Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition has been directed against an order of detention dated 22.07.2025 passed against one Femis, S/o. Abbas under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The petitioner herein is the mother of the detenu. The detention order stands confirmed by the Government vide order dated 18.09.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of one year from the date of detention.

2. The records available before us disclose that, on 11.06.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Malappuram, seeking initiation of proceedings under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known rowdy' as defined under Section 2p(iii) of the KAA(P) Act. For passing Ext.P1 detention order, the jurisdictional authority reckoned ten cases in which the detenu got involved. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.726/2025 of Tirur Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 137(2), 127(2), 115(2), 118(1), 110, 310(2) and 351(1) of Bharathiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “BNS”).

3. We have heard Sri. M. H. Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is vitiated, as it has been passed without proper application of mind and without arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned counsel, there was an inordinate delay both in mooting the proposal by the sponsoring authority and in passing the impugned order by the competent authority after the date of the last prejudicial activity, thereby snapping the live and proximate link between the said activity and the purpose of detention. The learned counsel further contended that, had the sponsoring authority entertained any bona fide apprehension regarding the likelihood of the detenu repeating criminal activities, it would have acted with promptitude in initiating the proposal for proceedings under the KAA(P) Act. Hence, it is urged that the impugned order warrants interference on the ground of delay and is liable to be set aside.

5. In response, Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor, asserted that there is no unreasonable delay either in submitting the proposal or in passing Ext.P1 detention order after the last prejudicial activity. However, some minimal delay is inevitable while passing a detention order, especially when it is the duty of the authority to ensure adherence to the natural justice principles while passing such an order. Moreover, a reasonable time would be necessary for collecting the details of the cases in which the detenu is involved, and minimal delay in mooting the proposal and passing the order is quite natural and hence justifiable. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the detaining authority passed Ext.P1 order after arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction, and no interference is warranted.

6. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced and have perused the records.

7. The records show that the detenu was classified as a “known rowdy”, considering his recurrent involvement in ten cases. While considering the contention of the petitioner, regarding the delay that occurred in submitting the proposal for detention and in passing the order, it cannot be ignored that an order under Section 3(1) of KAA(P) Act has a significant impact on the personal as well as fundamental rights of an individual. So such an order could not be passed in a casual manner instead it can only be passed on credible materials after arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction. Furthermore, there exists no inflexible rule requiring a detention order to be issued within a specific time frame following the last prejudicial act. However, when there is undue delay in making the proposal and passing the detention order, the same would undermine its validity, particularly when no convincing or plausible explanation is offered for the delay.

8. Keeping in mind the above, while coming to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.726/2025 of Tirur Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 137(2), 127(2), 115(2), 118(1), 110, 310(2) and 351(1) of BNS. The incident that led to the registration of the last prejudicial activity occurred on 26.04.2025. From the records, it is evident that after the commission of the said crime, the accused absconded. The records further reveal that the District Police Chief, Malappuram, submitted the proposal to the competent authority for initiation of proceedings under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act only on 11.06.2025. Therefore, it is evident that there is a delay of forty six days in submitting the proposal after the commission of the last prejudicial activity. The said delay cannot be justified as necessary for observing natural justice principles.

9. Curiously, the impugned order itself admits that there was some delay in mooting the proposal. The reason assigned therein for the said delay is that additional time was required to collect the details of the cases in which the detenu was involved. In the present case, as many as ten cases formed the basis for proposing and issuing the detention order. The details of those cases were readily available and could have been obtained without delay, particularly in view of the technological advancements and institutional capabilities of the law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the explanation that additional time was required to collect the details of the cases in which the detenu was involved is untenable. Though it is true that the accused was absconding after the commission of the last prejudicial activity, there is no legal impediment to initiating proceedings under the KAA(P) Act against an accused who has absconded after such activity. On the contrary, when the accused is neither apprehended nor in custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, the sponsoring authority ought to have exercised greater vigilance and promptitude in initiating proceedings under the KAA(P) Act, especially considering that the likelihood of the detenu engaging in further criminal activities continued to subsist.

10. If the Superintendent of Police who mooted the proposal was having bona fide apprehension regarding the repetition of anti- social activities by the detenu, definitely he would have acted swiftly after the last prejudicial activity. In the case at hand, as already stated, there is a delay of forty six days in mooting the proposal for the detention order. Therefore, nobody could be blamed if it is found that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention is snapped. The said delay in mooting the proposal itself shows that the proposed officer did not have any genuine apprehension regarding the immediate repetition of criminal activities by the accused.

11. In the result, this Writ Petition is allowed and Ext.P1 order of detention is set aside. The Superintendent of Central Prison, Viyyur, Thrissur is directed to release the detenu, Sri. Femis forthwith, if his detention is not required in connection with any other case.

                  The Registry is directed to communicate the order to the Superintendent of Central Prison, Viyyur, Thrissur, forthwith.