1. The Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’)/Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’) seeking to quash the proceedings against the petitioners/Accused Nos.1 to 3 in C.C.No.290 of 2025 (Crime No.902 of 2022 of Tadepalli Police Station, Guntur District) on the file of the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class Cum-Civil Judge (Junior Division), Mangalagiri, registered for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the IPC’), Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (for brevity ‘the D.P.Act’).

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned legal aid counsel for respondent No.2 and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. Perused the record.

3. As seen from the record, the de-facto complainant/respondent No.2 lodged a complaint on 23.12.2022 at Tadepalli Police Station against the petitioners. The said complaint was registered as a case in Cr.No.902 of 2022 for the alleged offences punishable under Section 498-A of ‘the IPC’ and Sections 3 and 4 of ‘the D.P.Act’. The complainant, Sajja Bhargavi, died on 28.01.2025 and, to that effect, the death certificate has been filed.

4. Indeed, on 07.03.2025, the learned Additional Junior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, also recorded in the proceedings that the de-facto complainant died at Indo-American Cancer Hospital because of advanced-stage cancer. The mother of respondent No.2 also died long back because of cancer. The Investigating Officer examined L.Ws.1 to 5 and filed the charge sheet against the petitioners. Petitioner No.1 is the husband of respondent No.2. Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are the mother-in-law and father-in-law of respondent No.2. They are aged people.

5. The petitioner No.1/husband of respondent No.2 has instituted a petition in F.C.O.P.No.1578 of 2021 seeking dissolution of marriage between petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 on the grounds of desertion and cruelty, and vide order dated 06.03.2025, the learned IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vijayawada, closed the case as abated, as the de-facto complainant/respondent No.2 herein, who was the respondent in the said F.C.O.P., had died. The petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 were blessed with a male child in the year 2014. He is now 11 years old. The male child is in the custody of petitioner No.1. After five years of desertion, she lodged the instant complaint against the petitioners.

6. The Respondent No.2, after parting her ways with petitioner No.1, started residing with her father/L.W.2 at Nuzvid. However, the respondent came all the way to Tadepalli claiming that she had been residing in a particular house at Tadepalli and lodged a complaint against the petitioners.

                  The Station House Officer, Tadepalli Police Station, registered a case against the petitioners. However, as seen from the averments in the death certificate, respondent No.2 was a permanent resident of Door No.25-171, Old Congress Office Road, opposite Sarada Junior College, Nuzvid, Krishna District. In the death certificate, the said address is also mentioned as her permanent place of address, besides the place where she died.

7. Be that as it may, since respondent No.2/de-facto complainant herself died on 28.01.2025 and the child is in the safe custody of petitioner No.1, no purpose would be served if the proceedings on the file of the learned Additional Junior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, Guntur District, are continued. In the statement of L.W.2, the father of respondent No.2/complainant is only a hearsay witness. The rest of the witnesses are also hearsay witnesses.

8. At this juncture, it is useful to refer the judgment, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Nitin Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab(Crl.A. No.187 of 2020, dated 18.09.2025), wherein at paragraph No.9 it is held as under by the Hon’ble Apex Court:

                  9. Here, the respondent filed the complaint after the grant of divorce, a month later. Granted that the same is not expressly prohibited by law, it certainly begs the question as to why despite having been separated from teh appellant for almost three years to the date, did the respondent consider filing asn application with the police at that relevant time. To entertain the possibility that the same is nothing but a counterblast to the fact that the appellant has two orders in his favour, one by the Court in Austria ordering the respondent to being the child back to Australia and the other, by the Courts in Australia, accepting the appellant’s prayer for grant of divorce, does not appear fat- fetched.

9. Admittedly, in the instant case, respondent No.2 lodged a complaint after petitioner No.1 had filed a petition for grant of divorce, to counterblast the divorce petition filed by petitioner No.1. Respondent No.2 has preferred to lodge a complaint against the petitioners either to bring back her son, who is with petitioner No.1/Accused No.1, or to harass the in-laws of respondent No.2. It is also relevant to refer to paragraph No.12 of the judgment in Nitin Ahluwalia supra, wherein it is mentioned as under:

                  12. Recently, this Court speaking through B.R.Gavai, J. (as the learned Chief Justice of India presently, then was) quashed similar proceedings in Digambar v. State of Maharashtra, observing as follows:

                  "...it was lodged after the legal notice for Divorce was sent by the complainant therein. It was therefore concluded that the FIR came to be lodged as a retaliatory measure intended to settle score with the husband and his relatives.

                  22. In another recent judgment of this Court titled Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat, the guilt of the appellant therein under Section 498-A of IPC was maintained, however, the ingredients of 498-A of IPC were discussed. It was observed thus:

                  "11. From the above understanding of the provision, it is evident that, 'cruelty' simpliciter is not enough to constitute the offence, rather it must be done either with the intention to cause grave injury or to drive her to commit suicide or with intention to coercing her or her relatives to meet unlawful demands."

                  23. Hence, it was clear that 'cruelty' is not enough to constitute the offence. It must be done with the intention to cause grave injury or drive the victim to commit suicide or inflict grave injury to herself. In the present case, the allegations levelled in the FIR do not reveal the existence of any such allegations.

10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it can be easily gleaned or perceived that respondent No.2 has resorted to retaliation, either to settle her scores with Accused No.1 or with his parents.

11. In the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Digambar v. State of Maharashtra2, and Jaydeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat3, it is observed that cruelty simpliciter is not sufficient to constitute an offence, but it must be shown that such cruelty was committed either with the intention to cause grave injury or to drive the woman to meet any unlawful demands. The parameters enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal4, are attracted to the facts of the instant case.

12. For the above reasons, the Criminal Petition is allowed, and the proceedings in C.C. No.290 of 2025 (Crime No.902 of 2022 of Tadepalli Police Station) on the file of the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class- Cum-Civil Judge (Junior Division), Mangalagiri, are hereby quashed.

As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.