(Prayer: Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India, to set aside the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.72 of 1994 by the Sub Court, Dharmapuri dated 06.03.2023.)

1. The revision petitioners are defendants in O.S.No.72 of 1994 on the file of the Sub-Court, Dharmapuri. The suit for specific performance filed by one Sagadhevan was decreed ex-parte on 06.03.2003 and the decree holders have initiated execution proceedings in REP.No.38 of 2011. The present revision petition has been filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India to set aside the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.72 of 1994 by the Sub-Court, Dharmapuri on 06.03.2003 as being illegal.

2. I have heard Mr.Sharath Chandran, learned counsel for Mr.Gowwtham Thelak V.B, learned counsel for the revision petitioners and Mr.P.Valliappan, learned Senior Counsel for M/s.P.V.Law Associates for the contesting respondents 2 to 5.

3. Mr.Sharath Chandran, learned counsel for the revision petitioners would submit that the plaintiff, Sagadhevan had initially filed a suit for permanent injunction, in which suit, he had specifically made an averment that he had an agreement of sale with the 1st petitioner, Maragadham Ammal alone. There was no mention of the said Maragadham Ammal, representing her minor children and subsequently, the said suit has been withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit for specific performance. However, in the suit for specific performance, the plaintiff has impleaded the minors, as defendants and has sought for a decree for specific performance, in respect of even the share of the minors.

4. It is also the contention of Mr.Sharath Chandran that when the second suit was returned repeatedly by the trial Court for filing the copy of the plaint in the earlier suit for permanent injunction, to suit her convenience, the plaintiff avoided filing of the copy of the plaint and by doing so, suppressing the case on which she came to Court at the first instance, the plaintiff attempted to get a decree against two minors, whose interest was never represented by their mother, the 1st petitioner in the suit sale agreement. It is therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the plaintiff has played fraud upon the Court and fraud vitiating all acts, the petitioners are entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of Constitution of India and seek for setting aside the decree passed in the suit.

5. It is the further contention of Mr.Sharath Chandran that in a suit for specific performance, the trial Court is bound to ensure that the plaintiff comes to Court with clean hands and also establishes readiness and willingness at all relevant points of time, before becoming entitled to a decree for specific performance. Inviting my attention to the judgment passed by the trial Court, he would contend that there has been no application of mind by the trial Court whatsoever and therefore, on this ground as well, the judgment and decree has to be necessarily set aside. He would also state that the plaintiff was aware of the fact that one Beeman, the 4th defendant in the suit become the owner of the property, pursuant to a compromise decree passed in an earlier civil proceedings and the trial Court, without even considering the interplay of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, has erroneously granted the decree for specific performance.

6. It is also the specific contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the decree violating mandate of Order XX Rule 4 of CPC is a nullity and when it has been brought about by playing fraud and illegality, the decree cannot stand the scrutiny of law and has to be necessarily set aside as nullity. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the following decisions:

                   1.Kiran Singh and others Vs. Chaman Paswan and others, (1954) 1 SCC 710.

                    2.Shabbir Ahmed Vs. Additional District Judge and others, (2011) SCC Online All 2017.

                   3.Asma Lateef Vs. Shabeer Ahmed, (2024) 4 SCC 696.

                   4.Odisha State Financial Corporation Vs. Vigyan Chemical Industries and others, (2025) 5 MLJ 253.

                   5.Muthalammal and another Vs. K.P.Natarajan and another, (2020) 7 MLJ 717.

                   6.K.P.Natarajan Vs. Muthalammal, SLP(C).No.2492 of 2021.

                   7.Ayyasamy Vs. Shanmugam, (2023) 6 MLJ 164.

                   8.R.Rasappan Vs. Rajalakshmi, 2025 SCC Online Mad 4068.

                   9.P.Sureshkumar Vs. Dhandapani, CRP.No.3801 of 2025.

                   10.Duraisamy Vs. Narayanasamy, CRP.No.1008 of 2025.

                   11.Kallathil Sreedharan and another Vs. Komath Pandyala Prasanna and another, (1996) 6 SCC 218.

7. Per contra, Mr.P.Valliappan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents 2 to 5 would invite my attention to the fact that the petitioners had attempted to set aside the ex-parte decre passed in the suit, along with an application to condone the delay. The condone delay application came to be dismissed by the trial Court, after contest and due enquiry and the said order was also unsuccessfully challenged before this Court. The petitioner has also moved the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP.Diary No.22698 of 2022 and the same also came to be dismissed on 17.07.2023.

8. It is also the contention of Mr.P.Valliappan, learned Senior Counsel that one Raman S/o. Beeman, brother of Panjalai had filed an application under Section 47 of CPC, questioning the executablity of the decree, where the very same contentions taken in the present revision petition were taken. However, the trial Court dismissed the said application, which has admittedly become final and therefore, he would contend that the said order would clearly operate as res judicata as against the revision petitioners as well. The learned Senior Counsel would further state that the withdrawal of the suit for bare injunction was only after getting liberty to file a proper and substantial suit for the relief of specific performance and once the Court has granted permission, it is not open to the petitioners to contend that the suit filed for specific performance is illegal and the petitioners cannot fall back on the plaint averments made in the earlier suit.

9. It is also the contention of Mr.P.Valliappan, learned Senior Counsel that the decree has stood valid for 22 years and the attempts to have it set aside by filing an application under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC, were admittedly unsuccessful and no attempt has been made to prefer an appeal under Section 96 of CPC. It is therefore the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that having failed in the earlier attempts, it is not open to the petitioners to straight away approach this Court under Article 227 of Constitution of India and seek for setting aside the decree passed in the suit, that too belatedly.

10. Mr.P.Valliappan, learned Senior Counsel would further state that at least in 2013, the petitioners were aware of the decree and in such circumstances, there is absolutely no reason assigned for the long silence, especially more than 12 years for seeking to set aside the ex-parte decree and it is not open to the petitioners to invoke the supervisory and extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, in order to set aside an ex-parte decree, alleging fraud and illegality, when the petitioners have clearly slept over their rights, in not approaching the competent Courts diligently and in time. The learned Senior Counsel would therefore prays for dismissal of the revision petition.

11. In reply, Mr.Sharath Chandran, learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that in so far as the challenge made by the petitioners in SLP.Diary No.22698 of 2022, the papers were not refiled, after defects were pointed out by the Registry of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and therefore, it may be proper to put the said proceedings taken before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the petitioners, because, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the factum of not refiling the SLP papers would not technically amount to dismissal of the SLP, resulting in merger of the order passed by the High Court with the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

12. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in so far as the share of the minors being brought into the suit for specific performance, in the absence of the agreement mentioning anything about their share in the suit property, the decree was clearly a nullity. He also contends that when fraud is established, the delay cannot be put against the revision petitioners. He would therefore reiterate his submissions that the Civil Revision Petition deserves to be allowed.

13. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners and the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents. I have gone through the records filed by way of typed set of papers, as well as the decisions on which reliance has been placed on by the learned counsel for the parties.

14. It is not in dispute that the 1st respondent, Sagadhevan filed a suit for specific performance in O.S.No.72 of 1994. An ex-parte decree came to be passed on 06.03.2003. Admittedly, an application was filed by the petitioners to condone the delay of 4915 days in filing an application to set aside the ex-parte decree. The said application came to be dismissed by the trial Court by order dated 29.11.2019 in I.A.No.713 of 2018. The said order was challenged before this Court in CRP.PD.No.3047 of 2021 and this Court, by order dated 05.01.2022, dismissed the revision petition, finding that the petitioners have not established sufficient cause for condonation of delay.

15. Admittedly, the petitioners challenge the said order before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by preferring SLP(D).No.22698 of 2022. Admittedly, the said SLP was not followed up and papers have not been represented by the petitioners. Without going to the question of whether it amounts to a dismissal order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court or not, the fact remains that with the non refiling of the SLP papers, the order passed this Court in CRP.No.3047 of 2023 has become final. Therefore, the avenue opened to the petitioners to seek setting aside of the ex-parte decree met a dead end.

16. There is also no dispute with regard to the fact that the petitioners did not even exercise their right to challenge the said ex-parte decree, by invoking the provisions of Section 96 of CPC. In view of the above, the decree has become final. In the execution proceedings, the 4th respondent herein, son of the 4th defendant in the suit, late Beeman filed an application, questioning the executability of the decree, by invoking Section 47 of CPC. The said application was contested in REA.No.27 of 2013 and by order dated 24.08.2021, the Section 47 application came to be dismissed.

17. Admittedly, the said order was not taken up on appeal and the order has become final. One of the sisters of the said Raman, by name Panjalai, the 5th respondent herein independently filed an application under Section 47 of CPC in REA.No.3 of 2024. The said application in REA.No.3 of 2024 was also dismissed by order dated 24.04.2024 and her belated attempt to challenge the dismissal of the application in CMP.No.32251 of 2025 was also heard by me and in and by a separate order, I have found that no sufficient cause has been made out and consequently, the application to condone the delay in filing the revision has been dismissed. In effect, the order passed in the Section 47 application has therefore become final. In view of the above, there are now two sets of Section 47 applications, which have been dismissed and have become final.

18. Now an attempt has been made by the defendants 1 to 3 in the suit to set aside the ex-parte decree passed by the trial Court, by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The primordial grounds on which the ex-parte decree is sought to be set aside directly invoking Article 227 of Constitution of India are that once the respondents have played fraud upon the Court by (i) suppressing the factum of the agreement being entered into by the plaintiff only with the 1st defendant and not with the minors; (ii) suppressing the plaint filed in the suit for permanent injunction, despite being called upon to file the same by the trial Court, while numbering the suit for specific performance; and (iii) suppressing the compromise in the suit in competent civil proceedings in and whereby the property was declared to be the property of the 4th respondent, Beeman and the illegality, according to the petitioners, is that the decree has been passed for specific performance of share of the minors, when the minors were not even parties to the suit sale agreement and (iv) the decree has been passed in violation of mandate of Section 20(4) of CPC and lastly, being a suit for specific performance, the trial Court has not given any findings with regard to the conduct of the plaintiff, the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to be entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance.

19. Mr.Sharath Chandran, learned counsel for the petitioners would also bring to my notice that in the suit, there has also been no order appointing a guardian and though an application for the same had been filed, the decision of this Court in K.P.Natarajan’s case, referred herein supra is relied on for this purpose. In fact, the order this Court came to be confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP.(C).2492 of 2021 as well. In so far as the facts are concerned, there is no dispute with regard to the fact that the petitioners have admittedly suffered an ex-parte decree and their attempts to set aside the ex parte decree, by invoking the Order IX Rule 13 of CPC, along with Section 5 of the Limitation Act were futile and unsuccessful. Attempts made by the other defendants to question the executability of decree, by invoking Section 47 of CPC have also been unsuccessful. In this backdrop, it is to be seen whether the petitioners are entitled to straight away approach this Court under Article 227 of Constitution of India and seek to set aside the decree passed on the grounds of fraud and illegality.

20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Asma Lateef’s case, referred herein supra, held that an unreasoned judgment, not revealing any adjudication of the rights of parties is a nullity in law and referring to the definition of ‘decree’ under Section 2(2) of CPC, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the decree should reveal an adjudication leading to determination of the rights of the parties in relation to any of the matters in controversy in the suit and if there is no adjudication or determination so as to conform to the requirements of the decree within the meaning of Section 2(2), the decree is not a decree in the eye of law and it would be open to objection in an application under Section 47 of CPC.

21. In Odisha State Financial Corporation’s case, referred herein supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, referring to the doctrine of sub silentio, held that judgment is an authority only for what it decides and when the judgment of the Court is silent on questions of law either raised earlier but not decided, or raised in the subsequent proceedings, it is permissible for constitutional Courts to decide such questions of law independently and the earlier judgment cannot be cited as a binding precedent or being conclusive. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that a decree passed without jurisdiction would be null and void and referring to Section 2(9) of CPC, defining a judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in order for a judgment to be valid, it must satisfy the requirements under Order XX Rule 4(2) of CPC and if the issues of maintainability is raised, or if the facts as pleaded by themselves create a cloud over, the jurisdiction of the Court or the maintainability of the proceedings, the same will have to be addressed, failing which the judgment will be unsustainable and a nullity.

22. In Sureshkumar’s case, referred herein supra, I had an occasion to deal with the violation of mandate of Order XX Rule 4 of CPC and permissibility of going into the said question in an application for condonation of delay. Following the ratio laid down by this Court. R.Rasappan’s case, I held that the question of violation of the mandate of Order XX Rule 4 CPC cannot be gone into at the stage of condonation of delay. In Subbathal’s case, which arose under orders passed in applications under Order XXI Rule 101 of CPC and Section 47 of CPC, which also arose in a suit of specific performance, I held that the trial Court not applying its mind with regard to readiness and willingness as contemplated under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, and the decision rendered in a summary manner, was exfacie illegal and would consequently be inexecutable and I proceeded to allow the Section 47 application.

23. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the question of a judgment violating the mandate of Order XX Rule 4(2) of CPC can be called in question. However, the timing of the challenge or questioning the judgment assumes significance in all cases and scenarios. In Subbathal’s case, the revision itself arose only out of proceedings under Section 47 of CPC and there is no question of any delay in approaching the Court.

24. Similarly, in Sureshkumar’s case as well, I had only held that the question of issue of whether the decree conforms to the mandate of Order XX Rule 4(2) of CPC cannot be gone into at the stage of condonation of delay. I had followed the ratio laid down by this Court in R.Rasappan’s case in this regard. In the facts of the present case, the petitioners have not filed an application under Section 47 of CPC. They have also not challenged the decree by way of preferring a first appeal under Section 96 of CPC. Their attempts to set aside the ex-parte decree, along with an application to condone an inordinate delay of 4915 days was dismissed by the trial Court and the said order came to be confirmed by this Court in revision. As against the order of this Court, no doubt, an attempt was made before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. However, the petitioners have not pursued the challenge and admittedly even according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the SLP papers were found to be defective by the Registry of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and thereafter, the petitioners have not refiled the papers.

25. It therefore puts a full stop to all the attempts made by the petitioners to set aside the ex-parte decree. The petitioners were equally aware of the applications filed under Section 47 of CPC by the other defendants, legal representatives of Beeman and the same being dismissed. The petitioners therefore have exhausted their rights to challenge the ex-parte decree up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thereafter, they have now come up with the present revision petition to set aside the ex-parte decree on the ground that the decree is a nullity and the respondents have played fraud upon the Court and the entire process is illegal. No doubt fraud vitiates all actions and at the same time, the parties cannot sleep over their rights for all times to come and at their whims and fancies, pick and choose remedies that are available to them.

26. As rightly contended by Mr.P.Valliappan, learned Senior Counsel at least in 2018, the petitioners were aware of the ex-parte decree. They did not chose to challenge the decree by way of first appeal under Section 96 of CPC and when the execution petition was filed as well, they did not chose to question the executibility of the decree. Instead, they only attempted to set aside the ex parte decree, along with an application for condonation of delay. Therefore, having failed in such attempts to set aside the ex-parte decree, the petitioners cannot belatedly approach this Court directly invoking Article 227 of Constitution of India, after lapse of 12 years from the date of filing of the EP.

27. In Rasappan’s case, referred herein supra, this Court held that if non speaking ex-parte judgments are allowed to set aside by invoking Article 227 of Constitution of India, after several years, it will open the pandora’s box.Though it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that what weighed in the mind of the Court was that the decree had already been executed and possession had also been handed over and in such circumstances, the belated challenge should not have been entertained, I am unable to countenance the said submissions in this regard. The judgment debtors who have suffered a decree whether on merits or be it an ex-parte judgment, cannot take advantage of the loopholes of the law and thwart the execution proceedings by taking one step after the other, to somehow or the other prevent the decree holder from enjoying the fruits of the decree.

28. The present revision petition has been filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India. There is no dispute with regard to the position that there is no time limit for preferring a revision under Article 227 of Constitution of India. At the same time, a litigant who seeks relief, that too invoking the extraordinary powers and jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of Constitution of India, has to approach the Court within a reasonable time. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bithika Mazumdar and another vs. Sagar Pal and others, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 748, has held as follows:

                   “4.It is an admitted position in law that no limitation is prescribed for filing application under Article 227 of the Constitution. Of course, the petitioner who files such a petition is supposed to file the same without unreasonable delay and if there is a delay that should be duly and satisfactorily explained. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has dismissed the said petition by observing that though there is no statutory period of limitation prescribed, such a petition should be filed within a period of limitation as prescribed for applications under Sections 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This approach of the High Court cannot be countenanced. As mentioned above, in the absence of any limitation period, if the petition is filed with some delay but at the same time, the petitioner gives satisfactory explanation thereof, the petition should be entertained on merits.”

29. There is absolutely no explanation on the side of the petitioners as to why they have approached this Court belatedly. In any event, they have already made an attempt to set aside the ex-parte decree by filing an application in 2018, the said attempt was unsuccessful and the said order has also become final. Further, the execution petition itself has been filed in the year 2013 and therefore, there is not even a whisper as to why the petitioners kept quite for more than 12 years, before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. One another factor that cannot be forgotten or brushed aside lightly is that though the primordial contentions of Mr.Sharath Chandran, learned counsel for the petitioners that the minors’ interest has not been protected or addressed by the trial Court, the fact remains that the minors admittedly attained the age of majority even in 1993 and 1997 years and therefore, nothing prevented the minors to have challenged the decree passed against them within the period of three years which is provided under the law of limitation. This exercise has also not been done by the petitioners. Therefore, it is a clear case where the petitioners are only attempting to delay and defeat the entitlement of the decree holder to enjoy the fruits of the decree.

30. In so far as Asma Lateef’s case, that was a case where the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought for and the jurisdiction had been erroneously assumed by the Court and exercised. In such view of the matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that such a decree was inexecutable in the eyes of law. In fact, there is no quarrel with regard to the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that any breach or violation of provisions of Order XX Rule 4(2) of CPC r/w Section 2(2) or 2(9) of CPC would be ultra vires and consequently inexecutable. In fact, even in the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has only held that the said decree can be questioned under Section 47 of CPC. Admittedly, the petitioners have not chosen that path. On the contrary, two other defendants who invoked Section 47 of CPC were unsuccessful in setting the decree at naught.

31. In Odisha State Financial Corporation’s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a judgment must satisfy the requirement under Order XX Rule 4 of CPC and when there is a cloud over jurisdiction of the Court or maintainability of the proceedings, the same will have to be addressed and in such circumstances, failure to render the judgment unsustainable and nullity in the eye of law. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioners did not appear and contest the suit diligently and they allowed an ex-parte decree to be passed. The attempt to set aside the ex-parte decree as already stated herein above, at the risk of repetition, was unsuccessful and therefore, there was no issue regarding maintainability or jurisdiction of the suit for the trial Court to have addressed such issues. In the light of the above, these decisions cannot be pressed into service in favour of the petitioners.

32. Even as regards the doctrine of sub silentio, I do not see how the same would come to the rescue of the revision petitioners. On the facts of the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that an earlier judgment which had not been decided an issue, but had disposed of the matter or some other issue, then in such eventuality, it is open to the constitutional Courts to decide the questions that were not decided in the earlier proceedings. This ratio is relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners to drive home the point that the dismissal of the revision petition arising out of the Section 5 application did not go into the merits of the case, but only dealt with the limited aspect of whether the petitioners were able to show sufficient cause or not. It is therefore contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that applying the doctrine of sub silentio, the order passed by this Court in CRP.PD.No.3047 of 2021 cannot be put against the revision petitioners. I am unable to countenance the said submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners.

33. The doctrine of sub silentio applies to the rule or principle where the Court has bye-passed or has been silent on a particular point of law which has not been applied to the facts of the present case before it, but the Court has proceeded to decide the issue on other questions of law or fact. The conduct of the petitioners has to be necessarily taken into consideration while giving them the benefit of the doctrine of sub silentio. As already found, even in 2013, when the execution petition was filed, the petitioners became aware of the ex-parte decree and no steps were taken by them until 2018, when the petitioners attempted to have a delay of more than 4900 days condoned, in filing the application to set aside the ex-parte decree and the said application was dismissed and the order was upheld by this Court in the revision petition. After having attempted to set aside the ex-parte decree in a manner known to law, the petitioners cannot thereafter fall back and invoke Article 227 of Constitution of India. The delay in approaching this Court, especially after having come to know of the ex-parte decree way back in 2013 at least, the petitioners are certainly not entitled to audience and this Court cannot be compelled to invoke the extraordinary powers under Article 227 of Constitution of India to set aside the ex-parte decree passed way back in 2013. For all the above reasons, I do not find any merit in the revision.

34. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition is closed.