Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The applicant in O.A.(EKM) No.180 of 2025 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Additional Bench at Ernakulam (the ‘Tribunal’ in short) filed this original petition, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 21.07.2025 passed by the Tribunal in that original application.

2. Going by the averments in the original application, the petitioner is presently working as a Consultant ENT at General Hospital Thrissur. The petitioner is getting superannuation on 31.05.2026 and has less than 2 years of service. Further, the petitioner belongs to the scheduled caste category. The petitioner's wife is working in Thrissur District, and their only daughter is studying in Ernakulam District. The petitioner is having a preferential right and claim as per the General Rules of transfer guidelines and norms. But, a draft list was prepared by rejecting the claims of the petitioner, and hence the petitioner has preferred appeals before respondents 1 and 2. But, shockingly, the respondents have sanctioned a transfer order by posting the 5th respondent to General Hospital Ernakulam. The petitioner has a preferential right and claim over the 5th respondent for getting transferred to the General Hospital, Ernakulam. Further, the petitioner has completed 3 years of service at General Hospital Thrissur, and the 5th respondent has completed only 1 year of service at General Hospital Kottayam. On 04.10.2024, the Health and Family Welfare Department issued Annexure A6, by sanctioning General Transfer of the Consultant (ENT) Medical officers of the Department. The above order is violating the principles of law and violating the General Transfer guidelines and their attached preferential criteria. Aggrieved by the above Government Order, the petitioner has approached the Tribunal and subsequently filed Annexure A7 statutory appeal to the 1st respondent. Vide Annexure A8 order dated 08.10.2024, the Tribunal directed the 1st respondent to consider and pass orders on Annexure A8 appeal at the earliest. But, the 1st respondent passed Annexure A9 order dated 06.01.2025 in a mechanical and illegal manner without considering the contentions of the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner-applicant approached the Tribunal with the original application filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs:

                  “i. Quash Annexure A9 order of the 1st respondent by finding that it is illegal.

                  ii. Quash Annexure A2 draft list and A6 final transfer order by finding it as illegal, to the extent that it violates the principles of natural justice to the applicant and it is passed against the provisions of law.

                  iii. Direct the respondents 1 and 2 to consider and allow the contentions and claims of the applicant, raised in Annexure A4, A5 and A7 appeals, by giving preferential rights to the applicant as per the Annexure A1 guidelines for General Transfer for the year 2024 issued by the Health and Family Welfare Department.

                  iv. Direct the respondents 1 and 2 to give transfer and posting to the applicant to General Hospital Ernakulam from General Hospital Thrissur, forthwith by giving preferential rights to the applicant as per the Annexure A1 guidelines for General Transfer for the year 2024 issued by the Health and Family Welfare Department.

                  v. Direct the respondents 1 and 2 to give transfer and posting to the applicant to General Hospital Ernakulam from General Hospital Thrissur, forthwith by giving preferential rights to the applicant as per the Annexure A1 guidelines for General Transfer for the year 2024 issued by the Health and Family Welfare Department and by finding that the applicant is having preferential right over the 5th respondent.

                  vi. Direct the respondents 1 and 2 not to transfer and post the 5th respondent in General Hospital Ernakulam and to find it as illegal by declaring that the 5th respondent is not eligible to get transfer and posting through the general transfer of the year 2024”.

3. In the original application, the 5th respondent filed a reply statement dated 26.02.2025 producing therewith Annexures R5(a) to R5(g) documents. Similarly, the 1st respondent also filed a reply statement dated 27.06.2025, producing therewith Annexure R1(a) document. Meanwhile, the 1st respondent issued Ext.P5 order dated 02.07.2025 by extending the work arrangement of the petitioner at Ernakulam General Hospital, for a period of six months from 02.07.2025.

4. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of the materials on record, by the impugned order dated 21.07.2025, the Tribunal dismissed the original application. Paragraphs 6 to 8 and the last paragraph of that order read thus:

                  “6. The applicant has a contention that he has got a preferential right to be posted in his home District in view of his impending retirement in 2026. The learned counsel for the 5th respondent, relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in Balan.C. v. Union of lndia [2024 (1) KHC 64] argued that the applicant who was in Ernakulam for more than 10 years, cannot have any preference for a posting in Ernakulam over and above the statutory rights of the son of the 5th respondent. ln the judgment in Balan's Case, it was held as follows:

                  “11. Thus, the question arises whether absence of the petitioner would deprive the child, the environment he enjoyed in equal measures with others. Considering the age and other factors, it cannot be said that his wife would be able to adequately maintain the child. lf any of the rights of the disabled child is denied by his absence, going by Section 5 of Chapter ll of PWD Act, the transfer order passed, without adverting to such right of the child, becomes illegal. ln the normal routine of matter an organization is not expected to have a consideration of the personal matters of an employee. However, when such personal matters are intertwined with the rights conferred under law, the organization is bound to address such matters and make sure that the transfer would not affect the child's best interest".

                  7. The respondents 1 and 2 are bound to see that the disabled child of the 5th respondent is given reasonable accommodation, by ensuring the presence of the applicant near him, in his home town.

                  8. ln the above said circumstances, it can be seen that the Government has considered the claim of the applicant and the 5th respondent in accordance with law and found that the 5th respondent who has to take care of his child having 60% disability, deserves compassionate consideration for a posting at Ernakulam, in his home District. We do not find any illegality in Annexure A9.

                  Accordingly, the Original Application is dismissed”.

5. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the original application by the Tribunal, the petitioner is now before this Court with the present original petition.

6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior Government Pleader.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is about to retire from service on 31.05.2026. He is specifically requested for a transfer to Ernakulam, which ought to have been considered instead of granting a transfer to the 5th respondent. Therefore, the impugned order of the Tribunal, as well as Annexure A9 order under challenge in the original application, are liable to be set aside.

8. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader invited our attention to paragraph 3 of the reply statement filed by the 1st respondent and submitted that the petitioner had been working in General Hospital, Ernakulam, for a period of 10 years from 19.09.2010 till 21.01.2021, before his transfer to Thrissur. As per Annexure A10 order, he is working in the General Hospital, Ernakulam, for three days a week on a working arrangement. There is no illegality in Annexure A9 order and so also in the impugned order of the Tribunal.

9. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

10. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

11. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

12. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

13. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

14. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

15. It is trite that whether an employee is to be transferred to a different station, etc, are matter for the employer to consider, depending upon the administrative necessities. The power to transfer an employee in a transferable service is within the prerogative of the employer. It is the employer who knows best where an employee should be deployed for an effective discharge of his or her duties for the establishment. The inconveniences caused to the employee and his family consequent to the transfer are not sufficient to interfere with the orders of transfer. Generally, the Court exercising writ jurisdiction would not interfere in the orders of transfer of an employee issued by the employer, for administrative reasons, as it would adversely affect the smooth functioning of that institution. The circumstance under which the Court can interfere with the orders of transfer is laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court in several judgments.

16. In Union of India v. S.L Abbas [(1993) 4 SCC 357] the Apex Court held thus:

                  “Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly, if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration.” (emphasis supplied)

17. In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd v. Shri Bhagwan [(2001) 8 SCC 574], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “It is by now well-settled and often reiterated by this Court that no Government servant or employee of public Undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the Tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they are the Appellate Authorities substituting their own decision for that of the Management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned.” (emphasis supplied)

18. In Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh and others [2024 SCC Online SC 279], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “15. In view of the foregoing enunciation of law by judicial decisions of this Court, it is clear that in absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegations are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not warranted. In the sequel of the said settled norms, the scope of judicial review is not permissible by the Courts in exercising of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

19. In Nixy James v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation [2023 (3) KLT 893], this Court held that the law is too well settled that transfer is an incident of service and the employee has no legal right in this behalf. Unless the orders of transfer are vitiated by statutory violations or mala fides, Courts should be loath to interfere with the same.

20. From Annexure A9 order as well as from the impugned order of the Tribunal, we notice that the respondents gave preference to the 5th respondent, considering the compassionate ground of the disability of the child of the 5th respondent. The petitioner has no case that the transfer order impugned by the petitioner was vitiated by malafides. A pleading to that effect is conspicuously absent in the original application. In such circumstances, viewed in the light of the judgments referred to supra, we find no reason to hold that the impugned order of the Tribunal is perverse or illegal, which warrants the interference of this Court by exercising supervisory jurisdiction.

                  In the result, the original petition stands dismissed.