Oral Judgment:

Madhav J. Jamdar, J.

1. Heard Mr. Jaiswal, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Shrikant Yadav, learned APP for the respondents - State.

2. By the present writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner challenges the legality and validity of the order dated 19th September 2025 passed by the Under Secretary, Home Department, State of Maharashtra in exercise of powers under Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”). By the said order, it has been directed that the petitioner be released after completion of 14 years of actual imprisonment and 30 years of imprisonment with remission and the petitioner was directed to further undergo imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.200/-, in default to undergo imprisonment for one month, for the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”).

3. It is the submission of Mr. Jaiswal, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, that the Supreme Court imposed punishment of life imprisonment upon the petitioner and further directed that the sentences for the offences for which the petitioner was convicted, except under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC, shall run concurrently and the sentence under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC shall run consecutively, after serving the sentences for the other offences. It is submitted that the Supreme Court directed that after completion of the life imprisonment, the petitioner shall undergo the sentence of 10 years’ of imprisonment imposed under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC.

4. Mr. Jaiswal, learned Advocate for the petitioner, relied upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Muthuramalingam & Ors. v. State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 313. He invited attention to paragraphs 30 and 31 of the said decision and submitted that the view that life sentences can run consecutively does not lay down the correct law and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Petitioner stands overruled to that extent.

5. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned order dated 19th September 2025 passed by the State Government directing the release of the petitioner after completion of 30 years of imprisonment with remission by exercising powers under Section 433A of the CrPC is erroneous. According to him, the petitioner cannot be directed to undergo an additional sentence of 10 years under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC after completion of life imprisonment.

6. He further submitted that the petitioner has already undergone actual imprisonment of 30 years, 6 months and 20 days and with remission he has completed 36 years, 5 months and 27 days of imprisonment. He, therefore, submits that the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside and the petitioner be directed to be released forthwith.

7. On the other hand, Mr. Yadav, learned APP, submitted that the Government Resolution dated 10th January 2006 deals with convicts who have attained the age of 65 years and are treated as senior citizens. He submitted that in terms of the said Government Resolution dated 10th January 2006, the State Government is required to constitute a Committee and take a fresh decision in the matter. He further submitted that the State Government has already passed an order under Section 433A of the CrPC, directing that the petitioner shall be released after completion of 30 years of imprisonment including remission and, in addition thereto, he shall undergo 10 years of imprisonment under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC. According to him, the said order has been passed in view of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in the case of the petitioner and, therefore, no interference with the impugned order is warranted.

8. He further submitted that the petitioner had absconded for a period of 1150 days and, therefore, Category 6(a) of the 1992 Guidelines would apply to him. According to him, the said conduct has been taken into consideration while directing that the petitioner shall be released after completion of 30 years of imprisonment including remission. He therefore submitted that interference with the impugned order is not warranted.

9. Before considering the rival contentions, it would be necessary to set out certain factual aspects.

                   i. The petitioner and the other co-accused were convicted by the learned District and Sessions Judge at Pune in Sessions Case No.574 of 1992 inter alia for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and were awarded the death sentence subject to confirmation by the High Court. Insofar as the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC is concerned, the petitioner and the co-accused were directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.200/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month each.

                   ii. This Court, by judgment and order dated 9th, 12th and 15th February 1996 passed in Criminal Appeal No.225 of 1995 and connected matters, confirmed the conviction and sentences awarded by the Trial Court except the conviction under Section 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

                   iii. The Supreme Court, in Criminal Appeal Nos.1064, 1065 and 1066 of 1997 filed inter alia by the present petitioner, modified the sentence awarded by the Sessions Court and confirmed by this Court under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC from death to imprisonment for life. It was further directed that the sentences for the offences for which the appellants were convicted, except under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC, shall run concurrently and that the sentence under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC shall run consecutively after completion of the sentences for the other offences. Paragraph 48 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of the petitioner is relevant, which reads thus:

                   “48. Considering the cumulative effect of all the factors, it cannot be said that the offences were committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for, the whole thing was done in a pre-planned way; having regard to the nature of offences and circumstances in which they were committed, it is not possible for the Court to predict that the appellant would not commit criminal act of violence or would not be a threat to the society. A-1 is 35 years' old, A-2 is 35 years' old and A-3 is 25 years' old. The appellants cannot be said to be too young or too old. The possibility of reform and rehabilitation, however, cannot be ruled out. From the facts and circumstances, it is not possible to predict as to who among the three played which part. It may be that role of one has been more. culpable in degree than that of others and vice versa. Where in a case like this it is not possible to say as to whose case falls within the "rarest of the rare" case, it would serve the ends of justice if the capital punishment is commuted into life imprisonment. Accordingly, we modify sentence awarded by Courts below under Section 302 read with Section 34 from death to life imprisonment. The sentences for the offences for which the appellants are convicted, except under Section 376(2)(g), I.P.C., shall run concurrently; they shall serve sentence under Section 376(2)(g), I.P.C. consecutively, after serving sentence for other offences.”

                   (Emphasis added)

                   iv. At this stage, it is relevant to note that, as per the prosecution case, the petitioner and the co-accused committed the murder of three persons, namely Mohan Ohal, his wife Ruhi Ohal and their son Rohan Ohal. They also committed robbery and also committed rape upon Ruhi Ohal. The manner in which the crime was committed and the seriousness and brutality involved therein have been noted by the Supreme Court in paragraph 47 of its judgment, which reads thus:

                   “47. Now reverting to the facts of this case, the mitigating circumstances in favour of the appellants are that A-1 is a qualified Civil Engineer and a married person having a son of four years old, his parents are serving at Spiritual Life Centre, Narsapur for the last thirty- six years. A-2 is 'Thaneshri' and 'Vasaishri', titles conferred on him for his body building; his marriage is a love marriage performed against the will of his parents as well as the volition of the parents of the wife and there is nobody to look after his wife and their two daughters and two sons of whom one is 11/2 years' old; A-3 pleaded that he is having a sick father and that he is only 27 years' old and an unmarried person. They are having no adverse antecedents in the sense of being habitual criminals. The aggravating circumstances are that A-1 is no other than the nephew (daughter's son) of the deceased Mr. Mohan Ohol. Because of the relationship, he gained access inside the house for him and for his friends; they enjoyed the hospitality of Ohols' family as it was found that there were five used plates in the sink which indicate that five had food; may be, all the three appellants and the couple or two of them. The victims were unarmed; the heinous crime was committed for gains, namely to rob the valuables of the Ohols family; to give effect to their nefarious plans the unholy alliance of the appellants not merely robbed the family of the valuables but killed all the three members of the family then in the house and above all committed sexual assault on Mrs. Ruhi Ohol. It cannot but be a dastardly act for A-1 to commit rape of Mrs. Ohol, who is none other than the wife of his maternal uncle and perhaps as old as his mother.”

                   (Emphasis added)

                   v. Thus, paragraph No.48 of the judgment of the Supreme Court clearly shows that the Supreme Court modified the sentence of death awarded by the learned Trial Court and confirmed by this Court to imprisonment for life, however, it was directed that although the sentences for the other offences, including the sentence of life imprisonment, shall run concurrently, the sentence imposed under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC shall run consecutively and shall be undergone after completion of the sentence for the other offences. In effect, what the Supreme Court has directed is that the petitioner shall first undergo imprisonment for life and thereafter undergo the sentence imposed under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC.

                   vi. In view of the said direction, the State Government, by the impugned order, has directed that the petitioner shall undergo 30 years of imprisonment including remission to serve life imprisonment and thereafter undergo 10 years of imprisonment imposed under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC by the learned Trial Court, which has been confirmed up to the Supreme Court.

10. Thus, in view of the above factual aspects, it is necessary to consider the rival contentions.

11. It is the submission of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the Guidelines dated 11th May 1992 (“1992 Guidelines”) would apply to the case of the petitioner and that his case would fall either under Category 1(e) or Category 5(a). It is further submitted that even considering the fact that the petitioner had absconded for 1150 days, at the most Category 6(a) would apply. For the sake of convenience, Categories 1(e), 5(a) and 6(a) of the 1992 Guidelines are set out herein below :-

                   “GUIDELINES FOR PREMATURE RELEASE OF PRISONERS SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT OR TO DEATH PENALTY COMMUTED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT AFTER 18TH DECEMBER 1978.