1. The petitioner is the accused in C.C. No.17/2020 on the file of the Court of the Judicial First-Class Magistrate, Angamaly (Trial Court), which has originated from Crime No.1728/2019 registered by the Angamaly Police Station, alleging the commission of the offence punishable under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

2. The petitioner has filed the Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C, for brevity), to quash all further proceedings in the above case.

3. The second respondent had lodged Annexure-I FIR with the Angamaly Police Station, inter alia, stating that, on 25.09.2019, at around 07.00 hours, while the second respondent was going for his regular morning walk along the Valavazhi Road, the accused drove his car directly towards the second respondent and intimidated him with a fear of death. On seeing the speeding vehicle, the second respondent moved aside, which saved his life. Immediately, the petitioner took a sharp turn and drove away. The above incident had caused a reasonable apprehension and fear of death in the mind of the second respondent. The incident was witnessed by one Vijayan. The petitioner harbours animosity towards the second respondent due to a pending litigation. The second respondent is a heart patient and is currently admitted to the hospital for treatment.

4. The Police, after investigation, filed Annexure- II final report. The gravamen of the final report is as follows:

                  “On 25.09.2019, at about 07:00 hours, the accused person (petitioner), out of his previous animosity and with an intention to instil fear in the mind of the second respondent, drove the car bearing registration No. KL-63-C-779 towards the second respondent, causing a fear of death to him”.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the second respondent.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argues that, even if the allegations in the FIR and the final report are taken on their face value, the same will not attract the offence under Section 506 IPC. The mere allegation made by the second respondent that the petitioner had intimidated him is not sufficient to attract the offence under 506 IPC. There should be a real threat to cause death or grievous hurt to the victim to attract the above offence. Even if the petitioner withstands the ordeal of trial, it will not result in a conviction. The learned counsel relies on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhushree Datta v. State of Karnataka [2025 KHC 6069] and that of this Court in Vijayakumar v. State of Kerala [2024 KHC 1321], in support of his contention. He prays that the entire proceedings may be quashed.

7. The learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the second respondent stoutly oppose the Crl.M.C. They, in unison, submit that, if the prosecution case in the FIR and the final report is taken on its face value, the same would attract the offence under Section 506 IPC. There is a specific allegation that the petitioner drove the vehicle at high speed to intimidate the second respondent. Moreover, there is a previous animosity between the parties due to the pending litigation. It is only because the second respondent moved away from the speeding car that he did not lose his life. This Court may not embark on a mini-trial and conclude that there was no intimidation made by the second respondent. Moreover, there is an eyewitness to the incident, who would be examined to prove the prosecution's case. Hence, the Crl. M.C may be dismissed.

8. The specific case of the prosecution is that the petitioner drove his car in such a manner, intimidated the second respondent, and instilled a fear of death in him. The said incident was witnessed by one Vijayan. Furthermore, there is a previous animosity between the parties.

9. In the above context, it is profitable to refer to Sections 503 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, which read as follows:

                  “503 Criminal intimidation Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.

                  Explanation.-- A threat to inure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.

                  506 Punishment for criminal intimidation

                  Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.: -- and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”

10. Section 506 has two limbs. The first limb is that if any person commits the offence of criminal intimidation, he shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years, with a fine or with both. And, as per the second limb, if the threat is with an intention to cause death or grievous hurt, then the imprisonment may extend to seven years.

11. Criminal intimidation has been defined in Section 503, which states that whoever threatens another with any injury to any person, reputation, or property commits criminal intimidation.

12. In Madhushree Datta’s case, the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows:

                  “37. Before an offence of criminal intimidation to be made out against the first accused, it must be established that she had the intention to cause alarm to the complainant. A review of the alleged threat reveals that the complainant is primarily alleging illegal termination, which constitutes a civil dispute, rather than criminal intimidation”.

13. In Vijayakumar’s case, this Court has held thus:

                  “6. As far as S.506 IPC is considered, the Apex Court in Manik Taneja and Anotherv. State of Karnatka and Another (2015 KHC 4046) considered the ingredients of the same. It will be beneficial to extract the relevant portion of the judgment:

                  "14. A reading of the definition of "Criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.”

14. Going by the principles laid down in the aforecited decisions and the specific allegations in the FIR and the final report, prima facie, I find that the petitioner had driven the car towards the second respondent with an intention to criminally intimidate him. If the allegations are taken at face value, they would constitute the offence alleged against the petitioner.

15. It is well settled that this Court has broad plenary powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which corresponds to Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to quash criminal proceedings. However, such inherent power, though expansive in nature, is not unbridled or unlimited. They are to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and within the parameters delineated by judicial precedents. One of the elementary principles to quash a criminal proceeding is that, even if allegations in the first information report or the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, the same will not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (Read the decisions in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Aryan Singh and Others [(2023) 18 SCC 399], Daxaben v. State of Gujarat and Others [(2022) 16 SCC 117] and Monica Kumar and Another v. State of U.P. and Others [(2008) 8 SCC 781]).

16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also consistently cautioned that High Courts, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, should not embark upon a "minitrial" or weigh the sufficiency of evidence, which falls within the domain of the Trial Court. The scope of enquiry is confined to whether, on a plain reading of the FIR/complaint and accompanying material, the ingredients of the alleged offence are disclosed. (Read the decisions in Rajiv Thapar and others v. Madal Lal Kapoor [(2013) 3 SCC 330] and HMT Watches Ltd. v. Abida M.A. and another [(2015) 11 SCC 776]).

17. After carefully analysing the allegations in the FIR and the final report and the law referred to above, I am not satisfied that this is a fit case to exercise the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to quash the criminal proceedings.

                  In the aforesaid circumstances, I dismiss the Crl.M.C, but by reserving the right of the petitioner to raise all his contentions before the Trial Court, including filing an application for discharge, if the charge has not been framed to date. If such an application is filed or a defence is taken, the Trial Court is directed to consider the application/defence, untrammelled by any observation made in this order.