Avm Jonnalagadda Rajendra, Avsm, Vsm (Retd)

This First Appeal has been filed by Opposite Party (OP)-1 under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 ("the Act") against the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Orissa (the State Commission) Order dated 31.05.2017 in C.C. No.50 of 2012, wherein the Complaint was partly allowed.

2. As per report of the Registry, there is 56 days delay in filing this Appeal. For reasons stated in IA No. 6780/2019 the delay is condoned.

3. For convenience, the parties in the present case are being referred to as per the complaint before State Commission. Sri. Harandra Narayan Mahapatra is identified as the Complainant and M/s SBI Cards & Payments Services Pvt Ltd is referred to as the Opposite Party (OP).

4. Brief facts of the case, as per the Complainant, are that he was holding credit card No. 4006676014823481 (Card No. xxxx3481) issued by OP-1 and cleared all outstanding dues against the said card, which was acknowledged by OP-1 vide letter dated 11.01.2011 confirming full and final settlement. The account was closed on 27.10.2010. He was never issued any other credit card by OPs. It is the case of the Complainant that CIBIL records were not accessible to public until 2011 and that he came to know of the adverse reporting against him for the first time only after CIBIL list publication on 18.08.2011. On obtaining Credit Information Report (CIR) of CIBIL, he found Rs.75,747 was wrongly shown outstanding against the card in A/c No. xxxx1063, which he was never issued to him, and that due to such incorrect reporting, he was continuously shown as defaulter since 2005. He addressed a letter to OP-1 on 16.12.2011 and sent an e-mail on 04.01.2012 seeking deletion of the adverse entry. OP-2 replied that the SBI card account was settled and updated in CIBIL, whereupon he again wrote on 16.01.2012 questioning the continued display of the outstanding dues. Upon his e-mail dated 31.01.2012 requesting the exact CIBIL record, OP-2 responded vide email dated 04.02.2012 stating that the CIBIL record was 'correctly updated' but did not provide any supporting record. Upon issue of a legal notice on 20.06.2012, OP-3 responded on 03.07.2012 and 05.07.2012 that the CIR could not be corrected unless updated data was supplied by OP-1. On 12.07.2012, OP-2 conveyed that the striking off of his defaulter status was under consideration. The Complainant alleged that despite closure of his only credit card and acknowledgment of full settlement, his name continued to appear in the CIR for several years due to negligent reporting by OPs, resulting in denial of loans and financial facilities, and causing substantial financial loss, mental agony and damage to his creditworthiness.

5. On issue of notice, OPs-1 & 2 filed their written version and raised preliminary objections to the maintainability of the complaint. They contended that the complaint was barred by limitation, he is not a 'consumer' under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, and that he had not approached this Commission with clean hands. OPs contended that the agreement between the Complainant and OP-1 contained a binding arbitration clause which required all disputes to be referred to a sole arbitrator appointed by OPs, thereby excluding this Commission's jurisdiction. On merits, they contended that his primary and add-on card accounts had incurred penal charges due to part-payments and were zeroised under a settlement in November 2010. The requests for CIBIL updation in 2011 and 2012 were duly acted upon and the discrepancy was rectified. Therefore, no subsisting cause of action survived. They denied any malafide intention or deficiency in service and sought dismissal of the complaint.

6. OP 3 (CIBIL), in its written version contended that the complaint was not maintainable as the Complainant was not its consumer and had not availed any service from it. OP-3 merely compiled with the credit information furnished by member banks and financial institutions under the Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Act, 2005 (CICRA), without carrying out independent verification. OP-3 contended that rectification could only be made upon confirmation from the reporting bank. Invoking Section 31 of CICRA, OP 3 claimed statutory protection and asserted that no cause of action lay against it and sought dismissal of the complaint.

7. The learned State Commission, vide the Order dated 31.05.2017 passed the following order:

                          "ORDER

                          "The complaint is allowed against O.Ps 1 & 2 and partly against O.P 3. O.Ps 1 & 2 are directed to pay compensation of Rs.5.00 lakhs to the complainant along with litigation cost of Rs.10,000/-. The said amount will be paid by the O.Ps 1 & 2 within a period of 2 months from the date of this order, failing which said amount will carry interest 10% per annum. O.P. is directed to strike out the name of the complainant from the CIBIL list on receipt of order of this commission."

8. Being aggrieved the OP 1 Bank filed the instant First Appeal No. 581 of 2018 with the following prayers:

                          "a) Set aside the impugned order dated 31.05.2017 passed by the Ld. State Commission, Cuttack at Odisha in complaint no. 50/2012.

                          b) Award the cost of the proceedings in favor of the Appellant and against Respondent.

                          Pass such other and further order(s)/directions) as this Hon'ble Commission may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."

9. In this Appeal, OP-1 Bank mainly raised the following grounds:

                          A. There was undue delay by the State Commission in pronouncing the order reserved on 13.05.2014 for three years. The matter was relisted at a belated stage and the OPs were not afforded opportunity to make the final arguments. The case was reserved for orders by the state Commission on 13.05.2014. It was re-listed on 17.04.2017 and 24.04.2017 the head "Further Hearing" and the final order was pronounced on 31.05.2017. The OPs were not present at the second final haring. Such action of the learned State Commission denied proper opportunity of being heard.

                          B. The State Commission failed to appreciate that OP-1 immediately rectified the Complainant's CIBIL payment status upon being informed of the discrepancy, and CIBIL itself, vide letter dated 05.07.2012, confirmed such rectification prior to filing of the complaint; therefore, no cause of action survived.

                          C. The State Commission finding that no steps were taken from 2011 to correct the record is contrary to the mails dated 14.01.2012, 27.01.2012 and 04.02.2012 was clearly evidenced OP-1's timely rectification.

                          D. The Complainant failed to place on record subsequent CIBIL Reports, including January 2012 and December 2012, thereby withholding material evidence necessary to establish deficiency or any continuing error, overlooking his own credit report reflected several other loan accounts, including four 'Settled' accounts and multiple delayed payments reflected, which could independently justify rejection of loan applications by lending institutions.

                          E. The State Commission proceeded on erroneous assumption of a 'CIBIL defaulter list', whereas CIBIL maintains no such list and only reports credit information submitted by member institutions; thus, the attribution of loss solely to OP 1 was misplaced.

                          F. The award of compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- was arbitrary and unsupported by reasons, and contrary to the law laid down in Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Balbir Singh.

10. In his arguments, the learned counsel for Appellant/OP-1 Bank reiterated the written version and the grounds of Appeal and argued that the impugned order was vitiated on procedural grounds, as the State Commission took three years to pronounce the order dated 31.05.2017 after reserving on 13.05.2014. Thereafter, it proceeded on 17.04.2017 and again reserved the matter on 24.04.2017 without issue of notice to OP Bank. He argued that OP Bank was deprived of its right of representation when the matter was re-heard, rendering the order unsustainable. The Complainant applied for a primary and an add-on credit card. Pursuant to which Card No. xxxx3481 and Add-on Card No. xxxx3499 were issued against A/c No. xxxx1063 as per the Card Holder Agreement. He was irregular in payments, attracting charges as per agreed terms, and the outstanding continued to escalate. Ultimately, at his request, OP settled the dues in November 2010 and the account was closed. Upon settlement, the Bank updated his repayment status with CIBIL and confirmed vide letter dated 11.01.2011 that there were no dues on Card No. xxx3481. Only on 16.12.2011 and 16.01.2012 that he informed OP-1 of an alleged discrepancy showing Rs.75,747 as outstanding in his CIR. The Bank immediately rectified the records and informed him vide email dated 27.01.2012. CIBIL was also confirmed on 05.07.2012 that the payment status was corrected. Notwithstanding this, he filed a complaint claiming an exorbitant compensation of Rs.99,00,000. The State Commission failed to appreciate that his CIBIL report which reflected irregularities and 'settled' status in four other loan accounts unrelated to OP Bank. Hence, no deficiency in service was established. He sought that the impugned order dated 31.05.2017 be set aside and the complaint be dismissed with costs.

11. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for Complainant reiterated the issues in the Complaint and argued that the OP Bank was deficient and negligent in service as he was wrongly shown as defaulter in the CIBIL CIR on the basis of a fabricated Card for A/c No. xxxx1063 showing an outstanding of Rs.75,747, though no such card was ever issued to him. He had only one genuine SBI Credit Card No. xxxx3481, whose dues were fully settled on 27.10.2010, as also acknowledged by OP Bank on 11.01.2011. It was argued that due to these wrong reports, his applications for personal, study and auto loans were rejected, causing financial loss, loss of credibility and serious mental agony. As CIBIL reports were not accessible to public until 2011, the Complainant discovered the error only on 18.08.2011, when CIR revealed that he was a defaulter since 2010. It was contended that despite taking up the issue immediately through letters and emails from December 2011 onwards, OP Bank repeatedly avoided answering how Card for Account No. xxxx1063 came to be reflected and failed to provide any updated CIBIL report, though claiming that the list was "correctly updated". The CIBIL itself informed that the entry appeared as per data supplied by OP Bank, and deletion was not possible without updated information from OP Bank. For the first time on 22.08.2012 OP Bank stated that removal of default status was "under consideration", contradicting its earlier assertions of rectification. At a later stage, OP Bank introduced a false and unsupported plea that the outstanding pertained to an Add-on Card allegedly issued in favour of his wife. The alleged application form filed by OP Bank was a manufactured document, without her signature and rather implanted signature of the Complainant. No document showing when or how the wrong entry was rectified was filed, though admitting such rectification. Despite paying all dues of his actual card, he continued to suffer the consequences of erroneous reporting from 2010 onwards. He sought dismissal of the Appeal with costs.

12. The learned counsel for OP-3 CIBIL contended that the Appeal was barred under Section 30(1) of the CICRA, 2005, which granted statutory protection to all actions taken in good faith by a Credit Information Company. It was contended that CIBIL had no role in credit decisions and it merely reflected, in a standard format, the information supplied by member banks and financial institutions, without classifying or altering account status, such classification being exclusively undertaken by member institutions in accordance with RBI guidelines. He relied on Section 31 of CICRA to argue that disputes concerning credit information fell outside the jurisdiction of consumer fora, as any recourse against a credit information company was required to be pursued strictly under the statutory framework. He cited Section 18, which mandated that disputes relating to the business of credit information were to be resolved only through arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, rendering the complaint itself not maintainable. It was asserted that the CIBIL neither created nor verified information, nor advised on credit decisions. It functioned solely as a repository of historical and current credit data shared with a closed user group permitted under CICRA. Under Section 21, any correction, deletion or modification in the credit information could be made only upon certification by the concerned credit institution; CIBIL had no unilateral authority to make changes and was not required to undertake individual verification. He reiterated that the in light of the statutory protection, lack of jurisdiction, and CIBIL's limited ministerial role under CICRA, the Appeal be dismissed with costs.

13. We have examined the pleadings and associated documents placed on record are rendered thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsels of both the parties.

14. Before we go into merits of the case, the specific contention of OPs with respect to allegation of unreasonable delay in pronouncement of the order reserved by the State Commission on 13.05.2014 and that the OPs were not afforded opportunity to make the fresh arguments deserves to be addressed. In this regard, it is a matter of record that the case was reserved for orders by the State Commission on 13.05.2014 and the order was pronounced on 31.05.2017. It is further revealed from the cause Lists of 17.04.2017 and 24.04.2017 that the case was listed again on 17.04.2017 and 24.04.2017 as Item No. 32 and 22 respectively under the head "Further Hearing". And the final order was pronounced on 31.05.2017. The OPs were not present at the second final haring. It is the specific contention of the OP Bank that no notice of such re-listing was received. The impugned order dated 31.05.2017 did not include the arguments advanced by any of the parties.

15. When the matter was finally heard by the State commission on 13.05.2014, the orders were reserved by learned Justice R.N. Biswal, the President and S. Mohanty and Mr. G.P. Sahoo, learned Members. After the lapse of about three years the case was again listed on 13.04.2017 and on 24.04.2017, and orders were again reserved on 24.04.2017 and pronounced on 31.05.2017 by learned Shri G.P. Sahoo, the President In-charge and Smt. Smarita Mohanty, learned Member.

16. While mere delay in pronouncement of an order by itself may not necessarily vitiate the proceedings, combination of prolonged delay between reserving and pronouncement, subsequent relisting of the matter for further hearing, and absence of OP-1 as well as absence of arguments advanced by the parties in the final order reflect procedural irregularity, verging to deprivation of fair hearing.

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318, held that:

                          "42. If delay in pronouncing judgments occurred on the part of the Judges of the subordinate judiciary the whip of the High Court studded with supervisory and administrative authority could be used and it has been used quite often to chide them and sometimes to take action against the erring judicial officers. But what happens when the High Court Judges do not pronounce judgments after a lapse of several months, and perhaps even years since completion of arguments? The Constitution did not provide anything in that area presumably because the architects of the Constitution believed that no High Court Judge would cause such long and distressing delays. Such expectation of the makers of the Constitution remained unsullied during the early period of the post-Constitution years. But unfortunately, the later years have shown slackness on the part of a few Judges of the superior courts in India with the result that once arguments in a lis concluded before them the records remain consigned to hibernation. Judges themselves normally forget the details of the facts and niceties of the legal points advanced. Sometimes the interval is so long that the Judges forget even the fact that such a case is pending with them expecting judicial verdict. Though it is an unpleasant fact, it is a stark reality.

                          43. Should the situation continue to remain so helpless for all concerned? The Apex Court made an exhortation in 1976 through a judgment which is reported as R. C Sharma v. Union of India (1976) 3 SCC 574 for expediting delivery of judgments. I too wish to repeat those words as follows: (SCC Headnote)

                          "Nevertheless an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment, unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even when written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some points which the litigant considers important may have escaped notice. But, what is more important is that litigants must have complete confidence in the results of litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments."

                          44. A quarter of a century has elapsed thereafter but the situation, instead of improving has only worsened. We understand that many cases remain in the area of "judgment reserved" for long periods. It is heartening that most of the Judges of the High Courts are discharging their duties by expeditiously pronouncing judgments. But it is disheartening that a handful of few are unmindful of their obligation and the oath of office they have solemnly taken as they cause such inordinate delay in pronouncing judgments. It is in the above background, after bestowing deep thoughts with a sense of commitment, that we have decided to chalk out some remedial measures to be mentioned in this judgment as instructions.

                          45. Sethi, J. has enumerated them succinctly as follows:

                          (i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in a case where the judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment where, on the first page, after the cause-title, date of reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the Court Officer concerned.

                          (ii) That Chief Justices of the High Courts, on their administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/Readers of the various Benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that month.

                          (iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months the Chief Justice concerned shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the Judges of the High Court for their information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover.

                          (iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months from the date of reserving judgment, any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with a prayer for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays.

                          (v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a period of six months, any of the parties of the said lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as he deems fit in the circumstances."

18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravindra Pratap Shahi vs. State of U.P. & Ors., Criminal Appeal No.(s).3700-3701 of 2025, decided on 25.08.2025 has directed as under:

                          7. It is extremely shocking and surprising that the judgment was not delivered for almost a year from the date when the appeal was heard. This Court is repeatedly confronted with similar matters wherein proceedings are kept pending in the High Court for more than three months, in some cases for more than six months or years wherein judgments are not delivered after hearing the matter. In most of the High Courts, there is no mechanism where the litigant can approach the concerned Bench or the Chief Justice bringing to its notice the delay in delivery of judgment. In such situation, the litigant loses his faith in the judicial process defeating the ends of justice.

                          8. This Court in Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318 dealt with such state of affairs prevalent in some High Courts wherein after conclusion of arguments, judgments are not pronounced for a period spread over years. This Court made observations and issued guidelines as contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment which are quoted herein below for reference:

                          "9 . It is true, that for the High Courts, no period for pronouncement of judgment is contemplated either under the Civil Procedure Code or the Criminal Procedure Code, but as the pronouncement of the judgment is a part of the justice dispensation system, it has to be without delay. In a country like ours where people consider the Judges only second to God, efforts be made to strengthen that belief of the common man. Delay in disposal of the cases facilitates the people to raise eyebrows, sometimes genuinely which, if not checked, may shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system. A time has come when the judiciary itself has to assert for preserving its stature, respect and regards for the attainment of the rule of law. For the fault of a few, the glorious and glittering name of the judiciary cannot be permitted to be made ugly. It is the policy and purpose of law, to have speedy justice for which efforts are required to be made to come up to the expectation of the society of ensuring speedy, untainted and unpolluted justice.

                          10. Under the prevalent circumstances in some of the High Courts, I feel it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments which, I am sure, shall be followed by all concerned, being the mandate of this Court. Such guidelines, as for the present, are as under:

                          (i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in a case where the judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment where, on the first page, after the cause-title, date of reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the Court Officer concerned.

                          (ii) That Chief Justices of the High Courts, on their administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/Readers of the various Benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that month.

                          (iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months, the Chief Justice concerned shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the Judges of the High Court for their information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover.

                          (iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months from the date of reserving it, any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with a prayer for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays.

                          (v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a period of six months, any of the parties of the said lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as he deems fit in the circumstances."

                          9. Some High Courts have adopted practice of pronouncing the final order without reasoned judgment, which is not delivered for substantial length of time depriving the aggrieved party of the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal. Deprecating such practice, this Court in State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, (1984) 1 SCC 596 issued directions which were restated time and again on several occasions including in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and Anr. vs. State of Gujarat and Ors., (2004) 4 SCC 158, Mangat Ram vs. State of Haryana, (2008) 7 SCC 96 and Ajay Singh and Anr. vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Anr., (2017) 3 SCC 330 and two recent judgments in the matter of Balaji Baliram Mupade and Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2021) 12 SCC 603 and Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat and Ors., 2024 INSC 801 in which one of us (Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra) is a member and K. Madan Mohan Rao vs. Bheemrao Baswanthrao Patil and Ors., 2022 INSC 1025 .

                          10. It is not that the situation with which we are dealing in these Appeals has arisen for consideration for the first time. The directions have already been issued by this Court in Anil Rai (supra). Therefore, what is required today is of adherence to the principles laid down by this Court in Anil Rai (supra). We reiterate the directions and direct the Registrar General of each High Court to furnish to the Chief Justice of the High Court a list of cases where the judgment reserved is not pronounced within the remaining period of that month and keep on repeating the same for three months. If the judgment is not delivered within three months, the Registrar General shall place the matters before the Chief Justice for orders and the Chief Justice shall bring it to the notice of the concerned Bench for pronouncing the order within two weeks thereafter, failing which the matter be assigned to another Bench.

                          11. The above direction is in addition to the guidelines/directions issued by this Court in Anil Rai (supra).

                          12. The present Appeals stand disposed of with the above observations and directions. Let a copy of this judgment be circulated to the Registrar Generals of all the High Courts for compliance.

19. In these circumstances, we are of the considered view that there was substantial procedural deviation impacting the rights of the parties, warranting interference. Therefore, without going into merits of the case, we remit the case back to State Commission for consideration of the matter afresh.

20. In view of the foregoing deliberations, the impugned Order dated 31.05.2017 passed by the learned State Commission in CC. No. 50 of 2012 is set aside, and the matter is remanded to the learned State Commission for fresh adjudication in accordance with law, after affording due opportunity of hearing to all the parties, preferably within a period of three months from the date of this order. We make it clear that we expressed no opinion on the merits of the case.

21. The Appeal stands disposed of with above directions.

22. There shall be no order as to costs. All pending Applications, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.