(Prayer: Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to set aside the fair and decreetal order dated 11.09.2025 made in I.A.No.2 of 2024 in O.S.No.188 of 2024 on the file of the learned VI Additional District Judge, Madurai and allow the Civil Revision Petition.)

1. Challenging the order passed by the trial Court, dismissing the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint, the present Civil Revision Petition has been filed.

2. The revision petitioners are the defendants 1 and 3 in the suit. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners contended that the impugned order passed by the trial Court is not in consonance with the settled principles of law. He placed reliance on Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the same is extracted hereunder:

3. According to the revision petitioners, the suit has been instituted by a minor plaintiff claiming that the first defendant is his grandfather, the second defendant is his father and the third defendant is his paternal uncle, while the remaining defendants are official witnesses. It is the specific case of the revision petitioners that a family partition had already taken place on 25.03.1980 among the first defendant (grandfather) and defendants 2 and 3 (father and uncle). Once such a partition had been affected, the claim made by the respondent/plaintiff is contrary to the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, more particularly Section 8 thereof.

4. The learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiff does not fall within the category of Class-I legal heirs as enumerated under the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act. A grandson does not acquire any independent right to seek partition of property already partitioned among his grandfather, father and uncle. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar and others, reported in 2025 (4) CTC 168, and relevant portion of which is extracted hereunder:

                            17. It cannot be disputed that the properties divided among Defendant No.1 and his brothers through partition deed dated 09.05.1986, are joint family properties. However, as per Hindu law, after partition, each party gets a separate and distinct share and this share becomes their self-acquired property and they have absolute rights over it and they can sell, transfer, or bequeath it as they wish. Accordingly, the properties bequeathed through partition, become the selfacquired properties of the respective sharers.

                            18. Apparently, the plaintiffs did not question the partition deed (Ex. P1) effected among the brothers. It states that the respective parties shall hereinafter enjoy the properties allotted to their share with a right to sell, lease, gift, encumber, etc. The partition deed further reveals that the suit property was allotted to C. Thippeswamy, one of the brothers of Defendant No.1; and Defendant No.1 was allotted 10 acres of land, which was different from the suit property measuring 7 acres 20 Guntas allotted to the said C. Thippeswamy. It also proceeds to state that after the death of the father Channappa, the joint family became unmanageable due to difference of opinion among the members and therefore, they decided that it was not good to stay together and partitioned the lands allotted to them. Thus, the intention of the parties and the recitals in the partition deed establish that the parties wanted to go their separate ways and did not want the property to remain as joint family property.

                            20. Regarding the doctrine of blending of self-acquired property with joint family, it is settled law that property separate or self- acquired of a member of joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein but to establish such abandonment a clear intention to waive separate rights must be established. From the mere fact that other members of the family were allowed to use the property jointly with himself, or that the income of the separate property was utilized out of generosity to support persons whom the holder was either bound or not bound to support, or from the failure to maintain separate accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for an act of generosity or kindness, will not ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal obligation [See: Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddy & Ors. v. Lakkireddi Lakshnama 15 and K.V. Narayanan v. K.V. Ranganandhan & Ors 16. In the present case, this question does not arise, as the suit property, which was purchased from C. Thippeswamy by Defendant No.1, is different from the property which is said to have been received by Defendant No.1 through a Will that allegedly blended with the joint family property. The plaintiffs have not adduced any evidence to show that the property received through the Will, blended with the joint family properties and that income was received from that property, which was utilized to purchase the suit property. There is no finding on this aspect by the High Court as well. On the other hand, as stated above, we are satisfied with the evidence on record that the suit property is a self-acquired property. However, the High Court erroneously applied the doctrine of blending under the Hindu joint family law by relying upon judgments that are not applicable to the case on hand, re-appreciated evidence without framing any substantial question of law and allowed the1964 (2) SCR 172 (1977) 1 SCC 244 appeal filed by the plaintiffs. This, according to us, is not sustainable for the aforesaid reasons.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that the trial Court had rightly dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. According to him, the partition dated 25.03.1980 was not in accordance with law and the plaintiff, being a coparcener, has a subsisting right in the suit properties.

6. The only point that arises for consideration is whether the respondent/plaintiff is entitled to seek partition of the suit properties, when a partition had already been effected on 25.03.1980 among the grandfather, father and uncle of the plaintiff. When the partition was effected on 25.03.1980, the view taken by the trial Court that the Mitakshara School of Law alone would apply is not factually or legally correct in the light of the settled principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Angadi Chandranna’s case (cited supra).

7. Once the partition had taken place and the properties stood divided, the respondent/plaintiff had no subsisting cause of action to institute the suit. The respondent/plaintiff does not fall within the category of Class-I legal heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act and, therefore, the initiation of the suit itself is without cause of action.

8. The relevant portion of the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, namely Vinod Infra Developers Limited v. Mahaveer Lunia and others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1208 is extracted hereunder:

                            9.5. Furthermore, Section 23 of the Registration Act mandates that any document required to be registered must be presented for registration within four months from the date of its execution. This requirement has not been fulfilled in the present case, as the power of attorney and the agreement to sell, both executed in 2014, remain unregistered. Despite the execution of the agreement to sell on 24.05.2014, no attempt was made by Respondent No.1 to have it registered within the stipulated period. This inaction further supports the appellant’s contention that the said agreement is not only inadmissible under Section 17 and 49 of the Act, but also legally ineffective due to non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of timely registration. The failure to seek specific performance or register the document within the period prescribed under Section 23 renders the foundational document unenforceable in law. That apart, the revocation of the Board Resolution and Power of Attorney prior to the execution of the impugned sale deeds vitiates the authority under which those deeds were executed by Respondent No.1. Accordingly, serious triable issues arise, which must be adjudicated by a competent civil court.

                            9.6. However, the High Court erred in treating the second cause of action – pertaining to the sale deeds registered on 19.07.2022 – as merely “academic”, and proceeded to reject the plaint in its entirety without undertaking a judicial examination of this distinct issue. This approach is contrary to the well settled legal principle that a plaint may be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC only if, on a plain reading of the plaint, it discloses no cause of action or falls within the other narrowly defined grounds under the said provision, such as under-valuation, insufficient court fees, or bar by any law. In this context, we may place reliance on the judgment in Central Bank of India (supra), wherein, this Court while examining the jurisdiction of civil courts in disputes involving immovable property and proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, held that a plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety merely because one of the prayers or reliefs sought is legally untenable, so long as other reliefs are maintainable and based on independent causes of action. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below:

                            “15. The plaintiff in her suit has prayed for 3 reliefs:

                            a) The first relief is in relation to a sale deed executed by Sumer Chand Jain in favour of Parmeshwar Das Prajapati.

                            b) The second relief is in relation to a mortgage deed executed by Parmeshwar Das Prajapati in favour of the bank.

                            c) The third relief is for being handed over the possession of the suit property.

                            24. Even if we would have been persuaded to take the view that the third relief is barred by Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act, still the plaint must survive because there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC. Hence, even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC. In the case on hand, the first and second reliefs as prayed for are clearly not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI ACT and are within the civil court’s jurisdiction. Hence, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.

                            25. If the civil court is of the view that one relief (say relief A) is not barred by law but is of the view that Relief B is barred by law, the civil court must not make any observations to the effect that relief B is barred by law and must leave that issue undecided in an Order VII, Rule 11 application. This is because if the civil court cannot reject a plaint partially, then by the same logic, it ought not to make any adverse observations against relief B.”

                            Therefore, the High Court’s wholesale rejection of the plaint, without appreciating that the reliefs claimed flowed from multiple and distinct causes of action – particularly one arising after the revocation of the power of attorney – amounts to an improper application of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Selective severance of reliefs is impermissible where different causes of action are independently pleaded and supported by distinct facts.

                            9.7. Although the private respondents contend that the power of attorney was notarized, a consent letter was executed, and the transaction was reflected in the income tax records – while also asserting possession over the subject property and alleging that the suit was instituted merely to harass and disturb such possession – these are all matters that require adjudication during trial. Such factual disputes cannot be resolved at the stage of considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, these contentions, even if raised, do not furnish a valid ground for rejection of the plaint at the threshold.

                            14. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside, and the order of the Additional District Judge is restored. Consequently, the plaint is directed to be taken on the file of the trial Court, which shall proceed with the suit in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observations made in this judgment. The parties shall bear their own costs.

                            and he placed the reliance of another judgement in Correspondent, RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar and others reported in 2025 (3) CTC 619 and relevant portion of which is extracted hereunder:

                            15. Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC mandates rejection of the plaint where it does not disclose a cause of action. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India & Another24, this Court pointed out that cause of action means every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support their right to judgment. It consists of bundle of facts which narrate the circumstances and the reasons for filing such suit. It is the foundation on which the entire suit would rest. Therefore, it goes without saying that merely including a paragraph on cause of action is not sufficient but rather, on a meaningful reading of the plaint and the documents, it must disclose a cause of action. The plaint should contain such cause of action that discloses all the necessary facts required in law to sustain the suit and not mere statements of fact which fail to disclose a legal right of the plaintiff to sue and breach or violation by the defendant(s). It is pertinent to note here that even if a right is found, unless there is a violation or breach of that right by the defendant, the cause of action should be deemed to be unreal. This is where the substantive laws like Specific Relief Act, 1963, Contract Act, 1872, and Transfer of Property Act, 1882, come into operation. A pure question of law that can be decided at the early stage of litigation, ought to be decided at the earliest stage. In the present case, the respondents' claim based on an agreement to sell. The legal effect of such an agreement must be examined in light of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which explicitly states that a contract for the sale of immovable property does not, of itself, create any (2006) 6 SCC 207 interest in or charge on such property. This principle has been consistently upheld by this Court in the following judgments:

                            (i) Rambhau Namdeo Gajre (supra) “13. The agreement to sell does not create an interest of the proposed vendee in the suit property. As per Section 54 of the Act, the title in immovable property valued at more than Rs 100 can be conveyed only by executing a registered sale deed. Section 54 specifically provides that a contract for sale of immovable property is a contract evidencing the fact that the sale of such property shall take place on the terms settled between the parties, but does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. It is not disputed before us that the suit land sought to be conveyed is of the value of more than Rs 100. Therefore, unless there was a registered document of sale in favour of Pishorrilal (the proposed transferee) the title of the suit land continued to vest in Narayan Bapuji Dhotra (original plaintiff) and remain in his ownership. This point was examined in detail by this Court in State of U.P. v. District Judge [(1997) 1 SCC 496] and it was held thus:

                            (SCC pp. 499-500, para 7) “7. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions we find that the High Court with respect had patently erred in taking the view that because of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act the proposed transferees of the land had acquired an interest in the lands which would result in exclusion of these lands from the computation of the holding of the tenure-holder transferor on the appointed day. It is obvious that an agreement to sell creates no interest in land. As per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the property in the land gets conveyed only by registered sale deed. It is not in dispute that the lands sought to be covered were having value of more than Rs 100. Therefore, unless there was a registered document of sale in favour of the proposed transferee agreement-holders, the title of the lands would not get divested from the vendor and would remain in his ownership. There is no dispute on this aspect. However, strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for Respondent 3 on Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. We fail to appreciate how that section can at all be relevant against the third party like the appellant State. That section provides for a shield of protection to the proposed transferee to remain in possession against the original owner who has agreed to sell these lands to the transferee if the proposed transferee satisfies other conditions of Section 53-A. That protection is available as a shield only against the transferor, the proposed vendor, and would disentitle him from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferees who are put in possession pursuant to such an agreement. But that has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the said lands till they are legally conveyed by sale deed to the proposed transferees. Such a right to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed in service against a third party like the appellant State when it seeks to enforce the provisions of the Act against the tenure-holder, proposed transferor of these lands.” (emphasis supplied) There was no agreement between the appellant and the respondent in connection with the suit land. The doctrine of part-performance could have been availed of by Pishorrilal against his proposed vendor subject, of course, to the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned above. It could not be availed of by the appellant against the respondent with whom he has no privity of contract. The appellant has been put in possession of the suit land on the basis of an agreement of sale not by the respondent but by Pishorrilal, therefore, the privity of contract is between Pishorrilal and the appellant and not between the appellant and the respondent. The doctrine of part-performance as contemplated in Section 53-A can be availed of by the proposed transferee against his transferor or any person claiming under him and not against a third person with whom he does not have a privity of contract.”

                            (ii) Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Another25, wherein, this Court comprehensively examined the nature of rights created by an agreement to sell and concluded that such agreements create, at best, a personal right enforceable against the vendor. The relevant paragraphs read as under:

                            “16. Section 54 of TP Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam and Anr. (1977) 3 SCC 247, observed: (SCC pp.254-55, paras 32-33 & 37) “32. A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the (2012) 1 SCC 656 Transfer of Property Act. See Rambaran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra [1967]1 SCR 293. The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognised in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein.

                            33. In India, the word `transfer' is defined with reference to the word `convey'. The word `conveys' in Section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership...

                            37....that only on execution of conveyance, ownership passes from one party to another...."

                            17. In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra [2004 (8) SCC 614] this Court held:

                            "10. Protection provided under Section 53-A of the Act to the proposed transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the transferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee who is put in possession in pursuance to such an agreement. It has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the property till it is legally conveyed by executing a registered sale deed in favour of the transferee. Such a right to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed in service against a third party."

                            18. It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred.

                            19. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of Sections 54 and 55 of the TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under Section 53-A of the TP Act). According to the TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of the TP Act enacts that sale of immovable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject-matter.”

                            (iii) Cosmos Co. Operative Bank Ltd v. Central Bank of India & Ors26 “25. The observations made by this Court in Suraj Lamp (supra) in paras 16 and 19 are also relevant.

                            …..

                            26. Suraj Lamp (supra) later came to be referred to and relied upon by this Court in Shakeel Ahmed v. Syed Akhlaq Hussain, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1526 wherein the Court after referring to its earlier judgment held that the person relying upon the customary documents cannot claim to be the owner of the immovable property and consequently not maintain any claims against a third-party. The relevant paras read as under: — “10. Having considered the submissions at the outset, it is to be emphasized that irrespective of what was decided in the case of Suraj Lamps and Industries (supra) the fact remains that no title could be transferred with respect to immovable properties on the basis of an unregistered Agreement to Sell or on the basis of an unregistered General Power of Attorney. The Registration Act, 1908 clearly provides that a document which requires compulsory registration under the Act, would not confer any right, much less a legally enforceable right to approach a Court of Law on its basis. Even if these documents i.e., the Agreement to Sell and the Power of Attorney were registered, still it could not be said that the respondent would have acquired title over the property in question. At best, on the basis of the registered agreement to sell, he could have claimed relief of specific performance in appropriate proceedings. In this regard, reference may be made to sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act and section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

                            11. Law is well settled that no right, title or interest in immovable property can be conferred without a registered document. Even the judgment of this Court in the case of Suraj Lamps & Industries (supra) lays down the same proposition. Reference may also be made to the following judgments of this Court:

                            (i). Ameer Minhaj v. Deirdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar (2018) 7 SCC 639

                            (ii). Balram Singh v. Kelo Devi Civil Appeal No. 6733 of 2022

                            (iii). Paul Rubber Industries Private Limited v. Amit Chand Mitra, SLP(C) No. 15774 of 2022.

                            12. The embargo put on registration of documents would not override the statutory provision so as to confer title on the basis of unregistered documents with respect to immovable property. Once this is the settled position, the respondent could not have maintained the suit for possession and mesne profits against the appellant, who was admittedly in possession of the property in question whether as an owner or a licensee.

2025 SCC OnLine SC 352

                            13. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondent that the judgment in Suraj Lamps & Industries (supra) would be prospective is also misplaced. The requirement of compulsory registration and effect on non-registration emanates from the statutes, in particular the Registration Act and the Transfer of Property Act. The ratio in Suraj Lamps & Industries (supra) only approves the provisions in the two enactments. Earlier judgments of this Court have taken the same view.” 15.1. Undoubtedly, a sale deed, which amounts to conveyance, has to be a registered document, as mandated under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. On the other hand, an agreement for sale, which also requires to be registered, does not amount to a conveyance as it is merely a contractual document, by which one party, namely the vendor, agrees or assures or promises to convey the property described in the schedule of such agreement to the other party, namely the purchaser, upon the latter performing his part of the obligation under the agreement fully and in time. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 explicitly lays down that a contract for sale will not confer any right or interest. Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 offers protection only to a proposed transferee who has part performed his part of the promise and has been put into possession, against the actions of transferor, acting against the interest of the transferee. For the proposed transferee to seek any protection against the transferor, he must have either performed his part of obligation in full or in part. The applicability of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is subject to certain conditions viz., (a) the agreement must be in writing with the owner of the property or in other words, the transferor must be either the owner or his authorised representative, (b) the transferee must have been put into possession or must have acted in furtherance of the agreement and made some developments,

                            (c) the protection under Section 53-A is not an exemption to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or in other words, a transferee, put into possession with the knowledge of a pending list, is not entitled to any protection, (d) the transferee must be in possession when the list is initiated against his transferor and must be willing to perform the remaining part of his obligation, (e) the transferee must be entitled to seek specific performance or in other words, must not be barred by any of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 from seeking such performance. The protection under Section 53-A is not available against a third party who may have an adversarial claim against the vendor. Therefore, unless and until the sale deed is executed, the purchaser is not vested with any right, title or interest in the property except to the limited extent of seeking specific performance from his vendor. An agreement for sale does not confer any right to the purchaser to file a suit against a third party who is either the owner or in possession, or who claims to be the owner and to be in possession. In such cases, the vendor will have to approach the court and not the proposed transferee. 15.2. In the present case, juxtaposing the above legal principles to the facts of the case, we find that the respondents' claim suffers from multiple fatal defects that go to the root of the case, which are as follows:

                            The above judgments only reiterate the principle that triable issues must be adjudicated at trial. However, in the present case, the respondent/plaintiff lacks the very foundation to institute the suit, as there is no cause of action.

9. In view of the above, the plaint is liable to be struck off and the order passed by the trial Court warrants interference. Accordingly, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No costs.