(Prayer: This Writ Appeal is filed u/S 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, praying to set aside the order passed in WP No.36576/2018 (SC-ST) dated 08.06.2023 By the learned single Judge and dismiss the writ petition in the interest of justice.)

CAV Judgment

Vijaykumar A. Patil, J.

1. This appeal is filed by the appellant under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, challenging the order dated 08.06.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.36576/2018 (SC/ST).

2. Sri. Prasad Hegde K.B., learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in allowing the writ petition without appreciating the material available on record in its proper perspective. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge has failed to take note of the fact that the sale deed executed is in violation of the grant conditions and solely on the ground of delay, has proceeded to allow the writ petition. It is further submitted that the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for short 'the Act') is a welfare legislation with a specific object to protect the interests of the grantee and there is no limitation provided under the Act to file an application for restoration and resumption. Hence, he seeks to allow the appeal.

3. Per contra, Sri.P.Nataraju, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.3 and 4 supports the order of the learned Single Judge and submits that the learned Single Judge, after considering the material on record and the judicial precedents, has held that the application filed before the respondent No.2 - Assistant Commissioner is after an enormous delay of 8 years 11 months and 8 years 1 month from their respective sale deeds and the same cannot be held to be reasonable in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, the order of the learned Single Judge does not call for any interference. Hence, he seeks to dismiss the appeal.

4. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for respondent No.3 and 4 and meticulously perused the material available on record. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions advanced on both sides.

5. The material on record indicates that one Sri.Kontha Madaiah, was granted land in Sy.No.37/B (New No.155) measuring 4 acres situated at Thamadahalli Village, Hanagodu Hobli, Hunsur Taluk, Mysore District, for an upset price vide grant order dated 31.07.1976 with a condition to not alienate the land for a period of 15 years. The appellants herein who are the legal heirs of the original grantee sold a portion of the land vide sale deed dated 20.02.2004 and rest of the portion of the land vide sale deed dated 18.01.2005. The appellants later filed an application before the respondent No.2 seeking restoration and resumption of the lands. The respondent No.2 vide order dated 27.04.2015 allowed the same and ordered for restoration and resumption. The said order was challenged before the respondent No.1 and the same came to be dismissed vide order dated 04.07.2017. The orders passed by the respondent No.1 and the respondent No.2 were assailed before the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.36576/2018. The learned Single Judge, on considering the material on record and placing reliance on the relevant judicial precedents, allowed the writ petition and passed the impugned order. The learned Single Judge held that the application for restoration and resumption of lands was filed after a delay of 8 years 11 months and 8 year 1 month from the execution of the respective sale deeds and the said delay, in view of the law laid down cannot be termed to be within a reasonable time. We do not find any error in the said finding recorded by the learned Single Judge.

6. It would be useful to refer to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER (2020) 14 SCC 232, VIVEK M.HINDUJA VS. M.ASWATHA (2019) 1 Kant.L.J. 819 SC, CHHEDI LAL YADAV VS. HARI KISHORE YADAV (2018) 12 SCC 527 and NINGAPPA VS. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS (2020) 14 SCC 236 wherein it was held that the application for resumption or restoration cannot be entertained beyond a reasonable period. The Co-ordinate Bench in the case of SRI.KESHAVAMURTHY AND ANOTHER V. SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 6517 and in the case of SMT.M.MANJULA AND OTHERS VS. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGLAURU AND OTHERS ILR 2024 KAR 4953, considering the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred supra as well as the decision in the case of SMT.GOURAMMA @ GANGAMMA V. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, HAVERI AND OTHERS W.A.No.100101/2024 dated 29.07.2024 held that the application seeking restoration should be within a reasonable period of time. In the case of Gouramma referred supra, the Co-ordinate Bench at para 3(f), (g), (h) and (i) held as under:

          "3.(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate.

          (g) There is a marked difference between 'delay & laches' that operate in equity and 'limitation & delay' that obtain in law. The following observations of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. N.Murugesan8 make out this point:

          "Delay, laches and acquiescence

          20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create nonconsideration of (2022) 2 SCC 25 at Para 20,21 & 22 condonation in certain circumstances.... The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.

          Laches.

          21. The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning "remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.

          22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy."

          (h) We are told at the Bar that the subject Amendment has been put in challenge in W.P.No.27496/2023 and that, matter is pending consideration. We make it clear that construction of a statute is one thing and its validity is another. We do not want to say even a word about the validity, that is being examined by the learned Single Judge before whom the matter is pending. We have only placed our interpretation on the amended provisions of the Act and nothing beyond.

          (i) Before parting with this case, we are constrained to observe that, legislative process is not simple and easy. It has to be undertaken with a lot of care, caution & expertise. Law speaks through language. If language is not properly employed what is said is not what is meant; if what is said is not what is meant, what needs to be done remains undone or misdone. A linguistic defect thus may defeat the intent of legislation. More is not necessary to specify."

7. In view of the preceding analysis, the unexplained delay of more than 8 years 11 months and 8 years 1 month from the date of the respective sale deeds in filing an application under Section 5 of the Act for resumption and restoration of the lands cannot be termed to be within a reasonable time. The learned Single Judge has rightly considered that there is an inordinate delay and dismissed the writ petition, which does not call for any interference.

8. Therefore, the appeal is devoid of merits and accordingly, the same is rejected.

It is needless to observe that the aforesaid findings would not come in the way of the appellant adjudicating his rights independently, if any, in accordance with law.

No order as to costs.