1. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (corresponding to Section 482 Cr.P.C.) assailing the order dated 03.12.2025 passed by the learned Eighteenth Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior in Sessions Case No. 501/2024, whereby the application preferred by the accused under Section 233 Cr.P.C. (now Section 256 BNSS) for summoning certain defence witnesses was rejected.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the prosecution has filed a charge- sheet against the petitioner under Sections 109, 115(2), 296, 3(5), 118(1), 118(2) IPC (as applicable) and Section 25(2) of the Arms Act. Cognizance was taken and the matter proceeded to trial. After conclusion of prosecution evidence and recording of the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the case was fixed for defence evidence. At that stage, the applicant moved an application seeking summoning of the certain officials as defence witnesses who are Head Constable (Writer), Police Station Janakganj, Head Constable (Writer), Police Station Girwai, Reader, Office of Superintendent of Police, Gwalior, Reader, Office of Inspector General of Police, Gwalior, Reader, CSP Hujarat Kotwali. The purpose of summoning the said officials was to prove FIRs and complaint applications allegedly lodged by the petitioner's family against the complainant party since 2015 and to demonstrate prior enmity and alleged false implication. The Trial Court rejected the said application holding that certified copies of the FIRs and complaint documents could be produced by the defence and summoning government officials at that stage was unnecessary.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the accused has a valuable right to lead defence evidence under Section 233 Cr.P.C. The documents sought to be proved demonstrate prior enmity and false implication. The officials concerned are custodians of the records and cannot appear without summons. Denial of opportunity to summon them, prejudices the defence. But, the trial court has passed the impugned order without considering the material facts and circumstances available on record, therefore, the impugned order be set aside and direction may be issue to the trial court to summon the aforementioned witnesses.

4. Learned counsel for the State opposed the prayer and prayed for its rejection.

5. Heard counsel for the rival parties and perused the record.

6. Section 233 Cr.P.C. confers a right upon the accused to enter upon defence and apply for issuance of process for compelling attendance of witnesses or production of documents. However, the provision itself empowers the Court to refuse such request if it is made for the purpose of vexation, delay, or defeating the ends of justice. Though the right of defence is sacrosanct, it is not unfettered. Inherent powers must be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. The order rejecting an application under Section 233 Cr.P.C. is interlocutory in nature. Interference in such matters is warranted only when the discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely.

7. The documents sought to be proved are FIRs and complaint applications. FIRs are public documents within the meaning of Sections 74 and 76 of the Evidence Act, and certified copies thereof are admissible without formal proof. In CBI v. Arvind Khanna (2019) 10 SCC 686 , the Supreme Court held that criminal trials cannot be converted into fishing and roving inquiries and the court must ensure expeditious conclusion of trial. The defence seeks to establish prior enmity. However, existence of previous FIRs or complaints can be established through certified copies. Summoning multiple police officials and administrative staff merely to prove documents already capable of proof through certified copies would unnecessarily prolong the trial. The Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan (2014) 11 SCC 709 , held that courts must prevent abuse of process and avoid unnecessary summoning of witnesses where documentary evidence suffices. The trial court specifically observed that certified copies may be filed. This reasoning cannot be said to be perverse.

8. A fair trial undoubtedly includes an opportunity to defend oneself. However, as held in Kalyani Baskar v. M.S. Sampoornam (2007) 2 SCC 258, though the accused has a right to present defence evidence, the court may refuse issuance of process if the request is vexatious or intended to delay proceedings. Similarly, in Rajaram Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar AIR 2013 SC 3081, the Supreme Court laid down that discretion to summon witnesses must be exercised judicially and only if evidence appears essential for a just decision. The present case is at the stage of defence evidence after full prosecution trial. The documents are already public records. No special or exclusive knowledge of the proposed witnesses has been demonstrated that cannot be proved otherwise. The mere fact that the officials are government servants does not automatically mandate their summoning. The law does not require oral examination of record-keepers when certified copies are admissible.

9. The petitioner relied upon the general principle that the accused has an indefeasible right to lead defence evidence. This proposition flows from T. Nagappa v. Y.R. Muralidhar AIR 2008 SC 2010 , where denial of defence opportunity was deprecated. However, in that case, the evidence sought was essential and not otherwise available. The ratio of T. Nagappa (supra) does not assist the petitioner because here the documents are capable of proof through certified copies and the necessity of summoning officials has not been demonstrated. Likewise, judgments emphasizing fair trial principles cannot override the statutory discretion provided under Section 233 Cr.P.C. permitting refusal where summoning is unnecessary.

10. From the record, it is clear that the stage of the case is defence evidence. The documents sought are public documents and certified copies can be produced. No special prejudice has been shown. The trial court has exercised judicial discretion. The impugned order does not suffer from perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error. Interference under inherent jurisdiction is unwarranted. This Court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the trial court merely because another view is possible.

11. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in the present petition. The petition is accordingly dismissed. However, it is clarified that the petitioner shall be at liberty to produce certified copies of the documents sought to be relied upon and the Trial Court shall consider the same in accordance with law without being influenced by any observation made herein.