Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. The petitioner herein is the mother of one Jithin @ Jithu, S/o. Velaudhan ('detenu' for the sake of brevity) and her challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against Ext.P1 order of detention dated 23.09.2025 passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The said order stands confirmed by the Government, vide order dated 24.11.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months with effect from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that on 03.09.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Palakkad, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known rowdy' as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act.

3. Altogether, four cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.871/2025 of Palakkad Town South Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 110 r/w 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita(BNS).

4. We heard Sri. M. H. Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor.

5. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another, [1991 (1) SCC 128], the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, though in Ext.P1 order, it is mentioned that the detenu was undergoing judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, the possibility of the detenu being released on bail is not properly considered. The learned counsel further submitted that there is an unreasonable delay in mooting the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act as well as in passing the impugned order of detention, and the said delay will certainly snap the livelink between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention. Moreover, the learned counsel urged that copies of some of the relied-upon documents served on the detenu are illegible and, hence, the detenu was incapacitated from filing effective representations before the Government and the Advisory Board. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that although the petitioner had submitted a representation to the Government, the same has not been considered, nor has its fate been communicated to him till date. According to the counsel, the non- consideration of the representation by the Government is fatal, and the same itself is a ground to set aside Ext.P1 order. On these premises, it was argued that Ext.P1 order is liable to be set aside.

6. In response, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that Ext.P1 detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, there is no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the detention order and the detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being fully satisfied that the same is the only way to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. It was further submitted that the jurisdictional authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, and it was on being satisfied that there is every chance that the detenu be released on bail, and if so released, he would in all probability indulge in criminal activities further, the order of detention was passed. Therefore, the order of detention will legally sustain irrespective of the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity while the impugned order was passed. The learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the contention of the petitioner that some of the copies of the relied-upon documents were illegible is also baseless and cannot be sustained. According to the Public Prosecutor, the contention of the petitioner that her representation was not considered by the Government is absolutely baseless and devoid of any merit. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the representation was considered by the Government and its fate was duly communicated to the detenu.

7. Before delving into a discussion regarding the rival contentions raised from both sides, it is to be noted that, as evident from the records, the present detention order is the second detention order passed against the detenu, although the earlier detention order was subsequently set aside by this Court. Curiously, within twelve days of the quashing of the earlier detention order, the detenu got involved in a criminal activity and the same led to the registration of a case as crime No.871/2025 of Palakkad Town South Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 110 r/w 3(5) of BNS. The incident that led to the registration of the said case was occurred on 27.07.2025. However, after the commission of the said offence, the detenu, who is arrayed as the first accused in that case, went absconding and he was subsequently arrested on 05.09.2025. It was on 03.09.2025, that the sponsoring authority mooted the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act against the detenu. The sequence of the events narrated above clearly demonstrates that there is no delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the detention order.     Moreover, some minimum time is required for collecting the details of the cases in which the detenu got involved and for verification of the records. Therefore, the minimal delay that occurred in mooting the proposal is negligible, and it cannot be said that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention has been snapped.

8. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves around this Writ Petition is whether an order of detention under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. While answering the said question, it is to be noted that, through a series of judicial pronouncements rendered by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court, it is well settled that there is no legal impediment in passing an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. However, an order of detention against a person who is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity cannot be passed in a causal manner. Undisputedly, an order of detention under the KAA(P) Act is a drastic measure against a citizen as it heavily impacts his personal as well as his fundamental rights. When an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to preventive detention is neither warranted nor permissible.        When a detenu is in jail in connection with the last prejudicial activity, obviously, there is no imminent possibility of being involved in criminal activities. Therefore, before passing a detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the concerned authority must satisfy itself that there is a real possibility that the detenu is on bail, and further, if released on bail, the material on record reveals that he will indulge in prejudicial activity if not detained. The circumstances that necessitate the passing of such an order must be reflected in the order itself.

9. In Kamarunnissa’s case (cited supra), the Supreme Court made it clear that a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed even in the case of a person in custody (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in probability indulged in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording its satisfaction in this regard, such an order would be valid.

10. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Veeramani v. The State of Tamil Nadu [1994 (2) SCC 337] and in Union of India v. Paul Manickam [2003 (8) SCC 342].

11. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, while reverting to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.871/2025 of Palakkad Town South Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 110 r/w 3(5) of BNS and Section 3 of the Explosive Substance Act. As already stated, the detenu, who was arrayed as the first accused in the said case, was arrested on 05.09.2025, and since then, he has been under judicial custody. The impugned order was passed on 23.09.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody.

12. In Ext.P1 detention order, it is specifically stated that at the time of passing the said order, the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity. Therefore, it is decipherable that the detaining authority was fully cognizant of the fact that the detenu was in custody at the time when it passed Ext.P1 order.

13. Moreover, in the impugned order, it is clearly mentioned that the co-accused in the case were already granted bail by this Court and there is every likelihood of the detenu also getting bail in the said case. In the order, it is further recorded that, if the detenu is released on bail, and upon his release, he would, in all probability, indulge in antisocial activities. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the jurisdictional authority passed the detention order after being satisfied of the triple test mentioned in Kamarunnissa’s case, which we have detailed above.

14. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that some of the copies of the relied-upon documents served on the detenu are not legible and hence the detenu was handicapped from filing an effective representation before the Government and the advisory board. The obligation of the detaining authority to furnish legible copies of relied-upon documents to the detenu is not a mere formality. Only when the said procedure is scrupulously complied with, the detenu can file an effective representation before the Advisory Board and the Government. The right of the detenu to file an effective representation before the Government as well as the Advisory Board is a constitutional right under Article 22(5) and also a statutory right.

15. However, in order to verify the correctness of the contention of the petitioner in the above regard, we have perused the original records of the case made available before us by the learned Public Prosecutor. From a perusal of the records, we found that the copies of the relied-upon documents, which find a place in the said records, are legible. Moreover, the petitioner has not appended the alleged illegible documents served on him along with the writ petition to substantiate his contention. In view of this, we are of the opinion that the petitioner’s contention that certain pages of the relied-upon documents served on the detenu were illegible is wholly without merit.

16. While considering the contention in the writ petition that the representation submitted by the petitioner was not considered by the Government, and the fate of the representation was not timely communicated to the detenu, it is to be noted that the right of a detenu to get his representation considered by the Government is a constitutionally as well as statutorily recognised one. However, the records reveal that the contention of the petitioner that the representation of the petitioner was not considered by the Government appears to be baseless.

17. From a copy of the letter dated 26.11.2025 addressed to the mother of the detenu, and made available before us for verification by the learned Government Pleader, it can be seen that Ext.P3 representation was duly considered by the Government and its fate was communicated to the detenu’s mother. Likewise, a perusal of the confirmation order reveals that the representation submitted by the petitioner is shown as ‘Read 5’ in the said order. In the confirmation order, it is clearly stated that the said order was passed after considering the relevant records, including the opinion of the Advisory Board and after considering the representation submitted on behalf of the detenu. Even the detenu does not have a case that the copy of the said confirmation order was not served on him. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the representation submitted by the detenu was neither considered nor its fate was communicated cannot be sustained.

                  In the result, we have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner has not made out any ground for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.