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CDJ 2025 Kar HC 1943 print Preview print Next print
Court : High Court of Karnataka
Case No : Writ Appeal No. 1055 of 2024 (SC-ST)
Judges: THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA
Parties : Narasamma & Another Versus State of Karnataka, Rptd By Principal Secretary Revenue Department, Bengaluru & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Appellants: Chokkareddy, Advocate. For the Respondents: R1 to R4 K.S. Harish, Government Advocate.
Date of Judgment : 02-12-2025
Head Note :-
Karnataka High Court Act - Section 4-

Comparative Citation:
2025 KHC 50176,
Summary :-
1. Statutes / Acts / Rules / Orders / Regulations, and Sections Mentioned:
- Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act
- Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 [PTCL Act]
- Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act
- Section 5 of the PTCL Act
- Amendment Act 30 of 2023 (amending Section 5(1) of the PTCL Act)
- Article 136 of the Constitution of India

2. Catch Words:
- Limitation
- Delay
- Laches
- Resumption
- Restoration

3. Summary:
The appellants filed an intra‑court appeal against a single judge’s order dismissing their writ petition challenging the restoration of a one‑acre land granted under the PTCL Act. The land, originally alienated without prior permission, was later sold, registered, and the sale approved by the Government under Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act. The single judge held the appellants’ application was barred by inordinate delay, citing Supreme Court precedents. The appellants argued that the 2023 amendment to Section 5 removed any limitation, but the court noted that the amendment merely restated the existing position that no statutory limitation exists and that equitable doctrines like laches still apply. The Supreme Court had also dismissed a related SLP. The appellate bench found the appeal itself filed after a delay of 644 days without sufficient cause and upheld the lower court’s dismissal on both procedural and substantive grounds.

4. Conclusion:
Appeal Dismissed
Judgment :-

(Prayer: This writ appeal is filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act praying to set aside the order in writ petition no.15546/2020 dated 13/09/2022, by allowing the appeal & etc.)

Oral Judgment:

Vibhu Bakhru, C. J.

1. The office objections have been complied with. We consider it apposite to restore the present appeal.

2. The appellants have filed the present intra-court appeal impugning an order dated 13.09.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.15546/2020 (SC-ST). The appellants had filed the said petition impugning an order dated 11.09.2020 passed by respondent No.2 (Deputy Commissioner) whereby the appeal preferred by respondent no.5 against an order passed by respondent no. 3, (Assistant Commissioner) was allowed.

3. The dispute relates to the appellants' application for resumption of the subject land measuring one (01) acre falling in Old Sy.No.104, (New Sy.No.104/P-51), located in Doddachimmanahalli Village, Kundana Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bangalore Rural District [subject land]. The subject land was granted to one late Sri. Munishamappa, s/o Narasimhappa on 30.09.1964. Saguvali chit was issued on 22.08.1983. In terms of the grant certificate, the subject land could not be alienated for a period of fifteen years.

4. Apparently, the original grantee (Sri. Munishamappa) sold the subject land to one Smt. Lakshmidevamma, wife of Narayanaswamy. After the said sale, the grantee (Munishamappa) filed a petition before the Assistant Commissioner under the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 [PTCL Act], seeking restoration of the subject land. The same was allowed in terms of an order dated 24.08.1998.

5. The said grantee once again sold the subject land, this time to respondent No.5 in terms of a sale deed dated 14.03.2005. However, the said sale deed was not registered as the permission for alienation of the land had not been obtained. Thus, absent any registered deed of conveyance, respondent No.5 did not acquire any interest in the subject land on the execution of the sale deed. Thereafter, the grantee filed an application seeking permission from the concerned authority to sell the subject land. The application for grant of permission was recommended by the Tahsildar in terms of a letter dated 22.11.2005. Pursuant to the same, the State Government granted approval for the sale of the subject land under Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act, which was communicated to the concerned parties by a letter dated 25.05.2007. Thereafter, the subject land was registered in favour of respondent No.5 on 07.11.2007 and the registered sale deed was released to him.

6. The original grantee, Sri. Munishamappa, expired on 08.09.2009. His son Sri. Narasimahappa also expired on 27.04.2010. Thereafter, the appellant no.1, who is the widow of Sri. Narasimahappa (son of the original grantee) filed an application before respondent No.3 (Assistant Commissioner) under Section 5 and 4(2) of the PTCL Act seeking resumption of the land.

7. The Assistant Commissioner allowed the said application by an order dated 28.07.2018, on the ground that the permission to sell the subject land was not obtained prior to the execution of the sale deed; the same was applied for and granted after the sale deed had been executed in favour of respondent no.5.

8. Respondent No.5 appealed the said order before the Deputy Commissioner, which was allowed in terms of an order dated 11.09.2020. The Deputy Commissioner noticed that the restriction imposed in the grant certificate was for non-alienation of land for a period of fifteen years. The same had been violated by Sri. Munishamappa by sale of the subject land to Lakshmidevamma and therefore the land was restored. It was noted that the subject land was transferred through a registered sale deed, which was released and registered on 07.11.2011 after the prior permission of the Government was granted on 18.06.2007. Therefore there was no violation of the PTCL Act.

9. The appellants preferred the writ petition challenging the said order which was dismissed by the impugned order on the ground that the application for restoration was filed after an inordinate delay. As noted above, the land was transferred pursuant to a sale deed dated 14.03.2005. It was registered on 07.11.2007. The application seeking restoration of the land was filed on 09.10.2017, which was more than 12 years after the sale deed was resented and 10 years after the date of registration. The learned Single Judge referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and another : 2018 (1) Kar.L.R. 5 (SC) and Chhedi Lal Yadav and others v. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. and others : 2018 (1) Kar.L.R.1 (SC) and held that in view of the inordinate delay, the same was not maintainable. The learned Single Judge had also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ningappa V. Deputy Commissioner and others: (2020) 14 SCC 236, reaterating the said view.

10. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that Section 5 of the PTCL Act was subsequently amended by Amendment Act 30 of 2023, whereby Clauses (c) and (d) are introduced in Section 5 (1) of the Act. Clause (c) provides that there would be no limitation for invoking the provision of the PTCL Act.

11. The import of the said amendment is considered by the Co- ordinate Bench of this Court in Smt. Gouramma @ Gangamma v. The Deputy Commissioner, Haveri and others : NC: 2024: KHC-D:10666-DB, and the the Court held as under.

                  "(d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity".

12. The Special Leave Petition preferred against the decision of this Court in Smt. Gouramma (supra) being SLP.(C) Diary.No.19020/2025 was dismissed by the Supreme Court by an order dated 09.05.2025, which reads as under:

                  "Heard learned counsel for the petitioner(s).

                  We see no merit in this case which calls for our interference, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

                  The present petition is, accordingly, dismissed along with pending application(s), if any."

13. In view of the above, we find no infirmity with the decision of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground that the appellant had filed an application for restoration of the sale deed after an inordinate delay. We are also not persuaded to interfere with the said order for the reason that in the present case, the Government had granted permission for sale of the land. The registration and release of the sale deed, which conferred title on respondent No.5, was done after the permission had been granted.

14. We also find that the present appeal has been filed after an inordinate delay of 644 days and there is no credible explanation for such delay. Apart from stating that the second appellant is a senior citizen; has age-related issues; belongs to a depressed class; had no legal knowledge or awareness to file the appeal within thirty days; and was not aware of the order, no other explanation is provided. These general grounds do not present a sufficient cause prevent the appellants from filing the appeal within the prescribed time.

15. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed, both on the grounds of delay as well as on merits.

16. Pending application stands disposed of.

 
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