Shree Chandrashekhar, CJ.

1. In Writ Petition No.5362 of 2024, the petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 17th April 2023 passed by the Collector, Mumbai Suburban District who is an officer appointed by the State of Maharashtra to be in charge of the revenue administration of the Mumbai Suburban District. The petitioner challenges the order dated 17th April 2023 as arbitrary, illegal and capricious and a replica of the order dated 1st October 2020 which has been challenged by him in Writ Petition No. 471 of 2021. The petitioner seeks to draw strength from the interim order dated 16th December 2020 passed in Writ Petition No. 471 of 2021 to contend that the order dated 17th April 2023 is contrary to law and passed in brazen defiance of the said interim order of this Court.

2. The petitioner, namely, Maheshkumar G. Garodia, aged about 78 years and engaged in business, states that the Secretary of State for India in Council granted a lease through an Indenture dated 16th February 1922 in favor of Nanabhoy Hormusji Bhiwandiwala for a period of 99 years commencing from 15th October 1917. The lease so granted and contained in the Indenture dated 16th February 1922 comprised of 251 acres and 21 gunthas of land within the limits of village Kanjur in the South Salsette Taluka of Bombay which are covered under Survey Nos. 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 as also the Khoti Marsh land of village of Kanjur; called Arthur Salt Works. Similarly, an Indenture dated 16th February 1922 was executed between the Secretary of State for India in Council and Nanabhoy Hormusji Bhiwandiwala for a period of 99 years commencing from 15th October 1917 comprising 151 acres and 16 gunthas within village Kanjur in the South Salsette Taluka of Bombay annexed as Plot No. III; known as Jenkins Salt Works. On 1st April 1930, an Indenture of Assignment was made by the Administrators of the estate of late Jamasji Framji Umrigar for the residual term of 99 years of piece and parcel of land admeasuring superficial area of 97 acres and 24 gunthas situated within the limits of village Kanjur and Bhandup in the South Salsette Taluka of Bombay. The present controversy involves the aforementioned Arthur Salt Works and Jenkins Salt Works which are referred to hereinafter as the subject properties. On 27th December 1947, the subject properties were transferred by Nanabhoy Hormusji Bhiwandiwala to the purchasers, namely, Shivchandrai Rampratap, Badri Narayan Rampratap, Shiv Karanlal Harakchand and Hiralal Rampratap for valuable consideration for the balance portion of the lease period on the terms and conditions as prescribed thereunder. The petitioner states that he is a transferee in interest and lessee of the subject properties. According to the petitioner, there were subsequent transfers through sale, gift deeds, etc. and the records in the Salt Department were corrected accordingly. He further states that the possession of his predecessor in interest as a lessee in respect of the subject properties has been accepted by the Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice and Corporate Affairs in the Government of India and he is in use, occupation and possession of the subject properties. The petitioner further states that his possession over the subject properties is protected by the interim injunction in Suit No.1173 of 2005 and the interim order passed by this Court in WP No. 471 of 2021. He exercised his right for renewal of the leases as per Clause VI (2) under the lease by writing two letters both dated 11th February 2016 for a further period of 99 years and the matter is pending adjudication in civil Court.

3. On 4th March 2004, a notice was issued to Gordhandas Shivchandrai Garodia, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner, for termination of both the leases. The Deputy Salt Commissioner passed two separate orders on 2nd November 2004 terminating the leases which were challenged in Writ Petition No. 904 of 2004. The High Court interfered in the matter and the writ petition was allowed with a direction to the Deputy Salt Commissioner to give a personal hearing to the lessee. In the meantime, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner instituted Suit No. 1173 of 2005 seeking a declaration that the lease termination orders both dated 2nd November 2004 were illegal, null and void ab-initio.

4. In the pending suit, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner moved Notice of Motion No.1246 of 2005 for temporary injunction restraining the defendants from taking any steps pursuant to the order dated 2nd November 2004 by which the leases for the subject properties were terminated. The plaintiff pleaded that the subject properties were transferred from the Ministry of Industries to the Ministry of Urban Development but those properties were still in the control of the Salt Department. This was the case setup on behalf of the plaintiffs that there was no privity of contract between the lessor and the transferee of the Salt Department, which did not proceed against the original lessee and had no jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice dated 27th January 2004 and to terminate both leases by separate orders both dated 2nd November 2004.

5. By an order dated 26th April 2005 in Notice of Motion No. 1246 of 2005, this Court granted ad-interim relief in favor of the predecessor in interest of the petitioner in terms of the prayer clause (a). Later on, Suit No. 1173 of 2005 was transferred to the Bombay City Civil Court at Greater Mumbai and renumbered as Suit No. 6256 of 2005. The relevant portions of the order dated 26th April 2005 passed in Notice of Motion No.1246 of 2005 are extracted below:

                   “10. The learned advocate for plaintiffs has submitted that the defendant No.1 has made the ground not mentioned in the show cause notice for termination of the lease in respect of the suit lands, and therefore, these orders are not sustainable in law.

                   11. I find considerable force in the submission made by the learned advocate for plaintiffs. In the orders dated 2-11-2004, the Deputy Salt Commissioner has made the alleged failure of plaintiffs to achieve the production norms of 20 metric tons per acer as one of the grounds for termination of the lease in respect of the suit lands. However, in the show cause notice dated 27-1-2004, the said ground was not raised. Therefore, plaintiffs had no opportunity to meet this ground.

                   12. The defendant No.1 has relied upon the inspection report, but the copy thereof was not supplied to plaintiffs. It, therefore, prima facie appears that the defendant No. 1 has passed the orders dated 2-11-2004 in violation of the principles of natural justice. So, in view of the ratio laid down in M/s. R. Bl. Shreeram Durga Prasad and another Vs. Settlement Commission (IT & WT) and another (AIR 1989 SC 1038), Govindsingh Ramsinghbhai Waghela Vs. G. Subbarao and others (1970 Gujarat Law Reporter 897), the orders dated 2-11-2014 must be held to be bad in law.

                   13. The learned advocate for defendants has fervently submitted that the lease deeds in question were executed prior to 1930, and therefore, in view of the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act, it was not necessary for defendants to adopt due process of law and only intention to repossess the suit lands was sufficient. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs, who have no privity of contract with defendants have no locus standi to challenge the orders dated 12-11-2004.

                   14. Admittedly, the lease deeds in respect of the suit lands were executed prior to the enforcement of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929. In Azim Ahmad Kazmi and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another [(2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases 278), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Government can dispossess the lessees in accordance with the Government Grant Act, 1895 without resorting to the other proceedings established by any other law. So also, in Eswari Bai Vs. The Collector of Madras (AIR 1974 Madras 114), it has been held that a lessee of the government land can be summarily evicted and resort to civil court is not necessary. In Namdeo Lokman Lodhi Vs. Narmadabhai Keshoodoo and others (AIR 1950 Bombay 123), it has been held that where a lease is entered into prior to 1-4-1930, no notice for determination of a lease is required.

                   15. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that for determination of a lease in respect of the government lands, it is not necessary to take resort to the due process of law and mere intention to repossess the land is sufficient. However, in the case in land, defendants issued show cause notice to plaintiffs as per the order dated 30-4-2004 in Writ Petition No. 904/2004 without challenging it, and therefore, they cannot be heard to say that they were not required to give personal hearing to plaintiffs.

                   16. In N. M. Nayak Vs. Chhotalal Hariram and others (AIR 1968 Bombay 51), it has been held that an assignee of a lessee has privity of contract between the assignee of a lessee estate, but there is no and lessor. From the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghuranı Rao and others Vs. Eric P. Mathias and others (AIR 2002 Supreme Court 797), it is clear that as there is no privity of contract between lessor and the transferee, the lessor is necessary party for determining the lessee.

                   17. Admittedly, plaintiffs are the assignees of the original lessee named Nanabhoy Hirmusjee Bhiwandiwalla. As such, they have no privity of contract with defendants. Defendants have not taken any action against the original lessee named Nanabhoy Hirmusjee Bhiwandiwalla. The defendant No. 1 has issued show cause notice dated 27-1-2004 and passed the orders dated 2-11-2004 against plaintiffs with whom they have no privity of contract. Thus, the orders dated 2-11-2004 terminating the lease of the suit lands are prima facie infructuous.

          `        18. From the record, it prima facie appears that plaintiffs are in possession of the suit lands. Plaintiffs have raised substantial question of law and facts as regards the validity of the orders dated 2-11-2004, which need to be decided on merit. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to maintain status quo as to the suit lands. If a relief of temporary injunction is not granted to plaintiffs, and they are dispossessed by defendants on the dint of the orders dated 2-11-2004, the suit would become infructuous.

                   19. In the case of Walawalkar Vs. Deputy Salt Commissioner (AIR 2006 Bombay 265), the Hon'ble Bombay Court in the similar set of facts was pleased to grant a relief of temporary injunction to the plaintiff in that case restraining defendants from acting upon the order terminating the lease. It is true that defendants have preferred an appeal against the said order, but the same is not stayed or set aside. So, I hold that in the present case, plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of temporary injunction on the ground of parity.

                   20. Plaintiffs have thus, made out prima facie case. The balance of convenience lies in their favour. So, I hold that they are entitled to the relief of temporary injunction as sought. Accordingly, I hold that the notice of motion deserves to be allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). Hence, the order:

                   ORDER

                   1. Notice of Motion No.1246 of 2005 is made absolute in terms of prayer clause(a).

                   2. Costs shall be the costs in the cause.”

6. After the suit was transferred to the Bombay City Civil Court and re-numbered as Suit No. 6256 of 2005, sixth respondent moved a motion vide Notice of Motion No. 321 of 2005 for a restraining order against the petitioner from dealing with or disposing of the suit properties or transferring or alienating the same to any third party, which was allowed by an order dated 16th April 2016 and the plaintiff has been restrained from creating any third party rights. The relevant portions of the order dated 16th April 2016 passed in Notice of Motion No.321 of 2005 are extracted below:

                   “7. From the affidavit filed in reply, it prima facie appears that plaintiffs had negotiated with Shri Ghevarchand Babulal Nahar in respect of the suit lands and entered into memorandum of understanding dated 26-12-2005 with him. They have accepted the cheque of Rs. 11,00,000/- from him. They have however, contended that they did not encash the said cheque and pursuant to the letter dated 13-8-2008, they had submitted the consent deed with M/s. Shapoorji Pallonji and Co. Ltd. to the State Government of Maharashtra to explore the possibility of the Public-Private partnership project obtaining approvals of the Union Government and the Government of Maharashtra, for affordable housing and to support them in such development, in the event the Government decide to permit and facilitate the development. The report submitted by Sub-Divisional Officer, Mumbai, Suburban goes to show that plaintiffs have not created any third party interest in the suit lands. However, the possibility that they would create third party interest therein cannot be ruled out safely. In Notice of Motion No. 1246/2005, an order of temporary injunction restraining defendants from taking action pursuant to the order dated 12-11-2004 terminating the lease in respect of the suit lands has been granted in favour of plaintiffs. So, the equity demands that plaintiffs should also maintain status quo with regard to the suit lands by not creating third party interest therein.

                   8. In the case of N. M. Nayak Vs. Chhotalal Hariram and others [AIR 1968 Bombay 51 (V 55 C. 11)], it has been held that an assignee of a lessee has privity estate, but there is no privity of contract between the assignee of a lessee and lessor. In the case in hand, plaintiffs are the assignees of the original lessee named Nanabhoy Hirmusjee Bhiwandiwalla. Considering the said fact, if plaintiffs, who have no privity of contract with defendants succeed in creating third party interest in the in the suit suit lands as apprehended by defendants, their right in lands would be jeopardized. On the contrary, if they are restrained from creating a third party interest in the suit lands, no prejudice or loss will be caused to them.

                   9. In Notice of Motion No. 2441/2006 in Appeal No. 534/206, the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the similar set of facts was pleased to direct the plaintiff in that suit not to create any third party interest in the subject matter of the suit. So, I hold that in the case in hand also, in order to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings and further complication in the matter it is necessary to maintain status quo in respect of the suit lands, more so what period of original lease is about to lapse.

                   10. For the reasons enumerated ut supra, I hold that the notice of motion deserves to be allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following order:

                   ORDER

                   1. Notice of Motion No. 321 of 2015 is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a).

                   2. Costs shall be the costs in the cause.”

7. While the aforesaid interim injunction orders were subsisting, the Collector, Mumbai Suburban District issued a direction vide order dated 1st October 2020 for handing over the possession of the subject properties to the MMRDA for transfer to the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (in short, DMRCL). The petitioner has laid a challenge to the order dated 1st October 2020 in Writ Petition No.471 of 2021. He is seeking an ad-interim direction to the MMRDA and Union of India to restore “status-quo ante” in respect of the subject properties, to remove machinery etc. and restore possession of the subject properties in its original condition to him. The prayers in Writ Petition No.471 of 2021 are reproduced as under:

                   “(a) that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a Writ of Certiorari, or a Writ in the nature of Certiorari, or any other appropriate Writ, Order or direction, calling for the papers and proceedings leading to the passing of the impugned order dated 1st October, 2020 and after going [Exhibit &herefo into the legality, validity and propriety thereof, to quash and set aside the same;

                   (b) that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a Writ of Mandamus, or a Writ in the nature of Mandamus, or any other appropriate Writ, Order or direction, directing Respondent Nos.4 & 5 to restore status-quo ante in respect of the said lands by removing itself, its equipment, machineries and men and material from the said lands and restore the said lands to the Petitioner in its original condition;

                   (c) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the writ petition:

                   (i) Respondent No.4 by itself, its servants and or agents and / or subordinates be restrained by an order and injunction from acting upon and/or taking any steps in furtherance of, and/or in implementation of and/or pursuant to the impugned order dated 1st October 2020, or in any manner whatsoever dealing with the said land;

                   (ii) Respondent No.4 by itself, its servants and/or agents and/or subordinates be restrained by an order and injunction of this Hon'ble Court from further encroaching upon or entering the said lands or placing any material and equipment on the said lands or any part thereof in any manner whatsoever;

                   (iii) Respondent No.4 by itself, its servants and/or agents and/or subordinates be ordered and directed by a mandatory order and injunction of this Hon'ble Court to forthwith remove all its equipment, machineries and men and material from the said lands and restore the complete possession thereof to the Petitioner;

                   (iv) the Respondent No.4 by itself, its servants and /to yah or agents and / or subordinates be restrained by Man order and injunction from performing all further activities on the said lands in furtherance of the order dated 1st October 2020;

                   (d) for ad-interim relief in terms of prayer (c) above;

                   (e) for costs of the petition and orders thereon; and

                   (f) for such further and other reliefs, as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

8. The Union of India also challenged the order dated 1st October 2020 passed by the Collector, Mumbai Suburban District by filing Writ Petition No.3931 of 2022. This writ petition has been disposed of on 30th August 2022 in the light of a subsequent order passed by the Collector, Mumbai Suburban District whereunder earlier order dated 1st October 2020 was withdrawn.

9. During pendency of the afore-mentioned writ petitions, the Collector, Mumbai Suburban District has passed an order on 17th April 2023 for transferring 15 hectares out of the subject properties to the MMRDA and this order has been challenged by the petitioner in Writ Petition No.5362 of 2024 with the following prayers:

                   “(a) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari and/or any other appropriate writ, order and/or direction, inter alia, calling for the records and proceedings before Respondent No. 2 in respect of the impugned Order dated 17 April 2023, [Ex. A hereto] and after considering the legality, validity and/or constitutionality thereof, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned Order as being illegal, ultra vires and/or unconstitutional;

                   (b) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, Order and/or direction, inter alia directing Respondent No. 2 to withdraw the impugned Order dated 17 April 2023 and prohibiting Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, and their employees, officers or agents from in any way implementing, acting in furtherance of, exercising any powers under, or pursuant to the impugned Order dated 17 April 2023;

                   (c) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, Order and/or direction, inter alia prohibiting Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, and their employees, officers or agents from attempting to take possession of trespassing on, or in any manner altering the status quo on the said lands (defined in paragraph 7 to 9 hereinabove) including carrying out any development or construction thereon and or from obstructing and preventing the petitioner and his employees, agents, representatives, workmen etc from entering the said lands or any part thereof.

                   (d) Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, Order and/or direction, to Respondent Nos.1, 3 and 4 to dismantle and remove the temporary shelter constructed on the said land (defined in paragraph 7 to 9 hereinabove) and withdraw their security personnel from the said lands. (defined in paragraph 7 to 9 hereinabove)

                   (e) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the present Petition, it is just, convenient, necessary and in the interests of justice that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a temporary Order and injunction:

                   (i) Staying the effect, implementation and operation of the impugned Order dated 17 April 2023 [Ex. A hereto];

                   (ii) restraining Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, and their employees, officers or agents from in any way implementing, acting in furtherance of, or exercising any powers under, or pursuant to the impugned Order dated 17 April 2023; and

                   (iii) restraining Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, and their employees, officers or agents from attempting to take possession of, trespass on, or in any manner alter the status quo on the said lands (defined in paragraph 7 to 9 hereinabove).

                   (iv) direct Respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4 to dismantle and remove the temporary shelter constructed on the said land and withdraw their security personnel from the said lands. (defined in paragraph 7 to 9 hereinabove)

                   (f) Ad interim reliefs in terms of prayer clause (d) above;

                   (g) For costs; and

                   (h) Such other reliefs as the Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the interests of justice may kindly be granted.”

10. In its affidavit-in-reply, the MMRDA states that the Collector, Mumbai Suburban Division granted advanced possession of 15 hectares of land under Survey 275, City Survey No.657A in village Kanjur within Taluka Kurla for setting up the Metro Car Depot and other ancillary works in Metro Line 6 stretched over Swami Samarth Nagar to Vikhroli through Jogeshwari. The corridors of the Metro Line includes the Metro Line-6 which is being implemented as an important Urban Transport Project. The MMRDA has been appointed as the Special Planning Authority vide Government Resolution dated 25th October 2016 under section 40(1)(c) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 for the said Project. The Project is at an advanced stage and expenditure of Rs.2293.12 crores has already been incurred. The civil works via duct has progressed to 87.60% and the civil works for station were complete upto 77.30% as per the progress report issued by the DMRCL on 23rd October 2025. It is stated that the Project is time-sensitive and requires to be completed by December, 2026.

11. The MMRDA has laid a stress over the importance of Mumbai Metro Line-6 and a need for its timely completion with the following details:-

                   “Importance of Mumbai Metro Line-6:

                   9. Metro Line-6 forms an integral part of the entire Mumbai Metro Railway Project which is aimed at reducing travel distance and time thereby greatly reducing the acute problems of traffic congestion in Mumbai Further, the Metro Railway shall provide a much-needed alternative and an environment friendly public transportation which is expected to greatly reduce the traffic congestion and improve the environment in the city of Mumbai.

                   10. The aim and objective behind developing the Metro Line-6 is to provide a supplementary system to an already existing, albeit overburdened, Mumbai Local Trains. Setting up of the Metro Line is the need of the hour to take off some burden from the Mumbai Local Trains onto the Metro Line, as on an average 2500 people die annually due to overcrowding of the local trains.

                   11. The proposed Metro Line-6 is founded on the principles of public utility, sustainable development and eco-friendly transportation system, aimed at benefiting the public and thus is not a private project being executed, to generate profits.

                   Salient features of Metro Line-6 as studied by DMRCL are mentioned herein below: