1. Heard.

2. Leave granted.

3. The appellant has challenged the order passes by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in writ petition(s) preferred by the respondent herein, assailing the FIR(s) registered against him by the Karnataka Lokayuktha Police under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

4. In the writ petition(s), filed before the High Court, the primary grounds laying challenge to the registration of the FIR(s) were two fold:-

                   i. That no preliminary enquiry whatsoever was conducted in accordance with Section 9 of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 and hence, the direction given by the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha to register the FIRs against the respondents for the offence/s punishable under the PC Act, were illegal and without jurisdiction.

                   ii. That the direction given by the Superintendent of Police to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, for investigating the cases pursuant to registration of the FIRs, was contrary to the mandate of Section 17 of the PC Act.

5. The High Court allowed the said writ petition(s) and accepted the challenge laid by the respondent against registration of the FIR(s) and further investigation on both grounds referred to supra and quashed the said FIR(s) having been registered without jurisdiction. One such similar order was assailed by the State of Karnataka and the Karnataka Lokayuktha Police by way of Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024 titled as State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy wherein this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court and affirmed the action of the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha, in directing the registration of the FIR and investigation thereof by the Deputy Superintendent of Police without conducting any preliminary inquiry.

6. During the course of hearing of the present appeal, learned counsel representing the respondent, candidly conceded that so far as the two pivotal issues pertaining to the registration of the FIR(s) without a preliminary inquiry being conducted and the power of the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha to authorize investigation by the Deputy Superintendent of Police are concerned, the same are no longer res integra and stand concluded against the respondent by the judgment of this Court in T.N. Sudhakar Reddy (supra) wherein, it was held as below:-

                   '51. In view of the above discussion, we conclude that:

                   a. The High Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the order dated 4th December, 2023, passed by the Superintendent of Police, was directly passed under Section 17 of the PC Act, thereby violating the mandatory provisions of the PC Act.

                   b. The preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in every case under the PC Act. If a superior officer is in seisin of a source information report which is both detailed and well-reasoned and such that any reasonable person would be of the view that it prima facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the preliminary inquiry may be avoided.

                   c. Section 17 of the PC Act relates specifically to the investigation process, and not the initial act of registering the FIR, for which it relies on the provisions of the CrPC. Hence, it places limitations on only the investigation; it does not impede the fundamental duty of the law enforcement agency to record and register an FIR for cognizable offences.

                   d. On a harmonious reading of the provisions of the PC Act and the CrPC, it is manifest that the Superintendent of Police is competent to direct the registration of an FIR if he has information about the commission of a cognizable offence, punishable under the PC Act. The former is also competent to simultaneously direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register an FIR for the offences under the PC Act, with the understanding that the subsequent investigation will be subject to the restrictions outlined in Section 17 of the PC Act. A composite order to register the FIR and conduct investigation aligns with the statutory framework of the CrPC and the PC Act.' (Emphasis Supplied)

7. Without prejudice to the above, the respondent's counsel have asserted before us that in addition to the above two grounds, relating to jurisdiction, numerous other grounds touching upon the merits were raised by the writ petitioners in their respective writ petitions which were not adverted to by the High Court because the said writ petitions were allowed on the above two preliminary grounds only, finding the action of the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha to be in teeth of the provisions contained under the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 and Section 17 of the PC Act.

8. They fervently urged that there was no foundational material available with the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha so as to justify direct registration of the FIRs, particularly those pertaining to the allegations of amassing disproportionate assets punishable under Sections 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the PC Act.

9. The writ petition(s) came to be allowed on the preliminary issues of jurisdiction and hence, various other grounds raised by the respondent in writ petition(s) which touched upon the merits of the matter were not dealt with by the High Court, thereby, causing grave prejudice to the respondent. Hence, he prayed that the matter should be remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration of the writ petition(s) on the issues and grounds not adverted to by the High Court while deciding the writ petition(s).

10. To this submission, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has no objection.

11. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at bar and have gone through the material placed on record.

12. Learned counsel representing the respondent have fairly conceded to the position that the High Court erred in quashing the FIR(s) on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Superintendent of Police to direct registration of the FIR without a preliminary inquiry and in authorizing the Deputy Superintendent of Police to conduct investigation. Undeniably, these issues stand concluded, and the reasoning assigned by the High Court has been reversed by this Court in the case of T.N. Sudhakar Reddy (supra) and which has been followed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Channakeshava H.D.

13. However, this Court is conscious of the fact that the grounds taken by the respondent touching upon the merits were not adverted to by the High Court because the writ petition(s) was decided on the preliminary issues of jurisdiction only. Hence, the respondent, [original writ petitioner], were deprived of adjudication of other grounds raised in the writ petition(s) which has left him remediless in view of the judgment in T.N. Sudhakar Reddy (supra).

14. In view of the discussion made above, we hereby quash the order passed by the High Court and remit the matter back to the High Court for fresh adjudication of the writ petition(s) on merits. This consideration upon remand shall be restricted to the grounds though taken but not adjudicated by the High Court while deciding the writ petition(s).

15. Learned counsel for the respondent has brought to the notice of this Court that owing to the order(s) passed by this Court, permitting the Investigating Agency to continue the investigation, chargesheet(s) has been filed against the respondent. It is, thus, urged that the respondent may be permitted to assail the chargesheet(s) in the writ petition(s) received post-remand.

16. We, therefore, provide that in whichever case(s) where the chargesheet(s) has been submitted during pendency of this appeal, the respondent (writ petitioner before the High Court) concerned shall be at liberty to assail the chargesheet(s) in his respective writ petition(s), which shall stand revived pursuant to this order. However, this liberty is limited to the extent of assailing the chargesheets, if any, filed during pendency of this appeal and shall not be taken as expanding the scope of the writ petition(s) any further. Needless to state that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 do provide ample remedies to an accused to challenge the order(s) passed by the trial Court whether interim, interlocutory or final and thus, the aggrieved person(s) would not be rendered remediless in any situation.

17. As the respondent was enjoying interim protection, while the writ petition(s) was pending before the High Court, we hereby direct that no coercive steps shall be taken against the respondent till the disposal of the petition/matter before the High Court.

18. Accordingly, it is directed that the writ petition(s) filed by the respondent before the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru shall stand restored to their original number(s). We request the High Court to take up and decide the writ petition(s) post remand expeditiously.

19. The impugned order is set aside, and the appeal is allowed in the above terms.

20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.