Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This Rent Control Revision is filed by the respondent- tenant in R.C.P. No.1/2018 on the file of the Rent Control Court, Cherthala. The aforesaid R.C.P. was filed by the respondent herein, the landlord, under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), seeking eviction of the tenant.

2. The Rent Control Court, by order dated 31.10.2022, dismissed the petition. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the petition under Section 11(3) of the Act, the landlord approached the Rent Control Appellate Authority by filing R.C.A. No.1/2023. The Rent Control Appellate Authority, after hearing both sides and considering the evidence on record, allowed the appeal filed by the landlord and ordered eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act.

3. Before examining the legality and propriety of the impugned order, it is to be noted that although the Rent Control Court ultimately dismissed the Rent Control Petition, it entered a clear finding that the landlord–tenant relationship between the parties is established. The Rent Control Court also found that the bona fide need projected by the landlord for own occupation is genuine. However, the Rent Control Court dismissed the petition solely on the ground that the tenant is mainly depending for his livelihood on the income derived from the business carried on in the petition schedule room and that no other suitable building is available in the locality for the tenant to shift his business. On that basis, the tenant was held entitled to the protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act.

4. In appeal, the Rent Control Appellate Authority, on a reappreciation of the evidence, found that the tenant is not mainly depending for his livelihood on the income derived from the business carried on in the petition schedule shop room and that he has other sources of income, including pension. The Appellate Authority also found that the tenant failed to prove the non- availability of other suitable buildings in the locality to carry on his textile business.

5. Undisputedly, the sole question that arises for consideration in this revision petition is the legality and propriety of the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority under Section 11(3) of the Act. As already noticed, both the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority concurrently found that a landlord–tenant relationship exists between the parties and that the need projected by the landlord for own occupation is genuine. The divergence in the findings of the two forums is confined to the question of the tenant’s entitlement to the protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. While the Rent Control Court answered the said question in favour of the tenant, the Appellate Authority reversed that finding and ordered eviction.

6. In the Rent Control Petition, the landlord pleaded that he was earlier employed abroad and now intends to conduct a textile business in the petition schedule shop room. It was further pleaded that though two other rooms are available in the same building, they are already occupied by other tenants. Undisputedly, to succeed under Section 11(3) of the Act, the landlord must establish that he bona fide requires the building for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him. It is well settled through a catena of decisions that, while considering bona fide need, the Court has to assess whether the requirement is natural, real, sincere, and honest. Further, when a landlord asserts that he requires the building for his own occupation, the Rent Control Court shall not proceed on a presumption that such requirement is not bona fide (see Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 100).

7. In the present case, the need projected is for the landlord to start a business in the petition schedule shop room. This need was substantiated by the oral testimony of the landlord, who was examined as PW1. Notably, no material was produced by the tenant to show that the landlord is in possession of any other suitable vacant building of his own in the same city, town, or village. The landlord also succeeded in proving that the other two rooms standing in his name are occupied by other tenants, by examining those tenants as witnesses.

8. After considering the pleadings and evidence, the Appellate Authority arrived at the conclusion that the need projected under Section 11(3) of the Act is bona fide. The Rent Control Court also entered a similar finding, though it ultimately dismissed the petition by extending the benefit of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act to the tenant. There is nothing on record to indicate that the concurrent finding of both authorities regarding the genuineness of the landlord’s need is perverse or patently illegal so as to warrant interference by this Court.

9. The crucial question that now requires consideration is whether the finding of the Appellate Authority that the tenant is not entitled to the protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is legally sustainable. The second proviso mandates that eviction shall not be ordered if the tenant is mainly depending for his livelihood on the income derived from the business carried on in the tenanted premises and if no other suitable building is available in the locality to carry on such business.

10. It is well settled that the burden of proving entitlement to the protection under the second proviso lies squarely on the tenant. The two ingredients of the proviso discussed above are conjunctive and not disjunctive; therefore, both must be satisfied. In the present case, the tenant failed to produce convincing material to establish that he is mainly depending for his livelihood on the income derived from the business carried on in the petition schedule shop room. The Appellate Authority, upon appreciation of the evidence, found that the tenant is receiving a monthly pension of ₹1,600/- and that there is absolutely no evidence to show that he mainly depends on the income from the business conducted in the tenanted premises.

11. Similarly, the Appellate Authority found that the tenant utterly failed to produce any evidence to establish that no other suitable building is available in the locality to carry on his business. The Appellate Authority also noted that the tenant had not taken out a commission to prove the alleged non-availability of other suitable buildings. As rightly held by the Appellate Authority, the tenant miserably failed to discharge the burden cast upon him under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Therefore, the finding that the tenant is not entitled to the protection under the second proviso is legally sound and warrants no interference.

12. It is also pertinent to note that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act is limited and not as wide as the appellate jurisdiction. A revisional court cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own findings unless the findings of the Appellate Authority are shown to be perverse, illegal, or suffering from material irregularity.

13. In Regy V. Edathil v. Hubert Leslie D’Cruz [2016(2) KLJ 164], a Division Bench of this Court held that, the High Court (in revision) is obliged to test the order of the Rent Control Court on the touch stone of whether it is according to law. For that limited purpose, it may enter into a reappraisal of evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Control Court is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available.

14. Viewed in the light of the above, the conclusion is irresistible that the reasoning of the Rent Control Appellate Authority while ordering eviction of the tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act is not perverse. There is no illegality, irregularity, or impropriety in the order of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, warranting interference in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act.

                  Resultantly, the Rent Control Revision fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, taking note of the fervent plea made by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the petitioner-tenant is granted five months’ time from the date of this order to vacate the building, subject to the following conditions;

                  i) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that he will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the petitioners-landlords within five months from the date of this order and that, he shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule shop room and further he shall conduct any business in the petition schedule shop room only on the strength of a valid licence/ permission /consent issued by the local authority/statutory authorities;

                  ii) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding months, without any default;

                  iii) Needless to say, in the event of the respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room will stand cancelled automatically, and the petitioners-landlords will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction.