1. This Criminal Petition is filed seeking to quash the proceedings against the petitioner in STC.NI.No.6651 of 2023 pending on the file of the learned VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Manoranjan Complex, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the complainant had filed a private complaint on 22.02.2023 before the VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, alleging that the petitioner had borrowed Rs.9,00,000/- and Rs.21,00,000/- as hand loans and had executed two promissory notes for Rs.30,00,000/-. It was further alleged that the petitioner had issued two cheques of Rs.15,00,000/- each, which were dishonoured with the endorsement “Exceeds Arrangement”. The complainant claimed to have issued a statutory notice and, upon receiving a reply denying liability, filed the complaint under Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act.

3. Heard Smt. Radha Rani Devaneni, learned counsel representing Smt. Pulipati Vandana, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as Sri. D. Arun Kumar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent - State and Sri Syed Khamruddin, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the allegations were false and did not disclose any offence under the NI Act and that the complaint was time-barred, vague, inconsistent, and based on a legally unenforceable debt. She further submitted that part payments were not endorsed on the cheques, the statutory notice lacked material particulars, and the alleged cash loan violated the Income Tax Act. She contended that the cognizance order lacked reasons and that continuation of proceedings amounted to abuse of process. In support of her submissions, she relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnam Raju Finances, Hyderabad v. Abida Sultana and another (2004 (1) ALD (Crl.) 546 (AP)), Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa (AIR 2019 SC 1983), and Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited ((2016) 10 SCC 458), Therefore, she prayed the Court to quash the proceedings against the petitioner by allowing this criminal petition.

5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that the petitioner had approached the Court with unclean hands by suppressing material facts and was attempting to misuse Section 482 Cr.P.C. to evade repayment of a clearly admitted and legally enforceable debt. He further submitted that the petitioner had taken a hand loan of Rs.30,00,000/- in the year 2016, acknowledged the liability by issuing two promissory notes and two cheques for Rs.15,00,000/- each, and thereafter defaulted on both principal and agreed interest. He contended that the cheques were dishonoured with the endorsements “Exceeds Arrangement” and “Funds Insufficient”, and a statutory notice was duly issued within time. He further submitted that the complaint was filed within the limitation period, the pleas of the petitioner were false, vague and intended to mislead the Court, and that the allegations in the complaint constituted a clear prima facie offence under Section 138 NI Act. He emphasized that the petitioner had been evading trial, had not appeared before the Magistrate, and was seeking to derail the proceedings. In support of his submissions, he relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.V. Murthy v. B.S. Nagabasavanna ((2002) 2 SCC 642), and Biten P. Dalal v. Bratindranatha Banerjee ((2001) 6 SCC 16), Therefore, he prayed the Court to dismiss the criminal petition.

6. In the light of the submissions made by both the learned counsel and upon perusal of the material placed on record, it appears that the primary contention of the petitioner that the promissory note was executed in the year 2016 and the complaint was filed in the year 2022, thereby rendering the alleged debt time-barred, cannot be adjudicated at this stage in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Whether a legally enforceable debt existed on the dates of issuance of the cheques, whether any part-payment amounted to acknowledgment of debt under law, and whether the debt was time-barred or saved by such acknowledgment, are all matters which require evidence to be led before the trial Court. Such disputed questions of fact cannot be examined in quash proceedings. The reliance placed by the petitioner on the judgment in Basalingappa (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand, as the said decision arose out of appellate proceedings after full-fledged trial based on appreciation of evidence.

7. The further contention of the petitioner that the complainant did not possess a money-lending licence is also not a ground for quashing proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, as the existence of a licence is not a statutory requirement for the maintainability of a complaint under the said provision. This issue, too, is a triable factual question. At the stage of considering a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court is required only to examine whether the complaint, taken at face value, discloses the ingredients of the offence.

8. In the present case, the allegations in the complaint, issuance of cheques, their dishonour, statutory notice, and filing of complaint within time collectively disclose a prima facie offence under Section 138 NI Act. Consequently, the grounds raised by the petitioner involve disputed factual aspects which cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and no case for quashing is made out. Hence, the criminal petition lacks merit and the same is liable to be dismissed.

9. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is dismissed.

Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.