Vijay Kumar Shukla, J.

1. Heard on I.A No.3744/2025, which is an application for delay.

2. The present appeal is filed against order of acquittal dated 9/11/2023 passed in Special Session Case No.07/2009. There is delay of 325 days. The calculation of the delay has been mentioned in the application. The reasons for constituting sufficient cause for such huge delay has been mentioned in the application by following calculation as under:-

          Total days consumed in filing the appeal days Excluding days for obtaining certified copy(Though the entire period 21 is not liable to be excluded as the appellant deliberately did not obtain days the copy) Excluding statutory limitation for filing of an appeal days Total days of delay days

3.According to the appellant the opinion for preferring the appeal was first sent to the SP, EOW on 08.12.2013 though Permission was accorded with a delay of almost 10 months only on 18.10.2024 even thereafter the appeal was filed on 17.01.2025, yet again with a delay of further 90 days.

4. The aforesaid facts merely state the days on which the correspondence were made from various departments and authorities, but no reason has been ascribed for such huge delay. It is pertinent to note here that the Appellant applied for certified copy of the judgement on 09/11/2023 and did not appear on any day thereafter, and on 29/11/2023 received the certified copy of the order. Thereafter, the appellant took 435 days for filing of the appeal after getting the certified copy. There is no proper explanation that why such a huge delay was caused in filing of the appeal. The plea that the delay is caused because of time consumed in obtaining the necessary permission from the department is neither supported by any document nor is satisfactory to explain such huge delay in filing of the appeal.

5. All approval was accorded on 18.10.2024, the delay occurred in getting the approval is of no consequence because the appeal was filed with a delay of further 90 days after the approval, therefore, stating that the appeal could not be filed due to approval is apparently unsustainable/unacceptable.

6. Counsel for the appellant argued that a lenient view be adopted as the appeal is filed by the State.

7. In the case of Post Master General Vs. Living Media Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 whereby it has been held that law of limitation binds everybody equally Government and defence. In the case of Amalendu Kumar Bera and others Vs. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 52, the Apex Court held that liberal approach in the case of State as litigant is not warranted in absence of sufficient cause. The Court should not take liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay when State's action in preferring appeal is marred by serious latches and negligence in absence of sufficient cause.

8. The law laid down in the case of Post Master General (supra) has been reiterated in the case of State of M.P. & Ors. vs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 wherein it has been held that delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party in this case. Law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including Government. There is no need to accept usual explanation that file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in process. The condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. In the case of State of M.P. & Anr. Vs. Chaitram Maywade reported in (2020) 10 SCC 667, it was held that the Law Department took 17 months in permitting filing of SLP. Officers responsible cannot just sit on the files and delay its filing. The SLP was dismissed with a cost of Rs. 35,000/- as delay of 588 days has occurred. In the case of Govt. of India Vs. Md Wasim Akram in SLP (Cr 1) Diary No. 10760/2020 the Court held, although it was a good case on merits, the threshold bar of delay and latches cannot be ignored. SLP was dismissed with a cost of Rs. 25,000/- for adelay of 254 days. The Apex Court in the matter of State of M.P. v/sRamkumar Choudhery (2025(1) JLJ-210 SC) referring recent judgment in the matter of UOI vs. Jahngir Byramji (2024 SCC Online SC 489) has strongly deprecated the delay and has held that the delaycannot be condoned as matter of generosity to the prejudice of the opposite party and this stage merit of the case cannot be considered.

9. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds that the appellants have failed to explain the huge delay of 325 days, by ascribing sufficient cause hence the appeal suffers from delay and on the said count itself, appeal is liable to be dismissed .

10. However, we also considered it apt to consider the appeal on merit as well.

11. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State against the judgment dated 09.11.2023, passed by the Court of the Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Indore, in Special Case No. 07/2009, whereby Accused Ghanshyam Chouhan and Rakesh Chouhan were acquitted of the charges under Section 420 IPC. Accused Amal Choudhary was acquitted of offences under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. Accused Chandrakant Kumawat and Aman Ullah Khan were acquitted of offences under Sections 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and accused Mahendra Kumar Jain was acquitted of offences under Sections 120-B and 420 IPC read with Section 34 IPC;

12. The prosecution case, in brief, is that complainant Mohan Verma submitted a complaint to the State Economic Offences Investigation Bureau, Bhopal, alleging that in Indore district, at Anand Nagar Grih Nirman Sahkari Sanstha, the housing scheme was approved in the year 1989 at three different places. The Patel Nagar Colony was developed and its layout plan was approved vide letter No. 3756 dated 26.07.1991, approving 39 plots. Later, by revised approval No. 1714 dated 31.03.2005, 06 additional plots were approved, taking undue advantage by manipulating records. Though originally approval was granted for 11.12 acres (approx. 8300 sq. meters), several unauthorized constructions were raised in collusion with municipal officials, resulting in illegal financial gains. Against 17 approved plots, 27 houses were constructed. On receipt of complaint No. 138/2007 dated 17.12.2007, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by Inspector Arun Kumar Jain, and after enquiry, an FIR was registered. Upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed before the competent court alleging that the accused persons in conspiracy with the public servants caused wrongful loss to the State and wrongful gain for themselves.

13. Counsel for the appellant argued that the trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence and wronly extended the benefit of doubt to the accused persons. He argued that the trial Court has failed to consider the testimony of PW-23 Vijay Kumar Jain, purchaser of House No. 04, clearly supported the prosecution case and proved that fraudulent layouts were prepared in connivance with co-accused, but the Trial Court failed to rely upon his testimony. PW-24 Mahesh Dulal, purchaser of Plot No. 03, categorically deposed regarding forged layouts and illegal permissions, but his evidence was wrongly disbelieved. PW-28 Ramesh Choudhary, purchaser of House No. 16, proved that illegal constructions were made using forged documents and conspiracy with municipal officers, yet the Trial Court ignored his evidence. PW-36 Mardan Singh Rawat, Record Keeper in the Sub-Registrar Office, proved discrepancies in registered sale deeds and location of plots, but his testimony was not properly considered. PW-04 R.C. Sen, Assistant Engineer, proved excess construction on land reserved for park and roads, contrary to sanctioned layouts. PW-06 Harbansh Singh, Building Officer, Indore Municipal Corporation, proved that approvals were granted on the basis of incorrect and manipulated records. PW-01 Vijay Savarkar, Joint Director, Town and Country Planning, supported the prosecution case regarding deviations from sanctioned plans.

14. On merit counsel for the respondents argued that after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court has clearly held that the prosecution has established the case in respect of two accused persons namely Shri Rajkishore Hardia, President of the Society and one employee Shri Sriram Sharma, Building Officer. Shri Rajkishore Hardia has been convicted and Shri Sriram Sharma, Building Officer has died during the trial.

15. He further contended that so far the other accused persons are concerned, they were made accused on the ground that in conspiracy with the other two accused persons namely Rajkishore Hardia and Sriram Sharma they caused wrongful loss to the State and wrongful gain to themselves. But the prosecution utterly failed to prove the same. He submitted that so far the respondent Nos.1 & 2/Ghanshyam Chouhan and Rakesh Chouhan are concerned they are the purchasers of the plot in no manner they can be liable for any alleged conspiracy of cheating, forgery etc. So far the accused Mahendra Kumar Jain is concerned he was a contractor and the role of the contractor is different. He had no business with the preparation of the title deeds or any other kind of documentation. He was engaged by the society for construction and the prosecution has failed to establish conspiracy by him with two aforesaid accused persons. Out of them, one has been convicted and the other has died. He argued that in the same manner accused Achal Choudhary was an architect and the prosecution has utterly failed to establish any role played by him in preparation of any forged documents. He has also drawn attention of this Court to the record and also findings recorded by the Trial Court in this regard.

16. So far, accused persons Amanullah, Garden Incharge and Chandrakant are concerned, the prosecution for them also failed to establish the charges. The Trial Court has rightly considered that the witnesses have not supported the prosecution case and the prosecution also could not prove its case from documents. In this regard, we have carefully considered paras 84 to 92 and 93 to 96 of the Trial Court order. Here we also noted that the entire prosecution case was that a map was forged in furtherance of a conspiracy so as to get fradulent benefit by executing the forged documents. We find that in para 74, after appreciation of the record, the trial Court held that the prosecution has also failed to produce the copy of the original map and the same was also not exhibited. The said crucial document/map was also not exhibited to prove the allegations of cheating and forgery. Thus, the trial Court has rightly recorded finding that the case was not proved. In the same manner, the trial Court has recorded finding that the charge under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was also not proved after appreciation of facts and evidence.

17. It is to note here that in an appeal, Hon'ble the Supreme Court In the case of State vs. K.Narsimhachary reported in (2005) 8 SCC 364 said that as per well settled principle, if two views are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the findings of acquittal recorded by the lower Court; it can only be interpreted where the material on record leads to sole inescapable conclusion of the guilt of accused. In the case of T.Subramanian vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2006) 1 SCC 401 , the Apex Court has reiterated the same principle relying upon said judgment and by interfering in appeal the judgment of the High Court was set aside restoring the judgment of the Trial Court acquitting the accused. In the case of K.Prakashan vs. P.K.Surenderan reported in (2008) 1 SCC 258 , the Apex Court has observed that in case two views are possible, the appellate Court shall not reverse the judgment of acquittal only because the another view may be possibly taken.

18. In view of the aforesaid, assimilation of facts and determination of law, we do not find any perversity in the order of acquittal.

19. Accordingly, the appeal is devoid of merit and the same is hereby dismissed.