(Prayer: This Civil Revision Petition is filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to set aside the fair and decreetal order dated 19.06.2024 passed in E.P. No.109 of 2023 in O.S. No.26 of 1999 on the file of Principle District Munsif, Poonamallee.)

1. This revision has thrown up some interesting questions of law. The interpretation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is called in question in the present revision petition, as one amongst other legal issues.

2. I have heard Mr.N.R.Anantha Ramakrishnan, learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Mr.M.V.Seshachari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

3. The revision petitioner is the tenant against whom originally a suit was filed before the Civil Court for recovery of possession. The suit came to be decreed in favour of the respondents/landlords. However, before the decree could be executed, the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (in short 'Act') was extended to the area in which, the petition premises was situate. Therefore, the respondents thought it fit to initiate Rent Control proceedings for eviction. Admittedly, the Rent Controller as well as the Rent Controller Appellate Authority have concurrently ordered eviction. However, the same was reversed in revision before this Court finding that it was only the date of institution of the suit that would be relevant and, in such circumstances, it was open to the respondents to execute the decree and not initiate Rent Control proceedings, taking advantage of the extension of the Rent Control Act.

4. It is contended by Mr.N.R.Anantha Ramakrishnan, learned counsel for the petitioner that firstly, the revision came to be allowed at the instance of the tenant, setting aside the concurrent orders of eviction. In such circumstances, according to the learned counsel, the landlords should have taken up the orders passed in the revision on appeal to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, since the order passed is erroneous and the said order cannot be taken advantage by the respondents to contend that the decree passed in the suit at the earliest instance, is executable.

5. It is also contended by Mr.N.R.Anantha Ramakrishnan, learned counsel for the petitioner that even assuming the decree can be executed, without admitting he would contend that the Execution Petition is hopelessly barred by limitation. In this regard, he would take me through the relevant dates. He would also state that though this Court while allowing the revision on 13.03.2023 had initially permitted the respondents to take advantage of the period pertaining to the RCOP proceedings to be excluded. However, subsequently by order dated 21.12.2023 in Rev. Application No.225 of 2023, at the instance of the tenant, the earlier order was reviewed, holding that the liberty granted by including the time spent in the RCOP proceedings to be excluded was withdrawn. He would therefore state that the resultant position is that the respondent did not have the benefit of exclusion of the period where he was agitating the issue before the Rent Controller, the Rent Control Appellate Authority and also in revision before this Court.

6. Mr.N.R.Anantha Ramakrishnan, learned counsel for the petitioner would also submit that even Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot come to the rescue of the respondents/landlords, pointing out to the decision that was relied on by this Court, which initially granting liberty, in the revision viz., Rajender Bansal and others Vs. Bhuru (Dead) through Legal Representatives and others, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 202, and this Court referring to paragraph No.18 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court had proceeded to hold that the Rent Control Act would not apply and on the date of institution of the suit, it was validly filed and therefore, the only remedy was to execute the decree in the Civil Suit.

7. Taking me through the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajender Bansal's case (referred herein supra), Mr.N.R.Anantha Ramakrishnan, would submit that this Court while disposing of the revision did not take note of the subsequent paragraphs of the very same judgment, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has drawn a distinction and held that the definition of 'tenant' was different in different rent legislations and therefore, it would ultimately depend on the enactment concerned, to decide whether the Rent Control Act would apply or not. He would further refer to paragraph No. 22 of the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and state that the definition of 'tenant' under the Act was more or less on the same lines on which the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act and West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act also defined a 'tenant' and in such circumstances, in the facts of the present case, it was only the Rent Control Act which would apply to the premises in question. He would therefore state that for the fault and omission of the respondents, he cannot take advantage of the erroneous order passed by this Court, contrary to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and try to execute an inexecutable decree passed in the Civil Suit.

8. Mr.N.R.Anantha Ramakrishnan, learned counsel would also place reliance on the decisions of Mani Subrat Jain Vs. Raja Ram Vohra, reported in 1980 1 SCC page 1, Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others Vs. Niranjan Modak, reported in, 1985 1 SCC 270 and Shankarlal Nadani Vs. Sohanlal Jain, reported in (2022) 19 SCC 680.

9. He would also rely on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rabindra Nath Samuel Dawson Vs. Sivakasi and others, reported in (1973) 3 SCC 381 and Deena (Dead) through LRs Vs. Bharat Singh (Dead) through LRs and others, reported in 2002 6 SCC 336 for the proposition that when there is want of bonafide and good faith, a litigant cannot take advantage of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. He would rely on Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh Vs. Walchand Ramchand Kothari, reported in (1950) SCC 766, Natesan Agencies (Plantations) Vs. State Represented by Secretary to Government, Environment and Forest Department, reported in (2019) 15 SCC 70, and Commissioner, Madya Pradesh Housing Board and others Vs. Mohanlal and Company, reported in (2016) 14 SCC 199 for the proposition that Section 14 would not even apply when the reliefs are different. In this regard, it is the contention of Mr.N.R.Anantha Ramakrishnan, that in the suit the relief was for delivery of possession. However, in the Rent Control proceedings, it was for eviction on different grounds altogether and therefore, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, cannot be pressed into service.

10. He would also rely on Union of India and others Vs. M.K. Sarkar, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 59, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that even if liberty is granted by the Court, it would not revive limitation. Relying on the said decision, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the execution petition is hopelessly barred by limitation. The learned Counsel has also relied on Gurdit Singh and others Vs. Munsha Singh and others, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 791 and Zafar Khan and others Vs. Board of Revenue, U.P and others, reported in AIR 1985 SCC 39, to drive home the point that lack of jurisdiction was different from erroneous exercise of jurisdiction and therefore, in the present case, there was no lack of jurisdiction for the Rent Controller to exercise jurisdiction and order eviction. In such circumstances, it is not open to the respondents/landlords to fall back on the erroneous failure to exercise jurisdiction available with the Rent Controller to now go back and attempt to execute the decree passed in the Civil Suit.

11. Per contra, Mr.M.V. Seshachari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would firstly submit that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, would squarely apply even though the order in revision came to be reviewed subsequently, withdrawing the express exclusion of the period spent in the RCOP proceedings. He would refer to the order passed by this Court in the Review Petition, where this Court has held that liberty has been given to the respondents to work out their remedy by filing appropriate Execution Petition, in a manner known to law. He would therefore state that when this Court had made it clear that the decree in the suit can be executed in a manner known to law, it would include not only the applicability of Section 14, but also Article 136 of the Limitation Act. He would further state that the Executing Court has rightly held that the petitioner is entitled to take advantage of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and there is no lack of bonafides on the part of the respondents for the simple reason that when the suit was decreed in favour of the respondents, as on the date of the institution of the suit, as well as the passing of the decree, there was absolutely no difficulty with regard to the validity of the said decree.

12. It was only before the decree could be executed when the Rent Control Act came to be extended to the area in question that there was clog on execution. Taking me through the provisions of Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Building Lease and Rent Control Act, Act 18 of 1960, Mr.Seshachari would contend that with the Act applying to the premises in question admittedly, there was a clear bar for the respondents to execute the decree that he may have obtained before the Civil Court. He would further state that in such circumstances alone, the respondents-initiated eviction proceedings to recover possession of the property and both the Rent Controller as well as Appellate Authority have concurrently, found favour with the request of the respondents and ordered eviction. Therefore, till atleast that point of time no malafides and inaction can be attributed to the landlords. It is only in revision, when the concurrent findings in favour of the respondents were set aside by this Court and subsequently, the said order was also reviewed for the first time, the respondent was forced to fall back on the exparte decree passed in the Civil Suit and execute the same.

13. As regards applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, Mr.Seshachari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/landlords had made an interesting argument that Section14 of the Limitation Act should be interpreted in the peculiar facts of the present case to mean that the Execution Petition is the subsequent petition and the RCOP proceedings is the prior proceedings and it should not be construed, as projected by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the suit is the earlier proceedings and the RCOP is the subsequent proceedings. Alternatively, the contention of Mr.M.V.Seshachari, learned counsel for the respondents is that even assuming the petitioner, without admitting that the petitioner cannot take advantage of provisions of Section 14 and bring the Execution Petition within time, still falling back on Article 136 of the Limitation Act, the respondents being prevented from executing the decree in view of the Tamil Nadu Building Lease and Rent Control Act, Act 18 of 1960 applying to the petition premises in question and such embargo was continuing till the repeal of the Act in 2017, the entire period has to be necessarily excluded and the Execution Petition could have been filed only after the repeal of the Tamil Nadu Building Lease and Rent Control Act, with the bringing into force the Tamil Nadu Regulation of Rights and Responsibilities of Landlords and Tenants Act, 2017 (in short 'TNRRRLT Act, 2017). He would therefore state that even if not under Article 14, the Execution Petition is well within time.

14. In order to fortify his submissions, Mr.M.V. Seshachari would rely on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Akkayanaicker Vs. A.A.A. Kotchadainaidu and another, reported in (2004) 12 SCC 469 and the decision of this Court in Mandhirikodi Vs. E. Balaraman and Another, reported in (2019) SCC Online Madras 37677.

15. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel on either side. I have also gone through the order of the Execution Court as well as the decisions on which elaborate reliance has been placed on by both the learned counsel.

16. The admitted facts are as follows:

                            The respondents had filed a suit for recovery of possession and obtained an exparte decree. The same was not put to execution for about six years and before the decree could be executed, the Rent Control Act, Act 18 of 1960 was extended to the petition premises. The respondents have therefore filed eviction proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Building Lease and Rent Control Act. Admittedly, eviction was ordered by the Rent Controller and came to be confirmed by the Appellate Authority. However, in the revision filed by the petitioner tenant, the concurrent orders of eviction were set aside on the ground that the suit having been filed was valid on the date of its institution, the respondents could not initiate the Rent Control proceedings and could only execute the decree passed in the suit.

17. Initially this Court thought it fit to exclude the period spent by the respondents in the RCOP proceedings, however in the review application, the said exemption was withdrawn. However, this Court gave liberty to the respondents to execute the decree in the Civil Suit in a manner known to law. It is thereafter that the Execution Petition has been filed. Admittedly, the Execution Petition was not filed within the period of twelve years. However, advantage was sought to be taken by resort to Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The Executing Court applying the principles of Section 14 and finding that it was available to the respondents/landlords, has entertained the Execution Petition and ordered delivery. Challenging this order, the petitioner/tenant is before this Court. 18. In order to decide the interesting questions that arise for consideration in this revision, it would be appropriate to extract the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act, viz., Section 14 and Article 136:

                            14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. —

                            (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

                            (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

                            (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of subsection (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation. —For the purposes of this section, —

                            (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted;

                            (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;

                            (c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.

                            136

                            For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court. Twelve years

                            6[When] the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place: Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation.

19. With regard to applicability of Article 14, though it has found favour with the Executing Court, I find merit in the contentions of Mr.N.R.Anantha Ramakrishnan, learned counsel for the petitioner. From a reading of the entire Section 14, it is clear that in order to claim exclusion of the period spent in another civil proceedings, the benefit can be availed, provided the earlier proceedings had been pending and it was being prosecuted with due diligence. I therefore find force in the submissions of Mr.N.R.Anantha Ramakrishnan, that Section 14 cannot be pressed into service when the Rent Control proceedings were initiated subsequent to the suit. Though it has been argued by Mr.M.V.Seshchari, that Section 14 should be construed in a manner that the RCOP proceedings should be taken as previous proceedings and the execution proceedings should be taken as subsequent proceedings, I am unable to countenance the said innovative arguments. The execution proceedings are only part and parcel and in fact continuation of the Rent Control proceedings to give effect to the order passed in the Rent Control proceedings. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be contended or accepted that the RCOP proceedings will have to be treated as earlier proceedings and the Execution proceedings will have to be treated as the subsequent proceedings.

20. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, can be tested only by taking the earlier suit proceedings as the earlier proceedings and the Rent Control proceedings as the subsequent proceedings. In such eventuality, the exemption under Article 14 does not apply to the time lost in its subsequent proceedings. If it was a contra case of the respondents that there was a delay in filing the RCOP proceedings on account of diligently prosecuting the suit, then probably Article 14 can be applied in such a situation. However, in my considered opinion, it cannot be applied in the present case.

21. Therefore, in view of the above findings, there is no necessity to go into the question of whether there was diligent or bonafide prosecution in the first place. The ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with regard to the applicability of Section 14 have also been considered by me and they also lend support to the argument that the exclusion of period can be sought only in respect of earlier proceedings and not subsequent proceedings. I also find force in the submissions of Mr.N.R.Anantha Ramakrishnan, that this Court did not notice the subsequent paragraphs in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, moreso, paragraphs 21 and 22 and stopped with referring to paragraph No.18 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajender Bansal's case (referred herein supra) alone. In any event, the order of this Court has become final and whether the view taken was right or erroneous cannot be now gone into at subsequent stages, when admittedly, the matter was not taken up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In fact, the review petition was at the instance of the tenant and that also came to be allowed, giving liberty to the respondent to execute the decree in accordance with law.

22. This Court in Mandhirikodi’s case (referred herein supra), held that once an area is notified as a Municipality or a Corporation and then the provisions of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act would automatically apply and no separate notification is required. This Court further held that even though there is no express bar for a suit for ejectment to be filed, Section 10(1) of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, places an embargo on the tenant being evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise. Interpreting Section 10 (1) and relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, in earlier decisions, this Court held that the expression ‘tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of the decree or otherwise’ necessarily implied that an interdict is on the execution of the decree and not institution of the suit or passing of the decree. Even in the facts of the said case, this Court held that when execution of decree for eviction in a Civil Suit is barred and taking note of the fact that the landlord cannot be left high and dry without any remedy and also noticing that the Tamil Nadu Building Lease and Rent Control Act has been repealed by promulgation of a new Act, TNRRRLT Act, 2017, this Court held that the decree passed by the Civil Court was valid and executable.

23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Akkayanaicker’s case (referred herein supra), referring to Section 48 of the CPC being replaced with Article 136 of the Limitation Act, held that when there is a change brought about by the legislature, the starting point of limitation must be the date on which the decree become capable for execution and interpreting the words ‘when the decree become enforceable’ employed in Article 136 of the Limitation Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the word enforceable has to be construed with reference to the decree that is sought to be enforced. Noticing that there was a legislative intervention preventing execution of the decree which was lifted much later, the bar on execution ceased only from the date of the decree being substantially scaled down by way of amendment, held that the execution petition was in time.

24. In fact, this Court in A.N. Yesudoss Vs. C. Rajaram, in CRP. Nos.1616 & 1617 of 2019 dated 13.12.2022, also held that in view of the execution of a decree being barred under the provisions of Act 18 of 1960 and the Act having been repealed by Act 42 of 2017, which does not bar execution of the decree obtained against the tenant, a decree of the Civil Court could be executed as the bar had been lifted.

25. In the light of the above, though the Executing Court did not allow the Execution Petition citing Article 136 of the Limitation Act, but proceeded to entertain and allow the Execution Petition applying Article 14, in view of the fact that this Court while reviewing the order in CRP.516 of 2022, had entitled the respondents/landlords to execute the decree of the Civil Court ‘in accordance with law’, I do not see any impediment for the respondents to execute the decree of the Civil Court.

26. For the foregoing reasons, having found that Section 14 of the Limitation Act will not apply to the facts of the present case, but however, when Article 136 of the Limitation Act certainly come to the rescue of the respondents/landlords admittedly, from the date of repeal of the Act 18 of 1960, the Execution Petition which has been filed in 2023, cannot be held to be barred by provisions of the Limitation Act.

27. In fine, while answering the issue of Section 14 of the Limitation Act not applying in the facts of the present case, however in view of the Article 136 coming to the aid of the respondents/landlords, I do not find that all doors should be closed on the respondents/landlords to recover possession of their property. The mere fact that the landlords did not choose to execute the decree for close to six years also does not take away anything from the entitlement of the landlords for the simple reason that as on the date of the decree and the law then prevailing, the respondents had 12 years’ time to execute the decree and mere filing of the Execution Petition after six years, in my considered opinion cannot be put against the respondents/landlords as fatal.

28. In fine, though for different reasons, the order of the Executing Court ordering delivery is confirmed and this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. Considering that the petitioner has been in occupation of the demised premises for 25 years, I am inclined to grant six months’ time subject to the petitioner filing affidavit of undertaking to the effect that,

(i) the petitioner shall vacate and hand over vacant possession peacefully without driving the respondent to continue the Execution Proceedings;

(ii) the petitioner shall not induct any third parties into possession;

(iii) the petitioner shall pay the last paid contractual rent from December 2025, till he vacates and hands over the vacant possession. It is open to the respondent to move the competent Civil Court to recover the arrears, if any. The affidavit shall be filed on or before 19.12.2025. Connected Miscellaneous Petition is also closed. No costs.