K. Lakshman, J.

1. Heard Mr. M. Radha Krishna, learned counsel for the appellant - plaintiff and Mr. M.V. Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent - defendant.

2. This appeal is preferred under Section - 96 read with Order - XLI, Rule - 1 of CPC assailing the order dated 09.08.2023 in I.A. No.663 of 2023 in O.S. No.38 of 2023 passed by learned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Rangareddy District at Kukatpally.

3. The facts which are not in dispute are as follows:

               i) The appellant herein is the plaintiff and the respondent herein is the defendant in O.S. No.38 of 2023.

               ii) The appellant filed a suit in O.S. No.38 of 2023 against the respondent for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 03.1.2020 in respect of suit schedule property i.e., Flat No.1402, admeasuring 2838 square feet in 14th Floor, F-Block, Sale Area which comprises of 1988 square feet of Carpet Area exclusive balcony area admeasuring 191 square feet and proportionate common area admeasuring 656 square feet along with allotment of three Car Parking spaces in basement and undivided 76 square yards of land out of 58585 square yards in Survey No.5, situated at Kondapur Village, Serlingampally Mandal, Rangareddy District.

               iii) In the said suit, the respondent - defendant filed an application under Order - VII, Rule 11 (a) of CPC to reject the plaint on the following grounds:

               (a) The appellant through her father approached the respondent’s father, GPA Holder, to cancel the agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 for sale of suit schedule flat and sought for refund of entire amount paid by her enabling her to purchase the bigger size of flat which belongs to the father of the respondent.

               (b) After several negotiations, the father of the respondent agreed to cancel the said agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 and accordingly entire advance sale consideration paid by the appellant was returned through RTGS on 02.03.2022 and 06.04.2022.

               (c) The father of the respondent also addressed a letter on 12.04.2022 to the appellant intimating about cancellation of said agreement and return of sale consideration amount and also the original agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020. The said letter was handed over to the father of the appellant when he visited to the office of the father of respondent, but the said original agreement was not returned.

               (d) The father of respondent informed the respondent that he had cancelled the subject agreement of sale with the appellant and he had already entered into another agreement of sale on 25.11.2021 and the appellant utilized the repaid amount towards advance for fresh agreement of sale dated 25.11.2021.

               (e) Thus, there is no subsisting cause of action between the parties.

               (f) The averments of entire plaint do not disclose any cause of action for the appellant.

               (g) There is no evidence to establish compliance of Section - 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act.

               iv) The appellant - plaintiff opposed the said application contending as follows:

               (a) The respondent - defendant failed to make out any ground for rejection of plaint.

               (b) The petition filed by the defendant is an abuse of process of the Court, vexatious, to prolong the hearing.

               (c) She denied about her father approaching the father of defendant to cancel the agreement dated 03.11.2022 and refund of amount etc.

               (d) She also denied about cancellation of agreement of sale dated 03.11.2022 and refund of amount.

               (e) The amounts paid under the subject agreement and the amounts paid under another agreement dated 25.11.2021 are different and they are no way concerned with each other.

               (f) There is cause of action in the plaint.

               (g) Non-issuance of notice cannot be a ground for rejection of plaint.

               v) Vide the aforesaid order dated 09.08.2023, learned trial Court allowed the said application holding that:

               (a) Admittedly the defendant returned the advance and part sale consideration amount paid by the plaintiff i.e., Rs.1,55,00,000/- to the plaintiff through RTGS on 02.03.2022 and 06.04.2022.

               (b) Though the appellant contended that the agreement of sale was in subsistence, there is no cause of action as to why the defendant refunded the advance sale consideration of Rs.1,55,00,000/-.

               (c) In the plaint, the appellant has not clearly mentioned the reason as to why advance sale consideration was refunded, and it is only averred that the defendant proposed to return the advance sale consideration amount, stating that as there was delay in execution of sale deed and asked the plaintiff to enjoy the benefit of the advance sale consideration, which contention is not believable.

               (d) As the defendant has refunded the advance sale consideration to the plaintiff by 06.04.2022, there was no subsisting contract between the parties after the said date.

               (e) Though the plaintiff contended that she waited for the defendant to approach her for execution of sale deed, there is no oral or written agreement between them extending time or executing a fresh agreement of sale for purchase of suit schedule property.

               (f) Even in the plaint, plaintiff mentioned that as informed by the defendant, the suit agreement of sale was presumed to be `terminated; the plaintiff has not issued any notice to the defendant prior to filing of the suit.

               (g) The trial Court also placed reliance on the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy v. Baddam Pratapa Reddy ((2019) 14 SCC 220).

4. Challenging the said order, the appellant – plaintiff preferred the present appeal.

5. Both learned counsel for the appellant and respondent made their submissions extensively.

          i. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the principle laid down in Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty ((1999) 6 SCC 337); Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi ((2001) 8 SCC 233); Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, rep.by its Chairman v. Ponniamman Educational Trust, rep.by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee ((2012) 8 SCC 706); Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra), dead through legal representatives ((2020) 7 SCC 366); E. Anantha Padmanabha Reddy v. Chadalavada Srinivasa Rao (2019 (2) ALD 85 (DB)) and Pulipati Naga Venkata Krishna Rao v. Shafathunnisa (2025 SCC OnLine AP 2785).

      i. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the principle laid ii. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the principle laid down in Bhargavi Constructions v. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy ((2018) 13 SCC 480); Mohinder Kaur v. Sant Paul Singh ((2019) 9 SCC 358); Sangita Sinha v. Bhawana Bhardwaj (2025 SCC OnLine SC 723) and R. Kandasamy (since died) v. T.R.K. Sarawathy ((2025) 3 SCC 513).

6. As discussed above, the appellant - plaintiff had filed the aforesaid suit for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020. The respondent - defendant had filed an application under Order - VII, Rule - 11 (a) of CPC, to reject the plaint on the aforesaid grounds. The same was allowed by the trial Court. Challenging the same, the appellant - plaintiff preferred the present appeal.

7. In the light of the above, it is apt to note that Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC deals with ‘rejection of plaint’. The same is relevant and extracted as under:

               “11. Rejection of plaint.— The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:—

               (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

               (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

               (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

               (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

               (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;

               (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:

               Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.”

8. In Dahiben5, the Apex Court considered the scope and ambit of Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC and held as under:

               “23.2. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision.

               23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.

               23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823] this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words : (SCC p. 324, para 12)

               “12. … The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.”

               23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7 Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.”

9. In Hari Shanker Jain3, the Apex Court held that the expression “cause of action” has been compendiously defined to mean every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of Court. Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad. The function of the party is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such further information in detail as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet. Merely quoting the words of the section like chanting of a mantra does not amount to stating material facts. Material facts would include positive statement of facts as also positive averment of a negative fact, if necessary. Failure to plead “material facts” is fatal to the election petition and no amendment of the pleadings is permissible to introduce such material facts after the time-limit prescribed for filing the election petition. It is the duty of the Court to examine the petition irrespective of any written statement or denial and reject the petition if it does not disclose a cause of action. To enable a Court to reject a plaint on the ground that it does not disclose a cause of action, it should look at the plaint and nothing else. Courts have always frowned upon vague pleadings which leave a wide scope to adduce any evidence. No amount of evidence can cure basic defect in the pleadings.

10. It is apt to note that the said judgment is in respect of an election petition and it is on consideration of scope and ambit of Section - 83 (1) (a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

11. In Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society4, wherein the date of Agreement of Sale is not mentioned in the plaint, considering Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix ‘A’ of CPC, the Apex Court held that failure to mention the date violates the statutory requirement and if the date is one which attracts the bar of limitation, the plaint has to conform to Order - VII Rule - 6 and specifically plead the ground upon which exemption from limitation is claimed. The Apex Court found fault with the pleadings of the plaint in the said case and held that there was shortfall in the plaint averments and statutory provisions, namely, Order - VII Rule - 11, Rule - 14 (1) and Rule - 14 (2), Forms 47 and 48 in Appendix A of the CPC which are statutory in nature. The Apex Court also held that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has correctly concluded that in the absence of any cause of action shown as against the first defendant therein, the suit cannot be proceeded either for specific performance or for the recovery of money advanced which according to the plaintiff was given to the second defendant in the suit and rightly rejected the plaint as against the first defendant.

12. Referring to the said judgment, Mr. M. Radha Krishna, learned counsel for the appellant, would contend that if clever drafting has created an illusion of a cause of action, trial Court can nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party under Order - X CPC.

13. Order - X of CPC deals with ‘examination of parties by the Court’ and Order - X, Rule - 1 of CPC. Order - X Rule - 1 of CPC deals with ‘Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or denied’. The same is relevant and extracted as under:

               “1. Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or denied.- At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall ascertain from each party or his pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations of fact as are made in the plaint or written statement (if any) of the opposite party, and as are not expressly or by necessary implication admitted or denied by the party against whom they are made. The Court shall record such admissions and denials.”

               Thereafter, it is for the trial Court to opt for any one mode of alternative dispute resolution etc.

14. In the said judgment, referring to Order - VII, Rules - 11 (a) and 11 (d), the Apex Court held that the Court has to satisfy that the plaint discloses a cause of action and does not appear to be barred by any law. The statutory forms require the date of agreement to be mentioned to reflect that it does not appear to be barred by limitation. In addition to the same, in a suit for specific performance, there should be an agreement by the defendant or by a person duly authorised by a power of attorney executed in his favour by the owner. It was further held that in the plaint, the plaintiff has to specifically plead the ground upon which exemption from limitation is claimed.

15. In E. Anantha Padmanabha Reddy6, A Division Bench of High Court of Judicature for the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, considered the non-adherence to the stipulations contained in Form Nos.47 and 48 of Appendix-A read with Order - VI, Rule - 3 of CPC. The Division Bench placed reliance on the principle laid down in Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Aley ((1969) 2 SCC 539), which was cited in Abdul Khader Rowther v. P.K. Sara Bai ((1989) 4 SCC 313), wherein the Apex Court held that a suit for specific performance has to conform to the requirements prescribed in Form Nos.47 and 48 of Appendix-A to the CPC and that it is incumbent upon the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance to plead that he applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement, but the defendant had not done so in the said case. Placing reliance on the said judgment and also considering the scope of Order - VI, Rule - 3 of CPC, the Division Bench held that Order - VI, Rule - 3 of CPC merely advocates the use of Forms provided in Appendix - A, “as nearly as may be”. Paragraph Nos.2 and 3 of Form Nos.47 and 48 are intended to serve two purposes, viz.,(1) to demonstrate that the agreement purchaser was ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation; and (2) also to demonstrate that the defendant was either unwilling to perform his obligation or positively refused to perform his obligation under the agreement. The averments in paragraph Nos.2 and 3 of Form Nos.47 & 48 are intended to demonstrate (1) the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff; and (2) the unwillingness or refusal on the part of the defendant to perform his obligations. These two paragraphs of Form Nos.47 & 48 are correlatable to Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the Explanation there under. Therefore, the requirement under Section - 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act has to be considered. If those requirements are satisfied otherwise than by way of a parrot like repetition of the contents of Form Nos.47 and 48, then there can be no objection on the basis of Form Nos.47 and 48.

16. In the said judgment, the Division Bench also considered that the plaintiff therein specifically pleaded that the entire sale consideration had been paid by the date of execution of the agreement of sale, as evidenced by the recitals contained in the agreement of sale, and that the possession of the property had also been delivered. Therefore, the only obligation left over, if the case of the plaintiff was true, was the mere execution of a sale deed. There was nothing left under the agreement of sale, for the plaintiff to do. Therefore, there is no use in the plaintiff pleading as an empty formality that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the obligations, especially when his part of the obligations already stood performed, at least according to him. In the said judgment, it was the admitted case of the agreement vendor himself that on 03.03.2010, he cancelled the GPA. By the time the suit was filed, agreement vendor had taken a positive stand that the nature of the transaction as reflected in Ex.A.1 was not one of sale and purchase of immovable property. Therefore, on consideration of the said fact, the Division Bench held that failure of the plaintiff therein to incorporate the contents of Form Nos.47 and 48 at least as an empty formality, cannot be put against him.

17. In Syed Dastagir2, the Apex Court framed the following issue for consideration:

               “How to construe a plea of ‘readiness and willingness to perform’ to sub-serve to the requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the interpretation of its explanation.”

               The Apex Court held that no specific phraseology or language is required to take such a plea. The language in Section - 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act does not require any specific phraseology but only that the plaintiff must aver that he has performed or has always been and is willing to perform his part of the contract. So the compliance of “readiness and willingness” has to be in spirit and substance and not in letter and form. So to insist for a mechanical production of the exact words of a statute is to insist for the form rather than the essence. So the absence of form cannot dissolve an essence if already pleaded. The Apex Court also relied upon the principle laid down by it in R.C. Chandiok v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal ((1970) 3 SCC 140), wherein it was held that readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a strait-jacket formula. This has to be determined from the entirety of the facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. The pleading as made by the plaintiff therein not only shows his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the obligation under the contract but by tendering the total amount which shows he has performed his part of the obligation. On examination of the said facts, the Apex Court held that such a plea to be a plea of

               “readiness and willingness” as required under Section - 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act.

18. In Kamala Kumar v. Premlata Joshi ((2019) 3 SCC 704) the Apex Court held as follows:

               “It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief of specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief. The material questions, which are required to be gone into for grant of the relief of specific performance, are:

               First, whether there exists a valid and concluded contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property;

               Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready and willing to perform his part as mentioned in the contract;

               Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity with the terms of the contract,|

               Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship to the defendant and, if so, how and in what manner and the extent if such relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff; and

               Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money etc. and, if so, on what grounds.”

19. In Ouseph Varghese13, the Apex Court held as under:

               “….A suit for specific performance has to conform to the requirements prescribed in Forms 47 and 48 of the 1st Schedule in the Civil Procedure Code. In a suit for specific performance it is incumbent on the plaintiff not only to set out the agreement on the basis of which he sues in all its details, he must go further and plead that he has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement pleaded by him but the defendant has not done so. He must further plead that he has been and is still ready and willing to specifically perform his part of the agreement. Neither in the plaint nor at any subsequent stage of the suit the plaintiff has taken those pleas. As observed by this Court in Prem Rai v. D.L.F. Housing and Construction (P) Ltd. 1968 SCC OnLine SC 151 that it is well settled that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in the absence of such an allegation the suit is not maintainable.”

20. In J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao((2011) 1 SCC 429), the Apex Court held as under:

               “It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that plaintiff has to comply with Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non- compliance with this statutory mandate, the Court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. "Readiness and willingness" to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties.”

21. In Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy (Supra), the Apex Court held as under:

               “Moreover, the High Court has wrongly observed that the plaintiff has not produced any evidence to prove that he demanded the performance of sale after the execution of the agreement of sale. The filing of a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale is governed by Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, read with Article 54 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963. In addition to this, Forms 47 and 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 prescribe the format of the plaint for such a suit. Thus, a plaint which seeks the relief of specific performance of an agreement/contract must comply with all these requirements. In the matter at hand, the plaintiff has specifically averred in his plaint that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract under the agreement of sale dated 20.04.1993. It was also specifically stated that the plaintiff had been demanding that the first defendant receive the balance consideration of Rs. 58,800/ and execute a regular registered sale deed at his cost, but the first defendant had been avoiding the specific performance of the agreement of sale. In light of this, in our considered opinion, all the formalities which are to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff for getting a decree of specific performance have been fulfilled. Moreover, there cannot be any proof of oral demand. Be that as it may, we are satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff had sufficient money to pay the balance consideration to the first defendant and was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.”

22. In Bhargavi Constructions (Supra), the Apex Court held that the term ‘law’ used in Order - VII, Rule - 11 (d) of CPC includes not only legislative enactments but also judicial decisions of the Apex Court in view of Article - 141 of the Constitution of India.

23. There is no dispute that the law laid down by the Apex Court is binding on all the Courts including trial Court and this Court in terms of Article - 141 of the Constitution of India.

24. In Mohinder Kaur (Supra), the Apex Court held that where the agreement of sale has been cancelled by Vendor, the party has to seek relief of declaration of such cancellation, in addition to seek relief of specific performance of such agreement of sale. The said principle was also reiterated by the Apex Court in Sangita Sinha (Supra) and R. Kandasamy (Supra).

25. Considering the pleadings, in Manickam v. Vasantha ((2022) SCC OnLine SC 2096), wherein suit was filed for specific performance of agreement of sale, the Apex Court held that relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief, and pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section - 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract and the same are mandatory.

26. In R. Shama Naik v. G. Srinivasiah (2024 INSC 927), the Apex Court held that the plaintiff is obliged not only to make specific statement and averments in the plaint but is also obliged to adduce necessary oral and documentary evidence to show the availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time. There is a fine distinction between readiness and willingness to perform the contract. Both the ingredients are necessary for the relief of specific performance. While readiness means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which would include his financial position, willingness relates to the conduct of the plaintiff.

27. Referring to the principle laid down in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal ((1977) 4 SCC 467) and other judgments in Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association v. Sri Bala & Co. (2025 (6) ALD 108 SC), the Apex Court held that the Court while dealing with an application filed under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC, has to consider whole plaint has to be read and not any particular plea has to be considered. The averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether Clause - (d) of Rule - 11, Order - VII of CPC is applicable. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint which are germane. The pleas taken by the defendant either in the affidavit filed in support of an application filed under Order - VII, Rule -11 of CPC or in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage. Under Order - VII, Rule -11 of CPC, the Court has to take a decision looking at the pleadings of the plaintiff only and not on the rebuttal made by the defendant or any other material produced by the defendant.

               i) Referring to the Limitation Act, 1963, the Apex Court further held that Limitation Act does not confer any substantive right, nor defines any right or cause of action. The Law of Limitation is based on delay and laches. Unless there is a complete cause of action, limitation cannot run and there cannot be a complete cause of action unless there is a person who can sue and a person who can be sued.

28. It is apt to note that in the present case, the appellant - plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit against the respondent – defendant seeking specific performance of agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020. Section - 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 deals with ‘personal bars to relief’. The same is relevant and extracted as under:

               “16. Personal bars to relief.—Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person—

               (a) who has obtained substituted performance of contract under section 20; or

               (b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or willfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract; or

               (c) who fails to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.

               Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (c),—

               (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court;

               (ii) the plaintiff must prove performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.”

29. Form Nos.47 and 48 of Appendix ‘A” of CPC are as follows:

               “No. 47

               SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (No. 1)

               (Title)

               A.B., the above-named plaintiff, states as follows:—

               1. By an agreement dated the …….day of ……. and signed by the defendant, he contracted to buy of [or sell to] the plaintiff certain immovable property therein described and referred to, for the sum of ……. rupees.

               2. The plaintiff has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement on his part, but the defendant has not done so.

               3. The plaintiff has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement on his part of which the defendant has had notice.

               [As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No. 1.]

               6. The plaintiff claims that the Court will order the defendant specifically to perform the agreement and to do all acts necessary to put the plaintiff in full possession of the said property or to accept a transfer and possession of the said property and to pay the costs of the suit.

               No. 48

               SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (No. 2)

               (Title)

               A.B., the above-named plaintiff, states as follows:—

               1. On the…….. day of……..19….../20….., the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement, in writing, and the original document is hereto annexed. The defendant was absolutely entitled to the immovable property described in the agreement.

               2. On the …….. day of……..19…../20…. , the plaintiff Tendered rupees to the defendant, and demanded a transfer of the said property by a sufficient instrument.

               3. On the ……. day of ……..19 ……./20…., the plaintiff again demanded such transfer. [Or the defendant refused to transfer the same to the plaintiff.

               4. The defendant has not executed any instrument of transfer.

               5. The plaintiff is still ready and willing to pay the purchase-money of the said property to the defendant.

               [As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No. 1]

               8. The plaintiff claims—

               (1) that the defendant transfers the said property to the plaintiff by a sufficient instrument [following the terms of the agreement;

               (2) rupees compensation for withholding the same.”

30. Order - VI, Rule - 6 of CPC deals with ‘condition precedent’. The same is relevant and extracted as under:

               “6.Condition precedent.- Any condition precedent, the performance or occurrence of which is intended to be contested, shall be distinctly specified in his pleading by the plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be; and, subject thereto, an averment of the performance or occurrence of all conditions precedent necessary for the case of the plaintiff or defendant shall be implied in his pleading.”

31. As discussed supra, respondent - defendant filed the aforesaid I.A. under Order - VII, Rule -11 of CPC to reject the plaint contending that plaint does not disclose cause of action, the agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 is novated and they have entered into an oral agreement.

32. In the light of the principle laid down in the aforesaid judgments and provisions, coming to the facts of the present case, it is not in dispute that the respondent had executed an agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 in favour of the appellant - plaintiff in respect of sale of suit schedule property on the specific terms and conditions mentioned therein. The total sale consideration agreed was Rs.1,89,55,000/-. The appellant paid an amount of Rs.80.00 lakhs under three cheques on the said date of agreement. It is agreed that the respondent - vendor shall hand over possession of the Apartment along with ready and complete common areas with all specifications, amenities and facilities of the project in place on or before 30.11.2021 subject to the extension of registration, if any, granted to the said project by the Authority, unless there is delay or failure due to war, flood, drought, fire, cyclone, earthquake or any other calamity caused by nature or any Court stay or Government order affecting the regular development of the real estate project (Force Majeure). The appellant being the Vendee, agreed that in the event it becomes impossible for the Promoter/Developer/Vendor to implement the project due to Force Majeure conditions, then this allotment shall stand terminated and the Promoter/Developer/Vendor shall refund to the Allottee the entire amount received by the Promoter/Developer/Vendor from the allotment within 90 days from that date.

33. It is also relevant to note that Clause - 5.5 of the said Agreement of Sale deals with ‘cancellation by Purchaser/Allottee’. The same is relevant and it is extracted as under:

               “Cancellation by Purchaser/Allottee: The Purchaser shall have the right to cancel/only as provided in the Act. Provided that where the Purchaser proposes to cancel/withdraw from the project without any fault of the /Vendor, the /Vendor herein is entitled to forfeit Rs.10,00,000/- from the amount paid. The balance amount of money paid by the Purchaser shall be returned by the Promoter/ Developer/ Vendor to the Purchaser within three months of such cancellation or at the time that the /Vendor is able to resell the said Apartment to another purchaser, whichever is later.”

34. Perusal of record would also reveal that the appellant herein has paid an amount of Rs.50,00,000/- on 16.01.2021, Rs.10,00,000/- on 31.03.2021 and Rs.15,00,000/- on 21.04.2021. Thus, in all, the appellant had paid an amount of Rs.1,55,00,000/- leaving balance sale consideration of Rs.34,55,000/-. According to the appellant, the respondent failed to receive balance sale consideration and execute register sale deed in her favour. The respondent - defendant returned the said sale consideration amount received by her to the appellant - plaintiff on 02.03.2022 and 06.04.2022 by way of RTGS. Therefore, the appellant had filed the aforesaid suit for specific performance of agreement of sale and sought a direction to the respondent - defendant to execute a register sale deed in favour of the plaintiff or her nominee by receiving balance sale consideration as per the agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 and in default thereof, the Court may execute and register a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff or her nominee and also a direction to respondent - defendant to deliver vacant physical and peaceful possession of suit schedule property.

35. In view of the allegations made by the respondent - defendant in the affidavit filed in support of petition vide I.A. No.663 of 2023 under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC, paragraph Nos.7, 8, 9 and 13 of the plaint are relevant and the same are extracted hereunder:

               “7. The Plaintiff submits that she had also purchased a residential Apartment bearing Flat No.B 10004, 10th Floor, Block-B, admeasuring 4095 sq.ft., along with three car parking's in the complex called TRENDSET JAYABHERI ELEVATE together with proportionate undivided share of land admeasuring 38720 Sq.Yds., in Sy.No.5, situated at Kondapur Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District from the father of Defendant herein namely Dr.K.L.Narayana who is her power of attorney also under an Agreement of Sale Dated 25.11.2021 which is followed by execution of Registered Sale Deed Dated 11.04.2022 bearing Document No 5886/2022. Thus the Plaintiff got great confidence in the Defendant to proceed and conclude the transaction liberally without adhering to the conditions strictly. The Plaintiff always kept good faith in the family of Defendant and equally she is ready to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 34,55,000/- towards the Suit Schedule Property. It is needless to add that the plaintiff is solvent and holding sufficient funds to pay the balance sale consideration thereby to obtain sale deed from the Defendant. There is ample evidence to substantiate her solvency and financial ability to conclude the sale transaction within the Schedule subject to compliance of conditions by the Defendant. The Defendant is in obligation to complete the Suit Schedule Property in accordance to the specification mentioned in the Agreement of sale on or before 30.11.2021 along with the amenities prescribed. On 30.11.2021 the plaintiff reiterated her demand to the defendant for receiving balance sale consideration of Rs. 34,55,000/- and to execute Registered Sale Deed while delivering physical possession of Suit Schedule Property. Unfortunately the Defendant did not yielded to the request of Plaintiff and continued to dodge on one or the other pretext and more particularly the Suit Schedule Property was still kept Incomplete without attaining the specifications mentioned in the Agreement of Sale.

               8. The Plaintiff submits that the acts of Defendant in not honoring Suit Agreement of Sale created impatience to her and therefore she express her discomfort in the transaction. It is obvious to understand that the Defendant had already received major part of sale consideration except the minor part of sale consideration which is to be paid at the time of sale transaction. Therefore the Plaintiff demanded the Defendant either to receipt balance sale consideration thereby to execute sale deed with possession or to compensate for the delay. In such circumstances the Defendant assured as she will execute and register the Sale Deed by honoring Agreement of Sale Dated 03.11.2020 in favour of Plaintiff and till such time the defendant proposed to return the advance paid amount of Rs.1,55,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Fifty Five Lakhs only) to retain the same with the Plaintiff till she gets communication from the Defendant. Thus, the defendant pampered the Plaintiff to enjoy the benefit on advance part of Rs.1,55,00,000/- while retuning the same by way of RTGS Dated 02.03.2022 for an amount of Rs.85,00,000/- and by way of RTGS Dated 06.04.2022 for an amount of Rs.70,00,000/- to the Plaintiff. Thus the Defendant assured the Plaintiff and requested to pay the complete sale consideration of Rs. 1,89,55,000/- (Rupees One Crore Fifty Nine Lakhs Fifty Five Thousand only) at the time of Registration of Sale Deed in compliance to the Suit Agreement of sale on communication from her. Thus the Plaintiff is enjoying the interest on 1,55,00,000/- apart from the keeping ready of balance consideration amount of Rs. 34,55,000/- thereby to handover to the Defendant on communication to conclude to transaction. It is essential to had that the Defendant assured the Plaintiff as the Suit Schedule Property will be completed with all specifications agreed by the end of December 2022 for which the Plaintiff is awaiting.

               9. The Plaintiff submits that believing the version of Defendant waited till the end of December 2022, more particularly when the representative of Defendant and her father had executed sale deed dated 11.04.2022 bearing Document No. 5886/2022 in respect of other purchased residential apartment No.B1004 in the same project. But unfortunately the Defendant did not evinced any positive expression to honour the promise at the end of December 2022. Therefore on 07.01.2023, the Plaintiff approached the Defendant demanding to execute and register the Sale Deed by honoring the unterminated Agreement of Sale Dated 03.11.2020 pertaining to Suit Schedule Property. The Defendant instead of honoring Suit Agreement of Sale despite the assurance made by her, had started demanding extra amount over and above Rs. 1,89,55,000/- to convey the Suit Schedule Property which is unlawful and unethical. The Defendant further threatened the Plaintiff as by reversing advance paid amount it is to be presumed that the Suit Agreement of Sale is terminated. But fact remains that the suit Agreement of Sale Dated 03.11.2020 was never cancel or terminated and the same is enforceable lawfully. Thus, the attitude of Defendant demonstrates her malice intention to evade the contractual obligation.

               13. The Plaintiff submits that the cause of action for the Suit arose on 03.11.2020 when the Defendant executed Agreement of Sale in favour of Plaintiff, and on 16.01.2021 when the defendant received Rs. 50,00,000/- as part of Sale consideration and on 31.03.2021 when the Defendant received Rs. 10,00,000/- as part of sale consideration and on 02.03.2022 and 06.4.2022 when the Defendant reversed the advanced paid consideration keeping the Suit Agreement intact and without termination promising to receive the entire consideration at the time of Registering the sale deed and in the end of December 2022 when the Defendant promised to convey the Suit Schedule Property and on 07.01.2023 when the Plaintiff finally demanded the Defendant for honoring the suit transaction which was denied by her acts and the same is to be considered as declining to honour the contractual obligation and hence the suit is well in time and not borrowed by the provisions of the Limitation Act.”

36. Thus, the appellant - plaintiff specifically pleaded that she had also purchased a residential Apartment bearing Flat No.B 10004, 10th Floor, Block-B, admeasuring 4095 square feet along with three Car Parking’s in the Complex called ‘TRENDSET JAYABHERI ELEVATE together with proportionate undivided share of land admeasuring 109 square yards out of total extent of 38720 square yards in Survey No.5, situated at Kondapur Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Rangareddy District from the father of defendant, who is her Power of Attorney also under an Agreement of Sale dated 25.11.2021, which is followed by execution of registered sale deed dated 11.04.2022 bearing document No.5886 of 2022. Thus, according to the appellant, she has reposed confidence on the defendant to proceed and conclude the transaction liberally without adhering to the conditions strictly.

37. The plaintiff also specifically pleaded that she is always kept good faith in the family of the defendant and equally she is ready to pay balance sale consideration of Rs.34,55,000/- towards suit schedule property. She has also pleaded that she is solvent and holding sufficient funds to pay the balance sale consideration. In the light of the same, the respondent - defendant cannot contend that the appellant - plaintiff has not pleaded that she is ready and willing to perform an obligation casts upon her under the aforesaid agreement of sale.

38. It is also apt to note that on receipt of the aforesaid amount of Rs.1,55,00,000/- from the respondent - defendant, the appellant herein did not address a letter or make any correspondence as to why the respondent - defendant returned the said amount. However, she has specifically pleaded in the plaint that the said agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 was not cancelled in terms of Clause - 5.5 and that the said original agreement of sale is with her. In fact, she has filed the original agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 in the Court along with the plaint.

39. Therefore, the respondent - defendant cannot contend that she has already cancelled the said agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020. The respondent also cannot contend that the appellant has purchased another Flat No.B 10004 of the very same apartment. As discussed above, the appellant - plaintiff has specifically contended in paragraph No.7 of the plaint that she has purchased the said Flat from the father of the defendant and he has already executed a registered sale deed. Therefore, the aforesaid allegation of the respondent that the agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 was cancelled / novated and, thereafter, there was an oral agreement between the appellant and the respondent is without any basis. However, the said aspect cannot be considered in a petition filed under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC while rejecting the plaint.

40. The trial Court has to consider only the contents of the plaint and documents filed by the plaintiff along with plaint, nothing more as held by the Apex Court in Dahiben5. In the present case, the appellant has specifically pleaded that the agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 is subsisting and it was not cancelled as per Clause - 5.5 of the said agreement of sale and that she is in possession of original agreement of sale with her. Therefore, she has also specifically pleaded with regard to return of advance sale consideration of Rs.1,55,00,000/- paid by her on two occasions by way of RTGS. Therefore, there is no suppression of fact on the part of the appellant.

41. With regard to the contention of Mr. M.V. Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent that there was no demand from the appellant to the respondent to pay the balance consideration and execute register sale deed in her favour, it is relevant to note that the appellant has specifically pleaded that the respondent has returned the aforesaid amount of Rs.1,55,00,000/- by way of RTGS without informing the appellant and it is unilateral. Therefore, in paragraph No.8 of the plaint, she has specifically pleaded that the acts of the defendant in not honouring the suit agreement of sale caused impatience to her and, therefore, she expressed her discomfort in the transaction. It is obvious to understand that the defendant had already received major part of sale consideration except the minor part of sale consideration which is to be paid at the time of sale transaction. Therefore, the plaintiff demanded the defendant either to receive the balance sale consideration and thereby to execute sale deed with possession or to compensate for the delay. The defendant assured as she would execute and register the sale deed by honouring agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 in favour of the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant allowed the plaintiff to enjoy the benefit on advance part of Rs.1,55,00,000/- while returning the same by way of RTGS dated 02.03.2022 for an amount of Rs.85.00 lakhs and by way of RTGS dated 06.04.2022 for an amount of Rs.70.00 lakhs to the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff is enjoying interest of Rs.1,55,00,000/- apart from keeping ready the balance consideration amount of Rs.34,55,000/-.

42. She has also specifically pleaded that she has waited till end of December, 2022 and approached the defendant on 07.01.2023 with a request to execute a register sale deed by honouring unterminated agreement of sale deed dated 03.11.2020. She has also specifically pleaded that instead of honouring suit agreement of sale despite assurance made by her, had started demanding extra amount over and above Rs.1,89,55,000/- to convey the suit schedule property, which is unlawful and unethical. The defendant further threatened the plaintiff by reversing advance paid amount, it is to be presumed that the suit agreement of sale is terminated. But, the fact remains that the suit agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 was never cancelled or terminated and the same is enforceable lawfully. Thus, the attitude of defendant demonstrates her malice intention to evade the contractual obligation. Thus, she has specifically pleaded about existence of agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 and that it was not cancelled.

43. It is apt to note that the said aspects are triable issues. The contentions of the respondent - defendant that her father addressed a letter dated 12.04.2022 to the appellant - plaintiff intimating about cancellation of the agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020, the said letter was handed over to the father of the appellant when he visited the office of respondent’s father is also a triable issue. The further contention of the respondent - defendant that the father of the respondent informed the respondent that he had cancelled the subject agreement of sale with the appellant and he had already entered into another agreement of sale dated 25.11.2022 etc., are also triable issues. The same cannot be considered in a petition filed under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC. At the cost of repetition, the Court has to consider pleadings of the plaint and documents filed along with the plaint. The said aspects are not there in the plaint and documents filed along with the plaint. The respondent herein - defendant asserted the said contentions in the affidavit filed in support of I.A. filed under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC. The said aspects cannot be considered in a petition filed under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC. Even then, vide order dated 09.08.2023, learned trial Court held that the stand taken by the plaintiff, her contentions are not believable. The said finding is not based on pleadings of the plaintiff in the plaint and contrary to the documents filed by her along with plaint.

44. The further finding of trial Court that as the defendant has refunded the advance sale consideration to the plaintiff on 06.04.2022 itself, there was no subsisting contract between the plaintiff and the defendant after the said date is also factually incorrect. The finding of trial Court that though the plaintiff contended that she waited for the defendant to approach her for execution of sale deed, there is no oral or written agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant extending the time or executing a fresh agreement of sale for purchase of suit schedule property is also contrary to record. The trial Court erred in holding that even in the plaint, the plaintiff got mentioned that as informed by the defendant the suit agreement of sale was presumed to be terminated. The further findings of trial Court that the plaintiff has not stated the dates on which she allegedly demanded the defendant to execute the sale deed and that there is no explanation as to why the plaintiff kept quiet till February, 2023 without seeking specific performance of agreement of sale are contrary to the pleadings of the plaintiff in the plaint and also documents filed by her along with plaint. They are beyond the scope of enquiry under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC. Thus, learned trial Court also erred in holding that the plaintiff has not issued any notice to the defendant prior to filing of the suit.

45. As discussed above, the plaintiff has specifically contended that the respondent - defendant has refunded the said amount received by her unilaterally and that there was another transaction between the plaintiff and the father of the defendant, she has approached the defendant on 07.01.2023 with a request to receive sale consideration and execute and register the sale deed in terms of agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020. The said aspects were not considered by the trial Court. It is not a clever drafting as contended by Mr. M.V. Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent herein. The said aspects cannot be considered by trial Court while deciding an application filed under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC.

46. However, there is no dispute with regard to object of Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC that trial Court has to discourage frivolous litigation, more particularly suits filed without proper pleadings, cause of action etc., and on going through the contents of the plaint, the trial Court instead of proceeding with trial, can nip the same at the budding stage. At the same time, when there are specific pleadings and documents filed along with the plaint, the trial Court cannot reject plaint by invoking its power under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC.

47. It is also contended by Mr. M.V. Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent that there is no cause of action in the plaint. As discussed above, paragraph No.13 of the plaint deals with cause of action and plaintiff has specifically pleaded regarding cause of action. However, cause of action is a mixed question of fact and law and in fact it is a bundle of facts as held by the Apex Court in Shakti Bhog Food Industries v. Central Bank of India ((2020) 17 SCC 260). In the present case, the plaintiff has specifically pleaded cause of action including the aforesaid dates. Therefore, the respondent cannot contend that there is no cause of action in the plaint. It is a triable issue and, therefore, on the said ground, learned trial Court cannot reject the plaint.

48. In R. Kandasamy11, Sangita Sinha10 and Mohinder Kaur9 relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent herein - defendant, the agreements entered by Vendors therein, were cancelled in writing and the said cancellation was informed to the Vendees therein. Therefore, on consideration of the said facts, the Apex Court held that the Vendees therein have to seek declaration instead of suit for specific performance of agreement of sale, whereas, in the present case, there is no cancellation of agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 by the respondent. Therefore, the facts of the said cases are different to the facts of the present case.

49. As discussed above, in the present case, the respondent - defendant has not cancelled the agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020, more particularly in terms of Clause - 5.5. It is also apt to note that the original of agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020 is with the appellant. She has filed the said original agreement of sale along with plaint. All the said aspects are triable issues and trial Court has to consider the same during the course of trial, but not in an application filed under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC. The scope of inquiry under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC is very limited. The trial Court has to consider pleadings in the plaint and the documents filed by the plaintiff along with plaint and not more than that. It cannot go beyond the same. In the present case, the trial Court gave the aforesaid findings contrary to the pleadings of the plaint and the documents filed by the plaintiff along with the plaint.

50. With regard to readiness and willingness to perform her part of obligation, the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that she is ready and willing to perform her part of obligation under an agreement of sale dated 03.11.2020. She has also specifically pleaded that she is solvent and ready to pay balance sale consideration amount. In proof of the same, she has filed bank statement. The trial Court has to consider the said document and the aforesaid pleadings during trial. Therefore, the impugned order is not a reasoned order and it is not on consideration of the aforesaid aspects. Thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

51. The present Appeal is accordingly allowed, setting aside the order dated 09.08.2023 in I.A. No.663 of 2023 in O.S. No.38 of 2023 passed by leaned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Rangareddy District at Kukatpally. I.A. No.663 of 2023 is accordingly dismissed. However, liberty is granted to both the parties to take all the pleas and grounds which they have raised before this Court during trial and the trial Court shall consider the same and dispose of the suit strictly in accordance with law without being influenced of any of the aforesaid findings. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in the appeal case shall stand closed.