IA/6260/2025

1. This Application has been moved praying for condoning the entire delay in the filing of the Review Application. The background is that on 16.01.2024, First Appeal No. 87 of 2016 that has given rise to this Review Application was allowed with a direction for payment of Rs.64,24,404/- to the Appellants alongwith interest @ 6% per annum and litigation cost of Rs.50,000/-. In the event of default of payment within the time prescribed the rate of interest would stand enhanced to 9%. The Insurance Company complied with the Order and made the payments but the interest was paid only from the date of the order of this Commission i.e. 16.01.2024.

2. The Appellant filed an Execution Application No. 230 of 2024 contending that the interest should be paid from the date of the filing of the Complaint but the Insurance Company in its reply to the Execution Application contested the matter urging that the interest has only been awarded from the date of the order and not from the date of the filing of the original Complaint. The Bench hearing the Execution Application therefore made an enquiry as to whether any review has been sought or not.

3. The explanation given in Paragraph No. - 4 of the Application is that since as per the understanding of the Appellant this Commission had impliedly granted the interest to the Appellant from the date of filing of the Complaint, but after contest by the Insurance Company in the Execution proceedings as referred to above, the Review Application has been filed in order to overcome this inadvertent error in the Order dated 16.01.2024, and as such there is no delay inasmuch as the Applicant was pursuing the remedy before this very Commission in the Execution Application.

4. A reply to the said delay condonation Application has been filed and Mr. Bhatt has urged that the delay of 455 days is huge and inordinate and there is no plausible explanation for filing this Review Application belatedly.

5. It is further stated in the Reply that the Appellant had claimed interest from the date of filing of the Complaint after the decision which was replied to by the Insurance Company on 05.04.2024 itself. In the said Reply the Insurance Company made the following statement:

                   'We may also like to inform you that we have also sought clarification and we have been informed by our defending counsel that during the proceedings your counsel had strenuously argued for payment of interest from the date of filing the complaint and the same was not considered and the National Commission allowed interest from the date of order which we have already complied with.

                   'We have clearly given the detailed calculation to you (explained hereinabove again) and please be informed that no further payment is due and the award as per the order of the National Commission is fully satisfied'.

6. Mr. Bhatt therefore submitted that if the said relief was not granted by this Commission and this fact was known to the Applicant in April, 2024 itself, then there was no reason for the Applicant to have waited for more than a year and therefore there is no valid explanation for the delay.

7. He submits that even otherwise the Review is misconceived and not maintainable and the claim of interest is non-admissible.

8. Having considered the submissions raised and perused the affidavits what we find is that the final Order was passed by this Commission on 16.01.2024 and on 15.03.2024 the Insurance Company made the payments and credited an amount of Rs.65,37,768/- but the interest that was included therein @ 6% was only from 16.01.2024 till 15.03.2024, which was for a period of 60 days to the tune of Rs.63,364/-.

9. On receiving this amount the Applicant wrote a letter to the Insurance Company on 26.03.2024 requesting the payment of interest from the date of filing of the Complaint. This was denied by the Insurance Company on 05.04.2024 and the Applicant aggrieved by the said reply moved the Execution Application No. 230 of 2024 before this Commission on 02.05.2024.

10. Thus the Applicant without any unreasonable delay had approached this Commission by filing an Execution Petition in May, 2024 itself.

11. It is in these circumstances that this Commission passed an Order in the Execution proceedings after almost a year on 29.04.2025 to the following effect:

                   'Learned Counsel for the Judgment Debtor has filed reply to EA on 11.04.2025 wherein it has been stated that the decree stands complied with in respect of the order directing payment of 64,24,404/- with interest @ 6% p.a. along with litigation costs of 50,000/- within a period of three months. He also hands over copy of the judgment of this Commission in Diary No. 14124/NCDRC/2024-FA dated 21.05.2024 wherein it has been held that the decree of the appellate court is extendable to the court of first instance which in the present case is the State Commission.

                   Learned Counsel for the Decree Holder fairly admits that the order dated 16.01.2024 does not mention the date from which the interest awarded is actually to be paid and that the rate of interest should be awarded from the date of filing of the Complaint. Learned Counsel for the Decree Holder prays for an opportunity to file a reply to the reply filed by the Judgment Debtor along with case laws he wishes to rely upon. He may do so within a period of two weeks.

                   List the matter on 14.05.2025.

12. The Applicant moved a Miscellaneous Application No. 211 of 2025 for clarification of the final order and it was observed by us that such a 'Miscellaneous Application' would not be maintainable. Accordingly the Bench hearing the Execution Petition passed the following Order on 14.05.2025:

                   'Counsel for the Appellant submits that he has filed the MA/211/2025 seeking clarification/Modification of the Order dated 16.01.2024 and that the matter has been posted on 29.07.2025 by Bench No.1. He seeks that the matter be transferred to Bench No.1 in view of the fact that the original order was passed by that Bench.

                   Registrar may seek appropriate orders of Hon'ble President in this regard.

                   List the matter before the Bench No.1 on 29.07.2025.'

13. The aforesaid timeline therefore clearly indicates that the Applicant had been pursuing his legal remedies before this very Commission and filed the Review Application along with the delay condonation application on 20.05.2025 vide diary No. 13770. The explanation given in our opinion is neither an excuse nor is it a pretence and is clearly a bonafide narrative. The Applicant had therefore pursuing his claim bonafidely before this very Commission and therefore we find that the delay in the filing of the Review Application has been sufficiently explained.

14. Mr. Bhat has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India versus Jahangir Byramji (2024) SCC OnLine SC 489 to urge that the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and therefore orders, which cause prejudice to the Opposite Party, should not be passed.

15. The ratio of the said judgment does not counter the explanation given by the Applicant who had exercised due diligence in prosecuting its concern of seeking interest from a particular date which had been omitted to be mentioned in the final order dated 16.01.2024. We therefore find the delay having been sufficiently explained. The Application is accordingly allowed and the Review Application shall be treated to have been filed within time.

RA/76/2025

16. The Review Application has been moved praying for appropriately correcting the order dated 16.01.2024 by mentioning the date from which the Applicant is entitled to receive interest @ 6% on the awarded amount. The contention is that the said date has not been expressly mentioned in the final order dated 16.01.2024 which ought to have been qualified by awarding the interest atleast from the date of the filing of the Complaint.

17. As noted in the Order regarding delay condonation herein above, the Insurance Company has paid the interest only from the date of the Order passed in the Appeal whereas the Applicant filed an Execution Application praying for extending the benefit of interest with effect from the date of the filing of the Complaint. The executing Bench expressed itself by indicating that since the date has not been specified the Applicant should take appropriate steps in the matter and consequently a Miscellaneous Application was filed which was found to be not maintainable whereafter the present Review Application has been moved praying for grant of interest with effect from the date of the filing of the Complaint till the date of payment. It may be noted that the Complaint had been filed on 01.08.2013. As noted above the interest has been paid only from 16.01.2024 to 15.03.2024. Notices were issued on this Application and a response to the same has been filed by the Insurance Company.

18. The first question is as to whether there is any error in our Order. Mr. Bhatt, learned Counsel for the Insurance Company vehemently argued that the request for the grant of interest from the date of the filing of the Complaint had been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the Appellant but the same was not accepted by this Commission during final hearing. We are unable to accept this argument inasmuch as there is nothing in the order dated 16.01.2024 that was delivered by one of us (A. P. Sahi, J.) to construe that the award of interest was refused from any particular date. Mr. Bhatt urged that the order does not even otherwise record the grant of interest from any particular date. The first part of the argument of Mr. Bhatt cannot be accepted but so far as the second part of the argument is concerned, it is correct that no date has been mentioned in the Order dated 16.01.2024 but that cannot be construed to mean that there was a refusal by the Bench while disposing of the matter on 16.01.2024 to grant interest from any particular date. In fact there does not seem to be any plausible reason for not mentioning the date of commencement of interest except that it was an inadvertence. This was therefore clearly an error which is apparent on the face of record and we therefore find that the order dated 16.01.2024 deserves to be corrected as the omission to mention the date of commencement of interest is an inadvertent error.

19. We may refer to the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Musammat Jamna Kuer versus Lal Bahadur, AIR 1950 FC 131 page 160 Paragraph No. 8 where the permissibility of Review has been dealt with by the Apex Court in the following words:

                   '......Whether the error occurred by reason of the counsel's mistake or it crept in by reason of an oversight on the part of the court was not a circumstance which could affect the exercise of jurisdiction of the court to review its decision. We have no doubt that the error was apparent on the face of the record and in our opinion the question as to how the error occurred is not relevant to this enquiry. A mere look at the trial court's decision indicates the error apart from anything else'.

20. We find the error in the present case to be covered by the principle enunciated and extracted herein above.

21. Even on merits we find that this Commission had awarded interest @ 6% and therefore there is no doubt that the same was clearly intended. Even otherwise we may point out that under Protection of Policy Holders Interest Regulation, 2002 under Claim Procedure in respect of an Health Insurance Policy the IRDA Regulations provide for payment of interest on account of any delay in the discharge of the liability by the Insurance as follows:

                   '(i) In case of delay beyond stipulated 45 days the Insurer shall be liable to pay interest at a rate 2% above the bank rate from the date of receipt of last necessary document to the date of payment of claim.'

22. Further, the Apex Court in the case of Sovintorg (India) Limited versus State Bank of India, New Delhi reported in (1999) 6 SCC 406 in Paragraph No. - 6 dealt with this issue as follows:

                   '6. Relying upon the province of Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was entitled to the payment of interest at the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by Nationalised Banks in relation to commercial transactions. Referring to IA No. 2 filed in this Court and Banking Law and Practice in India issued in 1991, she had contended that the appellant was entitled to the payment of interest minimum at the rate of 19.4 per cent per annum. The general submission made in this behalf cannot be accepted in view of the provision of Section 14 of the Act. There was no contract between the parties regarding payment of interest on delayed deposit or on account of delay on the part of the opposite party to render the services. Interest cannot be claimed under Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code as its provisions have not been specifically made applicable to the proceedings under the Act. We, however, find that the general provision of Section 34 being based upon justice, equity and good conscience would authorise the Redressal Forums and Commissions to also grant interest appropriately under the circumstance of each case. Interest may also be awarded in lieu of compensation or damages in appropriate cases. The interest can also be awarded on equitable grounds as was held by this Court in Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh [AIR 1961 SC 908 : (1961) 3 SCR 676]. Referring to the province of the Interest Act of 1839, in relation to the compulsory acquisition of land where no specific provision is made for grant for awarding the interest, the Court held:

                   'In this connection we may incidentally refer to Interest Act, 1839 (XXXII of 1839). Section 2 of this Act confers power on the court to allow interest in cases specified therein, but the proviso to the said section makes it clear that interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law. In other words, the operative provisions of Section 1 of the said Act do not mean that where interest was otherwise payable by law court's power to award such interest is taken away. The power to award interest on equitable grounds or under any other provisions of the law is expressly saved by the proviso to Section 1. This question was considered by the Privy Council in Bengal Nagpur Rly Co. Ltd. v. Ruttanji Ramji [(1937-38) 65 IA 66 : AIR 1938 PC 67]. Referring to the proviso to Section 1 of the Act the Privy Council observed 'this proviso applies to cases in which the court of equity exercises its jurisdiction to allow interest'. We have already seen that the right to receive interest in lieu of possession of immovable property taken away either by private treaty or by compulsory acquisition is generally regarded by judicial decisions as an equitable right; and so, the proviso to Section 1 of the Interest Act saves the said right. We must accordingly hold that the High Court was in error in rejecting the claimants' case for the payment of interest on compensation amount, and so we direct that the said amount should carry interest at 4% per annum from the date when Respondent 2 took possession of the claimants' lands to the date on which it deposited or paid the amount of compensation to them.'

                   To the same effect is the judgment in Laxmichand v. Indore Improvement Trust [(1975) 1 SCC 565 : AIR 1975 SC 1303]. The State Commission as well as the National Commission were, therefore, justified in awarding the interest to the appellant but in the circumstances of the case we feel that grant of interest at the rate of 12% was inadequate as admittedly the appellant was deprived of the user of a sum of Rs one lakh for over a period of seven years. During the aforesaid period, the appellant had to suffer the winding-up proceedings under the Companies Act, allegedly on the ground of financial crunch. We are of the opinion that awarding interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum would have served the ends of justice.'

23. Another judgment of the Apex Court in a matter arising out of an Arbitration award made similar observations in Paragraph No. - 3 in the case of Jagdish Rai and Brothers versus Union of India reported in (1999) 3 SCC 257 extracted herein under:

                   '3......The courts have taken the view that the award of interest under Section 34 CPC is a matter of procedure and ought to be granted in all cases when there is a decree for money unless there are strong reasons to decline the same..'

24. In another decision of the Apex Court in the case of LIC of India and Anr. versus S. Sindhu reported in (2006) 5 SCC 258 the provisions of the Interest Act, 1978 were considered and the observations made in Paragraph No. 12 - 15 are as follows:

                   '12. Where a statute provides for payment of interest, such interest will have to be paid in accordance with the provisions of such statute. Admittedly there is no enactment, or rules made under any enactment, either relating to contracts in general or insurance in particular, which provides for payment of interest in regard to the amount payable under such a policy.

                   13. Let us now consider the provisions of the Interest Act, 1978 ('the Act' for short) which deals with payment of interest up to the date of suit/claim. The Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to the allowance of interest in certain cases. The objects and reasons state that the Act was enacted to prescribe the general law of interest in a comprehensive and precise manner, which becomes applicable in the absence of any contractual or statutory provision specifically dealing with interest. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act provides that in any proceedings for the recovery of any debt or damages, or in any proceedings in which a claim for interest in respect of any debt or damages already paid is made, the court may, if it thinks fit, allow interest to the person entitled to the debt or damages or to the person making such claim, as the case may be, at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest, for the whole or part of the following period, that is to say-

                   (a) if the proceedings relate to a debt payable by virtue of a written instrument at a certain time, then, from the date when the debt is payable to the date of institution of the proceedings;

                   (b) if the proceedings do not relate to any such debt, then, from the date mentioned in that regard in a written notice given by the person entitled or the person making the claim to the person liable that interest will be claimed, to the date of institution of the proceedings.

                   14. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 makes it clear that nothing in Section 3 shall apply in relation to any debt or damages upon which interest is payable as of right, by virtue of any agreement, or any debt or damages upon which payment of interest is barred, by virtue of an express agreement. Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Act defines 'court' as including a tribunal and an arbitrator; clause (c) of Section 2 defines 'debt' as any liability for an ascertained sum of money and includes a debt payable in kind but does not include a judgment debt; and clause (b) defines 'current rate of interest'. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3, interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is payable by virtue of any enactment or other rule of law or usage having the force of law. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 provides that notwithstanding what is stated in Section 3 or Section 4(1) of the Act, in the cases of money deposited as security for performance of an obligation, interest is payable from the date of deposit; and in the case of money payable by virtue of a fiduciary relationship, money/property obtained/retained by fraud and money due as dower/maintenance, interest is payable from the date of cause of action. A claim for interest on the amounts of premium paid, from the respective dates of payment of premium to date of settlement of claim, does not find support from any of the provisions of the Act.

                   15. Even assuming that interest can be awarded on grounds of equity, it can be awarded only on the reduced sum to be quantified and paid from the date when it becomes due under the policy (that is on the date of death of the assured) and not from any earlier date. We do not propose to examine the question as to whether interest can be awarded at all, on equitable grounds, in view of the enactment of the Interest Act, 1978 making a significant departure from the old Interest Act (32 of 1839). The present Act does not contain the following provision contained in the proviso to Section 1 of the old Act: 'interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law'. How far the decisions of this Court in Satinder Singh v. Amrao Singh [(1961) 3 SCR 676 : AIR 1961 SC 908] and Hirachand Kothari v. State of Rajasthan [1985 Supp SCC 17] and the decision of the Privy Council in Bengal Nagpur Rly. Co. Ltd. v. Ruttanji Ramji [(1937-38) 65 IA 66 : AIR 1938 PC 67] holding that interest can be awarded on equitable grounds, all rendered with reference to the said proviso to Section 1 of the old Interest Act (Act of 1839), will be useful to interpret the provisions of the new Act (Act of 1978) may require detailed examination in an appropriate case.'

25. It has been held by the Apex Court while dealing with the payment of interest and taking notice of the Interest Act, 1978 in the matters of medical negligence and has directed a payment of interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Paragraph No. 131 of the decision in the case of Balram Prasad versus Kunal Saha reported in (2014) 1 SCC 384 is extracted herein under:

                   '131. Therefore, the National Commission in not awarding interest on the compensation amount from the date of filing of the original complaint up to the date of payment of entire compensation by the appellant doctors and AMRI Hospital to the claimant is most unreasonable and the same is opposed to the provision of the Interest Act, 1978. Therefore, we are awarding the interest on the compensation that is determined by this Court in the appeal filed by the claimant at the rate of 6% per annum on the compensation awarded in these appeals from the date of complaint till the date of payment of compensation awarded by this Court. The justification made by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant doctors and AMRI Hospital in not awarding interest on the compensation awarded by the National Commission is contrary to law laid down by this Court and also the provisions of the Interest Act, 1978. Hence, their submissions cannot be accepted as the same are wholly untenable in law and misplaced.

                   Accordingly, the aforesaid point is answered in favour of the claimant.'

Thus the Applicant / Appellant is entitled to the interest awarded with effect from the date of the filing of the Complaint i.e. 01.08.2013 till the date of actual payment. Since this was an error / omission of the Commission in mentioning the date of the commencement, the rate of interest would remain 6% only to be paid within two months from today after deducting the interest of 60 days which has already been paid by the Insurance Company. The interest shall be calculated accordingly upto the date of the actual payment. The Review Application is accordingly allowed and the Order dated 16.01.2024 shall stands modified accordingly.