Judgment & Order (Cav)

1. Heard Mr. D. Nandi, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. M. Kumari, learned Standing Counsel for the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

2. The instant criminal petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) has been filed by the petitioner for quashing of FIR No.RC-0172023A0010 dated 02.08.2023, pertaining to CBI, ACB, Guwahati, filed under Section 120-B IPC read with Sections 7/7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; the Charge-sheet No.08/2023 dated 13.11.2023 in RC0172023A0010, under Sections 120-B IPC read with Sections 7A and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; the order dated 12.01.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Guwahati in Special Case No. 02/2024, taking cognizance of the offences under Section 120-B IPC read with Sections 7A/12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; and the impugned order dated 04.06.2025, passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Chandmari, Guwahati in Special Case No.02/2024, framing charges against the accused-petitioner under Section 120-B IPC read with Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

3. It is the case of the accused-petitioner that while he was posted as Head Havildar at the Land Custom Station, Hatisar, District Chirang, Assam, a written complaint dated 01.08.2023 was filed by one Shri Suresh Kumar Nain before the CBI, ACB, Assam, Guwahati, alleging that his truck bearing Registration No.AS-01-PC-4691 was stopped at the Hatisar Integrated Check Post and that unknown custom officials demanded Rs. 1,500/- from the complainant’s driver, Roman Ali, for allowing the truck to enter Bhutan. After certain verification by the CBI, the CBI registered an FIR on 02.08.2023, being FIR No. RC0172023A0010, under Section 120-B IPC read with Sections 7 and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, alleging that one Pawan Chaudhary had demanded illegal gratification on behalf of unknown Custom officials for clearing the complainant’s truck bearing Registration No. AS-01-PC-4691. A trap was laid in connection with the said allegation, during which the accused-petitioner was arrested on suspicion along with the said Pawan Chaudhary.

4. The CBI, after completion of the investigation, filed a charge-sheet on 13.11.2023 in RC0172023A0010 under Section 120-B IPC read with Sections 7A and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, against the aforesaid Pawan Chaudhary and the accused-petitioner on the allegation of acceptance of unlawful and illegal gratification for clearing the complainant’s truck. The CBI alleged in the charge-sheet that the aforesaid Pawan Chaudhary was a clearing agent who used to scrutinize shipping bills received from drivers or representatives of exporters and importers on behalf of the accused-petitioner, and that he demanded Rs.1,500/- from the driver of the complainant for clearing the complainant’s truck. It was further alleged by the CBI that after the trap was laid, the aforesaid Pawan Chaudhary was arrested, and during the course of investigation, the accused-petitioner was summoned to the spot, which is alleged to be the table of the accused-petitioner. It was also alleged that, on being questioned, the accused-petitioner stated that Pawan Chaudhary was assisting him in his work by sitting at his table; however, the accused-petitioner denied having any knowledge about the demand or acceptance of any undue advantage by Shri Pawan Chaudhary from the driver of the complainant. The CBI further alleged that the tainted amount of Rs.1,500/- was recovered from the upper drawer of the office table of the accused-petitioner and that upon comparison, the GC note numbers were tallied with that of the pre-trap memorandum. The CBI sealed the GC notes in an envelope at the spot and also recorded the conversation between the driver of the complainant and the accused during the post-trap proceedings. It was also alleged by the CBI that the accused-petitioner was handling the shipping bills after joining at the Land Custom Station, Hatisar, till the date of occurrence, and that he had made various entries in the shipping bill register (bill for export) in the month of July and had also entered the shipping bill numbers on the bills for export on 02.08.2023. Accordingly, the said documents were seized during investigation and forwarded to the CFSL for examination by a handwriting expert.

5. It was further alleged by the CBI that during the investigation, while examining the driver of the complainant, it was found that Pawan Chaudhary had collected amounts from various drivers, as mentioned against their truck numbers on handwritten sheets on the pretext of office charges while sitting in the office of the Land Custom Station, Hatisar. On the basis of the aforesaid circumstances, the CBI held that there was a conspiracy between the aforesaid Pawan Chaudhary and the accused-petitioner to collect undue advantage, and thereby, the accused-petitioner had facilitated the aforesaid Pawan Chaudhary in collecting such undue advantage. It was also alleged that Pawan Chaudhary, in conspiracy with the accused-petitioner, demanded and accepted undue advantages from the driver of the complainant and others for allowing the vehicles to enter Bhutan for export/delivery of goods, and thereby alleged them of committing offences under Section 120-B IPC read with Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It was further alleged that the accused-petitioner, while posted and functioning in the aforesaid capacity as a public servant, abetted the offence of demand and acceptance of undue advantage by the co-accused, namely, Pawan Chaudhary, from drivers for allowing vehicles to enter Bhutan for export by permitting him to sit at his office table, and accordingly committed a criminal offence punishable under Section 120-B IPC read with Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

6. The learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam, upon receipt of the aforesaid chargesheet, took cognizance of the offences under Section 120-B IPC read with Sections 7A and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the accused persons, vide order dated 12.01.2024, passed in Special Case No. 02/2024, and accordingly, issued process against them by fixing a date for their appearance.

7. After hearing the parties on the point of charge, the learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam, was pleased to pass an order dated 15.07.2024, observing that prosecution sanction under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, against the accused-petitioner had not been obtained from the competent authority, therefore, the Court was not in a position to frame charges against both the accused persons at that stage. It was held that it would not be appropriate to frame charges only against the co-accused and proceed with the trial, as the evidence against both accused persons would be the same. Accordingly, the framing of charges was deferred until receipt of the requisite prosecution sanction. Thereafter, the learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam, vide order dated 16.07.2024, directed the CBI to obtain prosecution sanction against the accused-petitioner. Subsequently, the Presiding Officer of the learned Special Court, CBI, Assam, was transferred, and a new Presiding Officer was appointed. Consequently, the case was again fixed for hearing on the point of charge. Accordingly, after hearing the respective counsel appearing for both the defence and the prosecution on the point of charge on subsequent dates, the learned Special Judge was pleased to frame charges against the accused-petitioner under Section 120-B IPC read with Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, vide order dated 04.06.2025 passed in Special Case No. 02/2024, and fixed the matter for recording the evidence of prosecution witnesses.

8. It is the case of the accused-petitioner that he joined the Land Custom Station, Hatisar, on 10.07.2023 from North Salmara CPF (Custom Preventive Force). The petitioner was on leave from 16.07.2023 to 30.07.2023 and resumed duty on 31.07.2023 in the latter half of the day. It is the further case of the accused-petitioner that, contrary to the allegations made by the CBI, no official table was allotted to him, as his basic duties were limited to guarding, carrying out ward duties, undertaking the security work of the building unit and assisting senior officers in various assigned tasks. Therefore, the allegation that the petitioner abetted the co-accused, namely Pawan Chaudhary, in accepting a bribe on his behalf does not arise at all. Accordingly, the allegations made by the CBI are baseless, false, and devoid of any legal force. It is also the case of the petitioner that, prior to his joining, the co-accused Pawan Chaudhary had been working in the office of the Land Custom Station, Hatisar, for a long time, with the permission and consent of the higher officials of the Land Custom Station, Hatisar. The accused-petitioner, as Head Havildar, had no authority to examine shipping bills or grant any export clearances at the Land Custom Station, Hatisar. The petitioner worked only for a few days at the Land Custom Station, Hatisar, and had never communicated with anyone regarding official matters, except the Superintendent and the Inspector. It is also the case of the accused-petitioner that he never knew the co-accused Pawan Chaudhary, nor did he communicate with him physically, over the phone, or through any other medium. On the day of the incident, i.e. on 31.07.2023, the accused-petitioner had joined late and he was in the quarter residence of the Land Custom Station, Hatisar, which was adjacent to the Land Custom Office and there was no communication in whatsoever manner by the accused-petitioner with the co-accused, Pawan Chaudhary. He was not given any duty outside in connection with checking nor assigned any security or guard-related responsibilities and therefore, there was no verbal or physical communication between the accused-petitioner and the co-accused, Pawan Chaudhary, on the day of the incident.

9. It is the case of the accused-petitioner that, on the date of the incident, although it is alleged that the co-accused Pawan Chaudhary demanded an amount of Rs.1,500/- from the driver of the complainant and allegedly communicated with some unknown Custom officers regarding negotiation of taking money from the driver and the charge-sheet does not identify the person or persons to whom Pawan Chaudhary actually communicated. There is no allegation or whisper in the record as to the identity of the individual(s) with whom such communication allegedly took place. It is also the case of the accused-petitioner that the Call Detail Records (CDR) does not reveal any communication between him and the co-accused, namely, Pawan Chaudhary. Further, the accused-petitioner was never allotted any duty outside since joining the Land Custom Station. He was only assigned the task of making entries in the shipping bill register as per the orders of the Superintendent. It is stated that the petitioner was summoned by the CBI to the spot and accordingly, he appeared from the executive quarter before the CBI officials and stated that he had no knowledge of the demand or acceptance of any undue advantage by the co-accused Pawan Chaudhary from the driver of the complainant. It was further stated that the alleged documents and the purported tainted money said to have been recovered from the petitioner’s table did not bear his handwriting. It is also stated that, according to the Superintendent of Land Custom Station, Hatisar, Chirang, due to a shortage of staff, the accused-petitioner was temporarily assigned to examine shipping bills and give export clearance at the Land Custom Station, Hatisar. However, there is no supporting materials or documents of any such appointment of the accused-petitioner for the aforesaid work, as alleged by the Superintendent.

10. In view of the aforesaid factual statements, the accused-petitioner has stated that he has been falsely accused of the offences in the FIR as well as in the chargesheet.

11. Mr. D. Nandi, learned counsel for the accused-petitioner, submits that the petitioner is innocent, as he was totally unaware of any alleged demand or acceptance of undue advantage by the co-accused, namely Pawan Chaudhary, from the driver of the complainant. He submits that while he was working as Head Havildar, Land Custom Station, Hatisar, no such official table was allotted to him as his basic duties were to guard, carrying over duties, undertaking the security work of the building stock unit and assisting the senior officials in various duties. He further submits that the allegation that the accused-petitioner was handling shipping bills after joining the Land Custom Station, Hatisar, Chirang, is totally baseless. As a Head Havildar, the petitioner had no authority, whatsoever, to examine shipping bills or to grant export clearance at the Land Custom Station, Hatisar, Chirang. Learned counsel for the accused-petitioner further submits that the charges framed against the petitioner under Section 120-B of the IPC read with Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not maintainable in law. He submits that Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be read in isolation, as it deals with punishment for abetment of offences and applies when someone aids, assists or encourages the commission of an offence like bribery or illegal gratification under Section 7 or 11 of the Act. Therefore, there must be a substantive offence for Section 12 to be applicable. He submits that in the instant case, no such substantive offence has been committed by the accusedpetitioner and, therefore, the application of Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is not tenable under the law. The invocation and application of Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act against the petitioner is unsustainable and not maintainable in law.

12. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 04.06.2025 was passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam in violation of the settled law as the trial court cannot alter or amend it’s own order after it has signed and pronounced, except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors. He submits that once the order has been passed and signed, he becomes ‘functus officio’ meaning thereby, the court has completed its function in a particular manner. In this connection, he has referred to section 403 of BNSS (362 of Cr.P.C.). He referred to the case of Sanjiv Kapoor-vs-Chandana Kapoor, reported in AIR 2020 SC 1064 and V.C. Chukla-vs-the State, reported in AIR 1980 SC 962. He submits that in the instant case, the learned Special Judge, CBI, vide his order dated 15.07.2024, while considering the charge had clearly come to a finding that accused-petitioner, namely, Laliteswar Sharma would be liable under Section 7 (a) read with explanation 2 (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and not for abatement under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act in addition to section 120 (B) of IPC. He submits that the charge was not framed only because CBI did not invoke section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act in the charge sheet and hence, the CBI did not obtain any sanction for prosecution thereunder. He submits that the learned Special Judge, CBI came to a finding that it would necessary for CBI to obtain prosecution sanction under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act against the accused-petitioner from the competent authority. Therefore, the framing of charge was deferred till receipt of prosecution sanction. In view of the aforesaid, he submits that the learned Special Judge, CBI, has committed error by re-hearing the matter on charge and thereby, framing charge against the accused-petitioner under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, read with Section 120(B) of the IPC, vide his impugned order dated 04.06.2025.

13. The learned counsel further submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a catena of cases, has clarified that a charge under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot stand alone without a corresponding substantive offence being committed or at least alleged. Therefore, Section 12 is, in fact, a supporting provision which addresses the act of aiding or encouraging corruption, but it cannot be the primary charge without a related substantive offence being present. He further submits that in the absence of abetment and conspiracy as alleged, no criminal action is made out against the petitioner so as to attract Section 120-B IPC read with Sections 7A and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and therefore, the charge-sheet so filed is liable to be set aside and quashed. He further submits that a bare reading of the FIR and the charges filed by the CBI against the accused-petitioner clearly shows that no offences as alleged under Section 120-B read with Section 7/7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, have been made out warranting the framing of charges against the accused-petitioner. Therefore, the impugned order dated 06.2025 framing charges against the accused-petitioner is liable to be set aside and quashed.

14. The learned counsel appearing for the accused further submits that, since the petitioner is not a public servant, the impugned charge-sheet filed against the accused-petitioner under Section 120-B read with Sections 7/7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is untenable in law and is, therefore, liable to be set aside and quashed. He further submits that the learned Special Court, vide order dated 15.07.2024, had rightly held that there was no material to attract the provisions of Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. However, the said finding was wrongly interpreted by the successor Judge, who subsequently passed the impugned order dated 04.06.2025. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and quashed.

15. In the instant case, an affidavit has been filed by the CBI, wherein it has taken the stand that the present petition is not maintainable, as a charge-sheet has been filed against the accused-petitioner along with the other accused person on the basis of cogent evidence and materials, and not arbitrarily as contended by the accusedpetitioner. It is the case of the CBI that the CBI, Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), Guwahati, upon receipt of a complaint dated 18.02.2023 from one Suresh Kumar Nain, wherein it was alleged that Custom officials posted at the Hatisar Custom Check Post had demanded an undue advantage of Rs. 1,500/- from his driver for allowing his truck to enter into Bhutan. As the complainant was not willing to pay any undue advantage, he lodged the complaint with the CBI for taking legal action and accordingly, the CBI registered a regular case bearing FIR No.RC-0172023A0010 on 28.02.2023 under Section 120-B IPC read with Sections 7 and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, against the co-accused Pawan Chaudhary and unknown Custom officials of the Hatisar Integrated Check Post. After investigation, it was found that the accused-petitioner was involved along with the aforesaid co-accused, Pawan Chaudhary. Consequently, after completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the accused-petitioner as well as the said Pawan Chaudhary. It is also the stand of the CBI that, after a full-length hearing, charges under Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with Section 120-B of the IPC were framed against the co-accused, Pawan Chaudhary, and charges under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 120-B of the IPC were framed against the accused-petitioner by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Guwahati, vide order dated 04.06.2025, which does not suffer from any infirmity as contended by the accusedpetitioner.

16. Before going to the merits of the case, it would be important for this Court to examine the primary contention of the petitioner that the impugned order dated 04.06.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI is in violation of the settled law under criminal jurisprudence as the same order was passed after re-hearing the parties on framing of charge though the predessor judge of a Special Judge, CBI had already come to a finding on the framing of charge against the petitioner under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, read with Section 120 (B) of IPC.

17. It is seen that on 12.01.2024 after receipt of charge sheet dated 13.11.2023, cognizance was taken of the offences by the learned Special Judge, CBI and a case, i.e., Special Case No. 2/2024 was registered; and thereafter, issued summons to the accused persons, namely, (i) Shri Pawan Chaudhary (co-accused) and (ii) Laliteswar Sharma (petitioner) for their appearances. The case was taken up on 15.07.2024 for consideration of charge. After hearing the counsel appearing for the accusedpetitioner as well as the CBI, the learned Special Judge, CBI had come to the following findings:

                   “12. In the instant case, as per the facts and circumstances narrated in the charge sheet, accused Laliteswar Sharma had obtained such undue advantage with the intention to perform a public duty dishonestly through the medium of a third party i.e. accused Pawan Choudhuri. Therefore, accused Laliteswar Sharma would be liable under Section 7 (a) r/w explanation 2 (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and not for abetment u/d 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, in addition to section 120 B IPC, whereas accused Pawan Chaudhuri is liable to be charged u/s section 120 B IPC r/w section 7A of the PC Act.

                   13.However, since CBI has not invoked section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act in its charge sheet, it has not sought for or obtained any sanction for prosecution thereunder and the invoked sections i.e. 120B IPC/7 A and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act do not require prior sanction as per section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. But in view of the findings of this Court on the point of charge, as discussed above, it is now necessary for the CBI to now obtain prosecution sanction u/s 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act against the accused Laliteswar Sharma from the competent authority. Hence, the Court is not in a position to frame charge against both the accused persons together at this stage and it would not be appropriate to frame charge only against the co-accused and proceed with the trial from the point of view of convenience or conduciveness, given that the evidence will be the same against both. Accordingly, the same is deferred till receipt of Prosecution Sanction as indicated above.

                   14. Fixed 16.08.2024 for receipt of prosecution sanction order and necessary orders.”

18. From the aforesaid order dated 15.07.2024, it is clearly seen that the learned Special Judge, CBI, had come to a conclusion that the accused-petitioner would be liable under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with section 120(B) of IPC. It is only due to the fact that prosecution sanction from the concerned authority was not available at that point of time for charging the accused-petitioner, under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the charge could not be framed against the accused-petitioner and therefore, awaited for receipt of prosecution sanction and thereafter, fixed for necessary orders.

19. The aforesaid order dated 15.07.2024 was neither challenged by the CBI nor by the petitioner.

20. It is seen that the concerned authority, i.e., Additional Commissioner, CGST Commissionerate, Guwahati (Cadre controlling Authority), vide his letter dated 06.01.2025, addressed to the CBI, ACB, Guwahati refused to give sanction for prosecution of the petitioner citing the reason that he was not in a position to issue any sanction for prosecution in absence of direct linkage of the accused-petitioner with alleged undue advantage taken by Pawan Chaudhary, a private person. This rejection of sanction by the concerned authority was also not challenged by the CBI.

21. The case was taken up on 04.06.2025 by the successor Special Judge, CBI whereon the case was fixed for framing of charge and status report, if any, with regard to mobile handsets from CFSL. On that date, the learned Special Judge, CBI heard the parties at full length and came to the following findings:

                   “15. From the discussions made above, this Court has noticed that it was accused Shri Laliteswar Sharma, a public servant who abets accused Shri Pawan Chaudhari to accept money on his behalf but not accused Shri Pawan Chaudhari who abets accused Shri Laliteswar Sharma to accept bribe. Therefore, accused Shri Pawan Chaudhari having not involved in the act of abetting accused Shri Laliteswar Sharma to accept illegal gratification, he cannot be charged u/s 12 of the PC Act. Hence, accused Shri Pawan Chaudhari is discharged from the offence u/s 12 of PC Act. However, accused Pawan Chaudhari is liable to be charged u/s 7A of the PC Act r/w Section 120B of IPC.

                   16. As regards accused Shri Laliteswar Sharma, it is seen that irrespective of the refusal of the sanctioning authority to grant prosecution sanction against accused Shri Laliteswar Sharma to proceed u/s 7 of PC Act which is a substantive offence, nevertheless, there is cogent and credible materials emerged against him for the offence u/s 12 of PC Act which is an independent and substantive offence where, prosecution sanction is not needed to be proceed with. Since accused Shri Laliteswar Sharma appears to have entered into an agreement/conspiracy with accused Shri Pawan Chaudhari, to do an illegal act and in consequence thereof, accused Shri Pawan Chaudhari in the form of undue advantage accepted illegal gratification from the driver, Rahman Ali on behalf of accused Shri Laliteswar Sharma on his behalf.

                   17. In view of the foregoing discussions and reasons, as discernable from the record, accused Shri Laliteswar Sharma, being a public servant appears to have taken undue advantage with the intention to perform a public duty dishonestly through the medium of a second party i.e. accused Shri Pawan Chaudhari. Therefore, this Court has come to the conclusion that there is sufficient prima facie materials against accused Shri Laliteswar Sharma for framing charge u/s 12 of PC Act r/w Section 120B of IPC.

                   18. Accordingly, charges u/s 7A of the PC Act r/w section 120B of IPC are framed against accused Pawan Chaudhari and charges u/s 12 of the PC Act r/w section 120B are framed against accused Shri Laliteswar Sharma and kept with the case record in two separate sheets.

                   19. Particulars of the charges are read over and explained to the accused persons to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

                   20. Status report with regard to mobile handsets from CFSL as called for has been received and learned PP, CBI vide petition No. 533/25, informed that it is in the custody of the CBI and in the examination by CFSL, some incriminating materials have been found. Hence, it is prayed that another date may be fixed for hearing to which other side agreed.

                   21. Issue summons to the witness. Steps be taken forthwith.

                   “22. Fixed 11.06.2025 for hearing on zimma petition and 10.07.2025 for prosecution evidence.”

22. From the above order dated 04.06.2025 what is discernable is that the learned Special Judge, CBI had heard the matter on charge afresh on the basis of the same materials and had come to a different finding from the finding that had already been rendered by his predecessor Judge, vide his order dated 15.07.2024. Therefore, it is seen that vide his order dated 04.06.2025, the learned Special Judge, CBI has actually reviewed it’s own order dated 15.07.2024.

23. From the above facts, it is clear that at the initial stage on 15.07.2024, charges were framed under Section 7(a) read with explanation 2 (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with section 120 B of the IPC against the Petitioner, thereafter, without recording evidence on merits on 04.06.2025 charges have been altered to under section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with section 120B IPC on the same set of evidence.

24. In the above context, it is necessary to consider the provisions of Section 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is extracted herein below:

                   “ 216: Court may alter charge

                   (1) Any Court may alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced.

                   (2) Every such alteration or addition shall be read and explained to the accused.

                   (3) If the alteration or addition to a charge is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is not likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused in his defence or the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the Court may, in its discretion, after such alteration or addition has been made, proceed with the trial as if the altered or added charge has been the original charge.

                   (4) If the alteration or addition is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused or the prosecutor as aforesaid, the Court may, either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be necessary.

                   (5) If the offence stated in the altered or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is obtained, unless sanction has been already obtained for a prosecution on the same facts as those on which the altered or added charge is founded.”

A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that the Trial Court can alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced. However, such alteration or addition shall have to be read and explained to the accused.

25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the powers under Section 216 Cr.P.C provided to the Trial Courts in altering and adding charges during the trail. In the case of Jasvinder Saini and others -Vs- State (Government of NCT of Delhi) , reported in (2013) 7 SCC 256, while dealing with the issue at paragraph-11 held as under:-

                   “A plain reading of the above would show that the Court’s power to alter or add any charge is unrestrained provided such addition and/or alteration is made before the judgment is pronounced. Sub-sections (2) to (5) of Section 216 deal with the procedure to be followed once the Court decides to alter or add any charge. Section 217 of the Code deals with the recall of witnesses when the charge is altered or added by the Court after commencement of the trial. There can, in the light of the above, be no doubt about the competence of the Court to add or alter a charge at any time before the judgment. The circumstances in which such addition or alteration may be made are not, however, stipulated in Section 216. It is all the same trite that the question of any such addition or alternation would generally arise either because the court finds the charge already framed to be defective for any reason or because such addition is considered necessary after the commencement of the trial having regard to the evidence that may come before the Court.”

26. In this connection, it shall be useful at this stage to refer to the case of Dr. Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy –Vs-State of Andhra Pradesh & Others , reported (2020)12 SCC 467. Paragraphs 16 & 21 being relevant are reproduced herein below:-

                   “16. Section 216 appears in Chapter XVII CrPC. Under the provisions of Section 216, the court is authorised to alter or add to the charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced. Whenever such an alteration or addition is made, it is to be read out and explained to the accused. The phrase "add to any charge" in sub-section (1) includes addition of a new charge. The provision enables the alteration or addition of a charge based on materials brought on record during the course of trial. Section 216 provides that the addition or alteration has to be done "at any time before judgment is pronounced". Sub-section (3) provides that if the alteration or addition to a charge does not cause prejudice to the accused in his defence, or the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the court may proceed with the trial as if the additional or alternative charge is the original charge. Sub-section (4) contemplates a situation where the addition or alteration of charge will prejudice the accused and empowers the court to either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be necessary to mitigate the prejudice likely to be caused to the accused. Section 217 CrPC deals with recalling of witnesses when the charge is altered or added by the court after commencement of the trial.

                   21. From the above line of precedents, it is clear that Section 216 provides the court an exclusive and wide-ranging power to change or alter any charge. The use of the words "at any time before judgment is pronounced" in sub-section (1) empowers the court to exercise its powers of altering or adding charges even after the completion of evidence, arguments and reserving of the judgment. The alteration or addition of a charge may be done if in the opinion of the court there was an omission in the framing of charge or if upon prima facie examination of the material brought on record, it leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The test to be adopted by the court while deciding upon an addition or alteration of a charge is that the material brought on record needs to have a direct link or nexus with the ingredients of the alleged offence. Addition of a charge merely commences the trial for the additional charges, whereupon, based on the evidence, it is to be determined whether the accused may be convicted for the additional charges. The court must exercise its powers under Section 216 judiciously and ensure that no prejudice is caused to the accused and that he is allowed to have a fair trial. The only constraint on the court's power is the prejudice likely to be caused to the accused by the addition or alteration of charges. Sub-section (4) accordingly prescribes the approach to be adopted by the courts where prejudice may be caused.”

27. In a recent case of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence-vs-Raj Kumar Arora and Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 819, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph-154 has held as follows:-

                   “154. We are in agreement with the view that once charges have been framed by the Trial court in exercise of the powers under Section 228 CrPC, the accused cannot thereafter be discharged, be it through an exercise of the powers under Sections 227 or 216 CrPC. It is reiterated that the language of Section 216 CrPC provides only for the addition and alteration of charge(s) and not for the deletion or discharge of an accused. If the Legislature and intended to empower the Trial Court with the power to delete a charge at that stage, the same would have been expressly and unambiguously stated. Therefore, at such a stage of the trial, the accused must necessarily either be convicted or acquitted of the charges that were so framed against him. No shortcuts must be allowed.”

28. In the case of P. Kartikalakshmi Vs. Sri Ganesh , reported in (2017) 3 SCC 347, while dealing with powers under Section 216 Cr.PC, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: -

                   “6………….Section 216 Cr.PC empowers the Court to alter or add any charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced. It is now well settled that the power vested in the Court is exclusive to the Court and there is no right in any party to seek for such addition or alteration by filing any application as a matter of right. It may be that if there was an omission in the framing of the charge and if it comes to the knowledge of the Court trying the offence, the power is always vested in the Court, as provided under Section 216 CrPC to either alter or add the charge and that such power is available with the Court at any time before the judgment is pronounced. It is an enabling provision of the court to exercise its power under certain contingencies which comes to its notice or brought to its notice. In such a situation if it comes to the knowledge of the court that a necessity has arisen for the charge to the altered or added, it may do so on its own and no order need be passed for that purpose. After such alteration or addition when the final decision is rendered, it will be open for the parties to work out their remedies in accordance with law.”

                   (Emphasis added)

29. In view of the aforesaid ratios laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the Court has the power to alter or add any charge, if it finds that there was an omission at the framing of the charge and the Court is not powerless to alter or add any charge before the judgment is delivered. Therefore, the argument made by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that in the instant case, the Special Judge, CBI is barred from adding Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, due to provisions of Section 362 of the Cr.PC, is without any merit and the same is liable to be rejected due to the reason that Section 216 Cr.P.C specifically empowers the court to alter or add charges before the judgment is delivered.

30. In view of the aforesaid settled laws, the case laws relied upon by the learned counsel for the Petitioner, namely “Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) vs. Karimullah Osan Khan” , reported in (2014) 11 SCC 538 and “Directorate of Revenue Intelligence vs. Raj Kumar Arora & Ors. ”, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 819 are not applicable to the facts of the instant case.

31. Now, coming back to the facts of the instant case and the challenge made to the framing of charge by the learned Special Judge, CBI, vide order dated 04.06.2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Som Nath Thapa , reported in (1996) 4 SCC 659, held that if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction, a conclusion is required to be that the accused had committed the offence. It was further held that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court cannot look into the probative value of the materials on record. In this connection, the following paragraphs being relevant are quoted herein below: -

                   “30. In Antulay case Bhagwati, C.J., opined, after noting the difference in the language of the three pairs of sections, that despite the difference there is no scope for doubt that at the stage at which the court is required to consider the question of framing of charge, the test of "prima facie" case has to be applied. According to Shri Jethmalani, a prima facie case can be said to have been made out when the evidence, unless rebutted, would make the accused liable to conviction. In our view, a better and clearer statement of law would be that if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, a court can justifiably say that a prima facie case against him exists, and so, frame a charge against him for committing that offence.

                   31. Let us note the meaning of the word 'presume'. In Black's Law Dictionary it has been defined to mean "to believe or accept upon probable evidence". (emphasis ours). In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary it has been mentioned that in law 'presume' means "to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming", Stroud's Legal Dictionary has quoted in this context a certain judgment according to which "A presumption is a probable consequence drawn from facts (either certain, or proved by direct testimony) as to the truth of a fact alleged." (emphasis supplied). In Law Lexicon by P. Ramanath Aiyer, the same quotation finds place at p 1007 of 1987 Edn.

                   32. The aforesaid shows that if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.”

32. In the case of Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat & Ors., vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, reported in (2013) 11 SCC 476, while discussing the provisions under Section 228 Cr.PC, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: -

                   “15. This Court partly allowed the appeal qua the parents-in-law while dismissing the same qua the husband. This Court explained the legal position and the approach to be adopted by the court at the stage of framing of charges or directing discharge in the following words: (Onkar Nath case, SCC p. 565, para 11)

                   "11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence."(emphasis supplied)

                   16. Support for the above view was drawn by this Court from the earlier decisions rendered in State of Karnataka v. L Muniswamy, State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni. In Som Nath case, the legal position was summed up as under: (SCC p. 671, para 32)

                   "32. if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage." (emphasis supplied)

                   17. So also in Mohanlal case, this Court referred to several previous decisions and held that the judicial opinion regarding the approach to be adopted for framing of charge is that such charges should be framed if the court prima facie finds that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence as if to determine whether the material produced was sufficient to convict the accused. The following passage from the decision in Mohanlal case is in this regard apposite: (SCC p. 342, para 7)

                   "7. The crystallized judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused."

                   18. In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, this Court was considering whether the trial court can at the time of framing of charges consider material filed by the accused. The question was answered in the negative by this Court in the following words: (SCC pp. 577 & 579, paras 18 & 23)

                   "18. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. The reliance on Articles 14 and 21 is misplaced.... Further, at the stage of framing of charge roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible. If the contention of the accused is accepted, there would be a minitrial at the stage of framing of charge. That would defeat the object of the Code. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the defence of the accused cannot be put forth. The acceptance of the contention of the learned counsel for the accused would mean permitting the accused to adduce his defence at the stage of framing of charge and for examination thereof at that stage which is against the criminal jurisprudence. By way of illustration, it may be noted that the plea of alibi taken by the accused may have to be examined at the stage of framing of charge if the contention of the accused is accepted despite the well-settled proposition that it is for the accused to lead evidence at the trial to sustain such a plea. The accused would be entitled to produce materials and documents in proof of such a plea at the stage of framing of the charge, in case we accept the contention put forth on behalf of the accused. That has never been the intention of the law well settled for over one hundred years now. It is in this light that the provision about hearing the submissions of the accused as postulated by Section 227 is to be understood. It only means hearing the submissions of the accused on the record of the case as filed by the prosecution and documents submitted therewith and nothing more. The expression 'hearing the submissions of the accused' cannot mean opportunity to file material to be granted to the accused and thereby changing the settled law. At the state of framing of charge hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police.

                   23. As a result of aforesaid discussion, in our view, clearly the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has a no right to produce any material."(emphasis supplied)

                   19. Even in Rumi Dhar v. State of W.B., reliance whereupon was placed by the counsel for the appellants, the tests to be applied at the stage of discharge of the accused person under Section 239 Cr.PC were found to be no different. Far from readily encouraging discharge, the Court held that even a strong suspicion in regard to the commission of the offence would be sufficient to justify framing of charges. The Court observed: (SCC p. 369, para 17)

                   "17.... While considering an application for discharge filed in terms of Section 239 of the Code, it was for the learned Judge to go into the details of the allegations made against each of the accused persons so as to form an opinion as to whether any case at all has been made out or not as a strong suspicion in regard thereto shall subserve the requirements of law."

                   20. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, where this Court was examining a similar question in the context of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The legal position was summed up as under: (SCC p. 9, para 10)

                   "10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge:

                   (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.

                   (2) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

                   (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.

                   (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial."

33. Further, reference can also be made to the case of State of Karnataka -Vs- L. Muniswamy & Ors. , reported in AIR 1997 SC 1489, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of offence by the accused.

34. In view of the aforesaid case laws that have been discussed above, regarding framing of charge, it is a settled law that at the time of framing of charge, the Trial Court is not required to carry out a mini trial or a roving enquiry about the guilt of the accused. What is required is to be seen as to whether a prima facie case is made out or not against the accused person. If the prima facie case is made out, the Trial Court shall have all the powers within its ambit to frame the charge against the accused person. In this connection, the case of Homi Rajvansh vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. , reported in (2014) 12 SCC 556 may be referred to, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is no need to traverse all the factual details at the time of framing of charge and the Court is not required to scrutinize all the allegations against the accused for the purpose of deciding whether such allegations are likely to be upheld in the trial or not. Therefore, it is clear that what the Trial Court is required to do is come to a prima facie finding that there are prima facie materials against the accused, so that, the charge can be framed against the accused. After the framing of the charge, the Trial Court shall decide about the guilt of the accused on conclusion of the trial.

35. In the instant case, after investigation, CBI has filed the Charge-sheet after seizure of various documents, material objects and after recording the statements of various witnesses, including the statement of one Shri Ranjit Kumar Dutta, Superintendent of Customs, Land Custom Station, Hatisar, who was stationed at Hatisar at that point of time when the alleged offence was committed. The statement of the aforesaid Superintendent of Customs revealed that the duty of the accusedpetitioner, Shri Laliteswar Sharma, was to assist the executive staffs i.e., the Superintendent and Inspector of Land Custom Station, Hatisar, as there was an acute shortage of staffs and the accused-petitioner was instructed to put the shipping bill numbers by sitting at 4th Room of the Land Custom Station, Hatisar. It is seen that the accused-petitioner was maintaining the Shipping Bill Register (Bill for Export) and the Bill of Entry Register. It is also revealed that the accused-petitioner was on leave from 16.07.2023 to 30.07.2023 but, he resumed his duty on 31.07.2023 and he was continuing his duty till he was arrested by the CBI on 02.08.2023 when the CBI laid a trap. It is also revealed that the office of the Superintendent, Land Custom Station was in a single Assam type house, having four rooms. The 4th room of the aforesaid house was allotted to the accused-petitioner. It is revealed that on 02.08.2023, the coaccused namely, Pawan Chaudhary visited the office at about 10.00 hours for work of shipping bill as he was engaged by various exporters and importers, as a private agent. It is revealed that said Pawan Chaudhary was not appointed/authorized by the Customs office. It is seen that on 02.08.2023, he was caught red-handed by the CBI, while he was working in the office table allotted to the accused-petitioner in the 4th room. It is also revealed that due to shortfall of staff, the accused-petitioner was handling the shipping bills for export and import, which was admitted by the accusedpetitioner. Though the accused-petitioner denied about any knowledge of demand of any money from the Truck owners, including the complainant in the instant case, there are prima facie materials available which show that the accused-petitioner might have allowed the co-accused, Pawan Chaudhary to sit on his table in the 4th Room. As discussed about the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court about the materials to be considered by the Trial Court at the time of framing of charge, in the instant case, the Special Judge, CBI, is found to be within his ambit while framing charge against the accused-petitioner. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that there are prima facie materials to frame charge against the accusedpetitioner, under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120B of the IPC.

36. As far as the question of invoking the inherent powers under Section 528 of BNSS is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in catena of cases has held that the scope of Section 482 (presently section 528 BNSS) of Cr.PC, 1973 is well defined and the inherent power can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of Court and to otherwise, to secure the ends of justice. However, in exercise of such power, it is not permissible to appreciate the evidence, as it can only evaluate material documents on record to the extent of prima facie satisfaction of existence of sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused and the Court cannot look into materials, the acceptability of which will essentially be a matter of trial. In this connection, the case of N. Soundaram vs. P.K. Pounraj & Anr ., reported in (2014) 10 SCC 616 being relevant is referred to, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the power under Section 482 is to be exercised sparingly and cautiously to prevent abuse of the process of court and to secure ends of justice. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution and the High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie decision, unless, there are compelling circumstances to do so and it is only if, taking the allegations and the complaint as they were, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence was made out, only then the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding.

37. As settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and Ors., vs. Ch. Bajhan Lal & Ors. , reported in AIR 1992 SC 604, with regard to exercising the power of quashing, the Court has to exercise the same sparingly without undertaking and exercising to determine the reliability or the genuineness of the allegations made. The allegations made in the complaint are to be considered as genuine and thereafter, it must be considered whether the prima facie case has been made out against the accused person. The police are duty bound to investigate, if there is an allegation of commission of cognizable offence and the Courts, usually, should be slow in interfering with the duties of the police in their investigation. Therefore, charge-sheet being a report of the police of their investigation, the same being a preliminary document for taking ahead the trial, the same ought not to be interfered in a routine manner. The same ought to be interfered only when a palpable wrong or false allegation against the accused person are apparent on the face of the record. The trial is conducted for providing the opportunity to the accused to prove his innocence. Therefore, a charge against an accused usually cannot be termed as prejudicial to the accused if sufficient prima facie materials are available against the accused person.

38. In the instant case in hand, the accused-petitioner is alleged to have been involved in a criminal conspiracy, whereby he has allegedly committed the offence of abetment and thereby, the co-accused, namely, Pawan Chaudhary has committed the alleged offence under Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with section 120B of the IPC . From the materials available, this Court is of the considered opinion that there are prima facie materials against the accused-petitioner for charging him against the offences under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with Section 120B of the IPC.

39. In view of the aforesaid discussions and taking into account the ratios laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the instant petition does not merit any interference at this stage, and therefore, the same is dismissed.

40. The petition is disposed of in the above terms.