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CDJ 2026 Kar HC 071
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| Court : High Court of Karnataka |
| Case No : Writ Petition No. 38966 of 2025 (GM-CPC) |
| Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.R. KRISHNA KUMAR |
| Parties : Mysore Royal Academy, Bearing A Public Charitable Trust, Mysore Represented By Its Chairman / Managing Trustee, M. L. Kanthraj Urs & Others Versus Lagan Srivastava & Others |
| Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioners: M. S. Ashwin Kumar, Advocate. For the Respondents: ---- |
| Date of Judgment : 13-01-2026 |
| Head Note :- |
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 227 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order III Rules 1 & 2, Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, Section 39, 151 – Indian Trusts Act, 1882 – Section 47 – Power of Attorney Holder – Representation of party – Trustee dispute – Temporary injunction – Trial Court rightly permitted plaintiff residing in USA to prosecute suit through Special Power of Attorney holder under Order III Rules 1 & 2 CPC.
Court Held – Writ Petition Dismissed – Section 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 restricting delegation of trustee duties does not bar appointment of Power of Attorney holder for prosecuting a suit – Trial Court also justified in granting temporary injunction restraining defendants from interfering with plaintiff’s continuation as trustee and from giving effect to her removal pending suit – No illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error found in impugned order warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
[Paras 4, 5, 6]
Cases Cited:
Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423
K.P. Natarajan v. Muthalammal, AIR 2021 SC 3443
Mohammed Ali v. Jaya, (2022) 10 SCC 477
Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, (1990) 2 SCC 117
Hammad Ahmed v. Abdul Majeed, (2020) 1 SCC 475
Keywords: Power of Attorney Holder – Order III CPC – Trustee Dispute – Public Charitable Trust – Temporary Injunction – Article 227 Jurisdiction – Delegation of Trustee Duties – Agency – Trust Litigation
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| Summary :- |
Statutes / Acts / Rules / Orders Mentioned:
- Article 227 of Constitution of India
- Order III Rule 2 of CPC
- Order 3 Rule 2 of CPC
- Section 47 of the Indian Trust Act
- Sections 182 to 200 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
- Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 R/W Section 151 of CPC
- Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 R/W Section 94 and 151 of CPC
- Section 92 of CPC
- Section 73 of the Indian Trust Act
- Order 7 Rule 11[d] of CPC
Catch Words:
injunction, temporary injunction, permanent injunction, power of attorney, trust, trustee, delegation, removal, interlocutory injunction, lifetime trustee, virtual meeting, prima facie case, balance of convenience
Summary:
The petition under Article 227 challenges the trial court’s order allowing the plaintiff, a permanent U.S. resident, to prosecute a suit through her brother‑in‑law under a Special Power of Attorney. The High Court examined the applicability of Order III Rule 2 CPC permitting representation by an authorized agent, and considered the defendants’ reliance on Section 47 of the Indian Trust Act and Section 73 of the Trust Act to bar delegation. It held that the plaintiff’s agency was valid, that a prima‑facie case existed, and that the balance of convenience favored her. Consequently, the three interlocutory applications for injunctions were allowed, restraining the defendants from removing the plaintiff as trustee. The Court found no illegality in the trial court’s order and dismissed the writ petition.
Conclusion:
Petition Dismissed |
| Judgment :- |
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(Prayer: This W.P. is filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India praying to direction and quash the order dated 18.07.2025, passed in o.s.no. 10/2024 by the principal district and sessions judge, at Mysuru, allowing I.A.no.1 (annexure g to the writ petition), set aside the same.)
Oral Order:
1. This petition by defendant Nos.4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 in O.S.No.10/2024 on the file of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mysuru, is directed against the impugned order passed on I.A.No.1, whereby the trial Court permitted the respondent No.1- plaintiff to prosecute the suit through her power of attorney holder Sri.Anutham Urs.
2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent and perused the material on record.
3. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the respondent No.1-plaintiff instituted a suit in O.S.No.10/2024 through her Special Power of Attorney Holder against the petitioners-defendants and other defendants for declaration, permanent injunction and other reliefs in relation to the defendant No.1- Trust. In the cause title of the plaint as well as in the body of the plaint at paragraph No.2, the plaintiff specifically contended that she was residing in the United States of America and that since she was a permanent resident of USA at the address mentioned in the cause title, she had executed a Special Power of Attorney dated 07.02.2024 appointing her brother-in-law Sri.Anutham Urs as her lawful Power of Attorney holder to contest to prosecute and contest the present suit on her behalf. Accordingly, the respondent No.1 filed an application - I.A.No.1 for permission to permit her brother-in-law to file, prosecute and contest the suit through her said Power of Attorney holder. The said application I.A.No.1 having been opposed by the petitioners, the trial Court proceeded to pass the impugned order allowing the application, aggrieved by which the petitioners are before this Court by way of the present petition.
4. A perusal of the material on record including the impugned order will indicate that though the petitioners/defendants had taken up a contention that it is impermissible for the plaintiff to nominate or appoint a Power of Attorney holder to prosecute and contest the suit on her behalf, the trial Court has correctly and properly considered the provisions contained in Order III Rule 2 of CPC, which permit a party to prosecute the suit either through himself or through his recognized agent or pleader or authorized representative including Power of Attorney holder. The trial Court has also considered the objection raised by the petitioners, who have sought to invoke Section 47 of the Indian Trust Act in order to come to the conclusion that the said provision merely prevents a trustee to delegate his office or any of his duties to a co-trustee or to a stranger and the said provision could not come in the way of the respondent No.1-plaintiff in nominating or appointing a power of attorney holder to sue and prosecute the suit on her behalf having regard to the provisions contained in Order 3 CPC and Sections 182 to 200 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which permits creation of agency for the purpose of prosecuting the suit on behalf of the plaintiff. The respondent No.1 has also produced the Power of Attorney under which she nominated/ appointed her brother-in-law to prosecute the suit on her behalf.
5. Under these circumstances, the trial Court correctly allowed the application by holding as under:
ORDERS OΝ ΙΑ ΝΟ.1 ΤΟ 3
I.A.1 to 3 are filed along with main petition on 24.4.2024.
2. The Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Writ Petition 23106/2024 in its order dated 18.6.2025 directed to dispose I.A.s 1 to 3 within an outer limit of 30 days.
3. I.A.1 has been filed by the plaintiff under Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 R/W Section 151 of C.P.C seeking permission to file and contest the suit through her power of attorney holder. I.A.2 has been filed by the plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 R/W Section 151 of C.P.C seeking to grant temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in continuing her as a Trustee of defendant No.1 Trust. I.A.3 has been filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 R/W Section 94 and 151 of C.P.C seeking to grant temporary injunction restraining the defendants from giving effect to the order of removal of plaintiff as trustee during the pendency of the suit.
4. It is stated in the I.A.1 filed under Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 R/W Section 151 of C.P.C that plaintiff is residing at America since 2002 and she is the permanent resident of United States of America. Therefore, it is difficult for her to file and contest the above suit. She has appointed her brother-in-law Anutham Urs as power of attorney holder who is aware of all the facts of this case. Anutham Urs has represented her in the affairs of defendant No.1 Trust. If she is not allowed to represent her through her power of attorney holder, she will be put to hardship.
5. It is stated in the affidavit annexed to 1.A.2 that plaintiff is a lawyer by profession and one of the Trustees appointed for life of defendant No.1 Trust. She is the permanent resident of America and defendant No.1 is a public charitable trust established in 2012 vide registered deed of Trust dated 3.9.2010 and presently running the MYRA School of business. Defendant No.2 is the author and chairperson of defendant No.1 trust, who is highly qualified, renowned information scientist and academician and educationist. It was agreed that defendant No.2 shall hold the position of founder chairperson of trust for life. Similarly defendant No.3 is the secretary and defendant No. 4 is the treasurer of the defendant No.1 trust. defendant No.2 to 8 are the first Trustees of defendant No.1 trust. As per clause 7.A of the Trust deed, plaintiff was inducted as trustee of the defendant No.1 trust and first meeting of the trust was held on 29.10.2010 and second meeting was held on 12.12.2010, on which date she and defendant No.9 were inducted as Trustees. Plaintiff was appointed as trustee for life. First meeting was attended by Nalini Urs her mother-in-law and power of attorney holder. Plaintiff has contributed nearly Rs.70 lakhs from her earnings to the corpus of the trust from time to time to be utilized for furthering the object of the trust. She has discharged her duties as trustee by attending meetings of the trust and participating the affairs of the trust. She was involved in the establishment of MYRA School of Business since its inception and she has contributed for the development of the same on various ways and her activities were acknowledged by the trust from time to time by defendants 2 to 9. When matter stood thus, defendant No.7 styling himself as a secretary of the trust has issued show cause notice dated 19.12.2023 calling her to show cause as to why she should not be removed from the trust as a trustee on the ground that she is not attending any meetings of the trust and not involving in any activities of the trust. Since plaintiff is trustee for life, the very act of Issuance of show cause notice is contrary to the Trust deed. For the said notice she has given reply requesting to attend the meeting virtually and making necessary facilities for the same. For the said reply, defendant has issued reply on 12.1.2024 saying trustees have to attend the meeting physically and virtual presence is not permitted. Vide e-mail dated 13.1.2024 chairperson was permitted her to attend the meeting virtually, but defendant No.7 has re-iterated his objection that trustee will not be permitted to attend the meeting virtually. Defendant No.2 has sent the email dated 13.1.2024 with zoom link and plaintiff made an attempt to attend the meeting through zoom link, but she was prevented by defendant No.7. Defendant No. 4, 5, 6 and 8 are attempting to wrest control of the trust and they are trying to misappropriate the property of the trust. Trust deed provides maximum 15 number of trustees to be appointed and defendants are likely to replace her by persons who will support their activities. If she is removed, they will carry out amendment to the trust to remove her. Then said act is irreversible. On account of misdeeds of defendants, college will collapse and suit will become infructuous.
6. In the affidavit annexed to the 1.A. 3, the plaintiff has re-iterated the grounds narrated in the affidavit annexed to 1.Α.2.
7. The defendants 1, 4 to 8 have filed written statement and memo requesting to adopt the written statement also as objection to above 1.A.s and the said memo was allowed as per order dated 8.7.2025.
8. It is stated in the objection that notwithstanding anything contained in order III Rule 2 of C.P.C, trustee cannot delegate the power unless instrument so provides because power of attorney holder will not have any personal knowledge about the trust. Without taking permission under Section 92 of C.P.C, case is instituted and hence, suit is not maintainable. Defendants have denied the contention of the plaintiff that defendant No.1 is a public charitable trust brought into existence under the trust deed dated 3.9 2010. Bye-laws of the trust were also framed. Trust is running MYRA School of business. It is admitted that plaintiff is a permanent resident of USA. Invitation has been given to plaintiff and defendant No.9 to join defendant No.1 as a trustee is not disputed and further meeting held on 12.12.2010 and plaintiff and defendant No.9 Inducted as trustees are also not disputed, but it is denied that plaintiff is a lifetime trustee. Condition of clause 7[A] of the trust deed is misnomer because other terms and conditions of bye-laws, takes away the said right of the plaintiff. The defendants 1, 4 to 8 have denied the pleading that plaintiff was taken as trustee on account of her professional expertise and network in USA. It is also averred that similar to plaintiff's contribution of Rs.70 lakhs, other trustees were also contributed to the trust. These defendants have denied active participation of the plaintiff in the affairs of the trust and with MYRA School of Business from its inception. Further denied contribution of plaintiff and her husband on various ways in participating in seminars and providing guidance to the students of the college and assisting in drafting various MOUs of the trust etc. These defendants have admitted the issuance of show cause notice dated 19.12.2023 and 23.12.2023. Further admitted communications through email dated 8.1.2024, 11.1.2024, 12.1.2024 and 13.1.2024, but averred that these communications show that everything is not well between them. Plaintiff is the daughter-in-law of sister of defendant No.2 and hence, defendant No.2 is trying to protect the plaintiff. She [defendant No.2] is not a chairperson and hence, the said communication has no consequences. The email sent on 18.1.2024 about the minutes of meeting conducted on 13.1.2024 is correct state of affairs. There was amendment to deed of trust on 23.9.2020, where defendant No.3 was retired and new trustees were inducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the trust. The manner in which trustee shall be removed is provided under clause 7[f] of trust deed, there will be no personal discussion and majority decision binds on them. Further clause 8[a] of the trust deed clarifies that chairman, secretary and the treasurer of the trust are also entitled to resign from the trust as per the rules of the trust. Relief sought by the plaintiff is not maintainable and suit has to be dismissed with exemplary costs.
9. Heard both sides and perused the materials on record.
10. The points that arise for my consideration are:
1. Whether plaintiff can be permitted to appoint an attorney to represent her in this case?
2. Whether plaintiff proves that there is prima facie case in her favour?
3. Whether balance of convenience lies in favour of plaintiff ?
4. What order?
11. My answer to the above points are as follows:
Point No.1: In the affirmative.
Point No.2: In the affirmative.
Point No.3: In the affirmative.
Point No.4: As per final order for the following:
REASONS
12. POINT NO.1 to 3: Since reliefs sought in all the three I.A.s are inter connected, they are discussed together.
13. The learned Advocate for the defendants 1, 4 to 8 argued that, law regarding appointment of power of attorney holder in a trust matter is well settled notwithstanding anything contained in Order III rule 2 of C.P.C because trustee cannot delegate the power unless Instruments so provides. Further the learned Advocate also drew the attention to Section 47 of the Trust Act and argued that a trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his duties either to a co-trustee or to a stranger, unless (a) the instrument of trust so provides, or (b) the delegation is in the regular course of business, or (c) the delegation is necessary, or (d) the beneficiary, being competent to contract, consents to the delegation. In the present case it is not a ministerial work and trustee has to take independent decision, but plaintiff has not appeared in the meeting since 2012. As per Section 73 of the Trust Act, if trustee is absent for continuous period of 6 months from India or leaves India for the purpose of residing in abroad, she cannot be allowed to be a trustee.
14. It is pertinent to note here that above question requires the close scrutiny of oral and documentary evidence and at this stage, Court cannot touch the merits of the case.
15. It is argued by learned Advocate for plaintiff that when plaintiff appeared in the meeting of the Trust through virtual mode, the defendants have not objected and now new secretary has issued notice stating virtual meeting is not permissible, but there is no bar in the trust deed to appear in the meeting of the Trust through virtual mode. According to learned Advocate for the plaintiff, as per MYRA bye-laws column No.5, trustee can attend the meeting virtually. The said column is reproduced here below for easy reference:
"5. Annual meetings are required to be held before the graduation ceremony and this shall be attended either in person or virtually by all the First Trustees [per 7A of the Trust Deed) as this is a critical meeting and the award of the degree is to be approved".
16. It is pertinent to note here that plaintiff is the permanent resident of USA, who is appointed as a trustee and hence, she was allowed to attend through her power of attorney mother-in-law. In this regard as noted supra, the minutes of meeting has been produced wherein her mother- in-law Nalini Urs appears to have been represented her.
17. It is relevant to note here that the learned Advocate for the plaintiff drew the attention to para 6 of the Trust wherein purpose for which Trust has been created mentioned. It is to provide education, research and extension, rural development, women's welfare, environment protection and ecological development and other objective of general public utility. Further learned Advocate also argued that question of removing the life time trustees does not arise. In this regard, she drew the attention to clause 7.A of the Trust deed, wherein it was mentioned as follows:
“7.A the following persons shall be First Trustees of the Trust:
1. Smt. Shalini R Urs, W/o Sri Shrijay Devaraj Urs, aged about 55 years residing at 1515 Devaalaya anikethana road, C & d block, Kuvempunagar, Mysore 570 023 (herein after referred to as Author].
2. Shri D Shrijay Devraj Urs residing at 1515 Devaalaya anikethana road, C & d block, Kuvempunagar, Mysore 570 023 [herein after referred to as Trustee].
3. Kantharaj Urs M L residing at Dewans Road, Lakshmipuram, Mysore [hereinafter referred to as Trustee]
4. Sri Mohan Raj Urs S/o A B Lakshmikanth Raj Urs aged 46 years residing at 105, 4th Main, 3rd Stage, Gokulam, Mysore [herein after referred to as Trustee]
5. Sri Lakshmikantharaj Urs S/o Late Subbramanya raj Urs aged about 70 years, residing at ch 47 dewans road, lakshmipuram Mysuru 570 004 [herein after referred to as Trustee]
6. Sri Sharat Chandra Raj Urs S/o Sri D Subramanya Raj Urs aged 43 years residing at 910, 1 main, Lakshmipuram Mysore. [herein after referred to as Trustee]
7. Smt. Ramya Urs RN W/o Sri M L Kantharaj Urs aged 32 years residing at CH-47, Dewan's road, Lakshmipuram, Mysore - 4 [herein after referred to as Trustee].
18. Further learned Advocate also argued that trustee may be removed from trusteeship in case of violation of conditions at clause 'F' of the trust deed and specified that in case of failure on the part of the trustee to attend to his/her responsibilities as a trustee, they can be removed, but same shall not apply to the lifetime trustees.
19. As noted supra, it is the argument of the learned Advocate for the defendants 1, 4 to 8 that trustee cannot delegate her power and as it is not a ministerial work, she has to take independent decision. Further as per Section 73 of Indian Trust Act, if she remains continuously absent for a period of 6 months or leaves India, she shall be removed from the Trust.
20. Per contra, the learned Advocate for the plaintiff drew the attention to clause 5 of bye-law of MYRA, which is as follows:
"5. Annual meetings are required to be held before the graduation ceremony and this shall be attended either in person or virtually by all the First Trustees [per 7A of the Trust Deed] as this is a critical meeting and the award of the degree is to be approved".
21. But according to learned Advocate for the defendants, the said clause applies to first trustee, whereas plaintiff was inducted subsequently. Further learned advocate drew the attention to MYRA bye-laws [7], which runs thus:
"7. Given the enormous contributions of and the invaluable services rendered by all the founding members/first Trustees [7 A] the Trusteeship is for life and the clause of removal of Trustees [7 F] shall not apply to the first Trustees. It applies to other Trustees Inducted later".
22. It is important to note here that, plaintiff was one of the trustees and she had attended several meetings as admitted by the defendants 1, 4 to 8. Whether those Participation was at the instance of defendant No.2 or not, or that defendant No.2 has supported her to create cause of action can be gathered only on detailed discussion or scanning of materials before the Court. At this stage balance sheet of the trust produced by the plaintiff prima facie shows that plaintiff has contributed Rs.70 lakhs to the Trust. Further with regard to the contention of the plaintiff that whether she has contributed or facilitated for the growth or progress of the Trust can be evaluated or gathered only by going through all the oral and documentary evidence produced before the Court. At this stage Court has to see whether removal of plaintiff from trusteeship is proper.
23. In support of the case of the plaintiff, the learned Advocate for the plaintiff has submitted following citations:
1. Dorab Cawasji Warden vs Coomi Sorab Warden & Ors [1990[2] SCC 117] Supreme Court of India
2. Bheemasenacharya Srinivasacharya vs Gadag Veeranarayana Dev And Ors. [ILR 2002 Kar 2377] Karnataka High Court
3. M/S Mother Theresa Educaiton Society vs Shri Muniyappa [(2018) 1 KANT LJ 374] Karnataka High Court
4. Hammad Ahmed vs Abdul Majeed [(2020) 1 SCC 475] Supreme Court of India
5. Smt. JC Dhanamani V/s. Dr. Raviprakash in MFA 8709/2022 Karnataka High Court.
24. Further learned Advocate for plaintiff has argued that the reliefs of interlocutory mandatory injunction are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status, which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining.
25. Keeping in view the principles laid down in the above decisions and the discussion made supra, I opine that if remedy of injunction is declined to plaintiff as there is prima facie case in her favour, certainly she would suffer irreparable injury. Since defendants have not produced materials to show that it was defendant No.2 who by colluding with plaintiff, accepted the proposal of plaintiff to attend virtual meeting. Further prima facie appears that neither weightage nor appreciation has been given in respect of an act of contribution by the plaintiff before taking action of removal from her Trusteeship.
26. It is also the argument of learned Advocate for the defendants, 1, 4 to 8 that, suit is not maintainable under Section 92 of C.P.C as plaintiff filed this suit on individual capacity only. If she approaches the Court for the relief of public Interest, then she can file under Section 92 of the C.P.C. However, learned Advocate for the plaintiff has argued that plaintiff has approached this Court seeking individual and personal rights and hence, this suit is maintainable.
27. It is pertinent to note here that these I.A.s are filed seeking temporary and mandatory injunction and not on maintainability of this suit. Moreover, defendants 1, 4 to 8 have filed I.A. 9 under Order 7 Rule 11[d] of C.P.C seeking rejection of plaint and hence, above questions have to be discussed while passing an order on the said I.A. or while deciding the case on merits. Therefore, at this stage I opine that there is prima facie case in favour of plaintiff and balance of convenience is also in her favour. Hence, Point No. 1 to 3 are answered in the affirmative.
28 POINT NO.4:- For the discussion made on above points, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
I.A.1 under Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 R/W Section 151 of C.P.C, I.A. 2 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 R/W Section 94 and 151 of C.P.C and I.A. 3 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 R/W Section 94 and 151 of C.P.C filed by the plaintiff are hereby allowed.
Defendants are restrained from interfering in continuing the plaintiff as a Trustee of defendant. No.1 Trust and defendants are also restrained from giving effect to the order of her removal from defendant No.1 Trust.
6. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, upon re-appreciation, re-evaluation and reconsideration of the entire material on record, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the trial Court cannot be said to suffer from any illegality or infirmity nor can the same be said to be capricious or perverse or having occasioned failure of justice, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as held by the Apex Court in the cases of Radhey Shyam Vs. Chhabi Nath – (2015) 5 SCC 423, K.P. Natarajan Vs. Muthalammal – AIR 2021 SC 3443 and Mohammed Ali Vs. Jaya – (2022) 10 SCC 477.
7. In the result, I pass the following:
ORDER
i) The petition is hereby dismissed.
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