Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The petitioner in W.P.(C)No.46146 of 2025 filed this intra- court appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 19.12.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in that writ petition.

2. The appellant has filed W.P.(C)No.46146 of 2025 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P6 assignment agreement dated 26.03.2013 to the extent it relates to the properties of the appellant.

3. As per the pleadings in the writ petition, the appellant was an account holder in the 1st respondent bank from where he obtained a cash credit facility for his business. Ext.P6 assignment agreement dated 26.03.2013 executed by the 1st respondent bank in favour of the 3rd respondent J.M.Financial Asset Reconstruction company is bad as the same is done without informing the appellant and behind the back of the appellant and denying the opportunity for the appellant to pay off the then balance due and thereby to save his properties 6 in numbers as provided in Section 13(8) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (for short ‘SARFAESI Act’). For effecting the sale of the property, 30 days notice under Section 8(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules is required. But no such notice was given to the appellant, and therefore also the sale as per Ext.P6 made by the 1st and 2nd respondents to the 3rd respondent as per Ext. P6 is bad in law. Section 13(3A) of the SARFAESI Act was not complied with by giving the account details to the appellant, and therefore, the 1st and 2nd respondents were not entitled to proceed under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. The rights of the appellant for his properties are taken away against the property rights protected under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. All the further steps for the sale, as per Ext.P6, are conducted without any basis or footing under the SARFAESI Act. Ext.P6 sale is done, not complying with Kerala Registration Rules, as the appellant’s properties are in Kerala only. There was no Central Registry of Securitisation Asset Reconstruction and Security Interest of India (‘CERSAI’ for short) registration for effecting the assignment agreement/sale deed as per Ext.P6 by the 1st and 2nd respondents, and then also Ext. P6 is liable to be set aside to the extent the sale of the appellant's properties is concerned. The Registration particulars are also not revealed to the appellant, even as per Exts.P1 and P2. The same has resulted in the illegal denial of the appellant's right over his properties. The 1st respondent bank did not have CERSAI registration as provided under Section 26 of the SARFAESI Act as on the date of the sale, and therefore, there was no authority for the 1st and 2nd respondents to effect registration of the sale/assignment agreement to the 3rd respondent. The 5th respondent, Reserve Bank of India, also has to control and check the sale and transaction done by the 1st and 2nd respondents to the 3rd respondent Asset Reconstruction Company, being the controlling and governing authority of banks financial and related transactions in the country. Therefore, the 5th respondent is also a necessary party in the decision of this case. No valuation of the property was done by the 1st and 2nd respondents before making a sale of the property as provided under Rule 8(5) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules 2002. The properties 6 in numbers valued for a sum of Rs.3,39,00,000/- in the year 2011 sold for a sum of Rs.1,48,55,196/89 in the year 2013, which is also bad, causing heavy damages to the appellant without any sufficient and genuine reason. The state also should have seen that no registration of Kerala property of the appellant was done in Tamil Nadu State as per Ext.P6 without the permission of the State, which caused loss to Kerala State also. Ext.P6 sale deed/Assignment agreement is liable to be set aside to the extent the same covers the appellant’s 6 properties. There is no other suitable remedy for the appellant other than to approach this Court.

4. By the judgment dated 19.12.2025, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition. Paragraphs 2 to 6 and the last paragraph of that judgment read thus:

                  “2. The first petitioner availed a financial facility from the respondent Bank in the year 2004, which was enhanced in the year 2008 to ₹1,65,000/-. Upon default in repayment, the respondent Bank initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. A notice under Section 13(2) of the Act was issued on 17.05.2010, followed by a notice under Section 13(4) on 17.06.2010, demanding payment of the entire outstanding amount.

                  3. The respondent bank thereafter approaches the CJM Ernakulam by filing Crl.M.P.No.4689 of 2012 dated 29.11.2012 and Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act was passed whereby an Advocate commissioner was appointed. The petitioner filed W.P(C) No.29235 of 2012 before this Court to enable the petitioner to approach the DRT by filing a Section 17 petition and this court granted one week to keep status quo. Thereafter the petitioner filed S.A.No.953 of 2012.

                  4.       In the present writ petition, an interlocutory application has been filed as I.A. No. 1 of 2025 seeking amendment of the writ petition. One of the prayers therein is for a direction to the Debts Recovery Tribunal to dispose of the petition to set aside the ex parte order along with the petition to condone the delay, produced as Ext.P9 in the writ petition.

                  5.       The learned counsel for the respondent Bank, on instructions, submits that the application to set aside the ex parte order was originally numbered as I.A. No. 1644 of 2016, which was subsequently renumbered as M.A. No. 34 of 2016, and that the petition to condone the delay was originally numbered as I.A. No. 1643 of 2016, is renumbered as M.A. No. 33 of 2016.

                  6.       Since the limited request is for the disposal of M.A. Nos. 33 and 34 of 2016 within a specified time frame, I deem it appropriate to direct the Debts Recovery Tribunal to take up M.A. Nos. 33 and 34 of 2016 and pass appropriate orders within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.

                  In view of the above, the writ petition is disposed of”.

5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge, the appellant-petitioner has filed the present writ appeal.

6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2, the learned Senior Government Pleader and the learned Standing counsel for respondents 3 and 4. Considering the nature of the relief sought for, issuance of notice to the 7th respondent is dispensed with.

7. The grievance of the appellant is that the additional prayer sought in the connected O.P.(DRT)No.362 of 2025 was mistakenly considered in W.P.(C)No. 46146 of 2025, and hence the issue raised in the writ petition was not considered on merits by the learned Single Judge. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Ext.P6 sale deed dated 26.03.2013 is bad, since the sale was conducted without complying with Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act and also Rule 8(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules. The appellant has raised some other contentions also in the writ petition, raising non-compliance of statutory provisions, which were not considered on merits by the learned Single Judge.

8. The learned counsel for the Bank would submit that it is true that an error occurred on the part of the learned Single Judge while appreciating the facts of the writ petition, since O.P. (DRT)No.362 of 2025 filed by the very same appellant-petitioner was also considered along with W.P.(C)No.46146 of 2025. However, even on merits, the writ petition is not maintainable with the prayers sought therein, and hence no interference is needed on the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge.

9. In the writ petition, the appellant challenged Ext.P6 assignment agreement executed between the respondents 1 and 3. From the pleadings in the writ petition and from the reliefs sought for it can be gathered that the appellant is in effect challenging the proceedings initiated by the bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act against the secured asset, when the loan availed by the appellant became a non-performing asset. It is also pleaded in the writ petition that the bank has issued notice under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. However, the appellant contends that the said notice is illegal.

10. As far as jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in respect of proceedings initiated by the secured creditor is concerned, the position is settled by the judgments of the Apex Court as well as this Court.

11. In Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another v. Mathew K.C. [2018 (1) KHC 786], the Apex Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a writ petition only under exceptional circumstances and that it is a self-imposed restraint by the High Court. The four exceptional circumstances such as, where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, were re iterated in paragraph 6 of the said judgment by relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603].

12. This position was reiterated by the Apex Court in South Indian Bank Ltd. (M/s.) v. Naveen Mathew Philip [2023 (4) KLT 29] and after discussing the various judgments on the point as well as the circumstances in which the High Court can interfere with in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act, held as under:

                  “Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi - judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute”

13. In PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank [2024 (3) KHC SN 3] the Apex Court held that it is more than a settled legal position of law that in matters arising out of RDB Act and SARFAESI Act, the High Court should not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution, particularly when an alternative statutory remedy is available.

14. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Jasmin K. v. State Bank of India [2024 (3) KHC 266] reiterated the position of law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments.

15. From the judgments referred to supra, it is clear that unless the four exceptional circumstances mentioned by the Apex Court in Mathew K.C. [2018 (1) KHC 786], the appellant cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against the proceedings initiated by the Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. It is clear from the reading of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act that any person claiming a right on the secured asset can move the Debts Recovery Tribunal ( the ‘Tribunal’ for short) if aggrieved by the proceedings initiated against that property by the secured creditor under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.

16. It is true that from the impugned judgment, it appears that the learned Single Judge considered the facts of another connected case, i.e., O.P.(DRT)No.362 of 2025, as pleaded in the writ appeal. If the appellant is really aggrieved by the same, the remedy available to him was to approach the learned Single Judge with a review petition, since it was an error apparent on the face of the record. However, we are not inclined to direct the learned Single Judge to reconsider the matter for the aforesaid error in the appreciation of facts, for the reason that even otherwise, on merits, the appellant is not entitled to the relief sought in the writ petition. As noted above, the appellant has an equal and efficacious remedy before the Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Moreover, Ext.P6 is only an assignment agreement entered into between respondents 1 and 3, and it is not a sale deed as contended in the writ petition.

17. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we are of the opinion that there is no necessity to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge since the remedy available to the appellant is before the Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act as discussed above.

                  In such circumstances, this writ appeal is disposed of without prejudice to the right of the appellant to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal for appropriate relief, subject to the law of limitation.