintainable in the first place. Even otherwise the trial Court has exercised judicial discretion, taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case and thought it fit to give an opportunity to the 1st respondent to contest the suit on merits. Therefore, even on this ground, I do not see that there is any perversity or infirmity in the order of the trial Court warranting interference in this revision.

11. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. Considering the fact that the dispute is pending from 2019 onwards, the Trial Court shall expedite disposal of the pending applications, within a period of eight weeks and thereafter, subject to the result of the applications, shall dispose of the main suit, if necessary, within a period of six months thereafter. There shall be no order as to costs. Connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition is closed.