Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. The petitioner herein is the father of one Jerin P. R. ('detenu' for the sake of brevity), and his challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against Ext.P1 order of detention dated 06.11.2025, passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (PITNDPS Act for brevity). date of detention.

2. The records reveal that on 11.07.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Kottayam, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the PITNDPS Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. Altogether, six cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the detention order. Out of the said cases considered, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.608/2025 of the Kumarakam Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Section 22(b) and 29 of the NDPS Act.

3. We heard Sri. P. Mohamed Sabah, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that Ext.P1 order is illegal, arbitrary, and was passed without proper application of mind. According to the learned counsel, the jurisdictional authority passed the impugned order without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity, and the conditions imposed on him at the time of granting bail itself were sufficient to deter the detenu from being involved in further criminal activities. According to the learned counsel, the sufficiency of the bail conditions was not properly considered by the jurisdictional authority, and passed the impugned order in a casual manner. It is further contended that there is a delay of thirteen days in executing the detention order from the date of its issuance, and the said delay is not justifiable. The learned counsel further submitted that although the proposal was forwarded by the sponsoring authority to the Government on 11.07.2025, the same was placed before the Screening Committee only on 26.09.2025, and that such delay in processing the proposal has the effect of severing the live and proximate link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention. On these premises, the learned counsel contended that the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

5. In response, the learned Public Prosecutor asserted that the jurisdictional authority passed the Ext.P1 order after taking note of the fact that the detenu was on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity and after being satisfied that the bail conditions imposed while granting bail to the detenu are not sufficient to prevent him from being involved in criminal activities. The learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that after the commission of the last prejudicial activity, without any unreasonable delay, the order was executed, and hence, the contention of the petitioner that there is inordinate delay in executing the order cannot be sustained. Likewise, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that some minimum delay on the part of the Government is natural to occur in submitting the proposal before the screening committee due to administrative reasons and the said delay is liable to be discarded. The learned Public Prosecutor further urged that the order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction, and hence, warrants no interference.

6. The records reveal that the detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after considering the recurrent involvement of the detenu in criminal activities. As already stated, six cases in which the detenu got involved formed the basis for passing the detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.608/2025 of the Kumarakam Police Station alleging commission of offences punishable under Section 22(b) and 29 of the NDPS Act. The detenu was caught red-handed with the contraband in the said case on 08.06.2025. As evident from the records, he was granted bail in the said case on 08.08.2025. It was on 11.07.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, that the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the PITNDPS Act was forwarded by the sponsoring authority. Subsequently, on 29.08.2025 and on 19.08.2025, the sponsoring authority forwarded additional reports. Likewise, after receipt of the proposal, the Government had placed the proposal for the opinion of the screening committee on 26.09.2025. The screening committee, after verifying the records, forwarded a report to the Government and opined that this is a fit case to pass an order of detention against the detenu under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act. The said report was received by the Government on 10.10.2025. Subsequently, on 06.11.2025, Ext.P1 detention order was passed. The sequence of the events narrated above clearly reveals that there is no delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing Ext.P1 detention order.

7. One of the main contentions taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that it was not properly taking note of the fact that the detenu is on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity and without considering the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court at the time of granting bail, the jurisdictional authority passed the the impugned order of detention. While considering the contention of the counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted that there is no law that precludes the jurisdictional authority from passing an order of detention against a person who is already on bail. However, when an order of detention is passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to restrain him from being involved in criminal activities. Undisputedly, an order of detention is a drastic measure against a person. Therefore, when there are other effective remedies available under the ordinary criminal law to deter a person from engaging in criminal activities, an order of preventive detention is neither necessitated nor legally permissible. Therefore, when a person is already on bail, the compelling circumstances that necessitated passing an order of detention should be reflected in the order itself.

8. Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the impugned order itself, the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the cases registered against him is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the impugned order, the sufficiency of the bail conditions is also seen properly considered by the jurisdictional authority. In the impugned order, it is specifically mentioned that by considering his criminal antecedents, it is evident that the bail conditions and other preventive measures are not sufficient to curb his narcotic criminal activities, since he has violated similar conditions and restriction orders in the past. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will fail.

9. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is a delay of thirteen days in executing the detention order from the date of its issuance and that the said delay is not justifiable. While considering this contention, it is to be noted that from the submission made by the learned Public Prosecutor, it is gatherable that when Ext.P1 detention order was passed, the detenu was absconding. However, on 19.11.2025, i.e., after thirteen days from the date of the order, the accused was traced out, and the order was executed. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there is any unreasonable delay in executing the order.

10. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that although the proposal was forwarded by the sponsoring authority to the Government on 11.07.2025, the same was placed before the Screening Committee only on 26.09.2025, and that such delay in processing the proposal had the effect of severing the live and proximate link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention.

11. While considering the said contention, it is to be noted that, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the proposal dated 11.07.2025 was indeed placed by the Government before the Screening Committee on 26.09.2025. Evidently, there was a short delay in placing the proposal before the Screening Committee. However, it cannot be overlooked that, in the interregnum, two additional reports were submitted by the sponsoring authority, dated 19.08.2025 and 29.08.2025, respectively. Therefore, the sequence of events reveals that the delay in placing the proposal before the Screening Committee stands reasonably explained and justified. Moreover, a short delay occurring on account of administrative reasons in placing the matter before the Screening Committee or the Advisory Board is natural and, by itself, is not fatal to the detention proceedings.

Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.