1.  The present Criminal Appeal, filed by the appellant under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. is directed against the judgment and order dated 18.09.1995 passed by the learned C.J.M.-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge, Mayurbhanj, Baripada in Sessions Trial Case No.54/194 of 1994, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Sections 341/376 of I.P.C. and on that count, he has been sentenced to undergo S.I. for one month for the offence under Section 341 of I.P.C. and to undergo R.I. for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in default to undergo R.I. for one month for the offence under Section 376 of I.P.C.

2. Heard Mr. Pratik Nayak, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Aurobinda Mohanty, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State.

3. The prosecution case, in terse and brief, is that on 20.09.1994 at about 8:30 P.M., while the victim and Kumari Jayanti (P.W.3) were returning along the village road after purchasing chenachur from a nearby shop, the accused allegedly intercepted them. It is alleged that the accused gagged the victim by placing a cloth over her mouth and forcibly took her to a secluded place, where he committed rape upon her. Upon witnessing the occurrence, Kumari Jayanti (P.W.3) immediately ran to her house and informed her father about the incident. Thereafter, the complainant and his brother proceeded to the spot but found neither the victim nor the accused present there. A search was conducted with the assistance of other co-villagers, during which the victim was found in the house of the accused. It is further alleged that when the father and uncle of the accused were questioned, they assured the complainant that the victim would be married to the accused and requested that the matter not be reported to the police. On the following day, the victim returned to her parental home and disclosed that the accused had committed rape upon her and that she had been driven away by the family members of the accused. On 21.09.1994 in the evening, a village meeting (panch) was convened to resolve the dispute; however, the accused and his family members did not attend the meeting and, instead, suggested that a case be filed. Consequently, no decision could be arrived at in the said meeting. On 22.09.1994, a written report was submitted before the O.I.C., Badasahi Police Station. It is alleged that the O.I.C. did not send the victim for medical examination. Subsequently, on 25.09.1994, the complainant again approached the Police Station, but the O.I.C. expressed his inability to take action in the matter. Accordingly, a complaint petition was filed on 26.09.1994, wherein the age of the victim was mentioned as about 16 years. Upon receipt of the said complaint petition, the learned S.D.J.M., Baripada, recorded the initial statement of the complainant, directed that the victim be sent for medical examination, and conducted an inquiry into the matter. Upon completion of the inquiry, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offences under Sections 341/376 of the I.P.C. against the accused and committed the case to the Court of Session for trial.

4. The prosecution has examined seven witnesses to substantiate its case. Out of them, P.W.1 was the lady doctor, who examined the victim; P.W.2 is the elder father of the victim, who heard about the occurrence from the victim; P.W.3 is the cousin sister of the victim, who deposed that the accused took the victim putting a napkin on her mouth; P.W.4 was a witness, who heard about the occurrence; P.W.5 was the doctor, who conducted the ossification test of the victim and opined about her age; P.W.6 is the victim; and P.W.7 is the father of the victim and the complainant of this case.

                  On behalf of the defence, one witness has been examined. D.W.1 deposed that there was no panch in the village and that there was a marriage proposal between the victim and the accused.

5. The learned trial Court has addressed the present case with due sensitivity and circumspection, particularly having regard to the grave nature of the allegation involving the rape of a minor girl. The learned trial Court, upon an elaborate discussion of the material available, initially examined the ingredients of the offences alleged, including the charge of wrongful restraint. Thereafter, the question of the age of the victim and categorical findings were recorded in that regard. The evidence was scrutinized in detail and assessed in the light of settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. In paragraph-8 of the impugned judgment, the learned trial Court made specific and categorical observations with respect to the allegation of forcible sexual intercourse attributed to the accused-appellant. Upon a comprehensive appreciation of the testimony of the prosecutrix and the corroborative materials on record, the learned trial Court held as under:-

                  “8. Let us scrutinize the evidence on record to see how far the prosecution has been able to prove that the accused did sexual intercourse with the victim on the date of occurrence against her will and without her consent.

                  It is in the evidence of P.W.3 that accused took Gitarani on the date of occurrence. Except Gitarani, other witnesses have heard about the matter. So the only evidence of the victim is to be taken into consideration in order to come to a conclusion. P.W.6- the victim has stated that while returning purchasing chenachur, accused put a cloth in her mouth and lifted her to a lonely place and in that place he had sexual intercourse with her against her will and without her consent. There was discharge from the penis of the accused in her vagina. Thereafter the accused promised to marry and took her to his house. Nothing has been elicited from the mouth of P.W.6 in cross-examination to discard her sworn testimony. The statements of P.Ws. 2, 4 and 7 clearly reveal that they heard from the victim that the accused did sexual intercourse with her forcibly on the date of occurrence and they also found the victim in the house of the accused after search. Thus there is nothing on record to disbelieve the statement of P.W.6, the victim, about the alleged rape. P.W.1, the doctor found one old tear at 6 O’clock position of the hymen of the victim. She has stated that the age of the injury is within one week and the doctor examined the victim on 28.9.94. Unless there is forcible sexual intercourse, injury at 6 O’clock position of the hymen is not expected. When the doctor found one injury at 6 O’clock position of the hymen, she supports the statement of P.W.6, the victim, that there was forcible rape on the victim. The statement of P.W.6, the victim, finds corroboration from the statement of P.W.1, the doctor, regarding rape. So taking the statements of P.W.6, the victim and P.W.1, the lady doctor, I am of the clear opinion that there was forcible sexual intercourse on the victim by the accused against her will and without her consent on the date of occurrence. Moreover, had the fact not been true, an unmarried tiny aged girl would not have come forward to the Court to disclose the said fact knowing fully well the consequence of such disclosure. So taking all the above facts into consideration, I am of the clear opinion that on the date of occurrence, the accused did sexual intercourse with the victim against her will and without her consent. So the offence U/sec.376 I.P.C. has been well established and the accused is held guilty of the offence U/sec.376 I.P.C.”

                  Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid findings and observations, and being satisfied that the essential ingredients of the offences stood proved, the learned trial Court convicted the accused-appellant of the charges under Sections 341 and 376 of I.P.C.

6. Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction suffers from serious infirmities in the appreciation of evidence and is liable to be set aside. He contended that the learned trial Court has placed undue reliance upon the testimony of the victim (P.W.6) and the doctor’s evidence (P.W.1), while ignoring material contradictions which goes to the root of the prosecution case. The medical evidence, according to the appellant, does not support the allegation of forcible sexual assault, inasmuch as P.W.1 clearly opined that the hymenal tear was old, there was no fresh genital injury, and the possibility of intercourse was only stated in probabilistic terms. He argued that possibility cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to produce any forensic corroboration such as semen analysis, chemical examiner’s report or DNA evidence, despite allegations of seminal discharge. The non-examination of the Investigating Officer is also stated to have caused serious prejudice to the defence, as the defence lost the opportunity to confront the investigation regarding seizure, medical referral and recording of statements.

7. Mr. Nayak, submitted that the conduct of the victim and her family is inconsistent with the allegation of forcible rape, particularly when prosecution witnesses themselves admitted that the victim was found sitting alone in the house of the accused and was allowed to remain there overnight. The evidence of P.Ws.2 and 7 regarding marriage proposal and settlement talks introduces a serious possibility of false implication arising out of matrimonial discord. He also challenged the age determination evidence, submitting that radiological opinion is only approximate and carries a margin of error of 2-3 years either side, and therefore cannot be treated as conclusive proof of minority. He placed reliance upon decisions such as Vijayan v. State of Kerala, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 763, Uday v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 46 and Sudhansu Sekhar Sahoo v. State of Orissa, reported in (2002) 10 SCC 743, to contend that where medical evidence, surrounding circumstances and broad probabilities create serious doubt, conviction under Section 376 of I.P.C. cannot be sustained solely on uncorroborated testimony.

8. Per contra, Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for State, supported the judgment of conviction and submitted that the testimony of the prosecutrix is clear, consistent and trustworthy, and therefore sufficient to sustain conviction even in the absence of independent corroboration. He argued that minor discrepancies in medical evidence cannot override direct ocular version of the victim, particularly in offences of sexual violence where medical findings may vary depending upon the time gap, physical condition and other factors. He further submitted that the delay in filing the complaint stands reasonably explained in view of social stigma, attempts at village settlement and pressure for marriage from the side of the accused. It is contended that such delay cannot be treated as fatal when the core prosecution story remains intact. He urged that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence in its proper perspective and recorded a well-reasoned order of conviction which calls for no interference in appeal.

9. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel for the State, and perused the entire trial Court records, including the depositions of the prosecution witnesses, the medical evidence, and the reasoning assigned by the learned trial Court.

10. Upon careful re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, this Court finds that the testimony of the prosecutrix forms the backbone of the prosecution case. The victim, i.e. P.W.6, has given a clear, consistent and natural account of the incident. She has categorically stated that the accused gagged her mouth, forcibly took her to a secluded place and committed sexual intercourse against her will. She has further stated that there was ejaculation by the accused and thereafter she was taken to his house. The cross-examination of the prosecutrix does not bring out any material contradiction or inconsistency which could shake the substratum of her testimony. Minor discrepancies, if any, are natural and expected in truthful testimony and do not affect the core prosecution case. Extract of P.W.6’s testimony is profitable to be reproduced for true appreciation:-

                  “………Occurrence took place in the month of Aswin, 1994 on a Tuesday at about 8.30 P.M. Myself and Jayanti went to purchase chenachur to the village shop. While returning accused put a cloth in my mouth and lifted me to a lonely place. In that place he did sexual intercourse with me against my will and consent. The accused removed my pant by his teeth. There was discharge from the penis of the accused in my vagina. I got pain. There was swelling on my left thigh and there was bleeding from my vagina. The accused threatened me to kill if I disclose the fact before any body. Thereafter he promised me to marry and took me to his house, and allowed me to sit in his out door room, and left the place. After some time, my father, elder father and others came. Niranjan Badi also came. I narrated the incident before them.

                  xxxxx  xxxxx  xxxxx

                  It is not a fact that I have not deposed before the S.D.J.M. that accused threatened me to kill in case I disclose the facts before others. It is not a fact that I have not deposed before the S.D.J.M. that the uncle and aunt of the accused removed me from their house. The lady doctor examined me on the requisition of the S.D.J.M and at the time of examination I was alone in the room. I was getting pain on the date of examination by the doctor. There was bleeding also. The accused is not related to me. Prior to the occurrence I had no previous relationship with the accused. It is not a fact that there was marriage proposal with the accused and the accused refused to marry me.”

11. The law is well settled that the testimony of a victim of sexual or modesty-related offence does not require corroboration as a matter of rule. The Courts must examine whether the testimony is natural, consistent and inspires confidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that conviction can be based on sole testimony if it is trustworthy. Further, in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that courts must remain sensitive to the realities of such offences and avoid expecting corroboration as a rigid rule. It was held thus:-

                  “21. Of late, crime against women in general and rape in particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating woman's rights in all spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault — it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The courts, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.”

                  In the present case, the testimony of the prosecutrix is found to be consistent, natural and free from material embellishment. There is nothing on record to suggest that she had any motive to falsely implicate the accused in such a serious offence, which would otherwise cause social stigma and mental trauma to her.

12. The medical evidence adduced through P.W.1, the lady doctor, further lends corroboration to the prosecution case. The doctor found tear in the hymen and opined the possibility of sexual intercourse. The defence has tried to emphasize that the tear was old and there was absence of fresh external injuries. However, it is trite law that the absence of injury on the body of the prosecutrix or the absence of fresh genital injury is not decisive in a case of rape. Each case depends upon factual matrix. The Honourable Supreme Court in a recent case, Lok Mal v. State of U.P., reported in (2025) 4 SCC 470, reaffirmed the same legal principle. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is extracted herein below:-

                  “13. Merely because in the medical evidence, there are no major injury marks, this cannot be a reason to discard the otherwise reliable evidence of the prosecutrix. It is not necessary that in each and every case where rape is alleged there has to be an injury to the private parts of the victim and it depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. We reiterate that absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim is not always fatal to the case of the prosecution. According to the version of the prosecutrix, the accused overpowered her and pushed her to bed in spite of her resistance and gagged her mouth using a piece of cloth. Thus, considering this very aspect, it is possible that there were no major injury marks.”

                  The medical evidence in the present case does not contradict the prosecution case and rather supports the possibility of sexual intercourse within the relevant timeframe.

13. Another important aspect relates to the age of the victim raised by the defence. The prosecution has relied upon multiple pieces of evidence, including the testimony of the victim herself, the statement of her father and medical opinion based on ossification test. The evidence indicates approximate age of the victim to be around 16 years. Extract of P.W.5’s testimony is profitable to be reproduced for true appreciation:

                  “On 3.10.94 I was Radiologist, District Hqrs. hospital, Baripada. On the requisition of Dr. Pramila Baral, one Gitarani Badhuk D/o Paramananda Badhuk was X rayed on 29.9.94 for determination ofher age. I examined the X ray plates and determined the age. The age of the girl as determined by me with reference to X ray plates is 16 years(continuing). I have mentioned the reasons of my opinion in my report. Ex.3 is my report and Ex.3/1is my signature in Ex.3. Exts. 3/2, 3/3, 3/4 are the X ray plates.”

                  Though medical jurisprudence recognizes possible margin of error in ossification test, such opinion has to be read along with other evidence. In the present case, the cumulative evidence including parental testimony and victim statement clearly indicates that she was a minor or at best at borderline age. The learned trial Court has rightly appreciated this evidence in totality and not in isolation to arrive at the conclusion regarding the age of the victim.

14. The defence has heavily relied upon the delay in filing the complaint. However, the evidence on record shows that the matter was initially reported to the police but no effective action was taken. Thereafter, village-level attempts of settlement were made. In sexual offences, delay in lodging FIR or complaint is not uncommon because of social stigma, fear, family pressure, hesitation and village mediation. In the present case, the delay is sufficiently explained and cannot be treated as fatal to the prosecution case.

15. The defence has also argued the absence of forensic evidence such as semen analysis or DNA report. This Court is of the considered view that forensic evidence is only corroborative in nature and not mandatory in every case. Where the ocular testimony of the prosecutrix is found reliable and trustworthy, absence of forensic evidence is not fatal to prosecution, particularly once it is found that ocular version of the victim stood corroborated with the medical evidence.

16. The allegation that false implication arose out of marriage proposal or settlement dispute does not inspire confidence. No independent evidence has been presented to probabilise the existence of a prior consensual relationship or false implication. The mere suggestion of marriage proposal cannot automatically lead to an inference of consent or a false foisting of the case. The conduct of the accused in taking the victim to his house immediately after the occurrence rather supports prosecution version.

17. The argument regarding the non-examination of the Investigating Officer has also been considered. Though examination of I.O. is desirable, non-examination is not fatal unless prejudice is shown. In the present case, the defence has failed to demonstrate any specific prejudice caused due to non-examination of the I.O.

18. On an overall appreciation of evidence, this Court finds that the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused wrongfully restrained the victim and committed sexual intercourse against her will and without her consent. The learned trial Court has meticulously analyzed the evidence and has rightly arrived at the conclusion of guilt. The findings of the learned trial Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence and settled legal principles and do not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court.

19. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the conviction recorded by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Mayurbhanj under Sections 341 and 376 of I.P.C. is legally sustainable and calls for no interference. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.09.1995 passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Mayurbhanj at Baripada in Sessions Trial Case No.54/194 of 1994 is hereby affirmed. The sentence imposed is also proportionate considering the gravity of the offence and does not warrant reduction.

20. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal stands dismissed.