(Prayer: Appeal Under Section against orders to call for the records relating to the judgment and Decree dated 28.02.2011 passed in OA.No. 2164/2010 (Old No. 102/2005 D.C. Kakinada) on the file of the Andhra Pradesh Endowments Tribunal, Hyderabad and set aside the same and dismiss the OA.No. 2164/2001 (Old No. 102/2005 D.C.Kakinda) with costs throughout

IA NO: 1 OF 2011(CMAMP 747 OF 2011

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay all further proceedings in judgment and decree dated 28.02.2011 passed in OA.No. 2164/2010 (Old No. 102/2005 D.C.Kakinada) on the file of the A.P.Endowments Tribunal, Hyderabad

IA NO: 2 OF 2011(CMAMP 748 OF 2011

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to receive the documents annexure to the petition

IA NO: 3 OF 2011(CMAMP 1853 OF 2011

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased vacate the orders made in CMAMP.No. 747 of 2011 in CMA.NO. 375 of 2011dated 26-4-2011

IA NO: 1 OF 2017(CMAMP 1370 OF 2017

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased modify the order made in CMAMP No.747/2011 dated 26.04.2011 by directing the respondent / appellant herein to pay an amount of Rs.25,000/- per acre per year to the Petitioner / Respondent No.1 towards damages for use and occupation of an extent admeasuring Ac.6.80 cts in Sy No.90 of Patamata, Vijayawada, Krishna District belongs to the Petitioner / Respondent No.1 choultry

IA NO: 1 OF 2025

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to permit the respondent no.2 to Receive the additional Affidavit And material filed along with it in C.M.A No. 375 of 2011 and pass)

1. Does the Endowments Tribunal, constituted under an Act for Hindu religious institutions, possess the jurisdiction to order the eviction of a Christian minority school from land that is prima facie Government property?

This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, instituted under Section 84(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious, Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (Act 30 of 1987) is directed against the judgment and award dated 28.02.2011 in O.A. No. 2164 of 2010 (Old No. 102 of 2005 on the file of the Deputy Commissioner, Kakinada), as rendered by the Endowments Tribunal, Hyderabad.

2. The respondents, in their capacity as the original petitioners, instituted O.A. No. 102 of 2005. They sought action under Section 83 of Act 30 of 1987 against the appellant, with the objective of securing the eviction of Saint Mathew’s Public School from the premises known as Sri Nalluri Vari Dharma Thota, Patamata, Vijayawada.

3. The appellant is currently in occupation of the land from which their eviction is sought. The respondents contend that the appellant has encroached upon the property belonging to Sri Nalluri Vari Dharma Thota, Patamata, Vijayawada, a property duly published under Section 6(c)(i) of Act 30 of 1987. Aggrieved by the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal under Section 83(2) of the said Act, the appellant has preferred the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal under Section 84(2) of Act 30 of 1987.

4. The parties to this appeal shall be referred to in accordance with their respective designations as they appeared before the Tribunal.

5. The petitioners' case is that the respondent was illegally allotted land measuring 6.80 acres in R.S. No. 90, situated at Patamata, Vijayawada. This allotment was made by the then Trustees of Nallurivari Saint Mathew’s Public School, a Christian organization. There exists no lease approval orders from the competent authority, nor did the Commissioner of Endowments, Andhra Pradesh, grant permission for the alienation of the site to the school authorities. Despite the issuance of a legal notice dated 06.01.2005 demanding the vacation of the site, the school authorities have not responded and continued to operate the school.

6. In response, the respondent filed a counter, contending that the petitioners lack the legal standing to file the petition, as they never assumed charge of the institution or its property. The respondent asserts that Sri Nalluri Vari Dharma Thota, Vijayawada is a private trust, with trusteeship being managed by members of the Nalluri family since its inception. According to the respondent, the trust's aims and objectives include promoting education by utilizing its properties to establish or support educational institutions, as well as constructing temples. The respondent avers that the institution dedicated an extent of 6.80 acres in R.S. No. 90 of Patamata village through a Dedication Deed dated 15.01.1971, delivering possession to the respondent as the donee of the property. It is stated that the respondent is an International Educational Institution founded to advance the cause of education by establishing educational institutions in India. Subsequently, the respondent constructed pucca buildings after obtaining plan approval from the Gram Panchayat, Patamata, around 1973, developed playgrounds, and erected a compound wall around the entire property. The school has since operated under the name 'Nalluri Vari Saint Mathews Public School', popularly known as N.S.M. Public School, Patamata. The school received official recognition vide Letter L.Dis No.5B 28/B1-3/74 dated 19.12.1974. The respondent further states that some land belonging to the institution was also donated to a Government Elementary School. Additionally, the respondent denies the petitioners' characterization of the property as vacant land and disputes the alleged rental assessment of Rs. 10,000/- per acre as neither true nor correct. The respondent also claims to have acquired title to the property by adverse possession.

7. Based on the pleadings, the Tribunal framed the following point for consideration:

                  “Whether the respondent is an unauthorized occupant and encroacher upon the property claimed by the second petitioner institution, and is therefore liable for eviction under Section 83 of the Act?”

8. During the course of the inquiry and trial, the petitioners examined PW.1 and marked documents Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.3. Conversely, on behalf of the respondent, RW.1 was examined and documents Ex.R.1 to Ex.R.10 were marked.

9. Upon the conclusion of the trial and after hearing arguments from both sides, the Tribunal allowed the Original Application with costs. It directed the respondent to vacate and hand over possession of the schedule property, as appended to the decree of the award, within a period of two months.

10. Sri Dasari Anil Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, and the Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri Kappera Koteswara Rao, learned counsel for the respondents, have advanced their respective arguments. This appeal is now being disposed of, after hearing both sides.

11. Sri D. Anil Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, advanced a vigorous argument contending that the order passed by the Endowments Tribunal is void and non-est. His primary contention is that the inclusion of the land in the property register under Section 43 of Act 30 of 1987 in the year 2005 is illegal, invalid, and void. This is because, he argues, the Nallurivari Trust had already divested itself of all rights and interest in the land in 1971. Consequently, lacking any subsisting title to include the property, the action is invalid, and Section 20 of the Contract Act would apply. Learned counsel further contended that sufficient material was adduced during the inquiry before the Tribunal to prove the appellant's right, title, and interest over the disputed land. This interest, he asserted, is duly reflected and recorded in the appellant's name across various exhibits submitted to the Tribunal. Basing his argument on this material, he submitted that the Tribunal failed to consider the legal effect of the appellant's adverse possession of the subject land since 1971. Such long-standing possession, he argued, carries a presumption of possessory title, as every entry in the record of rights is presumed to be true. By referring specifically to the entries in Exhibits R-1 to R-10, learned counsel contended that the Tribunal erred in declaring the appellant an encroacher. He emphasized that the land is admittedly classified as "Inam Dry Land" and argued that the Tribunal failed to properly consider the relevant laws governing such land.

12. Consequently, it is submitted that the findings of the Tribunal are contrary to the evidence on record, the factual matrix of the case, and the applicable law. The evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant has not been appreciated in its proper perspective. As a result, the judgment and award of the Tribunal is erroneous, both on facts and in law. The initiation of eviction proceedings against the appellant by the respondent is without legal foundation. The process commenced with the issuance of the Notice, Ex.P-2, dated 06.01.2005. This notice falsely asserts that one N.V. Sambasiva Rao was designated as the Manager of the Nallurivari Dharma Thota by the Commissioner of Endowments; that the Thota was created as a Trust, registered, and published under the provisions of Act 30 of 1987; and that the ancestor of the Nalluri family, one Nalluri Venkata Subba Rao, created the Trust, which owns highly valuable immovable property. It is contended that none of these assertions were proven by evidence. The notice, Ex.P-2, demands the vacation of the schedule property on the ground that the appellant is in occupation of approximately 6.80 cents in R.S. No. 90, Patamata, Vijayawada, running the N.S.M. Public School without the prior permission and sanction of the Commissioner of Endowments. It is contended that this demand in Ex.P-2 is prima facie untenable.

13. Counsel for the appellant further contended, at the outset, that Ex.P-1 indicates the Nallurivari Dharma Thota was registered on 27.09.2006. A perusal of Ex.P-1 reveals that the application for registration of the second respondent Trust was made on 11.02.2005, and the Trust itself was registered on 27.09.2006. The schedule property was entered into the Section 43 register of Act 30/1987 on 11.02.2005, as reflected in Ex.P-1.This document, Ex.P-1, shows that the schedule property is an Inam Land. It was entered into the Section 43 register on 11.02.2005 for the purpose of registering the subject temple. The appellant contends that this Ex.P-1 register was issued without any proper enquiry and without following the procedure mandated under Section 43 of Act 30/1987. Consequently, the Trust was only registered with the first respondent, the Endowments Department, on 27.09.2006. This timeline falsifies the allegations in Ex.P-2 notice, dated 06.01.2005, which claims the second respondent was already registered. It is further contended that, given the Trust was not registered at the time, the designation of N.V. Sambasiva Rao as Manager by the Commissioner of Endowments lacks valid explanation. No supporting appointment order has been filed, and therefore, he had no locus standi to issue Ex.P-2. It is argued that as of the date of Ex.P- 2 (06.01.2005), the schedule property did not belong to the Endowments Department, a fact made clear and vivid by the subsequent Ex.P-1, dated 11.02.2005. As such, it is submitted that, Ex.P-1 appears to be a fabricated document created to support a wrongful claim against the appellant over the schedule property.

14. It is further contended that Exhibits R-4 to R-10 demonstrably establish the appellant's occupation of the land since 1973-74. These exhibits reveal that the appellant constructed school buildings after obtaining necessary permissions from the competent authority and has been operating the school since that time. Exhibit R-3, an application made to the District Collector, indicates that the appellant has been in possession of the schedule property since February 1971, completed construction works, and commenced the 'Nallurivari Saint Mathew’s Public School' (originally known as Vijayawada Public School) on 15.11.1973. This commencement was with the permission of the Government and under the affiliation of the CBSE Board. Collectively, the documents from Exhibit R-3 to R-10 prove the appellant's continuous, uninterrupted occupation since 1973 through the construction of school buildings and the operation of the school, demonstrating a clear animus possidendi (intention to possess). Therefore, it is argued that these documents retain full legal force. Exhibits R-1 and R-2, the Dedication Deed and Settlement Deed executed by the second respondent Trust in favour of the appellant's society, are also in evidence. The appellant relies on the established legal principle that the possession of a person holding under an invalid deed of transfer becomes prima facie adverse to the true owner from the date of entry under that deed. In support of this principle, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Alla Baksh vs. Mohd. Hussain (1996 AIHC 4105) wherein it is held thus:

                  “11. This Decision - (1989) 2 SCC 630 : A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1269 [(1989) 2 SCC 630 : AIR 1989 SC 1269], also establishes the principle that possession, of a person having no title in the property under invalid Deed of Transfer, his possession from the date of his entering into possession under that invalid deed becomes prima facie adverse to that of the owner. When he continues in possession for a period of more than 12 years, title by adverse possession accrues in favour of that person as owner. This being the settled position of law by their Lordships of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, in my opinion, the Courts below did not commit any error in holding that 1st defendant - respondent No. 1, perfected title by adverse possession. When the defendant claimed ownership on the basis of a invalid Deed of Transfer, the title against the real owner of the property, in my opinion, was sufficient exhibition of hostile title. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff - appellant relied on the case of Privy Council in Charles Edward Victor Seneviratne Corea v. MahatantrigeyIseris Appuhamy [AIR 1914 PC 2433] .

                  13. As it is well settled that the Decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court mentioned above that possession of a person under an invalid Deed of Transfer after entering into possession of it, prima facie becomes hostile and adverse to that of the real owner when the transferee claims ownership on the basis of that invalid Deed and that on completion of continuous possession for the requisite period of 12 years or more, such person acquires title by adverse possession.”

15. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/petitioners supported the findings and observations of the Tribunal. It was contended that, Ex.P-1 itself constitutes proof of title, establishing that the schedule property belongs to the respondents. As the appellant is an encroacher, his case falls squarely under Section 83 of Act 30/1987, thereby rendering the eviction proceedings against him valid and justified. It was argued that any challenge to Ex.P-1 must be made by an aggrieved party through the appropriate legal channel. Furthermore, the principle of adverse possession cannot be invoked by the appellant due to the statutory bar imposed by Section 143 of Act 30/1987. The counsel clarified that Ex.P-2 was issued by the Trust itself, not by the Endowments Department, as Ex.P-1 was not in existence at the time of Ex. P-2's issuance. It was submitted that an entry under Section 43 of the Act, such as Ex.P-1, can be issued by the first respondent (the Endowments Department) and is to be treated as conclusive proof of title for the purposes of eviction proceedings under the Act. The requirement for a ryotwari patta or other title deed in favour of the Trust is unwarranted, as it is a charitable institution, and Ex.P-1 is a valid document for this purpose. It was further contended that the respondents have no intention to dispossess the appellant without due process. The schedule property, as per Ex.P-1, is definitively shown to belong to the second respondent. Consequently, the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal is sound and requires no interference.

16. In light of the pleadings in the Original Application, the findings recorded by the Tribunal, and considering the rival contentions and submissions advanced by both sides before this Court, the following points arise for determination:

                  1. Is the Tribunal justified in holding that the petitioners/applicants are entitled to the eviction of the scheduled property, which is appended to the decree of the award, as prayed for?

                  2. Whether the provisions of Act 37 of 1956 and the rules apply, and whether Sec.2A of Act 20/1975 applies, and whether the plea of adverse possession fits in the case?

                  3. Does the Judgment/award passed by the Tribunal need any interference?

POINT NO.1

17. The Tribunal rendered its judgment and award against the appellant, placing significant reliance on Exhibit P-1. It held that Exhibits R-1 and R-2, being neither duly stamped nor registered, lack legal sanctity. These documents were held to be hit by the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act, rendering them totally inadmissible in evidence and incapable of being received. The Tribunal further concluded they were barred by Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. Consequently, it held that the appellant's possession, being based on the invalid documents Ex. R-1 and R-2, was unauthorized. Regarding Exhibits R-4 to R-10, the Tribunal found that they, at best, established the appellant's occupation of the premises since 1973-74 for the purpose of constructing school buildings and operating the school. However, it ruled that these documents were of no assistance in proving that any right over the property had been lawfully conveyed by the Trust to the appellant. The Tribunal observed that the appellant failed to adduce any evidence demonstrating the passing of title in its favour from the Trust. On the other hand, the Tribunal considered Exhibit P-1, which was opened in 2005 prior to the filing of the Original Application. While acknowledging that Ex. P-1 does not, by itself, confer absolute sanctity without corroboration from other material on record,  the Tribunal nevertheless relied upon it. Based on this consideration, the appellant was treated as being in unauthorized possession.

18. Against the backdrop of the issues requiring determination, it is essential to analyze whether the sole point for consideration framed by the learned Tribunal below—namely, whether the appellant/respondent is an unauthorized occupant and encroacher of the schedule property under Section 83 of Act 30 of 1987—is sufficient in itself. Evidently, the factual matrix of the present case, the legal implications involved, and the questions of law raised by the parties in their rival contentions clearly necessitate a more detailed analysis. This analysis must encompass the relevant questions of law and the necessary provisions under Act XXXVII of 1956 and the Rules of 1957 (pertaining to Inams), Act 20 of 1975 (also concerning Inams), and Act 30 of 1987 (the Endowments Act). This comprehensive examination is required because it is admitted that the subject schedule land, covering 6.80 acres in R.S. No. 90 of Patamata village, where the appellant/respondent institution is being operated, is classified as Inam Dry Land.

19. It must be considered whether the points for determination involve pure questions of law concerning the relevant provisions of Act 30 of 1987. In order to decide this, it is appropriate to extract hereunder the pertinent provisions of Act 30 of 1987, Act XXXVII of 1956 along with its Rules of 1957, and Act 20 of 1975.

20. Section 43 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 deals with Registration of Charitable and Religious Institutions and Endowments, which reads as follows:

                  (1) The trustee or other person incharge of the management of every charitable or religious institution or endowment shall, in the case of an institution or endowment in existence at the commencement of this Act, within ninety days from such commencement; and in the case of an institution or endowment found after such commencement, within ninety days of such founding make an application for its registration to the Assistant Commissioner within whose sub-division such institution or endowment is situated.

                  Provided that the Assistant Commissioner may, for sufficient cause, extend the time for making the application.

                  (2) (a)Where any endowment is situated in the sub divisions of two or more Assistant Commissioners, the trustee or other persons incharge of the management of the endowment shall apply for registration to any one of such Assistant Commissioners;

                  (b)On receipt of such application, the Assistant Commissioner concerned shall refer the matter to the Commissioner who will decide as to which of the Assistant Commissioners shall register the endowment and thereupon the application shall be entertained by such Assistant Commissioner.

                  (3) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), no application for registration shall be necessary in the case of any institution or endowment which was duly registered and entered in the book of endowments before the commencement of this Act, under the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act,1966.

                  (4) Every application made under sub section (1) shall contain the following particulars, namely.

                  (a) in the case of a religious institution or endowment, its origin, nature and denomination; in the case of a charitable institution or endowment, its date of commencement, objects, nature and particulars regarding beneficiaries if any;

                  (b) name of the founder, if any, and the names of the past and present trustees ;

                  (c) particulars of the institution or endowment and of the grant, the scheme of administration, muntakab, decree or any other record of rights pertaining to the founding of the institution or endowment ;

                  (d) names of all offices to which any salary is attached and the nature, time and conditions of service in each case and the names of the present holders thereof;

                  (e) names of Sthanacharyas, Archakas, Adhyapakas, Vedaparayanikas and such other persons, responsible for performing worship, and other religious service in the institutions and the particulars, regarding their salaries;

                  (f) particulars of the immoveable and moveable properties including jewels, gold, silver, precious stones, vessels and utensils belonging to the institution or endowment with their estimated value and the monies and securities and of the annual income therefrom.

                  (g) particulars of all title-deeds and other documents relating to the properties belonging to the institution or endowment ;

                  (h) in the case of religious institution, particulars of the idols and other images in the institution or connected therewith, whether intended for worship or for being carried in procession ;

                  (i) particulars regarding rights of a special nature, if any, the names of the holders thereof and the customs, usages and practices in force in connection therewith ;

                  (j) charges, liabilities and other actionable claims outstanding against the institution or endowment on the date of registration, whether under decree of a court or order of the Government or other competent authority or otherwise ;

                  (k) a brief account of the history, legend, sthalapuranam, and the artistic, architectural or achaeological significance of the institution or endowment and other particulars of a like nature ;

                  (l) details of the fairs, festivals, daily and periodical worships, service and other religious ceremonies connected with the institution or endowment and the particulars of dittam fixed therefor ; and

                  (m) such other particulars as may be prescribed ;

                  (5) On receipt of the application, the Assistant Commissioner shall, after making such enquiry as he thinks fit and hearing any person having interest in the institution or endowment, pass an order directing its registration and grant to the trustee or other person a certificate of registration containing the particulars furnished in the application with the alterations, if any, made by him as a result of his enquiry.

                  (6) The particulars relating to every institution or endowment contained in the certificate of registration granted under sub-section

                  (5) shall be entered in "the register of institutions and endowments" (hereinafter in this chapter referred to as the "Register") which shall be maintained by the Assistant Commissioner in respect of all institutions and endowments situated within his sub-division and one copy of the entries made in such register relating to every institution or endowment shall be furnished to the Deputy Commissioner having jurisdiction and another copy to the Commissioner.

                  (7) The register shall be divided into two parts, one for charitable institutions and endowments and the other for religious institutions and endowments.

                  (8) The Assistant Commissioner shall also enter in the register maintained by him under sub-section (6), all the particulars contained in the Book of Endowments or, as the case may be, in the register relating to every institution or endowment which was registered or deemed to have been registered before the commencement of this Act under the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 :Provided that if the book of Endowments or the aforesaid register does not contain all or any of the particulars required to be furnished in the application for registration under sub-section (4), the Assistant Commissioner shall call for such information relating to such particulars from the trustee or other person incharge of the management of such institution or Endowment and after making such enquiry as he deems fit shall make necessary entries in the register maintained by him under sub- section (6).

                  (9) In the case of every institution or endowment in respect of which no application for registration is required under sub-section (3), the Assistant Commissioner shall grant a ceritificate of registration to the trustee or other person incharge of the management of such institution or endowment containing all the particulars pertaining to it as entered by him under sub-section (8) in the register maintained by him under sub-section (6).

                  (10) The trustee or other person incharge of the management of an institution or endowment or his authorised agent shall report to the Assistant Commissioner every year the alterations, omissions or additions in the particulars, relating to the institution or endowment and shall also send to him once in three years the certificate of registration granted to him under sub-section (5) or sub-section (9) together with a statement of such alterations, omissions or additions, as may be necessary to the said certificate and the Assistant Commissioner shall thereupon make such enquiry as he deems fit and amend the certificate wherever necessary and return it to such trustee or other person and shall also make necessary amendments in the regard in the register maintained by him under sub-section (6). A copy of such amendments shall be furnished to the Deputy Commissioner having jurisdiction and another copy to the Commissioner.

                  (11) Where any trustee or other person aforesaid

                  (a) fails to apply for registration of an institution or endowment within the time specified in sub-section (1) ;

                  (b) fails to report the alteration, omissions or additions or to send the certificate of registration as required in sub-section (10) ; or (c)furnishes or causes to be furnished to the Assistant Commissioner, any particulars which are false and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true ; R he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees.”

21. From a reading of the aforementioned legal provisions, it is crystal clear that under Section 43(4) of the Act, an application must be made. However, no such application made by the second respondent/2nd petitioner to the first respondent/1st petitioner has been placed on record. Furthermore, in order to make an entry regarding the schedule property in the Section 43 register (Ex.P-1), every application under sub-section (1) must, pursuant to sub- section (4)(g), furnish particulars of all title deeds and other documents relating to the properties belonging to the institution or endowment. A perusal of the cross-examination of PW-1 is as under:

                  “I am working as E.O. to this petitioner temple since, 2009. I have not filed any document to show that the respondents’s property is of the institution. I do not know in which manner property is under institution. I filed Sec. 43 register (xerox) to show that the property is of institution. The said register was prepared in the year 2005. There is no documentary evidence to show that the link documents basing on which Sec.43 register was prepared i.e. Ex.P-1. To my knowledge except Ex.P-1 there is no other document of title with regard to the petition schedule property”.

22. The respondents/petitioners have grossly failed to place any material on record that justifies or substantiates their title to the schedule property. The non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 43(4)(g) of the Act is clearly evident. In the instant case, a perusal of Exhibit P-1 and its connected papers clearly reveals that the application for registration of the second respondent/2nd petitioner was made on 11.02.2005, specifically for the registration of the subject temple. This is further corroborated by the certificate of registration dated 27.09.2006. However, in the Section 43 register (Ex.P-1), the subject land is merely described as "Meraka" and "Inam" in columns 5 and 6 respectively. Crucially, no details or documentary proof to substantiate the second respondent/2nd petitioner's title to the schedule property have been placed on record.

23. Furthermore, at the time Section 43 Register (Ex.P-1) was issued, the appellant/respondent was already operating the school and was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the schedule property since 15.01.1971. During this period, the appellant/respondent raised structures, developed play- grounds, and obtained all necessary permissions for these activities. This includes approvals for building plans from the Gram Panchayat and Municipal Corporation, permission from the Government, and affiliation from the CBSE Board, as evidenced by Exhibits R-3 to R-10. Therefore, the appellant/respondent has been in open, continuous, and peaceful possession without any interruption from any party, including the respondents/petitioners. This possession has been accompanied by a clear animus possidendi (intention to possess), with the appellant/respondent asserting its title, possession, and enjoyment. The permissions obtained under Exhibits R-4 to R-10 were secured in its own name. The open and continuous operation of the school since 1973 demonstrates that the appellant/respondent is, clearly and ex facie, an interested party in the schedule property.

24. Furthermore, Exhibit P-2, dated 06.01.2005, is a notice demanding the appellant/respondent to vacate the schedule property. It does so on the pretext that the appellant is in unauthorized occupation. Specifically, the notice states that: (1) the second respondent/petitioner was registered and published under the provisions of Act 30/1987; (2) the appellant/respondent is in occupation of the schedule property, measuring 6.80 cents in R.S. No. 90, Patamata village, and is running the institution without prior permission from the Commissioner of Endowments; (3) any document obtained by the appellant/respondent from the second respondent/petitioner is illegal; and (4) the appellant/respondent is therefore in unauthorized occupation. However, the notice is critically deficient in its particulars. It fails to mention the date from which the alleged unauthorized occupation commenced, or any other specific details regarding that occupation. More significantly, the notice is entirely silent on the right, title, and interest of the second respondent/2nd petitioner or the Endowments Department over the property. It provides no details of any title deeds or other documents that would entitle them to issue such a notice. In the absence of these foundational particulars, the very validity of Ex.P-2, dated 06.01.2005, is called into question.

25. While this is the case, a perusal of the contents of Ex.P-1 reveals that the second respondent/2nd petitioner was registered only on 27.09.2006, under Registration No. A1/5075/06. This fact directly contradicts and falsifies the assertions made in Ex.P-2 notice dated 06.01.2005. Furthermore, a comparison of the dates is telling: Ex.P-2 (the notice) is dated 06.01.2005, while Section 43 Register entry (Ex.P-1) is dated 11.02.2005. This chronology demonstrates that at the time Ex.P-2 was issued, Section 43 entry (Ex.P-1) did not exist. A combined reading of both documents therefore reveals that a false claim was advanced through Ex.P-2, and the subsequently created Ex.P-1 (dated 11.02.2005) along with the registration of the second respondent/2nd petitioner on 27.09.2006, appears to have been orchestrated to support that claim. Crucially, this subsequent registration and the creation of Section 43 register entry were effected without conducting the requisite enquiry and without complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 43(4) and (5) of Act 30 of 1987.

26. From the recitals in columns 5 and 6 of Ex.P-1, the schedule property is described as Inam Dry land. Consequently, to determine whether the second respondent/2nd petitioner has any valid title to the property, it is essential to examine whether the provisions of Sections 3, 4, and 7 of Act XXXVII of 1956 were followed and complied with. Specifically, it must be ascertained whether a Ryotwari Patta was issued in favour of the respondents/petitioners in Form- VIII, as envisaged under Rule 7 of the Andhra Pradesh (A.A.) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Rules, 1957. Furthermore, the admissibility and evidentiary value of Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 must be scrutinized in this light. Therefore, it is appropriate to extract the relevant provisions hereunder for a proper analysis:

                  “Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh (A.A) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956, deals with the process of determining who is entitled to a ryotwari patta for inam land, which is a matter decided by the Tahsildar and Revenue Court.

                  Section 4(1) explains that in a ryotwari or zamindari village, the inamdar holding the land on the commencement date of the Act is entitled to a ryotwari patta.

                  Section 7 outlines the binding nature of the decisions made by the Tahsildar and Revenue Court under this Act.

                  XXXXX

                  Rule -7 of the Andhra Pradesh (A.A) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1957; the ryotwari patta, refered to in sub-section (1) of Sec.7, shall be in Form-VIII.”

27. Admittedly, the schedule property is Inam Dry Land, as recorded in Ex.P-1. Given this classification, the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 (Act 37 of 1956) are squarely applicable. When a property is Inam land, to claim title over it, the second respondent Trust must produce and substantiate proof of its ownership. In the present case, no such document has ever been produced. No title deed or ryotwari patta issued in favour of the second respondent by the competent authorities under the Inams Abolition Act has been proved or substantiated. Therefore, Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 lack legal sanctity. Consequently, these documents are null and void, and the schedule property cannot be lawfully claimed by the respondents. It follows that the eviction proceedings initiated under Section 83 of Act 30 of 1987 against the appellant are devoid of merit. Hence, the appellant cannot be termed as an encroacher over the schedule property, and the respondents are not the title holders. Furthermore, as per Section 2A of the Andhra Pradesh Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Amendment) Act, 1975 (Act 20 of 1975), dry and waste lands, porambokes, grazing lands, etc., are vested in the Government. Ex.R-3 application was submitted to the District Collector on this matter. Notably, for over 50 years, neither the Government nor any revenue authority has interfered, raised an objection, or claimed the property from the appellant institution. This is also evident from Exhibits R-3 to R-10, which demonstrate the appellant's open, continuous, uninterrupted, and peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property, in a manner clearly hostile to the Government's ownership. Hence, the provisions of Section 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would also be applicable to the appellant's case, which has, in a manner, perfected its title. It suffices to mention this aspect accordingly.

28. Now, in view of the findings rendered above, it is necessary to analyze whether the schedule property, being a dry and waste land, vests with the Government free from all encumbrances. For this purpose, Section 2A of Act XXXVII of 1956, as inserted by the Amendment Act 20 of 1975, is relevant and extracted hereunder:

                  “Section-2A of A.P. (A.A.) Inams (Abolish and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 1956 (short Act 37/1956 (Act 20/1975 amendment); Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act all Communal lands and porambokes, grazing lands, waste lands, forest lands, mines and quarries, tanks, tank-beds and irrigation works, steams and rivers, fisheries and ferries in the inam lands shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free of all encumbrances.”

29. Admittedly, the schedule property is dry and waste land. There is no proof or substantiation that it is arable land. Therefore, according to Section 2- A of Act 20 of 1975, which was inserted into Act XXXVII of 1956, the schedule property vests with the Government and shall stand transferred and vested in the Government, free from all encumbrances. When it can be safely concluded that the schedule property vests with the Government, it cannot be claimed by the respondents/petitioners. This conclusion is further fortified by the complete absence of any substantiation, proof, or evidence placed on record by them to support their claim. Consequently, the schedule property is vested with the Government, free from all encumbrances, by virtue of the inclusion and insertion of Section 2A in Act XXXVII of 1956 through the amendment Act 20 of 1975.

30. The schedule property is an Inam dry and waste land. The mandatory provisions of Sections 3, 4, and 7 of Act XXXVII of 1956, along with Rule 7 and Form-VIII of the 1957 Rules framed there under, have neither been followed nor initiated in letter and spirit. No document of title or ryotwari patta has been furnished in evidence to substantiate and prove the title of the respondents/petitioners over the schedule property. Now, it must be seen under what circumstances the provisions of Act 30 of 1987 are applicable, and under what circumstances a petition for eviction under Section 83 can be entertained by the Tribunal under Section 87 of the said Act. The respondents/petitioners were required to substantiate this by filing the necessary documents of title pertaining to the property, which they have failed to do. Since the schedule property is an Inam dry land and the respondents/petitioners have no title to the same, as already determined in the points of consideration above, it is clear that the respondents/petitioners have no right to initiate any eviction proceedings against the appellant/respondent in respect of the schedule property. Consequently, the ingredients of Section 83 of Act 30 of 1987 are not applicable. Therefore, both on facts and in law, and from the above discussion, it is crystal clear that the provisions of Act 30 of 1987 are not applicable to the facts of the present case. As a result, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The point is answered in favour of the appellant.

POINT NO.2

31. The next point that arises is to examine the aspect of adverse possession, as pleaded by the Appellant/Respondent in Paragraph 7 of its counter. While the appellant contends it has acquired title through adverse possession, the respondents/petitioners argue that, with respect to the schedule property, Section 43 of Act 30/1987 comes into operation, thereby barring such a plea. To determine this, it must first be analyzed whether adverse possession is a question of fact or law. If it is a question of fact, the inquiry must focus on whether this plea was indeed raised by the appellant/respondent. Having established that it was pleaded, the analysis must now turn to whether any substantive law is engaged on this point. Consequently, the plea of adverse possession presents a mixed question of fact and law. However, the factual position remains that the Appellant/respondent first entered into possession of the schedule property on 15.01.1971, relying on the documents Ex.R-1 and R-2, which have since been held inadmissible. Exhibits R-3 and R-4 to R-10 corroborate that since 1971, the appellant has been in possession, constructing school buildings after obtaining the necessary permissions. It is therefore clear that the appellant has been continuously operating the institution under the name “NSM Public School”. As evident from Ex.R-3, the appellant, as far back as 1975, applied to the District Collector of Krishna District, asserting a hostile title to the schedule property and requesting that the land be registered in its name. Furthermore, Exhibits R-7 and R-8 demonstrate that building construction plans and their approvals were obtained by the appellant/respondent in its own name. The notice Ex.P-2, alongside Ex.R-3, also clearly reveals that the District Collector, as the head of the District Revenue Department and thus representing the Government, was made aware of the appellant's possession of the schedule property. Despite this knowledge, there is no record to show that the Government raised any objection to the appellant's possession from 1971 to the present day—a period spanning over five decades.

32. In support of the plea of adverse possession taken by the appellant/respondent, reliance is placed on the legal principle established in the citation Alla Baksh Vs. Mohd. Hussain (supra). This principle finds resonance in a subsequent judgment rendered by a Full Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chandrakanthaben J. Modi & Narendra Jayantilal Modi vs. Vadilal Bapalala Modi(1989 (2) SCC 630), wherein their Lordships have taken a similar view, holding that:

                  “person entering into possession of the property claiming ownership under an illegal deed of transfer, if he continues to be in possession either by own self or his agent for the period of more than 12 years, he acquires the title by adverse possession.”

                  This citation squarely applies to the case of the appellant also.

33. It is contended that the material on record, as a matter of fact, demonstrates that the respondents/petitioners, and more particularly, the second respondent, hold no title to the schedule property. This is explicitly revealed in the cross-examination of PW-1, who admitted, "It is true that we filed an application to summon the documents from the previous trustee of the petitioner, Sri. I.V. Subba Rao, to produce documents, and in spite of notices by the Court, the same are not produced." This admission clearly shows that the second respondent/2nd petitioner failed to produce any title document standing in their name for the schedule property. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn, adverse to the respondents/petitioners, is that the second respondent/2nd petitioner has no title to the schedule property. Consequently, without any title, substantiation, or proof, Ex.P-1 was brought into existence without following due process of law, in a clandestine manner, and is therefore invalid. Thus, the second respondent/2nd petitioner, lacking title themselves, could not have conveyed any valid title to the Appellant/respondent. It is therefore clear that the schedule property belongs to the Government and not to the respondents/petitioners.

34. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the matter before the Endowments Tribunal, and consequently this appeal, arises from proceedings under its limited jurisdiction as defined by Section 87 of Act 30 of 1987. The Government has not been arrayed as a party to these proceedings. Therefore, while it is evident from the record that the schedule property belongs to the Government and is in the possession and enjoyment of the appellant since 1971, the definitive rights of the Government and the appellant over the property, including the question of ultimate title, cannot be conclusively determined in the present proceedings, which lack the necessary party. As such, for the purpose of this appeal, it suffices to determine that, based on the material on record, the schedule property vests with the Government, and the appellant has been in possession thereof since 1971.

35. Whether the State Endowments Department has jurisdiction over a Christian school is a pivotal question. Christian trusts and institutions are typically governed by separate legal frameworks, such as the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890, and specific state-level legislation for public trusts. They are generally not subject to the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (Act 30 of 1987), which is specifically tailored for Hindu religious and charitable endowments. The Tribunal further failed to consider a material fact evident from the record: the Appellant/Respondent is a Christian Minority Organization. This character is borne out by the very proceedings initiated against it by the Respondents/Petitioners. Consequently, the Tribunal erred in not considering that the provisions of Act 30 of 1987, by its specific nature and object, cannot be applied against such a Christian minority organization. The point is answered in favour of the appellant.

POINT NO.3

36. Now, it is to be examined and analyzed whether the learned Endowments Tribunal passed the impugned judgment correctly or whether it warrants interference. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment, it is seen that the Tribunal relied on two primary categories of evidence. It found that Exhibits R-1 and R-2 were inadmissible documents. For the respondents/petitioners, it considered Exhibit P-1, Section 43 Register under Act 30 of 1987. The Tribunal adopted a contradictory stand regarding Ex.P-1. On one hand, it implicitly accepted that an entry under Section 43 could confer a colour of title upon the respondents/petitioners, stating that if the appellant was aggrieved by this entry, the remedy lay in challenging it under Section 45 of the Act. On the other hand, in paragraph 6(ii), the Tribunal observed: "No doubt it is opened in the year 2005, prior to the filing of O.A. and not an old document to give absolute sanctity as a sole basis without corroboration from other material on record." This finding clearly indicates the Tribunal's own acknowledgment that Ex.P-1 lacks sanctity without corroborative evidence. Furthermore, in paragraph 6(i), the Tribunal found that "there remains Ex.R-4 to R-10, which at best speak of the occupation of the respondent since 1973-74 by construction of school buildings and running of the school and those are in no way helpful to claim any right by the respondent." Having thus acknowledged that Exhibits R-4 to R-10 confirm the appellant's continuous occupation, construction, and operation of the school since 1973-74, the Tribunal failed to provide any reasoning as to how and why these documents were "not helpful" for the appellant to assert a claim of title or a vested interest in the property. This constitutes a failure to apply the mind to a significant body of evidence corroborating longstanding, open possession.

37. Furthermore, having found that Ex.P-1 lacks absolute sanctity and acknowledging that, as per Ex.P-1 itself, the schedule property is an Inam land, the Tribunal failed to consider and frame the pure question of law concerning the applicability of the relevant Inams Abolition legislation. It neglected to examine the mandatory compliance with Sections 3, 4, and 7 of Act XXXVII of 1956, the related Rule 7, and the implications of Section 2A of Act 20 of 1975. Moreover, even when the evidence on record clearly demonstrates that Ex.P-1 was prepared in a clandestine manner, after the issuance of Ex.P-2, without any examination of the second respondent/petitioner's title or right over the schedule property and without conducting a proper enquiry, the Tribunal based its conclusions on this very document. Consequently, the impugned judgment of the learned Tribunal suffers from internal inconsistencies, a lack of cogent reasoning, and contradictory findings. The Tribunal failed to consider the oral and documentary evidence in its proper perspective and misapplied the relevant law and procedure. Therefore, the impugned judgment of the learned Endowments Tribunal is liable to be reversed. The point is answered accordingly.

38. In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances and accordingly this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed, setting aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 28.02.2011 in O.A. NO. 2164 of 2010 (old OA No.102/2005 of DC, Kakinada). There shall be no order as to costs.

                  As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.