(Prayer: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, against the judgment and decree, dated 28.08.2024 in A.S.No.56 of 2023 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Court, Kumbakonam, confirming the judgment and decree, dated 16.08.2023 made in O.S.No.138 of 2013 on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Kumbakonam.)

1. The Second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 28.08.2024 in A.S.No.56 of 2023 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Court, Kumbakonam, confirming the judgment and decree, dated 16.08.2023 made in O.S.No.138 of 2013 on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Kumbakonam.

2. The appellant is the seventh defendant. The first respondent as plaintiff has filed a suit in O.S.No.138 of 2013 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Kumbakonam, claiming permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their men from in any manner trespassing or interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property.

3. Pending suit, the fifth defendant was impleaded and after the death of the first defendant, the defendants 6 to 11 were impleaded.

4. Originally, the defendants 1 to 4 filed their written statement and contested the suit. The learned Principal District Munsif, Kumbakonam, after framing necessary issues and after full trial, passed the judgment and decree, dated 16.08.2023, granting the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the defendants 2, 6, 7, 9 and 10 preferred an appeal in A.S.No.56 of 2023 and the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam, upon considering the materials available on record and on hearing the arguments of both the sides, passed the impugned judgment and decree, dated 28.08.2024, dismissing the appeal and thereby confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Challenging the dismissal of the appeal, the seventh defendant has preferred the present second appeal.

5. At the outset, it is necessary to refer the mandate of Hon'ble Supreme Court for High Courts in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, given in the case of Gurnam Singh (dead) by LRs., and others Vs. Lehna Singh (dead) by LRs., reported in AIR 2019 SC 1441, that the jurisdiction of the High Court in an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly confined to the case involving substantial question of law and the relevant passage is extracted hereunder:

    “18. Before parting with the present judgment, we remind the High Courts that the jurisdiction of the High Court, in an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, is strictly confined to the case involving substantial question of law and while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, it is not permissible for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence on record and interfere with the findings recorded by the Courts below and/or the First Appellate Court and if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in Second Appeal. We have noticed and even as repeatedly observed by this Court and even in the case of Narayanan Rajendran v. Lekshmy Sarojini, (2009) 5 SCC 264, despite the catena of decisions of this Court and even the mandate under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Courts under Section 100 CPC are disturbing the concurrent findings of facts and/or even the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court, either without formulating the substantial question of law or on framing erroneous substantial question of law.”

6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrabhan Vs. Saraswati and others reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1273 has specifically held that right of appeal is not automatic and right of appeal is conferred by statute and when statute confers a limited right of appeal restricted only to cases which involve substantial questions of law, it is not open to the High Court to sit in appeal over the factual findings arrived at by the First Appellate Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court summarized the principles relating to Section 100 C.P.C., which are as follows;

             “(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law.

             (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.

             (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision based on no evidence", it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.”

7. Bearing the settled legal position in mind, let us proceed with the present case.

8. The case of the plaintiff is as follows:

             a) The plaintiff purchased the suit property situated in R.S.No.201/1B2 in 34 Vittalur Village, Kumbakonam Taluk, for valuable consideration vide sale deed, dated 14.03.2012. Since the purchase, the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The plaintiff has been cultivating the suit property and hence, his name has been entered in the revenue records. The plaintiff has insured the standing crops in the suit property in the scheme of National Agricultural Insurance scheme.

             b) Originally, the suit property was owned by one M.S.Balakrishnan, Chennai. The plaintiff's father-in-law one Palanivelu was cultivating the suit property by getting a lease deed from the said Balakrishnan; that since the Palanivelu handed over the possession of the suit property back to the landlord Balakrishnan in January 2012, the said Balakrishnan sold the suit property to the plaintiff.

             c) The first defendant and his sons defendants 2 to 4 are the distant relatives of the plaintiff's husband. The defendants have no right or interest over the suit property, but, they are having an eye over the suit property. The defendants, with ulruly elements, have attempted to encroach the suit property on 29.09.2012, but the same was thwarted and a complaint was lodged by the plaintiff through her husband before the Thiruneelakudi Police. The defendants had again attempted to interfere with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property on 08.04.2013 and the same was also thwarted with the help of neighbours. Hence, the plaintiff was constrained to file the above suit claiming permanent injunction.

9. The defence of the defendants is that the first defendant, having oral lease agreement with the landowner Balakrishnan, has been cultivating the suit property; that since the first defendant was aged, his sons defendants 2 to 4 were helping him in the cultivation; that the defendants alone had harvested paddy in the suit property in Pasali 1422; that the plaintiff, after purchasing the suit property, approached the first defendant and requested him to surrender his leasehold rights, but the first defendant refused the same, the plaintiff, irked over the refusal, has been attempting to interfere with the defendants’ possession and enjoyment of the suit property; that the plaintiff, taking advantage of the expiry of the caveat, filed the above suit and obtained interim orders; that the plaintiff's contention that his father-in-law was the cultivating tenant and he surrendered the lease in January 2012 and thereafter, the plaintiff purchased the suit property are all false and untenable; that the plaintiff has no cause of action and the one alleged is false and untenable and that the suit is liable to be dismissed.

10. As already pointed, it is the specific case of the plaintiff that he purchased the suit property from its original owner Balakrishnan on 14.03.2012 under Ex.P.1 and since the date of purchase, he has been cultivating the lands and that the Tamil Nadu Government has issued patta, dated 12.09.2012 in favour of the plaintiff.

11. It is the further case of the plaintiff that his father-in-law, Palanivelu, was cultivating the suit property by entering into a lease agreement with its owner Balakrishnan; that Palanivelu had surrendered his leasehold right to Balakrishnan during January 2012 and that the said Balakrishnan had executed a power of attorney deed in favour of the plaintiff's husband on 09.03.2000 under Ex.P.5 and in pursuance of the same, the plaintiff purchased the suit property on 14.03.2012 under Ex.P.1. The plaintiff examined three witnesses P.W.2 to P.W.4 to establish that the suit property was under the cultivation of his father-in-law Palanivelu, that the leasehold rights had been surrendered and that the plaintiff had purchased the suit property and was in possession thereof.

12. No doubt, the defendants have taken a specific stand that the first defendant, having entered into an oral lease agreement with the owner Balakrishnan, had been cultivating the lands for a long period; that on account of his advanced age, his sons namely defendants 2 to 4, have been assisting him in the cultivation and that the revenue authorities had already recognized the defendants' possession over the suit property and that therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed.

13. No doubt, the defendants had summoned and examined the then Village Administrative Officer as D.W.3 Dhanapal and through him, exhibited a certificate as Ex.X1 allegedly issued by the Village Administrative Officer, stating that the first defendant had dug a deep borewell in the suit property. However, the learned trial Judge, on considering the evidence of D.W.3 with regard to Ex.X.1, has observed that the said certificate was issued on a piece of cut paper and in the absence of any explanation given by VAO as to the purpose for which such certificate was issued, the same cannot be relied on.

14. The evidence of D.W.3, in fact, runs contrary to the stand taken by the defendants. According to the defendants, they had applied to the Tahsildar under the Right to Information Act and, pursuant thereto, were furnished with information under Ex.D.5 stating that the fourth defendant was cultivating the suit property. However, it is pertinent to note that such information was furnished by the Tahsildar only on the basis of the particulars allegedly provided by the Village Administrative Officer and not on the basis of any revenue records.

15. As rightly observed by the learned trial Judge, there is no reference to the scrutiny of the Adangal extracts or other revenue records for arriving at the finding that the fourth defendant was cultivating the suit property.

16. It is not the case of the defendants that the first defendant or the other defendants were registered as cultivating tenants under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act 1955. Though the defendants have alleged that there was an oral lease agreement with the owner Balakrishnan, they have not furnished any particulars as to when the said oral lease commenced, the rent payable thereunder or the payment such of rent. Admittedly, they have not produced any Adangal extracts or Chitta entries to show that the first defendant or the other defendants were in possession of the suit property.

17. The defendants have produced only three kist receipts standing in the name of fourth defendant, which relate to patta No.316. Though the defendants have alleged that the fist defendant has been cultivating the lands for very long period, they have not chosen to prove the payment of kist by the first defendant for the earlier period.

18. It is pertinent to mention that the plaintiff had summoned and examined the then VAO.Thiru.Subash, as P.W.5 who produced the copies of Chitta, Adangal extracts and 'A' register pertaining to the property in S.No.201/1 BZ, which forms part of the suit property.

19. It is evident that the said revenue records stand in the name of the plaintiff. The defendants have neither disputed the genuineness nor the contents of Ex.X.2 to Ex.X.4. Considering the evidence available on record, the Courts below have rightly come to the decision that the plaintiff has proved his ownership and possession over the suit property, whereas the defendants have miserably failed to establish that they have been cultivating the suit property and on that basis, the relief of permanent injunction was granted and the same cannot be faulted.

20. The appellant has not shown that material evidence available in the case had been ignored by the first appellate Court or that there was no evidence at all. The appellant has also not shown any wrong inference had been drawn by the first appellate Court from the proved facts by applying law erroneously. The appellant has also not canvassed any stand that the Courts below have wrongly placed the burden of proof.

21. It is pertinent to note that the first appellate Court on appreciating and re-appreciating the evidence and the legal aspects in proper perspective has come to a definite decision that the plaintiff is entitled to get the reliefs claimed.

22. Considering the judgments of the Courts below, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents no question of law much less Substantial Question of Law is made out. It is not open to this Court to sit in appeal over the factual findings arrived at by the first appellate Court confirming the findings of the trial Court. Hence, this Court concludes that since no substantial question of law is made out in the second appeal, the same is liable to be dismissed.

23. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed, confirming the concurrent judgments of the trial Court made in O.S.No.138 of 2013 on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Kumbakonam, and in A.S.No.56 of 2023 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Court, Kumbakonam. No costs.