Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. The petitioner herein is the mother of one Akshay @ Achu ('detenu' for the sake of brevity), and her challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against Ext.P1 order of detention dated 30.10.2025, passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAAP Act’ for brevity). The said detention order stands confirmed by the Government vide order dated 06.01.2026, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that it was on 14.08.2025 that a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Thrissur Rural, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. Altogether, four cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.600/2025 of Cherpu Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 115(1), 109(1), 118(1), 309(4), 351(3), 332(b) r/w 3(5) of the of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

3. We heard Sri. M. H. Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that Ext.P1 order of detention was passed without proper application of mind and on improper consideration of facts. The learned counsel contended that, among the copies of the relied-upon documents served on the detenu, some were illegible, and that the non-service of legible copies of relied-upon documents constitutes a sufficient ground to interfere with the impugned order. The learned counsel further urged that an application seeking cancellation of bail was already pending and, therefore, there was no necessity to invoke the provisions of the KAA(P) Act in haste, as cancellation of bail itself would have been an effective remedy to prevent the detenu from repeating criminal activities. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that although the father of the detenu had submitted a representation to the Government, the same has not been considered, nor has its fate been communicated to him till date. According to the counsel, the non- consideration of the representation by the Government is fatal, and the same itself is a ground to set aside Ext.P1 order. On these premises, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

5. In response, the learned Government Pleader submitted that Ext. P1 detention order was issued by the jurisdictional authority after complying with all procedural requirements and upon arriving at the requisite objective, as well as subjective satisfaction. The learned Government Pleader contended that, at the time of issuing the detention order, the authority was fully aware that the detenu was already in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. It was only after being satisfied that there existed a real and imminent likelihood of the detenu being released on bail and that, if so released, he would, in all probability, engage in further criminal activities, that the authority proceeded to pass the detention order. Therefore, according to the learned Government Pleader, the detention order remains legally sustainable notwithstanding the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody when the impugned order was issued. The learned Government Pleader further submitted that the contention of the petitioner that legible copies of the relied-upon documents were not supplied to the detenu is absolutely baseless and the said contention is liable to be discarded. The learned Government Pleader further contended that the mere pendency of a bail cancellation application does not preclude the detaining authority from passing a detention order, as cancellation of bail is not always an effective remedy to curb the criminal activities of habitual offenders. According to the Government Pleader, the order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction, and hence, warrants no interference.

6. As already stated, four cases in which the detenu got involved have formed the basis for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.600/2025 of Cherpu Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 115(1), 109(1), 118(1), 309(4), 351(3), 332(b) r/w 3(5) of the BNS. The incident that led to the registration of the said case occurred on 30.07.2025. The detenu, who was arrayed as the 1st accused in the said case, was arrested on 31.07.2025, and since then, he has been under judicial custody. It was on 14.08.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, that the proposal for proceedings under the KAA(P) Act was initiated. Later, on 30.10.2025, the detention order was passed.

7. It is well settled through a catena of judicial pronouncements that, while passing a detention order against a person who is already under judicial custody, the detaining authority must consider: (i) whether there exists a real and imminent possibility of the detenu being released on bail; and (ii) if so released, whether there is a likelihood of his indulging in prejudicial or criminal activities again. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that, at the time of passing the said order, the detaining authority was fully aware that the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity registered against him. The order specifically records that the bail application filed by the detenu had been dismissed by the Sessions Court, Thrissur; nevertheless, the authority noted the possibility of the detenu approaching higher courts seeking bail and obtaining bail. Further, the impugned order clearly states that, in the event of the detenu being released on bail, there is every likelihood of his again engaging in criminal activities. Therefore, it is evident that the detention order was passed after due and proper application of mind. The impugned order itself reflects that the circumstances warranting the issuance of a detention order against a person already in judicial custody have been adequately considered and explained.

8. One of the contentions taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that some of the copies of the relied-upon documents served on the detenu are not legible and hence the detenu was handicapped from filing an effective representation before the Government and the Advisory Board. Undisputedly, the obligation of the detaining authority to furnish legible copies of relied-upon documents to the detenu is not a mere formality. Only when the said procedure is scrupulously complied with, the detenu can file an effective representation before the Advisory Board and the Government. The right of the detenu to file an effective representation before the Government as well as the Advisory Board is a constitutional right under Article 22(5) and also a statutory right.

9. However, in order to verify the correctness of the contention that the copies of the relied-upon documents served on the detenu are illegible, we have perused the file made available before us by the learned Government Pleader. On such perusal, we are satisfied that the copies of the few pages of the relied-upon documents that find a place in the file, though faded, are still readable. Therefore, it cannot be said that the detenu was handicapped in making an effective representation before the Government or the Advisory Board. Hence, the contention of the petitioner in the above regard also would fail.

10. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, though in the detention order it is mentioned that an application has been submitted for cancellation of bail granted to the detenu in one of the cases registered against him, the jurisdictional authority passed Ext.P1 order without considering the said fact properly. According to the counsel, as an alternative remedy of cancellation of bail was available to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities, a drastic measure of preventive detention was not at all necessitated.

11. We are not oblivious to the fact that when an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to detention under preventive detention laws is neither warranted nor permissible. However, merely because a bail cancellation petition is pending, it cannot be said that an order of detention under the KAA(P) Act cannot be passed. When there is an imminent danger of repetition of criminal activities by a person who can be classified as ‘known goonda’ or ‘known rowdy’, cancellation of bail orders already secured by him would not be sufficient to deter such a person from indulging in criminal activities. The reason is that, first of all, the purpose and scope of an application for cancellation of bail and preventive detention are different. That apart, the bail cancellation procedure, having regard to the ground realities, is a time-consuming one. There is no assurance that an order of cancellation of bail could be secured in time before the person concerned indulges in another criminal activity. Preventive detention laws are enacted to address such exigencies. It is on account of these reasons that it has been held by the courts consistently that the authorities under the preventive detention laws need not have to wait till orders are passed on the application for cancellation of bail, for passing an order of detention. If it is held that, if there is an option for cancellation of bail, a detention order cannot be passed, it would render the preventive detention laws ineffective. Moreover, even after the cancellation of bail, there is no legal impediment in granting bail subsequently. Therefore, the pendency of the bail cancellation petition has no much significance and the same, by itself, will not constitute a valid ground to interfere with the detention order. Moreover, the impugned order specifically records that the bail cancellation proceedings have been pending for several months and are likely to take considerable time for completion. Therefore, it is evident that the detaining authority passed the detention order only after being fully satisfied that the proceedings initiated for cancellation of bail are time-consuming and do not constitute an effective or immediate remedy to prevent the detenu from continuing his criminal activities.

12. While considering the contention in the writ petition that the representation submitted by the father of the detenu was not considered by the Government within a reasonable time, and the fate of the representation was not timely communicated to him, it is to be noted that the right of a detenu to get his representation considered by the Government is a constitutional as well statutory right. However, the records reveal that the contention of the petitioner that the representation was not considered by the Government appears to be baseless. The copy of the said representation (Ext.P3), which is appended with the writ petition, reveals that the same is dated 13.11.2025. It is significant to note that, as evident from the records, Ext.P3 representation was received by the Government only on 18.11.2025. Prior to the date and receipt of the said representation, on 11.11.2025, the Government had referred the matter to the Advisory Board for opinion. Therefore, it is demonstrably clear that prior to the receipt of Ext.P3 representation, the matter was referred by the Government to the Advisory Board.

13. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in K. M. Abdulla Kunhi v. Union of India (1991 (1) SCC 476). In the said case in paragraph 16, the Supreme Court observed as follows;

                  “The time imperative for consideration of representation can never be absolute or obsessive. It depends upon the necessities and the time at which the representation is made. The representation may be received before the case is referred to the advisory board, but there may not be time to dispose of the representation before referring the case to the advisory board. In that situation, the representation must also be forwarded to the advisory board along with the case of the detenu. The representation may be received after the case of the detenu is referred to the board. Even in this situation, the representation should be forwarded to the advisory board, provided the board has not concluded the proceedings. In both the situations, there is no question of consideration of the representation before the date of receipt of the report of the advisory board. Nor it could not be said that the Government had delayed the consideration of the representation, unnecessarily awaiting the report of the board. It is proper for the Government in such situation to await the report of the board.”

14. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Golam Biswas v. Union of India and another (reported in 2015 KHC 5588).

15. Keeping in mind the above principle, while reverting to the case at hand, as already noted, Ext.P3 representation was received by the Government only on 18.11.2025. The matter had been referred to the Advisory Board prior to the receipt of the said representation. As the matter was already seized of by the Advisory Board, the Government  is  justified  in  not  considering  the  representation immediately. The Advisory Board formed its opinion and forwarded the same to the Government on 24.12.2025. Thereafter, the Government confirmed the order of detention vide order dated 06.01.2026. A perusal of the confirmation order reveals that it was after considering Ext.P3 representation submitted by the father of the detenu and the opinion of the Advisory Board that the detention order was confirmed. Moreover, by producing a copy of the letter dated 07.01.2026, the learned Government Pleader had succeeded in convincing us that the fate of the representation was duly communicated to the detenu. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the representation submitted by the father of the detenu was not considered by the Government will not be sustained.

                  In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.