Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging Ext.P3 externment order dated 27.10.2025, passed against the petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity]. By the said order, the petitioner has been interdicted from entering the limits of Thrissur Revenue District for a period of one year from the date of the receipt of the order. Subsequently, as per the order of the Advisory Board dated 28.11.2025, the period of externment was modified to six months from one year.

2. The records available before us reveal that, it was after considering the recurrent involvement of the petitioner in criminal activities, that on 14.10.2025, the District Police Chief, Thrissur Rural submitted a proposal for initiation of proceedings against the petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007 before the authorised officer, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range. For initiation of the said proceedings, the petitioner was classified as a 'known rowdy' as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007.

3. The authority considered four cases in which the petitioner got involved for passing the externment order. The case registered against the petitioner with respect to the last prejudicial activity and considered by the authority for passing the externment order is crime No.826/2025 of Vadanappally Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 78(1), 296(b) and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short 'BNS').

4. Heard Sri. M. R. Sarin, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Ext.P3 order was passed on improper consideration of facts and without arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the petitioner was on bail, it was imperative on the jurisdictional authority to take note of the said fact and to consider the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed on him before passing the order. The learned counsel urged that the jurisdictional authority ought to have passed such an order only after being satisfied that the said bail conditions are not sufficient to prevent the recurrence of prejudicial acts by the petitioner. However, the jurisdictional authority failed to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on the petitioner at the time of granting bail were sufficient to restrain him from repeating criminal activities. On these premises, it was urged that the externment order is liable to be set aside.

6. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the externment order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after due application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned Government Pleader, it was after being satisfied that the conditions imposed on the petitioner at the time of granting bail were not sufficient to restrain him from engaging in criminal activities that the jurisdictional authority passed the externment order. According to the learned Government Pleader, the detaining authority passed the Ext.P3 order after arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction, and no interference is warranted in the said order.

7. On perusal of the records, it is evident that it was after taking into account the petitioner's involvement in criminal activities that the District Police Chief, Thrissur Rural, has mooted the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act against the petitioner. Altogether, four cases formed the basis for passing the externment order. Out of the said cases, the case registered against the petitioner with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.826/2025 of Vadanappally Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 78(1), 296(b) and 351(2) of the BNS. The alleged incident constituting the last prejudicial activity occurred on 24.09.2025, and he was arrested and released on bail from the Police station itself on 09.10.2025, as all the offences alleged against the petitioner are bailable. The District Police Chief, Thrissur Rural, forwarded the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act against the petitioner on 14.10.2025. Subsequently, the externment order was passed on 27.10.2025. The sequence of the events narrated above clearly shows that there is no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the externment order.

8. The main contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is that, although he was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity, the said fact was not duly taken into consideration by the jurisdictional authority. According to the petitioner, the jurisdictional authority did not consider the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed on him properly and casually passed the impugned order.

9. While considering the above contention, it is to be noted that no law precludes the jurisdictional authority from passing an order under the KAA(P) Act against a person who is already on bail. However, when an order has to be passed against a person who is already on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed by a court on such a person while granting bail are adequate to prevent him from engaging in criminal activities. Notably, as previously stated, all the offences alleged against the petitioner in the most recent case registered against him are bailable in nature. Consequently, upon his release on bail from the Police Station, no specific conditions would ordinarily have been imposed. In such circumstances, the question of examining or assessing the adequacy or sufficiency of bail conditions in the said case does not arise.

10. Nevertheless, a bare perusal of the impugned order indicates that the jurisdictional authority has examined the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed upon the petitioner in the earlier cases registered against him and has recorded its satisfaction that he repeatedly engaged in criminal activities in violation of those conditions. The order further records that the measures initiated under the BNS and the BNSS did not yield the intended result, and that the petitioner continued his anti-social activities in defiance of the prevailing law. Moreover, it is specifically noted that the petitioner violated the conditions of the bond executed pursuant to an order passed under Section 126 of the BNSS by the Executive Magistrate, inasmuch as he continued to involve himself in criminal activities even after executing the said bond.

11. A holistic reading of the impugned order further reveals that the act of the petitioner violating the bail conditions and being involved in criminal activities is one of the materials which the jurisdictional authority relied on to enter into a subjective satisfaction to pass the externment order. Therefore, it cannot be said that the jurisdictional authority did not consider the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed on the petitioner at the time of granting bail to him. The impugned order reveals that the antecedents of the petitioner, which included criminal activities and the undermining of earlier bail orders, persuaded the jurisdictional authority to arrive at a subjective satisfaction regarding the necessity of passing the order. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will fail.

                  In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed.