(Prayer: To call for the records and set aside the order as to deposit of 20 percentage of the compensation amount before the Trial court at the credit of CC within sixty days from the date of order of suspension of sentence, passed in Crl.MP.No.1/2025 in CA.No.657/2025, dated 14-5-2025, passed by XIX Additional Sessions Judge/Vacation Sessions Judge, Chennai.)

1. This Criminal Original Petition has been filed to call for the records and set aside the order directing the petitioner to deposit of 20% of the compensation amount before the Trial court, to the credit of C.C. No.2808 of 2014, within sixty days from the date of the order of suspension of sentence passed in Crl. M.P. No.1 of 2025 in C.A. No. 657 of 2025, dated 14.05.2025, by the XIX Additional Sessions Judge/Vacation Sessions Judge, Chennai.

2. The case of the complainant is that the respondent / complainant has originally filed a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C., for the offence committed under Section 138 r/w Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, against the petitioner / accused before the XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, and the same has been taken cognizance. After full-fledged trial, the trial Court has convicted the accused and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of nine months and directed him to pay the cheque amount of Rs.78,00,000/- as compensation under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C., to the complainant, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two months, by judgment dated 23.04.2025.

                   2.1. Against the said judgment, the petitioner / accused has preferred an appeal before the Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai. On 14.05.2025, the First Appellate Court has suspended the sentence till 22.05.2025 and in terms of Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2018, directed that the sentence imposed on the appellant / accused be suspended and enlarged the accused on bail on execution of a bond for Rs.10,000/- with two sureties each for a likesum to the satisfaction of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court – V, Saidapet, Chennai on or before 22.05.2025, and enlarged him on bail. The First Appellate Court also directed the petitioner to deposit 20% of the compensation amount before the trial Court, to the credit of C.C.No.2808 of 2014, within 60 days from the date of the said order.

                   2.2. Aggrieved by the said conditional order passed by the First Appellate Court, the petitioner / accused has preferred this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to set aside the conditional order imposed by the First Appellate Court.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the First Appellate Court has proceeded on an erroneous premise that the deposit of a minimum of 20% of the compensation amount is mandatory in all cases and that there is no scope for dispensing with the said requirement. According to the learned counsel, when the petitioner seeks suspension of sentence without insisting upon such deposit, the Appellate Court is required to examine whether the facts and circumstances of the case warrant exercise of its discretion to dispense with the deposit.

                   3.1. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jamboo Bhandari v. M.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. And Others reported in 2023 (3) MWN (Cr.) DCC 104 (SC).

                   3.2. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the order of the First Appellate Court directing the petitioner to deposit 20% of the compensation amount may be set aside and the sentence may be suspended without imposing any condition.

4. The learned counsel for the respondent would submit that, in view of Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the High Court, the deposit of 20% of the compensation amount is mandatory. As such, the First Appellate Court has rightly directed the petitioner to deposit 20% of the compensation amount. The petitioner has not shown any reason to grant an exception from the said requirement. Therefore, the learned counsel would submit that the First Appellate Court was right in imposing the said condition while suspending the sentence.

5. This Court has carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent and perused the materials available on record.

6. There can be no doubt that the requirement of depositing 20% of the compensation amount while considering an application for suspension of sentence cannot be treated as an absolute and inflexible rule in all cases. The Appellate Court undoubtedly possesses the discretion to consider whether the facts and circumstances of a particular case warrant dispensing with or modifying such condition. If the First Appellate Court decides to grant exemption from imposing the condition of depositing 20% of the compensation amount, it has to record the reasons thereof.

7. In the present case, the petitioner has not placed any material either before the First Appellate Court or before this Court to demonstrate that the case falls within any exceptional circumstances warranting complete dispensation with the requirement of deposit. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner has not placed before this Court any specific material demonstrating his inability to comply with the condition imposed by the First Appellate Court. Even during the course of arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has not advanced any substantial grounds or circumstances which would persuade this Court to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner.

8. In Jamboo Bhandari v. M.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. And Others reported in 2023 (3) MWN (Cr.) DCC 104 (SC) (supra), which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that the First Appellate Court has the discretion to grant suspension of sentence without any condition, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

                   “7. When the Appellate Court considers the prayer under Section 389 Cr.P.C., of an accused, who has been convicted for offence under Section 138 of NI Act, it is always open for the Appellate Court to consider whether it is an exceptional case which warrants grant of suspension of sentence without imposing the condition of deposit of 20% of the fine / compensation amount. As stated earlier, if the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that it is an exceptional case, the reasons for coming to the said conclusion must be recorded.

                   8. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the Original Complainant is that neither before the Sessions Court nor before the High Court, there was a plea made by the Appellants that an exception may be made in these cases and the requirement of deposit or minimum 20% of the amount be dispensed with. He submits that if such a prayer was not made by the Appellants, there were no reasons for the Courts to consider the said plea.

                   9. We disagree with the above submission. When an accused applies under Section 389 Cr.P.C. for suspension of sentence, he normally applies for grant of relief of suspension of sentence without any condition. Therefore, when a blanket order is sought by the Appellants, the Court has to consider whether the case falls in exception or not.”

9. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Muskan Enterprises & Another Vs. State of Punjab and Another reported in (2024) 20 SCC 85, observed as follows:

                   “29. We may take the discussion a little forward to emphasise our point of view. There could arise a case before the appellate court where such court is capable of forming an opinion, even in course of considering as to what would be the appropriate quantum of fine or compensation to be kept in deposit, that the impugned conviction and the consequent sentence recorded/imposed by the trial court is so wholly incorrect and erroneous that it is only a matter of time for the same to be set aside and that ordering a deposit would be unnecessarily burdensome for the appellant.

                   30. Such firm opinion could be formed on a plain reading of the order, such as, the conviction might have been recorded and sentence imposed without adherence to the mandatory procedural requirements of the NI Act prior to/at the time lodging of the complaint by the complainant rendering the proceedings vitiated, or the trial Court might have rejected admissible evidence from being led and/or relied on inadmissible evidence which was permitted to be led, or the trial court might have recorded an order of conviction which is its ipse dixit, without any assessment/analysis of the evidence and/or totally misappreciating the evidence on record, or the trial court might have passed an order failing to disclose application of mind and/or sufficient reasons thereby establishing the link between the appellant and the offence, alleged and found to be proved, or that the compensation awarded is so excessive and outrageous that it fails to meet the proportionality test: all that, which would evince an order to be in defiance of the applicable law and, thus, liable to be labelled as perverse.”

10. Considering the above observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the view that the present case does not fall within any of the grounds mentioned in the judgment so as to persuade this Court to set aside the order imposing the condition of depositing 20% of the compensation amount.

11. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner recognise the discretion available to the First Appellate Court and do not lay down that the requirement of deposit has to be dispensed with as a matter of course. The exercise of such discretion necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances of each and every case. If the First Appellate Court considers a case to be exceptional, warranting the grant of suspension of sentence without imposing the condition of deposit of 20% of the fine or compensation amount, it must record the reasons thereof.

12. As such, in the present case, this Court do not find any ground or reason to exercise its discretion to dispense with the deposit of 20% of the compensation amount.

13. Therefore, this Court finds no infirmity or illegality in the conditional order passed by the First Appellate Court warranting interference in exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court.

14. Accordingly, this Criminal Original Petition stands dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.