Common Judgment:

Gadi Praveen Kumar, J.

1. Since these Civil Miscellaneous Appeals arise out of the common order dated 06.03.2025, they are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. Heard Sri Thomas George, learned counsel for the appellant duly assisted by Sri Manav Gecil Thomas, Sri Sunil B. Ganu, learned Senior Counsel representing Ms.Manjiri S.Ganu, learned counsel for the respondents, duly assisted by Sri T.S.Praveen Kumar, learned counsel, and Sri E.Ajay Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Ms.E.Anisha Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent No.2.

3. Both the CMAs are filed being aggrieved by the common order passed in I.A.Nos.540 and 541 of 2020 in O.S.No.146 of 2020 dated 06.03.2025 by the XI Additional District & Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar, which were filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC seeking to restrain the respondents from proceeding with construction or changing nature of schedule property and also to restrain the respondents from alienating, mortgaging or creating any third party interest over the schedule property.

4. The lis arises out of a long-standing dispute concerning extensive extents of land situated at AraziMaktaKokapet, now known as Kokapet Village, within Gandipet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, forming part of the erstwhile Hyderabad State and presently within the State of Telangana.The lands involve portions of Survey Nos.31, 36 and 37(property) forming part of a larger extent historically described as AraziMaktaKokapet,the character, ownership, possession, and legal incidents attached to the said lands form the core of the dispute.

5. The appellant/plaintiff claims rights over the suit schedule lands basing on the registered sale deeds executed in the month of October 1965, whereas the respondents/defendants assert independent title, possession and enjoyment through separate chains of conveyance, revenue records, and statutory permissions.

6. The appellant/petitioner contends before the trial court that having purchased part of the property under a registered sale deed dated 20.10.1965 and the remaining extent having been purchased by his sister under a registered sale deed dated 19.10.1965. It was pleaded that the petitioner and his sister were in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the properties ever since the purchases and that, upon the death of his sister in the year 2018, the petitioner became the absolute owner of her share also by virtue of a Will dated 09.12.2017, which was duly probated by the High Court of Bombay.

7. It was further contended that taking advantage of the abnormal escalation of land values and the absence of the petitioner, certain third parties and land grabbers created false and fabricated documents and, in collusion with the respondents, illegally entered upon the suit schedule property in the year 2018. The petitioner asserted that earlier interference in the year 2011 was resisted by filing O.S. No.337 of 2011 for injunction, which was decreed in his favour, thereby recognising his possession.

8. The petitioner contends that despite issuance of public notice and reply thereto asserting his ownership and possession, the respondents proceeded to purchase the property under registered sale deeds of the year 2016, which, according to the petitioner, are void and not binding, as the vendors themselves had no title. It was contended that based on such invalid documents, the respondents obtained construction permissions from HMDA and commenced construction, compelling the petitioner to approach the High Court and thereafter the civil court as advised.

9. It was contended that he had never conveyed or transferred the suit schedule property to any person and that the respondents are rank trespassers, who are attempting to change the nature of the property and create third-party rights. The petitioner pleaded that he has made out a strong prima facie case, that balance of convenience lies in his favour, and that irreparable loss would be caused if the respondents are not restrained from proceeding with construction and alienation.

10. On these premises, the petitioner sought temporary injunction restraining the respondents from changing the nature of the suit schedule property and from alienating or creating third-party interest therein pending disposal of the suit.

11. The respondent No.1/defendant No.1 filed counter-affidavit before the Trial Court and the same was adopted by the respondents/defendants No.1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 36. The respondents contentedthat the suit, as framed, is wholly misconceived, legally untenable, and founded on incorrect and suppressed facts. Though the petitioner asserts that he was dispossessed in the year 2018, the respondents categorically denied the same and pleaded that the suit schedule property has been in the continuous possession and enjoyment of the respondents and their predecessors in title from as early as 1979–1981 onwards. It was specifically pleaded that neither the petitioner nor his predecessors were ever in possession of the suit lands and that the plea of dispossession is a false and invented claim intended to bring the suit within limitation.

12. The respondents further contended that the petitioner’s claim of title is fundamentally flawed, as his alleged vendors themselves had no title or possession over the suit schedule property. It was asserted that late NawabNusrat Jung-I was never the owner or possessor of the subject lands and that the so-called twenty-eight persons projected as his legal heirs are fictitious and had no legal relationship or interest in the property. Consequently, theyhad no authority to execute any power of attorney. The alleged power of attorney relied upon by the petitioner was stated to be vague, not describing the property, survey numbers or extent, tracing no title, created for a limited purpose, and not subsisting on the date of execution of the alleged sale deeds of 1965, rendering the said sale deeds void and inoperative.

13. The respondents contended that the title to the subject lands, particularly in Survey No.31 admeasuring Ac.16-13 guntas, vested in one Mohammed Azam Saab, whose name stood recorded as pattadar and possessor in the KhasraPahani for the year 1954-55. After his death, his legal heirs alienated various extents of land through registered sale deeds commencing from the year 1979 onwards. Thereafter, the property changed hands through a series of registered conveyances in the years 1981, 1984, 1986, 1989, 1997, 2004 and 2006, all supported by mutations in revenue records, issuance of pattadar passbooks and title deeds, and continuous enjoyment by successive purchasers.

14. The respondents contended that entities such as M/s. Prabhakar Investment Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Padmalaya Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (later known as M/s. Yamuna Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.), M/s. Ruby Agro Farms Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Diamond Farms Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Pearl Farms Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Neptune Projects Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Uranus Projects Pvt. Ltd. derived valid title under registered instruments, carried on agricultural operations, developed orchards and farmhouses, and their possession stood reflected in revenue records for decades. Ultimately, under registered sale deeds dated 22.08.2016, the respondents acquired the suit schedule extents, after which further alienations and development agreements were executed, resulting in creation of third-party rights, construction of residential complexes, and occupation by purchasers.

15. It was therefore contended that the petitioner, having neither title nor possession, cannot seek declaration or injunction in respect of lands which stood alienated long prior to the institution of the suit. It was urged that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, that the petitioner failed to establish any prima facie case or balance of convenience, and that no irreparable injury would be caused to him by refusal of injunction, whereas grant of injunction would seriously prejudice the respondents and innocent third parties. Accordingly, the respondents prayed for dismissal of the interlocutory applications.

16. Respondent No.2/defendant No.2 filed a separate counter-affidavit before the Trial Court contending that the suit schedule property forms part of patta lands originally owned and possessed by one Mohammed Azam Saab, whose name stood recorded as pattadar and possessor in the KhasraPahani for the year 1954–55 and in successive pahanipatrikas till 1978–79. Upon his death on 12.03.1973, his legal heirs succeeded to the estate and alienated various extents through registered sale deeds commencing from the year 1979 onwards. From that point, the property passed through an unbroken chain of registered conveyances, mutations, and revenue entries, culminating in acquisition by the respondents and their predecessors, all of whom were reflected as pattadars and possessors in the official revenue records.

17. It was contended that the lands in Survey Nos.31 and 37, to the extent relevant to the present proceedings, were successively alienated in favour of Dr. M. Nagarathnamma, Sri K.P. HarikrishnaBabu, M/s. Prabhakar Investments Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Padmalaya Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., and thereafter in favour of various corporate entities, including M/s. Ruby Agro Farms Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Diamond Farms Pvt. Ltd., and M/s. Pearl Farms Pvt. Ltd., all under registered instruments. Each such alienation was followed by mutation in revenue records, issuance of pattadar passbooks and title deeds, and continuous possession and enjoyment of the land, including agricultural operations and development activities.

18. Respondent No.2 further contended that it acquired title to specific extents under registered sale deeds dated 22.08.2016 and thereafter entered into development agreements, while Respondent No.1 obtained development rights from several landowners, consolidated contiguous extents, secured statutory permissions from HMDA, and commenced construction of a multi-storied residential complex. It was asserted that substantial construction has been completed and third-party rights have been created pursuant to valid development agreements and conveyances, thereby altering the nature of the property long prior to the institution of the suit.

19. It was specifically contended that the petitioner’s claim of title based on Muntakhab No.57 of 1955 and the sale deeds of the year 1965 is wholly untenable. According to Respondent No.2, the said Muntakhab has been declared void and unenforceable by governmental orders and judicial pronouncements, which attained finality up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It was pleaded that neither NawabNusrat Jung-I nor his alleged legal heirs were ever reflected in the revenue records as owners or possessors of the lands in Kokapet Village and that the petitioner failed to establish any flow of title or possession from the said Muntakhab.

20. Respondent No.2 therefore contended that the petitioner, whose name never figured in revenue records and whose vendors themselves had no right, title, or interest, cannot seek declaration or injunction against the respondents, who trace their title through lawful conveyances and long-standing possession. It was urged that the suit and interlocutory applications are an abuse of process, filed after noticing extensive development, and that no prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable injury is made out. Accordingly, Respondent No.2 prayed for dismissal of the petition with exemplary costs.

21. Basing on the above pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following point for its consideration:

“Whether the petitions can be allowed as prayed for restraining the respondents from changing the nature of the petition schedule property and alienating or creating third party interest thereover?”

22. During the course of enquiry, the Trial Court marked Exs.P.1 to P.31 on behalf of the appellant and Exs.R.1 to R.90 & 90/A on behalf of the respondents.

23. While recording various contentions in the backdrop of the documents, the Trial Court finally held that the primafacie case and balance of convenience are not in favour of the appellant, though he can be, if at all, to be stated, a dispute worth gone into during trial but it is not substantial enough to restrain the respondents from alienating the suit schedule property to third parties or change the nature of the property, therefore, held that the balance of convenience is not sufficiently proved by the appellant/petitioner so as to order injunction against the respondents as prayed for. Therefore, the question of the appellant suffering loss or hardship is a remote possibility and accordingly, dismissed the applications.

24. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that AraziMaktaKokapet was originally purchased under registered sale deed vide document bearing No.948/65 dated 20.10.1965 and appellant’s sister, viz.,Ms.FaridhaDhanji Shaw Oomrigarpurchased land in Survey Nos.31 and 36 under registered sale deed dated 19.10.1965. It is further submitted that originally AraziMaktaKokapet was purchased in the year 1852 by NawabNusrat Jung-I as his self-acquired property and that the said land never formed part of any Jagir or Government land.

25. The learned counsel for the appellant, upon the demise of Nusrat Jung-I, succession disputes arose among legal heirs, leading to various enquiries before the competent authorities of the erstwhile Hyderabad State to determine the true legal heirs and the nature of the land.

26. Learned counsel further contends that after exhausting enquiries, the authoritative categorically held that the land was the self-acquired property of Nusrat Jung-I and that his legal heirs were entitled to succeed to the same. In support of the same, he placed strong reliance upon Atiyat/Inam proceedings, which further culminated in the issuance of Muntakhab No. 57 of 1955, declaring the legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I as the holders of AraziMaktaKokapet.

27. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Atiyat Court, being a Civil Court under the relevant statute, passed a final and binding order, and that no appeal was preferred within the statutory period, thereby rendering the Muntakhabas a final document and that the subsequent attempts by revenue authorities to question, cancel or refuse implementation of the Muntakhab were legally impermissible and contrary to statutory provisions.

28. The appellant further contends that multiple governmental correspondences, internal notes, and memoranda issued over several decades acknowledging the binding nature of the Muntakhab and directed its implementation, though such directions were not carried out in practice.Learned counsel also submits that administrative failure or inaction on the part of the State cannot defeat or dilute vested proprietary rights recognised by judicial or quasi-judicial orders.

29. Learned counsel for the appellant further contends that all the legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I executed General Powers of Attorney in favour of Sri J.H. Krishna Murthy, authorising him to manage, recover and alienate the lands covered by the Muntakhab.He asserts that acting under valid authority, the said Power of Attorney holder executed registered sale deeds in October 1965, conveying portions of the land in Survey Nos.31, 36, and 37 in favour of the appellant and his sister.

30. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the execution of registered sale deeds conferred absolute title, and symbolic or legal possession followed such conveyance, even if physical possession was subsequently disturbed.It is further contended that the appellant’s sister, who purchased land in Survey No. 31, passed away on 28.11.2018 after executing a Will bequeathing the property in favour of the appellant and that probate has been granted by a competent Court.

31. It is further contended that the appellant and his predecessors were constrained to reside outside Hyderabad for long periods, during which time unauthorised third parties began to interfere with the suit lands.Learned counsel relies upon earlier civil proceedings, including a suit for injunction filed in the year 2011, wherein injunction was granted against third-party interference, to contend that possession was recognised by Courts.

32. Learned counsel further submits that despite issuance of legal notices objecting to proposed alienations and developments, the respondents proceeded to execute sale deeds and obtain permissions without resolving the underlying title dispute.It is alleged that the statutory authorities granted permissions mechanically, without proper verification of title or consideration of objections raised by the appellant.

33. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that subsequent constructions, developments and creation of third-party interests by the respondents are illegal, void, and subject to the outcome of the suit pending before the learned Trial Court, therefore, prays that unless injunctive relief is granted, the suit itself would be rendered infructuous and that the appellant would be subjected to irreparable loss.

34. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 36, would contend that the subject suit filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession and therefore the entire burden lies upon the appellant to establish a clear, valid, and subsisting title.The respondents placed reliance on Muntakhab No.57 of 1955, without proof of its implementation or delivery of possession, does not confer actionable title capable of being enforced against the third parties.

35. Learned counsel for the respondents further assert that the alleged legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I never obtained possession pursuant to the Muntakhab and were themselves continuously approaching the Government for release of lands, which demonstrates lack of possession.It is specifically contended that the Power of Attorney relied upon for the 1965 sale deeds had limited validity, stood expired prior to execution of the sale deeds and was not executed by all persons named in the Muntakhab.According to the respondents, the alleged vendors under the 1965 sale deeds had no marketable or transferable title, and therefore could not convey any valid right to the appellant.

36. Learned counsel for the respondents also contendsthat no survey identification or demarcation of lands was ever effected pursuant to the Muntakhab, rendering the appellant’s claim vague and unenforceable.It is contended that revenue records, including KhasraPahani of 1954-55 and subsequent pahanis, consistently reflect possession of third parties and not the appellant or his predecessors.

37. It is further contended by the learned counsel that the respondents mainly rely upon mutation orders, registered sale deeds from the year 1981 onwards and continuous revenue entries to establish settled possession and enjoyment; and that prior civil proceedings resulted in findings that the heirs of Nusrat Jung-I were entitled only to commutation or monetary benefits and not to possession of the land.

38. Learned counsel finally submits that the appeal is misconceived and is liable to be dismissed, only on the ground that the appellant approached the Court with inordinate delay and acquiescence, disentitling him to equitable relief. Therefore, contended that the learned Trial Court has rightly dismissed the applications, since, the appellant has failed to satisfy the three requirements,viz.,primafacie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss would be caused if injunction is not granted.

39. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 submits that the respondent No.2 is a bona fide purchaser/developer which acquired rights through registered conveyances from persons whose names stood recorded as pattedars and possessors in revenue records.It is asserted that revenue entries beginning from the KhasraPahani of 1954-55 onwards constitute primary record-of-rights, carrying statutory presumption of correctness.

40. Learned counsel for the Respondent No.2 further submits that neither the name of the appellant nor his predecessors were ever reflected in revenue records at any point of time and that the respondent No.2 obtained all statutory permissions and sanctions, including development permissions and occupancy certificates, after thorough verification by the competent authorities.

41. Learned counselalso asserts that substantial construction has been completed and that third-party purchasers have acquired flats and formed associations, thereby creating irreversible third-party rights.It is vehemently contended that granting injunction at this stage would severely prejudice innocent purchasers who are not parties to the original transactions of 1965 and that the appellant had deemed notice of registered transactions under the Registration Act and Transfer of Property Act.

42. According to the learned counsel for the respondent No.2, the suit and interlocutory applications wereinstituted making an attempt to unsettle the settled rights after decades of silence and therefore contended that damages, if any, would be an adequate remedy and that injunctive relief is wholly unwarranted and submits that the Trial Court has rightly exercised its discretion and refused to grant temporary injunction warranting interference by this Court and contended to dismiss the appeals with exemplary costs.

43. We have given our earnest consideration and perused the record.

44. Upon considering the various aspects and for better understanding, we once again examine ‘Khasra’ as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh through Principal Secretary and others Vs. Pratap Karan and others ((2016) 2 SCC 82), ‘Khasra’ is a register recording the incidents of a tenure and is a historical record. Khasra would serve the purpose of a deed of title, when there is no other title deed.

45. On the other hand, a ‘Muntakhab’ is a document recognised under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act as a public document. It ordinarily contains a list of names along with the survey numbers or fields held by the original grantee or his successors. A certificate issued by the competent authority recognising succession may form part of a Muntakhab or may, by itself, constitute a Muntakhab. When such recognition is preceded by an enquiry, it involves a determination of rights. Nevertheless, though a Muntakhab is a public and privileged document within the meaning of Sections 74 and 123 of the Evidence Act, the rights flowing therefrom must be shown to have been implemented and translated into possession and revenue recognition in accordance with law.

46. Keeping the above principles in view, it is to be noted that O.S. No.146 of 2020 was instituted by the appellant seeking declaration of title and recovery of possession, along with I.A. Nos.540 and 541 of 2020 seeking temporary injunction to restrain the respondents from alienating, mortgaging or creating third-party interest over the suit schedule property. The material on record reveals that the appellant has failed to demonstrate a clear and subsisting title. On the contrary, Respondent No.2 traces its title through predecessors whose names are reflected in the KhasraPahani for the year 1954–55. Significantly, the appellant’s name does not find place in the KhasraPahani or in any subsequent revenue records.

47. The appellant’s claim of title is founded primarily on Muntakhab No.57 of 1955. However, the said Muntakhab was declared void by Memo dated 21.05.2005 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, which attained finality up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court by order dated 04.10.2017 in Civil Appeal Nos.15571–72 of 2017. Once the root document itself has been declared void and unenforceable, no right, title or interest can be claimed or traced therefrom.

48. The flow of title, as borne out by the respondents’ documents, is traceable to Mohammed Azam Saab, whose name is recorded as pattadar and possessor in the KhasraPahani for the year 1954–55. The said KhasraPahani, being the primary record of rights in respect of agricultural lands in the State of Telangana, constitutes strong prima facie evidence of title and possession in favour of the respondents’ predecessors.

49. A further examination of the appellant’s documents shows that reliance is placed on a General Power of Attorney dated 05.09.1962 allegedly executed by the legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I. The said GPA does not specify the survey numbers or extents of the subject land. Though it purportedly authorised recovery of the property from the Government and alienation thereof, it was valid only for a limited period and stood expired prior to the execution of the registered sale deeds of the year 1965. Moreover, the alleged legal heirs themselves are not shown as vendors in the sale deeds, and the GPA holder, having no independent title, could not have conveyed any valid right.

50. Apart from the above, Section 47 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act mandates prior permission of the Tahsildar for transfer of agricultural lands during the relevant period. Admittedly, no such permission was obtained for the sale deeds dated 19.10.1965 and 20.10.1965 relied upon by the appellant. Consequently, the said sale deeds are invalid in law and incapable of conferring any right, title or interest.

51. The record further discloses that the appellant was never in possession of the suit schedule property. Even the earlier litigation, including W.P. No.227 of 1960, proceeded on the footing that possession was with the Government. There is no pleading or material to show that the GPA holder ever took steps to recover possession pursuant to the Muntakhab. In fact, despite prolonged litigation spanning several decades, the Muntakhab has never been implemented and possession was never delivered to the alleged legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I.

52. On the other hand, the respondents have produced voluminous documentary evidence, including Sethwar, KhasraPahani (Exs.R-1 to R-10), subsequent pahanis (Ex.R-11), registered sale deeds from the year 1981 onwards (Exs.R-12 to R-17), and revenue proceedings (Exs.R-18 to R-31), which clearly demonstrate a consistent and successive tracing of title and possession. These documents establish continuous enjoyment of the property by the respondents and their predecessors from 1954–55 till date.

53. It is also relevant to note that the registered sale deeds executed from July 1981 onwards constitute deemed notice under Section 3 of the Registration Act and Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. Despite such long-standing registered transactions and revenue entries, the appellant remained silent for decades and has now sought, at a belated stage, to cancel documents executed between 1979 and 2010, which relief is clearly barred by limitation.

54. The appellant has not placed on record a single document evidencing settled possession at any point of time. The allegation of dispossession in the year 2018 is vague, unsupported by particulars and not followed by prompt legal action. Such bald assertions cannot dislodge consistent revenue entries and registered conveyances standing in favour of the respondents.

55. The learned Trial Court, upon a detailed consideration of the material, rightly held that the sale deeds dated 19.10.1965 and 20.10.1965 did not emanate from persons having valid and transferable title and, therefore, could not create any right, title or interest in favour of the appellant. Per contra, the respondents’ title is traceable through lawful conveyances supported by revenue records dating back to 1954–55.

56. The record further reveals that Respondent No.1 obtained all statutory permissions, completed construction, obtained occupancy certificate from the Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority and sold flats to third-party purchasers, who have also formed a registered association. Grant of injunction at this stage would unsettle crystallised third-party rights and cause grave prejudice.

57. In applications filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, the plaintiff must cumulatively establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. In the present case, the appellant has failed to establish a prima facie right, any alleged injury and even balance of convenience is in favour of the respondents, who are in settled possession and have altered the nature of the property pursuant to lawful permissions.

58. Considering the various rival claims and considering the exhibits marked therein, the learned Trial Court rightly held that there is no prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury in favour of the appellants. Therefore, basing on the material available on record, the learned Trial Court arrived at a right conclusion that the appellants have failed to establish their case.

59. This Court is of the view that the said findings recorded by the learned Trial Court cannot be interfered with, since the said findings are recorded based on the evidence on record.

60. However, to meet the ends of justice, we deem it fit to direct the learned Trial Court to decide the suit as expeditiously as possible on priority basis.

61. Accordingly, C.M.A.Nos.242 and 243 of 2025, along with all connected applications, are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.