Anil K. Narendran, J.

1. The 3rd respondent in W.P.(C)No.40294 of 2025 is before this Court in this writ appeal, invoking the provisions under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the interim order dated 11.10.2025 of the learned Single Judge in that writ petition, which was one filed by the 1st respondent herein, invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P7 order dated 23.10.2025 of the 2nd respondent State Election Commission in O.P.No.8 of 2023, which was one filed by the appellant herein, invoking the provisions under Section 4 of the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1999, for declaring that the 1st respondent herein-petitioner committed defection and hence disqualified to continue as member of Pulincunnoo Grama Panchayat, and for declaring her as disqualified to contest as a candidate in any election to the local authorities for a period of six years. By Ext.P7 order dated 23.10.2025, the 2nd respondent State Election Commission allowed O.P.No.8 of 2023 and declared that the 1st  respondent herein-petitioner is disqualified for being member of Pulincunnoo Grama Panchayat, as provided under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1999, and she was declared as disqualified from contesting as a candidate in an election to any local authorities for a period of six years from the date of that order, as provided under Section 4(3) of the said Act. The further relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.40294 of 2025 is a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P8 notification dated 03.02.2024 issued by the 2nd respondent State Election Commission, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub- rule (1) of Rule 12 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995, and Kerala Municipality (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995, publishing the up-to-date list of election symbols;  a  declaration  that  the  Kerala  Local  Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1999 is unconstitutional, arbitrary and beyond the legislative competence of the State; and a declaration that Rule 12 of the Kerala Panchayat (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995 is unconstitutional, arbitrary and beyond the legislative competence of the State.

2. On 31.10.2025, when W.P.(C)No.40294 of 2025 came up for admission, it was admitted on file. On 11.11.2025, when the matter came up for consideration, the learned Single Judge passed the interim order, which reads thus;

                  “ This writ petition was admitted on 31.10.2025 because a prima facie case is made out by the petitioner.

                  The learned senior counsel assisted by Adv.Bhavana Velayudhan pressed for an interim order because general election to the local bodies is declared and the petitioner wants to contest in the election.

                  Counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent seriously opposed the prayer and submitted that he wants to file a counter affidavit.

                  On the other hand, the learned senior counsel submitted that, since the election is already declared, unless the impugned order is stayed, there will be great difficulty for the petitioner to contest in the election.

                  Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and also considering the fact that a prima facie case is made out by the petitioner, I think the operation of the impugned order can be stayed for a period of three months. Therefore, the operation of the order dated 23.10.2025 in O.P.No.08 of 2023 issued by the 2nd respondent is stayed for a period of three months.”

3. Challenging the interim order dated 11.11.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.40294 of 2025, the appellant- 3rd respondent is before this Court in this writ appeal.

4. On 11.12.2025, when this writ appeal came up for admission, the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent- petitioner sought adjournment and accordingly the matter is listed today for consideration.

5. Heard arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant-3rd respondent, the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent-petitioner, the learned Special Government Pleader for the 2nd respondent State and also the learned Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent Kerala State Election Commission.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant and also the learned Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent State Election Commission would place reliance on the decision in Jomy Joseph v. Varghese Thomas [2025 KHC OnLine 1234 : 2025 (6) KLT 440], by a Division Bench of this Court, in which one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J.] was a party. It is contended that the issue raised in this writ appeal is squarely covered by the said decision of the Division Bench and therefore, the impugned interim order dated 11.11.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.40294 of 2025 cannot be sustained.

7. The learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent- petitioner and also the learned Special Government Pleader for the 2nd respondent State would submit that there is delay on the part of the appellant-3rd petitioner in filing this writ appeal. Though the impugned interim order is one dated 11.11.2025, the appellant has chosen to file this writ appeal only on 08.12.2025.

8. The learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent- petitioner would point out that after the interim order dated 11.11.2025 of the learned Single Judge, the 1st respondent- petitioner submitted nomination in the election to local authorities, 2025 and she is contesting the election as an independent candidate. Therefore, the delay in filing this writ appeal has caused serious prejudice to the 1st respondent- petitioner.

9.     On the legal issues involved, the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent-petitioner would submit that the issue raised in this writ appeal and that considered by the Division Bench in Jomy Joseph [2025 KHC OnLine 1234] are one and the same. In W.P.(C)No.40294 of 2025, the petitioner has also sought for an additional relief, i.e., a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P8 notification dated 03.02.2024 issued by the 2nd respondent State Election Commission, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (1) of Rule 12 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995, and Kerala Municipality (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995, publishing the up-to-date list of election symbols.

10. The learned counsel for the appellant-3rd respondent would submit that the writ appeal was filed within the period of limitation and therefore, there is absolutely no merits in the contention of the learned Special Government Pleader and the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent-petitioner on the delay in challenging the interim order dated 11.11.2025 in a writ appeal filed on 08.12.2025. On the strength of the interim order dated 11.11.2025, the 1st respondent-petitioner submitted nomination in the election to local authorities, 2025. Though she submitted nomination as an independent candidate, she is contesting the election as an independent candidate supported by the Left Democratic Front (LDF). She was an elected member from Ward No.4 of Pulincunnoo Grama Panchayat, who contested the election to local authorities, 2020 as an official candidate of Indian National Congress (INC).

11. In Ext.P7 order dated 23.10.2025 of the State Election Commission in O.P.No.8 of 2023, the State Election Commission found that the abstinence of the 1st respondent herein from the no-confidence motion held on 21.01.2023 is a method adopted to defeat the no-confidence motion for want of quorum. The State Election Commission found that there is breach of agreement and a series of defiance of the directives of the political party by the 1st respondent herein, apart from violation of party directive to attend the meeting of no- confidence motion held on 21.01.2023 and that there is evidence on record to show that she intentionally refused and delayed to accept the directions issued by the political party. The 1st respondent herein, who was aware of the decision taken by the Indian National Congress failed to act in accordance with the political directive and acted hand in glove with Left Democratic Front Members to defeat the no-confidence motion moved by the United Democratic Front. It would attract defection, as provided under Section 3(1)(a) of the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act. Therefore, the State Election Commission issued Ext.P7 order dated 23.10.2025 whereby the 1st respondent herein is declared as disqualified for being a member of Pulincunnoo Grama Panchayat and she is further disqualified from contesting as a candidate in an election to any local authorities for a period of 6 years from the date of that order.

12. The challenge made against a similar interim order dated 13.11.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)Nos.33894 of 2025 and 33995 of 2025 in respect of disqualification of elected representatives of Changanassery Municipality was considered by this Court in the decision in Jomy Joseph [2025 KHC OnLine 1234].

13. In paragraph 9 of the decision in Jomy Joseph [2025 KHC OnLine 1234], the Division Bench quoted the common reliefs sought for in W.P.(C)Nos.33894 of 2025 and 33995 of 2025. Paragraph 9 of that decision reads thus;

                  ‘9. The common reliefs sought for in the writ petitions are as follows;

                  “(i) Issue a writ of certiorari calling for records leading up to Ext.P3 order and to quash the same;

                  (ii)      Issue a Writ of certiorari calling for records leading up to Ext.P4 order and to quash the same;

                  (iii)     Declare that the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1999, is unconstitutional, arbitrary, and beyond the legislative competence of the State;

                  (iv) Declare that Rule 12 of Kerala Municipality (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995, is unconstitutional, arbitrary, and beyond the legislative competence of the State.”

14. In paragraphs 10 to 28 of the decision in Jomy Joseph [2025 KHC OnLine 1234], the Division Bench dealt with the rival contentions on the legal issues. Paragraphs 10 to 28 of that decision read thus;

                  ‘10. The learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent addressed arguments in detail, relying on various decisions, to contend that the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1999, is unconstitutional, arbitrary, and beyond the legislative competence of the State.

                  11.     On the above aspect, the learned counsel for the appellant in the respective appeals and also the learned Standing Counsel for the State Election Commission would point out the provisions in Article 243-V of the Constitution of India and Section 91 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994.

                  12.     Article 243-V of Part IX-A of the Constitution of India deals with disqualification for membership. The said provision reads thus;

                  “Article 243-V.-Disqualifications for membership.- (1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of a Municipality –

                  (a)      if he is so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of elections to the Legislature of the State concerned:

                  Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than twenty-five years of age, if he has attained the age of twenty-one years;

                  (b)      if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by the Legislature of the State.

                  (2) If any question arises as to whether a member of a Municipality has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1), the question shall be referred for the decision of such authority and in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide.”       (underline supplied)

                  13. Section 91 of the Kerala Municipality Act deals with the disqualification of Councillors. As per clause (ll) of sub-section (1) of Section 91, a Councillor shall cease to hold office as such if he has been disqualified under the provisions of the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act 1999.

                  14. Section 3 of the Defection Act deals with disqualification on the ground of defection. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act reads thus;

                  “Section 3: Disqualification on ground of defection.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (13 of 1994), or in the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 (20 of 1994), or in any other law for the time being in force, subject to the other provisions of this Act,-

                  (a)      if a member of a local authority belonging to any political party voluntarily gives up his membership of such political party, or if such member, contrary to any direction in writing issued by the political party to which he belongs or by a person or authority authorised by it in this behalf in the manner prescribed, votes or abstains from voting,-

                  (i) in a meeting of a Municipality, in an election of its Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, a member of a Standing Committee or the Chairman of a Standing Committee; or

                  (ii)      in a meeting of a Panchayat, in an election of its President, Vice President, a member of a Standing Committee or the Chairman of the Standing Committee; or in a voting on a no-confidence motion against any one of them except a member of a Standing Committee;

                  xxx     xxx     xxx ”

                  15. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Defection Act contains a non-obstante clause, which provides that, “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (13 of 1994), or in the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 (20 of 1994), or in any other law for the time being in force, subject to the other provisions of this Act, ………”.

                  16. Section 4 of the Defection Act deals with a decision on a question as to disqualification on the ground of defection. Section 4 reads thus;

                  “4. Decision on question as to disqualification on ground of defection.- (1) If any question arises as to whether a member of a local authority has become subject to disqualification under the provisions of this Act, a member of that local authority or the political party concerned or a person authorised by it in this behalf may file a petition before the State Election Commission for decision.

                  (2)      The State Election Commission shall, after making such enquiry as it deems necessary, decide whether such member has become subject to such disqualification or not and its decision thereon shall be final.

                  (3)      Where the State Election Commission decides that a member has become subject to disqualification under sub-section (2), he shall cease to be a member from the date of such decision and shall be disqualified for contesting as a candidate in an election to any local authority for six years from that date.”

(underline supplied)

                  17. In view of the provisions under sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Defection Act, the State Election Commission shall, after making such enquiry as it deems necessary, decide whether such member has become subject to such disqualification or not, and its decision thereon shall be final. As per sub-section (3) of Section 4, where the State Election Commission decides that a member has become subject to disqualification under sub- section (2), he shall cease to be a member from the date of such decision and shall be disqualified for contesting as a candidate in an election to any local authority for six years from that date.

                  18. In Kihota Hollohon v. Zachillhu [(1992) Supp 2 SCC 651], before a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution introduced by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985, was assailed. On the contentions raised and urged at the hearing, the Constitution Bench formulated questions (A) to (H) at paragraph 24 of the said decision. Question (A) reads thus;

                  “(A) The Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985, insofar as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule is destructive of the basic structure of the Constitution as it is violative of the fundamental principles of Parliamentary democracy, a basic feature of the Indian constitutionalism and is destructive of the freedom of speech, right to dissent and freedom of conscience as the provisions of the Tenth Schedule seek to penalise and disqualify elected representatives for the exercise of these rights and freedoms which are essential to the sustenance of the system of Parliamentary democracy.”

                  (underline supplied)

                  19. In Kihota Hollohon [(1992) Supp 2 SCC 651], the Constitution Bench answered the question at 53 of the said decision, which reads thus;

                  ‘53. Accordingly, we hold:

                  “That the Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution is valid. Its provisions do not suffer from the vice of subverting democratic rights of elected Members of Parliament and the Legislatures of the States. It does not violate their freedom of speech, freedom of vote and conscience as contended.

                  The provisions of Paragraph 2 do not violate any rights or freedom under Articles 105 and 194 of the Constitution.

                  The provisions are salutary and areintended to strengthen the fabric of Indian parliamentary democracy by curbing unprincipled and unethical political defections. The contention that the provisions of the Tenth Schedule, even with the exclusion of Paragraph 7, violate the basic structure of the Constitution in that they affect the democratic rights of elected Members and, therefore, of the principles of Parliamentary democracy is unsound and is rejected.”(underline supplied)

                  20. In Kihota Hollohon [(1992) Supp 2 SCC 651], while answering Question (A), the Constitution Bench has stated in categorical terms that the provisions of paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution are salutary and are intended to strengthen the fabric of Indian parliamentary democracy by curbing unprincipled and unethical political defections.

                  21. The argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent-petitioner is that imposing party discipline and outside political control would defeat the very meaning of election under Part IX and Part IX-A of the Constitution of India, where representatives are intended to act in the interest of their constituencies and not merely as delegates of political parties. According to the learned Senior Counsel, in view of the Constitutional scheme, and the absence of a legal basis for coalitions, whips and symbols at the local body level, the Defection Act, 1999, is ultra vires the Constitution.

                  22. In Health for Millions v. Union of India [(2014) 14 SCC 496], a decision relied on by the learned Senior Government Pleader, a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that in matters involving challenge to the constitutionality of any legislation enacted by the legislature and the rules framed thereunder the Courts should be extremely loath to pass an interim order. At the time of final adjudication, the Court can strike down the statute if it is found to be ultra vires the Constitution. Likewise, the rules can be quashed if the same are found to be unconstitutional or ultra vires the provisions of the Act. However, the operation of the statutory provisions cannot be stultified by granting an interim order except when the Court is fully convinced that the particular enactment or the rules are ex facie unconstitutional and the factors, like balance of convenience, irreparable injury and public interest are in favour of passing an interim order. Paragraph 13 of the said decision reads thus;

                  “13. We have considered the respective arguments and submissions and carefully perused the record. Since the matter is pending adjudication before the High Court, we do not want to express any opinion on the merits and demerits of the writ petitioner's challenge to the constitutional validity of the 2003 Act and the 2004 Rules as amended in 2005 but have no hesitation in holding that the High Court was not at all justified in passing the impugned orders ignoring the well-settled proposition of law that in matters involving challenge to the constitutionality of any legislation enacted by the legislature and the rules framed thereunder the courts should be extremely loath to pass an interim order. At the time of final adjudication, the court can strike down the statute if it is found to be ultra vires the Constitution. Likewise, the rules can be quashed if the same are found to be unconstitutional or ultra vires the provisions of the Act. However, the operation of the statutory provisions cannot be stultified by granting an interim order except when the court is fully convinced that the particular enactment or the rules are ex facie unconstitutional and the factors, like balance of convenience, irreparable injury and public interest are in favour of passing an interim order.”   (underline supplied)

                  23. The learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent petitioner would rely on the decision of the Apex Court in Rahul Gandhi v. Purnesh Ishwarbhai Modi [(2024) 2 SCC 595] and Union Territory Administration of Lakshadweep v. Mohammed Faizal - order dated 22.08.2023 in Crl.A.No.2501 of 2023 – to contend that the learned Single Judge committed no error in granting an interim stay of Ext.P3 order of the State Election Commission, thereby staying the disqualification of the 1st respondent-petition under the Defection Act.

                  24. The said decisions of the Apex Court are in the context of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 8 of the said Act deals with disqualification on conviction for certain offences. As per sub-section (3) of Section 8, a person convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years, other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release.

                  25. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Standing Counsel for the State Election Commission, in view of the provisions under Article 243-V of the Constitution of India, Section 91 of the Kerala Municipality Act and Sections 3 and 4 of the Defection Act, the decision of the State Election Commission on the question as to whether a member has become subject to disqualification or not shall be final and he shall cease to be a member from the date of such decision and shall be disqualified for contesting as a candidate in an election to any local authority for six years from that date. The provisions under sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act are not pari materia with the provisions under the Defection Act.

                  26. Section 19 of the Kerala Municipality Act deals with motion of no-confidence. Sub-section (9) of Section 19, relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, provides that the debate shall automatically terminate on the expiry of four hours from the time appointed for the commencement of the meeting, if it is not concluded earlier. Upon the conclusion of the debate or upon the expiry of the said period of four hours, as the case may be, the motion shall be put to vote, which shall be by means of open ballot and the Councillor who casts his vote shall write his name and affix his signature on the reverse side of the ballot paper.

                  27. As already noticed hereinbefore, sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Defection Act contains a non-obstante clause, which provides that “notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (13 of 1994), or in the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 (20 of 1994), or in any other law for the time being in force, subject to the other provisions of this Act, ………”.

                  28. Another contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for 1st respondent-petitioner is that Rule 12 of Kerala Municipality (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995, is unconstitutional, arbitrary, and beyond the legislative competence of the State. The learned Standing Counsel for the State Election Commission would point out the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in John Joseph v. State of Kerala [2020 (5) KHC SN 4], wherein it was held that Rule 12 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995 and the Kerala Municipality (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995 are not in dissonance with the object and intention of the Parliament in making the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment. Paragraphs 21, 22 and 41 of the said decision read thus;

                  “21. Taking into account the provisions of law discussed above, it is clear that it was in exercise of the powers under Rule 12 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995 and the Kerala Municipality (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995 and the powers conferred by Articles 243K and Article 243ZA of the Constitution of India, the State Election Commission, Kerala has issued the Local Authorities Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 2017 for the allotment and assignment of symbols as provided under Rule 12 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995 and the Kerala Municipality (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995.

                  22. Therefore, on an overhaul appreciation of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that Rule 12 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995 and the Kerala Municipality (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1995 are not in dissonance with the object and intention of the Parliament in making the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment.

                  xxx     xxx     xxx

                  41. This is more so because, by introduction of 10th schedule on and with effect from 01.03.1985, as per the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985, thus incorporating provisions as to disqualifications in contemplation of Articles 102(2) and 191(2) of the Constitution of India. Though inclusion of the 10th Schedule and the provisions of Articles 102(2) and 191(2) are referring to the disqualifications for membership to either house of parliament and the State legislature, the State has made a law to deal with the defection, so as to protect the democratic principles, and the Parliamentary and Democratic interest in the functioning of the Local Self Government institutions which is clearly a state subject as per entry 5 of list 11 of schedule 7 of the Constitution of India dealing with local authorities. Therefore, the defection laws of the Local Self Government Institutions discussed above and all other laws framed by the State Government are in accordance with law and made with the intention to sustain the democratic principles and moral values on the basis that the political parties contest the election in the panchayats and the Municipalities.”

15. In paragraphs 29 to 34 of the decision in Jomy Joseph [2025 KHC OnLine 1234], the Division Bench dealt with the question of maintainability of writ appeals against the interim order of the learned Single Judge. Paragraphs 29 to 34 read thus;

                  ‘29. On the question of maintainability of the writ appeals against interim orders, the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent-writ petitioner placed reliance on the decision of a Larger Bench of this Court in K. S. Das v. State of Kerala [1992 (2) KLT 358], which was followed by this Court in State of Kerala v. Pradeepkumar A.V. [2025 (1) KHC 672].

                  30.     In K.S. Das [1992 (2) KLT 358] the Larger Bench held that the word ‘order’ in Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act includes, apart from other orders, orders passed by the High Court in miscellaneous petitions filed in the writ petitions provided the orders are to be in force pending the writ petition. An appeal would lie against such orders only if the orders substantially affect or touch upon the substantial rights or liabilities of the parties or are matters of moment and cause substantial prejudice to the parties. The nature of the ‘order’ appealable belongs to the category of ‘intermediate orders’ referred to by the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551]. The word ‘order’ is not confined to ‘final order’ which disposes of the writ petition. The ‘orders’ should not however, be ad-interim orders in force pending the miscellaneous petition or orders merely of a procedural nature.

                  31.     In Thomas P. T. and another v. Bijo Thomas and others [2021 (6) KLT 196], a Division Bench of this Court noticed that the view that was upheld by the Larger Bench in K.S. Das [1992 (2) KLT 358] was that even though an appeal could be filed against an interlocutory order passed in a writ petition, in order to be qualified for challenge in an appeal, the order shall be either substantially affecting or touching upon the substantial rights or liabilities of the parties or which are matters of moment and cause substantial prejudice to the parties. According to the Larger Bench, the nature of the order appealable belongs to the category of intermediate orders referred to by the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye [(1977) 4 SCC 551]. It was, however, clarified by the Larger Bench that such orders should not, however, be ad interim orders or orders merely of a procedural nature.

                  32.     In the instant case, O.P.Nos.59 of 2025 and 60 of 2025 were filed by the appellant-3rd respondent, invoking the provisions under Sections 3 and 4(1) of the Defection Act, seeking a declaration that the respondent therein has become subject to disqualification under both limbs and the provisions of the Defection Act, who committed defection and is disqualified to continue as a Councillor of Changanassery Municipality. A declaration was also sought that the respondent therein is disqualified to contest in any election to the local bodies for a period of 6 years. By Ext.P3 common order of the State Election Commission, the respondent therein is declared as disqualified for being a Councillor of Changanassery Municipality, as provided under Section 3(1)(a) of the Defection Act. The respondent therein is further declared as disqualified from contesting as a candidate in an election to any local authorities for a period of 6 years from the date of that order, as provided under Section 4(3) of the said Act.

                  33.     In terms of the direction contained in the order of the learned Single Judge dated 12.11.2025, the 1st respondent-petitioner has sworn to an affidavit dated 13.11.2025 in the writ petitions. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of that affidavit read thus;

                  “2. This Hon'ble Court on 12.11.2025 had directed the petitioner to submit an affidavit as to whether the petitioner intends to contest the elections to local self- government institutions in Kerala for the year 2025 and if so, on which seat and under what banner. It is pursuant to the same that the instant affidavit is being filed.

                  3. It is submitted that the petitioner intends to contest in the elections to local self-government institutions in Kerala for the year 2025, in the Changanassery Municipality, in ward No.30, as a candidate of Indian National Congress (I). The petitioner has sought permission from leaders of the said party for the same. However, if at all, such permission is denied, the petitioner intends to contest in the above elections as an independent candidate or a nominee of any other political party.”                        (underline supplied)

                  34. When the effect of the order of stay granted by the learned Single Judge by the order dated 13.11.2025 is that the 1st respondent-petitioner in the respective writ petitions, who are disqualified on defection by Ext.P3 order of the State Election Commission, can contest in the elections to local self-government institutions in Kerala for the year 2025, the said order falls under the purview of an appealable order under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, in view of the law laid down by the Larger Bench in K.S. Das [1992 (2) KLT 358], and these writ appeals filed by the appellant-3rd respondent, who was the petitioner in O.P.Nos.59 of 2025 and 60 of 2025 before the State Election Commission are maintainable in law.’

16. In View of the law laid down by the Division Bench in Jomy Joseph [2025 KHC OnLine 1234], when the effect of the order of stay granted by the learned Single Judge by the interim order dated 11.11.2025 in W.P.(C)No.40294 of 2025 is that, the 1st respondent-petitioner, who is disqualified on defection by Ext.P7 order dated 23.10.2025 of the Kerala State Election Commission in O.P.No.8 of 2023 can contest in the elections to local bodies, 2025, the said order falls under the purview of an appealable order under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, as held by the Larger Bench in K. S. Das v. State of Kerala [1992 (2) KLT 358]. As already noticed hereinbefore, on the strength of interim order dated 11.11.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.40294 of 2025, the 1st respondent herein-petitioner, who is declared as disqualified for being a member of Pulincunnoo Grama Panchayat and ceased to be a member from the date of Ext.P7 order, i.e., 23.10.2025, who is further disqualified from contesting as a candidate in an election to any local authorities for a period of six years from the date of that order, is contesting in the election to local authorities, 2025 as an independent candidate, with the support of Left Democratic Front.

17. The decisions and the legal principles relied on by the Division Bench in Jomy Joseph [2025 KHC OnLine 1234], is squarely applicable to the legal issues raised in this writ appeal, since the legal contentions raised in both the cases are one and the same.

18. In such circumstances, we find absolutely no reason to sustain the interim order dated 11.11.2025 in W.P.(C)No.40294 of 2025, and the writ appeal is allowed by setting aside the aforesaid interim order.

                  It is made clear that the observations, if any, contained in this judgment touching the merits of the matter pending before the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.40294 of 2025 are made for the limited purpose of deciding the writ appeals.