(Prayer: Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue any writ or order or direction particularly a writ of certiorari by calling for the records of the 2nd Respondent pertains to MP No. 06 of 2006 dated 14.12.2015 on the file of the Labour Court, Guntur, Guntur District and allow the same, duly setting aside the order of the 2nd Respondent in MP No. 06 of 2006 dt.14-12-2015 passed therein and quash the same as being illegal, irrational and without authority of law and consequently set aside the said orders of 2nd Respondent

IA NO: 1 OF 2017(WPMP 24316 OF 2017

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the operation of order dt 14-12-2015 in MP No.06 of 2006 passed by the respondent No.2 pending disposal of writ petition

IA NO: 4 OF 2017(WPMP 112398 OF 2017

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased)

1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following main prayer:

                  “to issue any writ or order or direction particularly a writ of certiorari by calling for the records of the 2nd Respondent pertains to MP No. 06 of 2006 dated 14.12.2015 on the file of the Labour Court, Guntur, Guntur District and allow the same, duly setting aside the order of the 2nd Respondent in MP No. 06 of 2006 dt.14-12-2015 passed therein and quash the same as being illegal, irrational and without authority of law and consequently set aside the said orders of 2nd Respondent and to pass”

2. Heard arguments of Sri V.Siva Prasad Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner. The workman filed Miscellaneous Petition vide M.P.No.6 of 2006 on the file of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur (hereinafter called, „the Labour Court‟) to direct the employer- society for payment of Rs.2,02,680/- with interest at 18% per annum from due date till the date of realization. The Labour Court, vide order dated 14.12.2015, partly allowed the said petition, directing the employer-society to pay Rs.2,02,680/- to the workman.

3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

                  The workman was joined as a paid secretary of erstwhile Mamdur Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society of Chejarla Mandal, Nellore District for a salary of Rs.9,200/- per month. Later, on 12.01.2004, a resolution was passed suspending the workman for a period of six months with effect from 28.01.2004 basing on the report of the Nodal officer and the workman was directed to handover the charge to one Mr.Audisesha Reddy. Thereafter, another resolution dated 22.07.2004 was passed extending the suspension for a further period of six months i.e., from 28.07.2004 to 28.01.2005. Again, the suspension period was further extended from 28.07.2005 to 27.01.2006.

4. The case of the workman is that suspension period cannot be more than six months and the disciplinary action should be finalized and disposed of within six months. If not, it may extend further up to two months. In the present case, the workman was suspended for a period of more than eight months and he was not paid salary for the period from 01.06.2023 to 27.01.2004. Therefore, claiming Rs.72,680/- towards arrears of salary for the period from 01.06.2023 to 27.01.2004, Rs.28,800/- for the period from 28.01.2004 to 27.09.2004 and Rs.1,01,200/- towards subsistence allowance for the period from 28.09.2004 to 28.10.2005, in toto Rs. 2,02,680/- with interest @ 18% per annum, the workman filed a petition before the labour court.

5. The learned labour court, after hearing the learned counsel on both sides, partly allowed the petition, by granting Rs.2,02,680/- to the workman. Aggrieved by that, the present writ petition is filed.

6. The principal contention raised by the petitioner/ society in the present writ petition is that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute of entitlement of the subsistence allowance of the workman and the Labour Court can only interpret an award or settlement on which the claim is based. Whereas in the present case, there is no award and therefore the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue upon raised by the workman by exercising power under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

7. For the said proposition, learned counsel for the society relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bombay Chemical Industries υ. Deputy Labour Commissioner and another((2022) 5 SCC 629), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate the dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim of workman and it can only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim is based, relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and another((1995) 1 SCC 235). The Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Labour Court's jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is like that of an Executing Court and as per the settled preposition of law without prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workman, proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages and/or difference of wages claimed by the workman shall not be maintainable under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Relying on the said judgment, learned counsel for the society would submit that as there is no award, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the workman.

8. Learned counsel for the society would submit that an application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is not a proper procedure which should be followed. He submits that there is no plea existing the right of the workman to get his pay protected and further submits that until and unless there is an order from any competent authority or the Court crystallizing the right of the workman, the monetary benefits, flowing out from such right cannot be enforced by filing an application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He submits that the proceedings under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is in the nature of execution proceedings and since in the instant case there is no plea existing or pre-determined right, initiation of the proceedings under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is not proper and hence prayed to allow the Writ Petition.

Analysis of the Court: -

9. As per the judgment of the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S.Rajagopalan etc(AIR 1964 SC 743), the power of the Labour Court in the proceedings under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act being akin to that of the Executing Court, the Labour Court is not competent to interpret the award or settlement, on which the workman bases his claim under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and that the power of the Executing Court is to interpret the power of execution proceedings. Relevant extract from the said judgment is as under:-

                  “Besides, there can be no doubt that when the Labour Court is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is open to the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court; but like the executing Court, the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under section 33(C)(2). Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under section 33(C)(2), it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests."

10. This decision itself indicates that the power of the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act extends to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests, like the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution, where the basis of the claim is referable to the award or settlement, but it does not extend to the determination of the dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim, if there be no prior adjudication or recognition of the same by the employer. As per the judgment of the Constitutional Bench in P.S.Rajagopalan’s case (Supra 3), the labour court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim made by the workman under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the said judgment was not referred in the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the society in Bombay Chemical Industries’s case (Supra 1) and in the present case, the society admitted that the workman is the employee of the society and also admitted about the payment of subsistence allowance and the labour court rightly exercised its jurisdiction.

11. Yet another aspect involved in the lis is that the scope of High Courts while exercising its power under Article 226 of Constitution of India, in interfering with the findings of the Tribunal/Labour Court. The Apex Court in Bharti Airtel Limited Vs. A.S Raghavendra((2025) 3 SCC 266), had held as under:-

                  “……29. As regards the power of the High Court to reappraise the facts, it cannot be said that the same is completely impermissible under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. However, there must be a level of infirmity greater than ordinary in a tribunal's order, which is facing judicial scrutiny before the High Court, to justify interference. We do not think such a situation prevailed in the present facts. Further, the ratio of the judgments relied upon by the respondent in support of his contentions, would not apply in the facts at hand……”

12. In the recent judgment of Ajay Singh Vs. Khacheru and others 5 , the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has clearly stated in its vivid terms that the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, does not act as an appellate authority over the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal or Labour Court.

13. In view of the above discussion and also the well settled legal principles, this court finds no merit in the writ petition.

14. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

                  As a sequel, all pending applications shall stand closed.