1. Criminal Petition has been filed under Sections 480 and 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’), seeking to enlarge the petitioner/Accused No.29 on bail in Cr.No.470 of 2024 of Tirupati East Police Station, Tirupati District, registered against the petitioner/Accused No.29 herein and some other accused for the offences punishable under Sections 274, 275, 316(5), 318(3), 318(4), 61(2), 299, 336(3) and 340(2), 49 read with 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘the BNS’) and Sections 51 and 59 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.

2. Material averments stemming from the case of the prosecution are that, M/s A.R. Dairy Food Private Limited, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu, in collusion with certain other accused, committed the offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust with common intention supplying adulterated and substandard cow ghee to the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams (TTD), thereby causing wrongful loss to the institution and deliberately hurting the religious sentiments of Hindu devotees of Lord Sri Venkateswara Swamy; that despite the tender conditions mandating supply of 10 lakh kilograms of Agmark Special Grade cow ghee pursuant to the tender notification dated 12.03.2024, finalized on 08.05.2024 and supply order issued on 15.05.2024, the accused supplied four tankers of ghee on 12.06.2024, 20.06.2024, 25.06.2024 and 04.07.2024 which, upon confidential testing at NDDB CALF Laboratory, Anand, Gujarat, was found to be adulterated with vegetable and animal fat–based substances including lard, thereby violated the tender agreement clauses and committed acts of deception for wrongful gain; and basing upon the said laboratory report dated 12.07.2024, the complainant, Sri P.Murali Krishna, General Manager (Procurement), TTD, lodged a complaint on 25.09.2024 before the Station House Officer, East Police Station, Tirupati.

3. Sri K.S.Murthy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri K S Murthy Associates appearing for the Petitioner submits that the allegations sought to be attributed to the Petitioner are wholly misconceived and unsustainable in law. The Petitioner, who served as General Manager (Procurement), was entrusted only with the limited function of procurement, while the statutory duty of drawing samples, forwarding them to laboratories, and placing the resultant reports before the competent authority lay exclusively with the Deputy Executive Officer (Warehousing). The attempt to foist liability upon the Petitioner for alleged suppression of laboratory reports is therefore contrary to the administrative scheme and amounts to imputing culpability without any proximate act of omission or commission attributable to him.

4. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the structural division of the Marketing Department into three independent wings in 2013, Procurement, Warehousing, and Auctions, was intended precisely to delineate responsibilities and prevent overlap. In the instant case, no file was ever put up by the Deputy Executive Officer when the reports were received, and yet the Petitioner is being singled out as if he had deliberately suppressed the same. Such attribution of liability is not only contrary to the administrative framework but also violative of the settled principle that criminal responsibility must rest upon clear and direct evidence, not upon conjecture or misplaced responsibility.

5. It is further urged that the allegation regarding retrospective application of newly framed FSSAI guidelines is equally untenable. The record reveals that the issue was deliberated upon by technical experts, financial advisors, and the marketing section, and the Board itself resolved not to give retrospective effect to such standards. The Petitioner, being one among several officers, cannot be held criminally liable for a collective decision of the Board taken in accordance with expert opinion. To proceed against him for decisions that were neither unilateral nor within his exclusive competence amounts to arbitrary persecution.

6. Sri K.S.Murthy, learned Senior Counsel would also submit that the allegation of having issued a favorable report to M/s Bhole Baba Organic Dairy Milk Private Limited is demonstrably false. The report in question was issued by the Plant Inspection Team collectively, of which the Petitioner was only one member. Moreover, the exclusion of ‘Beta Sitosterol’ from the tender conditions was affected by the Executive Officer upon expert recommendation and in conformity with prevailing FSSAI standards. The Petitioner had no role in such exclusion, and imputing mala fides to him in this regard is wholly unsustainable.

7. It is further submitted that the allegation that the Petitioner received certain articles from an alleged agent is equally devoid of legal foundation.

                  Learned Courts have consistently held that mere entries in diaries or uncorroborated records cannot form the basis of prosecution. In the absence of cogent evidence establishing receipt of undue advantage, such allegations remain speculative and cannot sustain criminal liability. The attempt to rely upon such tenuous material only demonstrates that the Petitioner is being unfairly targeted and harassed.

8. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that all offences alleged against the Petitioner are punishable with less than seven years, except for Section 316(5) of ‘the BNS’, which has no application to the facts of the present case. The essential ingredients of entrustment and dishonest misappropriation of property are conspicuously absent. The Petitioner was never entrusted with property, nor did he misappropriate or convert any entrusted property. The invocation of Section 316(5) of ‘the BNS’ is therefore a deliberate attempt to evade the procedural safeguards under Section 35(3) of ‘the BNS’, and urged to struck down as an abuse of process.

9. Finally, it is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that several co- accused, including Accused Nos.2 to 5, have already been released on bail, and the Petitioner has cooperated fully with the investigation, attending SIT inquiries and producing files whenever called upon. He was even subjected to police custody for four days and extended complete cooperation. In such circumstances, continued incarceration of the Petitioner serves no purpose, as the investigation stands substantially completed. No prejudice would be caused to the prosecution if the Petitioner is enlarged on bail. The Petitioner undertakes to comply with any condition that this Court may deem fit and proper to impose while enlarging the Petitioner on bail and, it is urged to allow the petition.

10. Per contra, Mr. P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI has vehemently opposed the prayer for grant of bail and submits that the present petition filed by Accused No.29 is devoid of merit, both in law and on facts, and is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. The allegations sought to be denied by the Petitioner are not mere conjectures but are borne out of a meticulous investigation conducted by the Special Investigation Team under the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The record unmistakably reveals the complicity of the Petitioner in a larger conspiracy that has caused grave prejudice to the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams (TTD) and irreparable injury to the religious sentiments of millions of devotees. The Prosecution submits that the Petitioner, while functioning as General Manager (Procurement), was entrusted with the solemn responsibility of ensuring the genuineness of documents submitted by dairies in the tender process. The investigation has revealed that the Petitioner deliberately failed to discharge this statutory duty, thereby facilitating the entry of ineligible dairies into the procurement process. Such deliberate omission cannot be brushed aside as administrative lapse, it constitutes conscious participation in a fraudulent scheme designed to secure wrongful gain for private entities and corresponding wrongful loss to TTD.

11. It is submitted that further investigation established that the Petitioner, being a member of the Plant Inspection Teams, connived with the management of M/s Sri Vyshnavi Dairy Specialties Pvt. Ltd., M/s Bhole Baba Organic Dairy Milk Pvt. Ltd., and M/s Malganga Milk & Agro Products Pvt. Ltd. The inspection reports prepared under his watch were demonstrably perfunctory and tailored to favour these dairies, thereby enabling them to secure tenders despite their incapacity to produce Agmark Special Grade cow ghee. The subsequent supplies of adulterated ghee, procured from unauthorized sources, stand as irrefutable evidence of the Petitioner’s collusion.

12. Mr. P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor submits that the Petitioner’s role was not passive but active and facilitative. By failing to ensure genuine inspection and by endorsing fabricated compliance, the Petitioner became an indispensable link in the chain of conspiracy. The wrongful loss to TTD quantified in crores of rupees, coupled with the desecration of sacred prasadam, underscores the gravity of his misconduct. Such acts transcend mere administrative negligence and fall squarely within the ambit of criminal breach of trust and conspiracy.

13. It is further submitted that the Petitioner accepted pecuniary and non- pecuniary advantages in the course of his official duties. The acceptance of a silver plate worth Rs.16,700/- and a Samsung mobile phone worth Rs.50,000/- from representatives of the dairies is not a trivial matter but a clear manifestation of quid pro quo. These undue advantages establish mens rea and demonstrate that the Petitioner acted with dishonest intention to favour private parties in violation of his fiduciary obligations as a public servant.

14. Learned Special Public Prosecutor submits that the magnitude of the conspiracy is unprecedented. The dairies, aided by the Petitioner and other accused, diverted lakhs of kilograms of palm oil and palm kernel oil to manufacture adulterated ghee worth hundreds of crores. The Petitioner’s failure to discharge his duty and his active connivance facilitated the supply of such adulterated ghee to TTD, thereby desecrating the sanctity of Srivari Laddu Prasadam. The enormity of this offence cannot be overstated, for it strikes at the very heart of public faith and religious devotion.

15. The contention of the Petitioner that he had no role in initiating action against adulteration is wholly untenable. As General Manager (Procurement), he was the custodian of the procurement process and bore the responsibility of ensuring compliance with tender conditions. His deliberate failure to act upon laboratory reports and his suppression of adverse findings constitute culpable omissions. The doctrine of public trust demands that such dereliction be visited with penal consequences, lest public servants be emboldened to betray their fiduciary duties.

16. Learned Special Public Prosecutor further submits that the invocation of Section 316(5) of ‘the BNS’ is fully justified. The Petitioner, being entrusted with dominion over property in his capacity as a public servant, committed criminal breach of trust by facilitating the diversion of funds and resources to private parties. The essential ingredients of entrustment and dishonest misappropriation stand satisfied in the present case. The attempt of the Petitioner to evade liability under this provision is a desperate stratagem to escape the rigours of law.

17. Mr. P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor eventually submits that the Petitioner’s complicity in the conspiracy, his acceptance of undue advantage, his suppression of adverse reports, and his facilitation of adulterated ghee supplies collectively establish grave offences under ‘the BNS’, ‘the I.P.C.,’ Food Safety and Standards Act, and the Prevention of Corruption Act. The offences are of a serious nature, involving breach of public trust, fraud upon a religious institution, and desecration of sacred prasadam. In such circumstances, the Petitioner is not entitled to the discretionary relief of bail, and his petition deserves to be dismissed in limini in the larger interests of justice, public faith, and sanctity of religious institutions.

18. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record.

19. In view of the rival submissions advanced by both the learned Counsel and upon a perusal of the prosecutorial narrative, the pivotal issue now meriting for consideration is:

                  “Whether the Petitioner is entitled for grant of bail?”

20. In Pinki v. State of Uttar Pradesh(2025 SCC OnLine SC 781), the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para Nos.67 and 78 held that considering the gravity of the offence and the accused’s modus operandi, the High Court erred in granting bail in a callous manner without adequate safeguards, resulting in accused absconding and jeopardizing the trial; the Court failed to balance personal liberty with societal interest by not imposing conditions such as regularly reporting to the police; and the true test of judicial discretion in bail lies in striking a fair balance between the rights of the accused and the interest of society, based on the facts of each case.

21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor((1978) 1 SCC 240), at para No.9, held that courts may consider the risk of an accused interfering with justice when deciding bail. Examining the applicant’s criminal antecedents is rational, especially to assess the likelihood of reoffending while on bail. Thus, bail discretion based on criminal history is relevant and justified to protect society.

22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi((2001) 4 SCC 280), at para No.8 held that bail must be granted judiciously, based on settled principles and the specific facts of each case, not arbitrarily. Courts must consider the nature of the accusation and evidence, severity of punishment, character of the accused, risk of absconding or witness tampering, and public interest. At the bail stage, the court needs only assess whether there are reasonable grounds to believe a prima facie case exists.

23. The Hon’ble Supreme Apex Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh((2002) 3 SCC 598), at para No.3 held that grant of bail is discretionary but must be exercised judiciously and supported by cogent reasons.

                  Bail decisions depend on the facts of each case, and social standing of the accused alone is not decisive. The nature and gravity of the offence are crucial factors, with more heinous crimes justifying greater caution in granting bail.

24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chattergee((2010) 14 SCC 496) at para No.9 held as under:

                  “9…It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

                  (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

                  (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

                  (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

                  (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail:

                  (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused:

                  (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

                  (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced: and

                  (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail."

25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar((2022) 4 SCC 497), at para No.35 held that individual liberty is vital, but courts must also consider the seriousness of accusations supported by adequate material. Bail decisions must rest on a reasoned prima facie assessment of the vital facts on record. The nature of the crime, criminal antecedents, and the severity of punishment upon conviction are key considerations.

26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Manoj Kumar Khokhar v. State of Rajasthan((2022) 3 SCC 501) at para Nos.37 and 38 held that courts must exercise bail discretion judiciously, balancing the alleged crime with the need to ensure a fair trial. Though detailed reasoning is unnecessary, a bail order must contain relevant reasons and cannot be unreasoned. If bail is perverse or ignores material facts, it may be challenged on appeal or cancelled if new circumstances arise.

27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki supra at para No.63 held that individual liberty cannot be so overstated as to cause disorder or undermine law and order in society. Bail decisions must reflect reasoned application of mind and adherence to established legal norms, not rigid formulas. Liberty operates within the limits of law and carries a responsibility to preserve social tranquility and safety.

28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Pinki supra at para No.64, relying on its earlier decision in Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh((2012) 9 SCC 446), held that personal liberty, though highly valued, is neither absolute nor unrestricted. It must be exercised within limits so as not to endanger the life or liberty of others. Society does not tolerate actions that are anti-social or harmful to the collective good.

29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rohit Bishnoi v. State of Rajastan(2023 18 SCC 753) at para Nos.24 and 25 held that while individual liberty is vital, bail decisions must account for the seriousness of accusations supported by adequate material and a reasoned prima facie assessment. Courts need not give elaborate reasons or examine merits in detail, especially at an early trial stage. However, bail orders must consider material factors such as gravity of offence, possible punishment, witness influence, evidence tampering, criminal antecedents, and prima facie satisfaction.

30. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. Central Bureau of Investigation((2013) 7 SCC 439) at para Nos.34 and 35 held that economic offences form a distinct category and require a stricter approach to bail due to their serious impact on public funds and the national economy. Such offences, often involving deep-rooted conspiracies, are treated as grave threats to financial stability. While granting bail, courts must consider the nature of accusations and evidence, severity of punishment, character of the accused, risk of absconding or witness tampering, and public interest.

31. In this regard, it is apposite and profitable to refer to the landmark judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in P. Chidambaram v. CBI((2020) 13 SCC 337), where the entire law on grant of bails was discussed. At paragraph Nos.16, 17, 22 to 25, it is held as under:

                  “16. Expression of prima facie reasons for granting or refusing to grant bail is a requirement of law especially where such bail orders are appealable so as to indicate application of mind to the matter under consideration and the reasons for conclusion. Recording of reasons is necessary since the accused/prosecution/victim has every right to know the reasons for grant or refusal to grant bail. This will also help the appellate court to appreciate and consider the reasonings for grant or refusal to grant bail. But giving reasons for exercise of discretion in granting or refusing to grant bail is different from discussing the merits or demerits of the case. At the stage of granting bail, an elaborate examination of evidence and detailed reasons touching upon the merit of the case, which may prejudice the accused, should be avoided.

                  Observing that “at the stage of granting bail, detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case should be avoided”, in Niranjan Singh [Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote, (1980) 2 SCC 559 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 508], it was held as under: (SCC pp. 561-62, para 3)

                  “3. … Detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits should be avoided while passing orders on bail applications. No party should have the impression that his case has been prejudiced. To be satisfied about a prima facie case is needed but it is not the same as an exhaustive exploration of the merits in the order itself.”

                  17. In the present case, in the impugned judgment, paras 52 to 75 relate to the findings on the merits of the prosecution case. As discussed earlier, at the stage of considering the application for bail, detailed examination of the merits of the prosecution case and the merits or demerits of the materials relied upon by the prosecution, should be avoided. It is, therefore, made clear that the findings of the High Court in paras 52 to 75 be construed as expression of opinion only for the purpose of refusal to grant bail and the same shall not in any way influence the trial or other proceedings.

                  22. There is no hard-and-fast rule regarding grant or refusal to grant bail. Each case has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case and on its own merits. The discretion of the court has to be exercised judiciously and not in an arbitrary manner. At this stage itself, it is necessary for us to indicate that we are unable to accept the contention of the learned Solicitor General that “flight risk” of economic offenders should be looked at as a national phenomenon and be dealt with in that manner merely because certain other offenders have flown out of the country. The same cannot, in our view, be put in a straitjacket formula so as to deny bail to the one who is before the court, due to the conduct of other offenders, if the person under consideration is otherwise entitled to bail on the merits of his own case. Hence, in our view, such consideration including as to “flight risk” is to be made on individual basis being uninfluenced by the unconnected cases, more so, when the personal liberty is involved.

                  23. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528, it was held as under : (SCC pp. 535-36, para 11)

                  “11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well-settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are:

                  (a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence.

                  (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant.

                  (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh [Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Puran v. Rambilas [Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338)”

                  24. Referring to the factors to be taken into consideration for grant of bail, in Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N. [Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N., (2005) 2 SCC 13: it was held as under: (SCC pp. 21-22, para 16)

                  “16. … The considerations which normally weigh with the court in granting bail in non-bailable offences have been explained by this Court in State v. Jagjit Singh [State v. Jagjit Singh, AIR 1962 SC 253 : (1962) 1 Cri LJ 215] and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118 and basically they are — the nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the evidence; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State and other similar factors which may be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

                  25. After referring to para 11 of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528, in State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21, it was held as under : case [State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21, SCC p. 31, para 18)

                  “18. It is well-settled that the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail [see Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118. While a vague allegation that the accused may tamper with the evidence or witnesses may not be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail will be refused.””

32. In this context, it is also apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh(2025 SCC Online SC 1157), at Para Nos.27 and 53 (iv) it is held as under:

                  “27. To some extent, the petitioners could be said to have made out a prima facie case of political bias or mala fides but that by itself is not sufficient to grant anticipatory bail overlooking the other prima facie materials on record. Political vendetta or bias if any is one of the relevant considerations while considering the plea of anticipatory bail. The courts should keep one thing in mind, more particularly, while considering the plea of anticipatory bail that when two groups of rival political parties are at war which may ultimately lead to litigations, more particularly, criminal prosecutions there is bound to be some element of political bias or vendetta involved in the same. However, political vendetta by itself is not sufficient for the grant of anticipatory bail. The courts should not just look into the aspect of political vendetta and ignore the other materials on record constituting a prima facie case as alleged by the State. It is only when the court is convinced more than prima facie that the allegations are frivolous and baseless, that the court may bring into the element of political vendetta into consideration for the purpose of considering the plea of anticipatory bail. The frivolity in the entire case that the court may look into should be attributed to political bias or vendetta.

                  53. From the above exposition of law, the following emerges:

                  (iv) Where such police statement of an accused is confessional statement, the rigour of Section(s) 25 and 26 respectively will apply with all its vigour. A confessional statement of an accused will only be admissible if it is not hit by Section(s) 24 or 25 respectively and is in tune with the provisions of Section(s) 26, 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act respectively.

                  In other words, a police statement of an accused which is in the form of a confession is per se inadmissible and no reliance whatsoever can be placed on such statements either at the stage of bail or during trial. Since such confessional statements are rendered inadmissible by virtue of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, the provision of Section 30 would be of no avail, and no reliance can be placed on such confessional statement of an accused to implicate another co-accused.”

33. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi)( 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690), held while culling out the principles for grant of bail at paragraph No.19 as under:

                  “19. The principles which emerge as a result of the above discussion are as follows:

                  (i) An appeal against grant of bail cannot be considered to be on the same footing as an application for cancellation of bail;

                  (ii) The Court concerned must not venture into a threadbare analysis of the evidence adduced by prosecution. The merits of such evidence must not be adjudicated at the stage of bail;

                  (iii) An order granting bail must reflect application of mind and assessment of the relevant factors for grant of bail that have been elucidated by this Court. [See : Y v. State of Rajasthan (Supra); Jaibunisha v. Meherban9 and Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu10]

                  (iv) An appeal against grant of bail may be entertained by a superior Court on grounds such as perversity; illegality; inconsistency with law; relevant factors not been taken into consideration including gravity of the offence and impact of the crime;

                  (v) However, the Court may not take the conduct of an accused subsequent to the grant bail into consideration while considering an appeal against the grant of such bail. Such grounds must be taken in an application for cancellation of bail; and

                  (vi) An appeal against grant of bail must not be allowed to be used as a retaliatory measure. Such an appeal must be confined only to the grounds discussed above.”

34. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan(2025 INSC 979), while elaborately dealing with the law relating to grant or cancellation of bail, set aside the bail granted to the accused therein.

35. In the instant petition for bail preferred by Accused No.29, who functioned as General Manager (Procurement) in the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams (TTD), this Court has meticulously perused the averments in the petition, the counter-affidavit filed by the prosecution, and the materials unearthed by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the supervisory jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Upon careful perusal of the entire investigation material, it has been found that the Petitioner/Accused No.29, while functioning as General Manager (Procurement) in TTD during the relevant period, was entrusted with the responsibility of overseeing procurement of commodities including Agmark Special Grade Cow Ghee for preparation of Srivari Laddu Prasadams. It is revealed that certain dairies, namely M/s Harsh Fresh Dairy Products Pvt. Ltd./M/s Bhole Baba Organic Dairy Milk Pvt. Ltd. (A-7), M/s Sri Vyshnavi Dairy Specialties Pvt. Ltd. (A-6), and M/s Malganga Milk & Agro Products Pvt. Ltd., (A-19), submitted false and fabricated documents to meet tender specifications, and despite the mandate under Clause 5(v) of Annex-B of the NIT requiring verification of genuineness of such documents, the Petitioner, being head of the procurement department, failed to discharge his duty and recommended ineligible dairies as eligible. Further, as a member of the technical inspection team, the Petitioner connived with the management of M/s Sri Vyshnavi Dairy Specialties Pvt. Ltd. (A-6) and failed to conduct a diligent inspection on 15.03.2021, thereby enabling the said dairy to secure multiple tenders for supply of cow ghee. Subsequent to award of tenders, M/s Sri Vyshnavi Dairy Specialties Pvt. Ltd. (A-6), instead of manufacturing Agmark Special Grade cow ghee, procured adulterated ghee from M/s Bhole Baba Organic Dairy Milk Pvt. Ltd. (A-7) and supplied to TTD in violation of contractual terms, resulting in supply of 4,14,599 kgs, 53,550 kgs, and 5,16,045 kgs of adulterated ghee under different tenders, thereby misappropriating TTD funds to the tune of Rs. 14,99,97,748/-, Rs. 1,98,26,029/-, and Rs. 17,78,12,804/- respectively, and causing wrongful loss to TTD.

36. Petitioner was arrested on 27.11.2025 and he has been in judicial custody for the past 55 days. The Petitioner was taken into police custody for a period of five days. The Petitioner functioned as General Manager (Procurement) from 06.05.2017 to 17.05.2018 and later from 13.05.2022 to 01.05.2023. Those periods are very crucial. On 23.11.2025 a memo was filed showing the Petitioner as Accused No.29. Though, the Petitioner is placed under suspension he is transferred and posted as Executive Engineer, TTD, which is a crucial position. If the Petitioner is enlarged on bail at this juncture there is a serious threat to the progress of the investigation inasmuch as there were severe and serious allegations levelled against the Petitioner that he pressurized the officials not to reveal the report received from Mysore Laboratory.

37. The prosecution's narrative, buttressed by irrefutable investigative findings, unveils a pernicious conspiracy orchestrated by dairy conglomerates, including M/s A.R. Dairy Foods Pvt. Ltd., M/s Sri Vyshnavi Dairy Specialities Pvt. Ltd., M/s Bhole Baba Organic Dairy Milk Pvt. Ltd., and M/s Malganga Milk & Agro Products Pvt. Ltd., in active collusion with public servants including the petitioner. As a result, it was allegedly facilitated for the supply of adulterated Agmark Special Grade cow ghee, laced with palm oil, palm kernel oil, palmolein, and chemical adulterants, to TTD, thereby caused wrongful loss aggregating hundreds of crores and desecrating the sanctity of Srivari Laddu Prasadam. Consequently, inflicted profound injury upon the religious sentiments of millions of devotees.

38. The petitioner's contention that his role was circumscribed to procurement, absolving him from sampling, warehousing, or report dissemination duties, is a matter of trial. Continued pre-trial incarceration in judicial custody for some more period is thus imperative to forestall witness tampering, flight risk, and furtherance of the conspiracy, whose tentacles span multiple accused and colossal financial malversion.

39. With regard to the alleged role played by the Petitioner in the instant case the investigation is at crucial stage. Some more material witnesses are to be examined and some more important documents are to be secured by the investigating officer. If the petitioner is enlarged on bail at this crucial juncture his release would derail the progress of the investigation.

40. This Court is of the benign view that the present petition, at this juncture, is bereft of merit, for the offences' gravity, implicating public faith, fiduciary betrayal, and religious desecration, disentitles the petitioner to discretionary enlargement, particularly when investigation stands substantially not concluded yet and necessitates custodial restraint for further period.

41. In view of above facts and circumstances of the case, nature and gravity of the allegations leveled against the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to consider request of petitioner for enlarging the petitioner on bail at this juncture.

42. In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed.