1. The sole accused in C.C.No.4/2003 on the files of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge (SPE/CBI)-II, Ernakulam has filed this criminal appeal. He impugns the verdict in the above case dated 09.08.2006 whereby he was found guilty for commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w.13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘PC Act, 1988’ for short). The respondent herein is the Central Bureau of Investigation represented by the Special Public Prosecutor.

2. Heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant as well as the learned Special Public Prosecutor in detail. Perused the verdict impugned and the relevant documents.

3. Here, the prosecution case is that the accused, while working as Deputy Chief Controller of Explosives in the office of the Deputy Chief Controller of Explosives, Cochin, during the period between June 2001 and October 2002, demanded and accepted Rs.5,000 as bribe from PW1, Sri.V.V.Mathew, to issue short firers permit, acting on the application put up by PW1. Thereafter, the accused had demanded and accepted Rs.3,000 as bribe on 17.10.2002. On this premise, the prosecution alleges commission of above offences by the accused.

4. In this case, when final report filed before the Special Court, the learned Special Judge took cognizance of the said offences and proceeded with trial. During trial, PW1 to PW10 were examined and Exts.P1 to P20 as well as MO1 to MO13 were marked on the side of the prosecution. On the side of the defence, DW1 was examined and Exts.D1 to D7 were marked.

5. On consideration of the evidence in detail, the learned Special Judge found that the accused committed offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and accordingly, he was sentenced as under:

                  “In the result, the accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 months under each count of offence punishable u/s.7 and 13(1)

(d) r/w Sec. 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988. The sentence shall run concurrently. Accused is also allowed to set off if any u/s.428 Cr.P.C.”

6. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant raised multiple contentions and the contentions are put into writing in the form of an argument notes and the same read as under:











                  clarifies that PW1 is not a person who is not involved in the line of contracting work that requires a short firers permit under Explosives Act.

                  With regard to demand of Bribe

                  It is stated by PW1 that, the occasion for PW1 to meet the appellant for the first time was on 13.09.2002. It is further alleged that he was told to bring the required document along with the application on 27.09.2002. When PW1 met appellant on 27.09.2002, it is alleged that, for the first time, appellant had demanded an amount of Rs.5000/- and when told about the financial difficulties by PW1, appellant allowed the bribe amount to be reduced to Rs.3000/-. Thereafter on 4.10.2002, when PW1 telephoned appellant, he was directed to meet the appellant at his office alone on 7.10.2002 and that day the appellant was illegally trapped. There is absolutely no evidence other than the untrustworthy statement given by the PW1. No witness or material is before the court other than the solitary statment of PW1 who's statement is unbelievable and without any credence.

                 

                  It is the very own defence case that PW1 owned money to appellant, which was borrowed by PW1 for a hospital emergency of his wife and it was this cash that the appellant had sought for. Upon perusing the above statement, it can be clearly understood the money was not a bribe and indeed was return of credit. The court below erred in not considering the defence version that the amount of Rs.3000/- was the money which was borrowed by PW1 from the appellant on the pretext of the medical expenses for the treatment of his wife, and which was returned to the appellant especially in the context of the fact that upon asked by PW6 about the above money, the appellant had categorically stated to him it was his money.

                  The whole story of the alleged demand revolves round the uncorroborated, prevaricating, inconsistent and contradictory versions made by PW1.

                  The primary question to be considered in this regard is whether PW1, who being the solitary witness for the story of alleged demands, stands the test of a sterling witness. By looking at the evidence of PW1, the only conclusion which could be arrived is that he is not a witness of sterling quality. Even otherwise he is not a reliable witness.

                  Perversity in relying PW9 (Inspector of CBI)

                  Though the examination of PW9 was zealously objected by the counsel for appellant for reason of it being irrelevant, the same was over ruled and relied in the impugned judgment. Likewise the seizure of M.0.9 to M.O 13 is without any basis and is against the interest of justice. The court below committed serious mistake in ordering the confiscation of M.O.s 9 to 13 as there was no charge in the above case in connection with the seizure of M.Os 9 to 13 and that the appellant was never called upon to answer any charges in connection with the seizure of M.Os 9 to 13.

                  From the above stated facts it could be easily inferred that PW1 was used as a stooge in the hands of some permit holders against whom accused had initiated procedures (evident from perusing D1 to D7) and this alone will vitiate Ext.P1 complaint as it being baseless and one preferred with ulterior motive to illegally trap the appellant.

                  It is respectfully submitted that the appellant had never demanded any bribe and accepted any amount as bribe.

                  It is respectfully submitted that finding entered by the trial Court about demand of bribe by the accused is legally unsustainable and unwarranted in the light of the settled legal position in this regard.

                  A few decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard viz the "demand" as well as the decision regarding solitary witness and failure to register FIR are produced herewith for the kind consideration by this Hon'ble Court.

7. In the argument notes, the learned Senior Counsel also placed 24 decisions in a tabular form to buttress his arguments. The first decision cited is the latest decision of the Apex Court in  M.Sambasiva Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in 2025 KHC OnLine 6618, to contend that independent witnesses of the trap team are also required to confirm the demand made by the Accused personally, which has not been done in the present case. Thus, the procedure of the trap case itself from the very inceptual stage suffers from serious legal lacuna.

8. The second decision placed by the learned Senior Counsel is the decision in P.A.Hariharan v. State of Kerala, reported in 2021 (3) KLJ 49, to contend that in the said decision, this Court, following the law laid down by the Apex Court in Meena Balwant Hemke v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 2000 SC 3377], reiterated that in trap cases, the demand has to be proved by cogent and reliable corroborative evidence, and that mere evidence of the complainant alone is not sufficient to sustain a conviction, wherein in paragraph No.21, this Court held as under:

                  “Law has always favoured the presence and importance of a shadow witness in the trap party, not only to facilitate such witness to see but also overhear what happens and how it happens also (See Meena Balwant Hemke v. State of Maharashtra : AIR 2000 SC 3377). In the instant case, there was no shadow witness arranged to witness what happened inside the office room of the accused or to overhear the conversation between PW2 and the accused.”

9. The learned Senior Counsel further placed specific emphasis on the decision in Meena Balwant Hemke’s case (supra) where the Court found that no shadow witness had been arranged to observe what happened inside the office room of the accused or to overhear the conversation between PW-2 and the accused, to contend the legal unsustainability of the alleged demand of bribe.

10. The third decision cited is the decision in Madan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2025) 4 SCC 624, wherein in paragraph Nos.18 and 19,it was held as under:

                  “18.  On an examination of the evidence, there is considerable doubt raised in our mind, which qualifies as reasonable doubt, as to whether there was acceptance of bribe amounts by both the accused. True, the officers of the trap team spoke about the handing over of the money by the complainant to the 1st accused who handed over half, to the 2nd accused; which amounts were said to have been put by both the accused in their trouser pockets. PW8 who led the trap team merely spoke of a recovery of the bribe amounts from the possession of the accused and the hands and trousers of the accused having positively reacted to the test solution. The said deposition is contrary to the statements made by the independent witnesses that some notes were found thrown on the floor. None of the officers spoke of any of the accused having taken out the c notes and thrown it on the floor.

                  19.  On an examination of the entire evidence, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubt, the demand of bribe and its acceptance.”

                  In order to prove inconsistency in prosecution evidence of exact bribe amount, reference was placed to paragraph No.11 of this decision.

11. Decision in State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere Vs. C.B. Nagaraj reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1175 has also been placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, wherein in paragraph Nos.26 and 27, the Apex Court held as under:

                  “26. Moreover, the testimony of the Complainant, as discussed supra, does not inspire confidence, inasmuch as, for reasons best known to him alone, he completely denied the visit of the Respondent for spot inspection, that too, just two days prior to the date of the trap and immediately changed such stance by accepting such visit and admitting the spot report as also identifying his own, his father's and the witness's signatures. In the considered opinion of this Court, such conduct is sufficient to render his testimony unreliable.

                  27.   Though it can be commented that the High Court was required to give detailed factual reasoning, which has not been done, as to why it was overturning an order of conviction by that of acquittal, yet since the factum of demand itself has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the acquittal of the Respondent by the Impugned judgment cannot be termed perverse or unwarranted, in the factual matrix of the present lis. In Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi, MANU/SC/0420/2025 : 2025:INSC:420, this Court opined that 'The Trial Court could have better worded its order through clearer’.

12. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has also placed reliance on the decision in Mir Musthafa Ali Hasmi v state of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (2024) 10 SCC 489, wherein, in paragraph 18, the Apex Court has held as follows:

                  “18. It was the complainant (PW 1) who voluntarily took his friend, PW 2, and got him associated during the trap proceeding. As per Shri Naidu, this was a clear attempt by the complainant (PW 1) in connivance with the TLO (PW 10) to create evidence through a partisan witness acting and hence, the prosecution is guilty of deliberately associating an interested witness so as to fortify the alleged transaction of demand and acceptance of bribe.”

13. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.Shanthamma v. State of Telangana, reported in (2022) 4 SCC 574, wherein the Apex Court, in paragraph 14, has held as follows:

                  “14.  The prosecution offered no explanation why PW8 did not accompany PW1 inside the chamber of the appellant at the time of the trap.”

14. To prove the conditions to be satisfied in order to have sufficient evidence of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision in Neeraj Dutta v. State, reported in 2023 KHC 6268, in paragraph Nos.14 and 16.

15. Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in A. Karunanithi v. State, represented by the Inspector of Police, reported in 2025 KHC Online 6683, wherein, after referring to and quoting the Constitution Bench judgment in Neeraj Datta v. State (NCT of Delhi), it was reiterated that proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for recording a conviction under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

16. It is contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellant/accused further that, in a case where this Court was not inclined to interfere with the conviction and sentence when considered by the Apex Court in the latest decision of the Apex Court in Pounammal K. v. State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2025 KHC 6718, the Apex Court modified the sentence for the period already undergone by confirming the conviction and avoiding further sentence in respect of the accused who was aged 76 years on the date of pronouncement of judgment ie, 21.08.2025. Therefore, the sentence in this case also, to be modified in tune with the decision in Pounammal’s case (supra), in the event this Court confirms the conviction in this case.

17. The learned Senior Counsel placed the decision of this Court in C. Sukumaran v. State of Kerala , reported in 2015 KLD SC (1) 311 to submit that, demand of illegal gratification by the accused is the sine qua non for constituting an offence under the provisions of the Act.

18. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the decision in Mukhtiar Singh v State of Punjab, reported in 2017 KHC 6462, wherein the Court, in paragraph 25, has held as follows:

                  “25. A stray query ipso facto in absence of any other cogent and persuasive evidence on record cannot amount to a demand to be constituent of the offence u/s 7 or 13 of P.C Act.”

19. In the decision in P. Somaraju Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 2025 KHC Online 6895, wherein in paragraph Nos.18 and 19, it was held as under:

                  “18. The statutory presumption Under Section 20 of the PC Act is not automatic and arises only once the foundational facts of demand and acceptance are proved. The same has been reiterated time and again by this Court; in the recent decision of Rajesh Gupta v. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, MANU/SC/0527/2022 : 2022:INSC:359 it was held:

                  17. For an offence Under Section 7 of PC Act, the demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non to prove the guilt. Mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute an offence Under Section 7 of PC Act, unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that Accused voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe. The proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand.”

                  19. It is therefore vital to examine these elements before the circumstance of recovery can assume any significance. We once again rely on the observation of this Court in Rajesh Gupta (supra):

                  16.....The law is well-settled by the judgments of this Court in Panna Damodar Rathi v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0201/1979 : (1979) 4 SCC 526 and Ayyasami v. State of Tamil Nadu MANU/SC/0119/1992  :  (1992)  1  SCC  304, whereby it has been clarified that the sole testimony of the complainant, who is the interested witness, cannot be relied upon without having corroboration with the independent evidence.”

20. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has further placed reliance on the decision of this Court in M.K. Harshan v. State of Kerala reported in 1995 AIR SC 2178 to contend that mere recovery of tainted currency notes, in the absence of proof of demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification, is wholly insufficient to sustain a conviction.

21. The learned senior counsel for the appellant also relied on the decision in Crl.A. 1769 of 2014 (SC) [Rajesh Gupta Vs. CBI], would contend that the prosecution has failed to adduce any corroborative evidence in support of the alleged demand of bribe.

22. In the decision in State of Punjab Vs. Madan Mohan Lal Verma reported in 2013 KHC 4309, in paragraph No.7, the Apex Court observed as under:

                  “7. ……..Mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to convict the accused when substantive evidence in the case is not reliable, unless there is evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the money was taken voluntarily as a bribe. Mere receipt of the amount by the accused is not sufficient to fasten guilt, in the absence of any evidence with regard to demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification. Hence, the burden rests on the accused to displace the statutory presumption raised under Section 20 of the Act 1988,by bringing on record evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to establish with reasonable probability, that the money was accepted by him, other than as a motive or reward as referred to in Section 7 of the Act 1988.”

23. To substantiate the contention regarding the omission of important facts in the FIR, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision in Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1026.

24. Whereas the learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI vehemently opposed the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant and he has specifically pointed out the evidence available to find commission   of   the   offences   alleged   against the accused/appellant. Therefore, the learned Special Public Prosecutor zealously opposed interference in the verdict impugned and pressed for confirmation of the same.

25. Having addressed the rival contentions, the points arise for consideration are :

                  1. Whether the Special Court went wrong in finding that the accused committed offence under Section 7 of PC Act, 1988?

                  2. Whether the finding of the Special Court, holding the view that the accused committed offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 is correct?

                  3. Whether the verdict would require interference?

                  4. The order to be passed?

26. Points Nos.1 to 4

                  In this case, the Special Court analysed the evidence available with specific reference to the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW6, supported by other evidence.

27. PW1 examined in this case is Sri.V.V.Mathew. According to him, he had studied upto graduation and worked in Federal Bank and then he went abroad. After returning from abroad, he had engaged in business and agriculture as well as contract works. He reached the office of the accused three times for the purpose of short firers permit and he had signed the registers on all these three days. According to him, he reached the office of the accused firstly on 13.09.2002. Later, he reached the office of the accused on 27.09.2002 as directed by the accused, he appeared before him with documents and the accused instructed him to produce copy of his passport and demanded Rs.5,000 as bribe for issuance of permit. When he explained his difficulties in arranging the money, he had reduced the same to Rs.3,000. He also demanded production of DD along with Rs.25,000. On 04.10.2002, he met the accused at his office along with DD and asked whether all the papers were in order. The accused readily answered in the affirmative but insisted for the production of an antecedents certificate from the police, he was directed to meet him at 5:00 p.m. on 07.10.2002 at the office. Since he had no interest to pay bribe, he lodged complaint before the CBI. The CBI verified his complaint and taken him to an officer and he advised him to wait at the room at the ground floor. After two hours, an officer called him and took him to Sri.Varkey, the Inspector of Vigilance. When he reached before Sri.Varkey, there were seven persons present. Among them, Sri.Sasikumar and Sri.Divakaran were also present. They were officials of Provident Fund Office which was so informed by the Inspector. Thereafter, there was a demonstration of the trap proceedings, and the Inspector demanded the money meant for the trap. He gave six currency notes of Rs.500, and the Inspector noted their numbers and demonstrated the phenolphthalein test by preparing sample of sodium carbonate solution. When the fingers of Sri.Sasikumar were dipped in the said solution, there was no colour change. Later, phenolphthalein powder was smeared on the notes and entrusted to Sri.Sasikumar, who counted the same and returned them to him. Again, the hands of Sri.Sasikumar were dipped in the sodium carbonate solution, the same showed pink colour change and the solution was taken in a bottle after marking ‘A’. Thereafter all of them washed their hands using soap and the money was inserted into his pocket with instruction not to touch the same and to give the same when the accused would demand the same. Thereafter, he was instructed to show signal by combing his hair after acceptance of bribe by the accused. According to him, at 4 pm, the trap party, including PW1, moved towards the office of the accused and stopped the vehicle on the main road towards the office. According to him, Ext.P1 is the complaint lodged by him and there was a mahazar prepared before the pre-trap proceedings and the same is Ext.P2. Later, the accused arrived his office at 5 pm and called PW1 after five minutes. PW1 met him, and the accused spoke in Hindi, “Paise laya hai kya?” PW1 answered, “Hai.” Thereupon, the accused showed his right hand, and PW1 handed over the money kept in his pocket to the accused. The accused counted the same and put it in his shirt's pocket. Thereafter, the counterfoils of the applications were given to PW1 to show the same in the Section, and he did so. Then he showed signal and the Inspector and his party reached there and he showed the accused. Then, Sri.Varkey introduced himself as an officer from the CBI, and then the face of the accused became pale. When the accused was seated, and the Inspector asked whether he had received the money, he denied the same, but admitted that he had met him. When the Inspector asked PW1 whether he had given money, he replied that he had given the money as demanded by  the  accused. When  the  accused  was questioned whether he had Rs.3,000, he said that the same was his personal money. Thereafter sodium carbonate solution was prepared and the right hand of the accused was dipped in the solution, which showed a pink colour change. The said solution was collected by marking ‘B’. Again, another sample of sodium carbonate solution was taken and the left hand of the accused was dipped which also showed a pink colour change. Then, Sri.Sasikumar took out the notes from the pocket of the accused, counted and also verified the numbers of the notes entrusted during the pre-trap proceedings   with   the   notes   recovered   and   found the same as correct. Thereafter, the light orange colour shirt worn by the accused also was taken and subjected to phenolphthalein test and the shirt was seized along with the notes. Thereafter, the body of the accused was searched and Rs.6,000 was recovered from his handbag along with a bundle of keys from his pants pocket. When the brief case of the accused, kept at the cupboard, was searched, Rs.70,000 was found. PW1 deposed further that Ext.P3 recovery mahazar was prepared and thereafter arrest of the accused was recorded. PW1 also deposed that Ext.P4 is the visitor’s register maintained at the office of the accused from 09.08.2002 and Ext.P4 entry dated 13.09.2002 is that of him. He further deposed that Ext.P4(b) entry is that of him as on 20.09.2002 and Ext.P4(c) entry is that of him on 07.10.2002. He also identified the application he put up as Ext.P5 and the annexures thereof as Ext.P5(a). It was through him, MO2, the shirt worn by the accused at the time of trap, and MO3, the sodium carbonate solution used for demonstration test, were also marked. According to him, the trap-proceedings continued till 8.45 pm.

28. In the argument notes filed by the accused, some statements given by PW1 during his cross-examination were extracted to make the evidence of PW1 as untrustworthy. The evidence of PW1 in page No. 12 (readable copy), stating that he did not do any contract work, is pointed out to contend that his evidence that he had engaged in contract works could not be believed. Further, it is pointed out that PW1 was used as a stooge at the hands of some permit holders, against whom the accused had initiated proceedings. In this regard, the evidence of PW1 in page 12 (readable copy of deposition), admitting quarries nearby him has been placed. At the same time, in the argument notes, it is noted that PW1 specifically denied the suggestion that he had given Ext.P5 to trap the accused and that he had acted as a stooge for the quarry owners. Similarly, PW1 also denied having any animosity to the accused. Another contention raised is that PW1 never had any intention to obtain short firers permit and the version supporting the same, as extracted in page No.16 (readable copy of deposition), also shows the same. In fact, the evidence tendered by PW1 in toto, along with his versions extracted during cross-examination when read together, the contentions raised in the argument notes as discussed, nothing material to be found to disbelieve the version of PW1, which is categorical and trustworthy in its stature to show that there was demand of bribe of Rs.5,000 by the accused and thereafter reduction of the same to Rs.3,000 and demand and acceptance of the same on the date of trap.

29. Apart from the evidence of PW1 and PW2, the decoy witness, Sri.Sasikumar, had also given evidence supporting both the pre-trap and post-trap proceedings. According to PW2, the trap party consisted of independent witnesses, including himself and CW2, as well as CBI officials, including Inspectors and constables. The complaint of PW1 was read over to them by PW6, which revealed demand of bribe of Rs.3,000 by accused and unwillingness of PW1 to pay the bribe. PW6, the trap laying officer, demonstrated the procedure by preparing a sodium carbonate solution, in which CW2 dipped his hands, and no colour change was found. PW6 enquired PW1 as to whether he  had  brought  the  bribe  amount  and  thereupon  PW1 tendered six currency notes of Rs.500. At the instance of CBI personal, the said notes were treated with phenolphthalein powder and thereafter, PW2 was called to dip his hands after counting the phenolphthalein smeared currency notes. There occurred  a  colour  change  and  the  solution  was collected in a glass bottle and named as ‘A’. Numbers of currency notes tendered by PW1 were noted down by CW2 and entered in the entrustment mahazar, Ext.P2. Thereafter, phenolphthalein treated currency notes were placed in the left hand shirt’s pocket of PW1, with strict instruction not to take it out until and unless the accused demanded bribe. He was also given instruction to show a signal by combing his hair in case the accused demanded and received bribe.

30. After a mutual search among the trap members, and allowing PW1 to retain Ext.P5 application along with a comb and other papers, the trap party proceeded to the office premises of accused at about 4.30 pm. PW1 was allowed to enter the office chamber alone while the trap party members took positions in groups at convenient locations.

31. It is further stated by PW2 that after about 5 pm, PW1 came out and showed signal by combing his hair. Immediately, the members of trap party approached him and PW1 pointed out accused, who was also coming behind him. After disclosing identity of PW6, the Inspector requested accused to extend maximum co-operation. All of them were lead to the office chamber of the accused and the accused got seated on the visitor’s chair. PW8, an office staff member, was called inside, and when PW6 asked the accused whether he had received any bribe, the accused replied in the negative. The question was repeated to PW1 and he informed that the accused demanded bribe and he had tendered Rs.3,000 placed in his shirt’s pocket. Again PW6 asked the accused and then he replied that he was in possession of Rs.3,000, but that it was his own money. Sodium carbonate solution test was conducted by preparing a fresh solution at the instance of CBI personal in the trap party and accused was asked to dip his right hand whereupon the solution showed colour change. It was collected in a glass bottle and labelled as ‘B’. Thereafter, the left hand of the accused was also tested for phenolphthalein and the solution showed colour change and it proved positive. That solution was collected and labelled as ‘C’. Thereafter, the shirt's pocket of the accused was also dipped in a fresh solution of sodium carbonate and it also showed a colour change. It was collected in a glass bottle and marked as ‘D’. The currency notes contained in the shirt's pocket of the accused was taken out by PW2 and counted and the number tallied with the currency note numbers mentioned in Ext.P2 entrustment mahazar. PW2 identified signatures found on the entrustment mahazar as well as recovery mahazar and also identified MO1 to MO7, the phenolphthalein smeared currency notes, shirt worn by accused, bottle Nos.’A to D’ and labelling cloth.

32. PW6, the trap-laying officer, testified regarding the procedure he carried out in laying the trap on the accused. He received Ext.P1 complaint on 07.10.2002 and assigned for registering a crime and investigation. Ext.P14 is the FIR. He testified that the had received complaint at about 1.30 pm on 07.10.2002 and after verifying the allegations and about the accused, PW6 decided to arrange a trap on the accused. Accordingly, PW2 and CW2, two independent witnesses, were called from the provident fund office at Ernakulam. After arranging the trap party, PW6 called in PW1, whose complaint was read out to the members of trap party. He carried out demonstration of phenolphthalein sodium carbonate solution test before entrustment of tainted currency notes to PW1 for tendering to accused, in case, he demanded bribe. He proved Ext.P2 entrustment Mahazer as well as MO3 bottle containing colour changed sodium carbonate solution, which was collected from his office, labelled and containing due signatures of independent witnesses. After entrusting phenolphthalein treated currency notes to PW1, the trap party proceeded to the office premises of the accused at about 4.30 pm, carrying trap kit. He also deposed that currency notes treated with phenolphthalein were put in the right hand shirt's pocket of PW1 with strict instruction to touch it only in case accused demanded bribe while meeting him alone at his office at about 5 pm as instructed by the accused.

33. According to PW6, PW1 was allowed to go alone and the trap party members in groups took convenient positions near to the premises of office of the accused to avoid suspension by the accused. On PW1 showing the signal at about 5:10 p.m. while he came out of the Chamber of accused, the trap party rushed to the office building and PW1 showed accused who was also coming behind him.He disclosed his identity and asked the accused to render maximum co-operation.

34. In addition to that, PW6 deposed about the further proceedings carried out by him in the office Chamber of the accused in the presence of independent witnesses and office staff PW8, by subjecting the accused to phenolphthalein sodium carbonate solution test. He asked the accused whether he had received bribe from PW1 to, which the accused replied in negative. Whereas PW1 informed that he had tendered bribe on demand made by the accused. Again when questioned, the accused replied that he possessed Rs.3,000 in his pocket, which was his own money. Accordingly, phenolphthalein sodium carbonate solution test was conducted and it proved positive. PW2 took out M01 currency notes from the shirt's pocket of accused, which had been tendered by PW1 and the same tallied with the currency note numbers noted in Ext.P2 entrustment mahazer. PW6 identified MO1 as the tainted currency notes. MO2 was subjected to sodium carbonate phenolphthalein test and MO3 to MO6 were identified as the bottles used for phenolphthalein test. MO7, the labelling cloth and MO8, the labelled cover were also identified by PW6.

35. The body search conducted by PW6 on the accused also deposed by PW6. According to him, prior to the body seach of the accused, he had examined the hand bag possessed by the accused, from which a sum of Rs.6,900/- was recovered by preparing Seizure Mahaser. Then, by using the key obtained during the body search of the accused, a briefcase placed in the almarah of the office chamber was opened and a sum of Rs.70,910/- was also recovered. They are identified as MO9 and MO10. Thereafter, the search party, along with the accused, went to the residence of the accused at Pachalam and conducted search there. PW6 recovered a sum of Rs.1,38,400/- placed in 12 envelopes from the bedroom of the accused, which was seized under a separate Seizure Mahaser and identified as MO11. The accused was declared arrested prior to the residence search and his superior was accordingly informed. The amount of Rs.1,38,400/- recovered during the house search was seized as the accused was unable to offer any explanation regarding its possession.

36. PW4 is the Joint Controller of Explosives at Chennai. He stated about the jurisdiction of the accused in issuing short firers permits. He further deposed that on 24.10.2002, he took charge of office in Ernakulam as directed by his superior, subsequent to the arrest of the accused on 7.10.2002. Ext.P9 is the letter under which he assumed charge of office in Ernakulam. It was through him, Ext.P10 series files relating to issuance of short firers permit handled by accused during his tenure in office from 8.06.2001 to 7.10.2002 was tendered in evidence. He also identified Ext.P12 as the identity card of the accused and Ext.P13 as short firers permit issue register. According to him, Ext.P5 application of PW1 was kept pending on direction from his superior officer.

37. PW9 is the trap laying officer and he supported the prosecution case. Regarding the evidence of PW9, it is pointed out in the argument notes that there is perversity in relying on the evidence of PW9 on the ground that the examination of PW1 was objected by the learned senior counsel for the appellant as his evidence was irrelevant and the same was ruled out by the Court and therefore, the seizure of MO9  to  MO12  by  PW9  could  not  be  relied  upon. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, PW1 was used as a stooge to implicate the accused in this crime. However, on scrutiny of the evidence of PW1 and PW9, along with the other evidence available, these contentions could not be appreciated and thus the same are dispelled.

38. Now, it is necessary to address the ingredients required to attract the offences under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988. The same are extracted as under:

                  “Section 7:- Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. – Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government Company referred to in clause (C) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

                  Section 13:- Criminal misconduct by a public servant. – (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,-

                  a) xxxxx

                  (b) xxxxx

                  (c) xxxxxx

                  (d) If he,- (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest. Xxxxx

                  (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than four years but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.”

39. In this connection, it is relevant to refer a 5 Bench decision of the Apex Court in [AIR 2023 SC 330], Neeraj Dutta Vs State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi), where the Apex Court considered when the demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the P.C Act, 1988 to be said to be proved along with ingredients for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and in paragraph 68 it has been held as under :

                  "68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under:

                  a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and

                  (ii) of the Act.

                  (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.

                  (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.

                  (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

                  (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act.

                  In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

                  (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

                  iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.

                  (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

                  (f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.

                  (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1) (d) and (ii) of the Act.

                  (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.”

40. Thus the legal position as regards to the essentials under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the P.C Act, 1988 is extracted above. Regarding the mode of proof of demand of bribe, if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. The mode of proof of demand and acceptance is either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law.

41. In this connection, it is relevant to refer the latest decision of this Court in Sunil Kumar K. V. State of Kerala, reported in 2025 KHC 983. In paragraph No.12 of the judgment, this Court observed the ingredients as under:

                  “12. Indubitably in Neeraj Dutta’s case (supra) the Apex Court held in paragraph No.69 that there is no conflict in the three judge Bench decisions of this Court in B.Jayaraj and P.Satyanarayana Murthy with the three judge Bench decision in M. Narasinga Rao, with regard to the nature and quality of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for offences under Section 7 or 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, when the direct evidence of the complainant or “primary evidence” of the complainant is unavailable owing to his death or any other reason. The position of law when a complainant or prosecution witness turns “hostile” is also discussed and the observations made above would accordingly apply in light of Section 154 of the Evidence Act. In view of the aforesaid discussion there is no conflict between the judgments in the aforesaid three cases. Further in Paragraph No.70 the Apex Court held that in the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary,oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to  draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. In paragraph No.68 the Apex Court summarized the discussion. That apart, in State by Lokayuktha Police’s case (supra) placed by the learned counsel for the accused also the Apex Court considered the ingredients for the offences punishable under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act,1988 and held that demand and acceptance of bribe are necessary to constitute the said offences. Similarly as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Aman Bhatia’s case (supra) the Apex court reiterated the same principles. Thus the legal position as regards to the essentials to be established to fasten criminal culpability on an accused are demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused. To put it otherwise, proof of demand is sine qua non for the offences to be established under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and dehors the proof of demand the offences under the two Sections could not be established.

                  Therefore mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of bribe or as undue pecuniary advantage or illegal gratification or the recovery of the same would not be sufficient to prove the offences under the two Sections in the absence of evidence to prove the demand.”

42. In view of the law settled by the larger Bench decision of the Apex Court in Neeraj Dutta's case, (supra), the contention raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant to unsettle the verdict impugned found to be untenable. In the instant case, the sanction to prosecute the accused was proved through PW7 and Ext.P15 is the sanction so issued, for which no challenge has been raised by the accused.

43. On scrutiny of the evidence, the required elements, viz., the demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused, are well established by the evidence of PW1,  supported by PW2 and PW6, beyond reasonable doubt. Based on the said finding, the learned Special Judge rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant/accused for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988. Thus, on re-appreciation of evidence, there is no reason to interfere with the finding of guilt recorded against the accused and the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel, by pointing out immaterial versions extracted during cross-examination of PW1 and finding blame on the investigating officer, would not rescue the accused in any manner. Therefore, those contentions are repelled.

44. In view of the discussion, the conviction does not require any interference. Coming to the sentence, reduction of sentence to the period already undergone or beyond the statutory minimum based on the decision in Pounammal’s case (supra), cannot be considered by this Court since it was so done by the Apex Court by invoking power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In this connection, it is relevant to refer another decision of the Apex Court in Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2025 KHC 6456, where the Apex Court considered the question as to whether power conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India can be exercised to reduce a minimum sentence prescribed in the Statute. In the said decision, the Apex Court held that the excise of power conferred by Article 142, in a case such as the present where a minimum sentence is prescribed by the statute, cannot be tinkered for, as the same would amount to legislation by the Court; and, prescription of a term of sentence quite contrary to what the Parliament has legislated would be legally impermissible.  The  statutory  prescription  in  relation  to punishment for a minimum period, unless challenged, cannot be reduced by this Court even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

45. Going by the decision in Dashrath’s case (supra), the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India also could not be invoked to reduce a sentence than the minimum sentence provided by the statute, as the same would amount to legislation by the Court overstepping on the domain of the legislature, which is impermissible.

46. Following the decision in Pounammal’s case (supra), referred by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused also, this Court cannot reduce the sentence beyond the statutory minimum, since no power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is bestowed on this Court. Therefore, this contention could not be appreciated in the matter of sentence.

47. In such circumstances, this Court cannot reduce the sentence beyond the statutory minimum. Here, the sentence imposed is the statutory minimum.

48. In the  result,  this  appeal  is  dismissed. Conviction and sentence imposed by the special court on the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 are confirmed.

49. The substantive sentence shall run concurrently and the default sentence shall run separately.

50. The order suspending sentence and granting bail to the accused stands vacated, with direction to the accused to appear before the special court forthwith to undergo the sentence, failing which, the Special Court is directed to execute the sentence, without fail.

                  Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Special Court, forthwith for information and compliance.