1. This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”) by the Petitioner/Accused, seeking quashing of the proceedings in C.C. No. 8191 of 2023 pending on the file of the IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally, Hyderabad, for the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) and Section 12(1)(b) of the Passports Act, 1967, arising out of FIR No. 24 of 2023 registered at Nallakunta Police Station.

2. Heard Mr. A. Tulsi Raj Gokul, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Syed Yasar Mamoon, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1.

3.1. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the complainant/respondent No.2 and the petitioner are husband and wife, their marriage having been solemnized on 04.03.2020. They have a minor son, who was born on 30.03.2021. The parties are involved in matrimonial litigation, including proceedings under Section 498-A of the IPC, child-custody proceedings before the Family Court at Bangalore, and proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights at Hyderabad.

               3.2. According to respondent No.2, the petitioner left the matrimonial home on 30.06.2021 along with the minor child and thereafter shifted to Bangalore. He alleges that, in November 2021, he came to know that the petitioner intended to relocate to Singapore with the child, where she had previously worked and held a work visa. He claims to have approached the Child Welfare Commission, the Regional Passport Authority, Bangalore, and the Collector, and to have obtained orders from the competent Family Court concerning the movement of the child outside the jurisdiction.

               3.3. Respondent No.2 further alleges that the petitioner cancelled her earlier passport and applied for a fresh passport without mentioning him as her husband, thereby allegedly concealing the subsisting matrimonial relationship. It is further alleged that, on 14.12.2021, she applied before the Original Passport Office, Bangalore, for issuance of a passport to the minor child, leaving the father’s name blank and allegedly relying upon Annexure-C/Annexure-D without his consent. It is also alleged that she obtained an Aadhaar card for the minor child on 04.12.2021 without informing him and without reflecting his name therein.

               3.4. According to respondent No.2, the petitioner suppressed the pendency of the matrimonial and child-custody proceedings from the passport authorities and failed to furnish the requisite declaration. He states that, on 04.01.2022, the Regional Passport Office required the petitioner to furnish the father’s consent through Annexure-D or to produce an appropriate court order; however, according to him, she did not comply thereafter.

               3.5. Respondent No.2 further states that he had earlier approached the Nallakunta Police Station by e-mails dated 24.07.2022 and 10.01.2023, but no action was taken. Thereafter, pursuant to his private complaint filed under Section 200 read with Section 156(3) of the CrPC, the learned IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, directed registration of an FIR, resulting in Crime No.24 of 2023 of Nallakunta Police Station. The investigation was entrusted to the SIT, and the proceedings have culminated in C.C. No.8191 of 2023.

4.1. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been falsely implicated and that, even if the allegations are taken at their face value, the essential ingredients of the alleged offences are not made out. It is contended that the passport application was made before the Regional Passport Authority at Bangalore and, therefore, the alleged passport-related acts occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of the learned IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad.

               4.2. With regard to the offence under Section 406 of the IPC, it is submitted that there is no allegation of entrustment of property, dishonest misappropriation, or conversion. Insofar as Section 420 of the IPC is concerned, it is contended that there is no allegation of dishonest inducement, delivery of property or valuable security, or dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction.

               4.3. As regards Section 12(1)(b) of the Passports Act, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner disclosed her matrimonial status as “separated” and furnished Annexure-C in relation to the passport application concerning the minor child. It is, therefore, contended that there was no conscious or knowing furnishing of false information. The petitioner also relies upon the fact that she approached the Family Court at Bangalore in relation to the minor child’s passport, which subsequently directed respondent No.2 to appear before the Regional Passport Authority and render his consent. According to the petitioner, such conduct negatives any allegation of clandestine or fraudulent intention.

               4.4. It is further contended that the criminal proceedings arise out of an ongoing matrimonial and child-custody dispute and that the criminal machinery has been invoked to give a criminal colour to what is essentially a matrimonial dispute. Learned counsel submits that continuation of the proceedings, despite the absence of the essential ingredients of the alleged offences, would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Reliance is placed on Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287, with regard to the safeguards applicable to an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. The petitioner accordingly seeks quashing of C.C. No.8191 of 2023 insofar as she is concerned.

5.1. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the present petition is an attempt to have disputed questions of fact adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. It is contended that the petitioner is relying upon her defence, which cannot properly be examined by conducting a mini-trial at the stage of quashing.

               5.2. It is submitted that, despite the pendency of matrimonial and child-custody proceedings, the petitioner applied for the minor child’s passport at Bangalore on 14.12.2021, allegedly leaving the father’s name blank and relying upon Annexure-C/Annexure-D without obtaining the consent of respondent No.2, even though he was alive, available, and in communication with her. Respondent No.2 further relies upon the alleged obtaining of the minor child’s Aadhaar card on 04.12.2021 without his knowledge and the subsequent passport application, contending that these circumstances disclose deliberate conduct on the part of the petitioner.

               5.3. Respondent No.2 contends that the alleged omission of the father’s particulars and suppression of material information constitute a prima facie case under Section 12(1)(b) of the Passports Act. According to him, whether the information furnished by the petitioner was false or incomplete, whether Annexure-C/Annexure-D was properly invoked, and whether the passport authority was thereby deceived are matters requiring examination on the basis of evidence. It is further contended that these issues, including the question of territorial jurisdiction, cannot appropriately be conclusively determined at the threshold.

               5.4. Learned counsel submits that merely because the passport application was made at Bangalore, the proceedings instituted at Hyderabad are not liable to be quashed, particularly when, according to respondent No.2, consequences of the alleged acts were suffered at Hyderabad in relation to his parental rights. Reliance is placed on Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728, in support of the contention that territorial jurisdiction ordinarily cannot, at the threshold, be made a ground for stalling criminal proceedings.

               5.5. It is further submitted that the mere pendency of matrimonial proceedings does not bar prosecution for an independent criminal offence. Reliance is placed on Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370, and Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686. Learned counsel also relies upon State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, contending that the allegations, when taken at their face value, disclose the factual foundation of the alleged offences and do not fall within the categories warranting quashing of the criminal proceedings.

               5.6. According to respondent No.2, the petitioner’s assertion that she disclosed her status as “separated”, furnished Annexure-C, and approached the Family Court are matters of defence. Their evidentiary value, it is submitted, can be properly assessed only during the course of trial. It is, therefore, prayed that the Criminal Petition be dismissed and that the criminal proceedings be permitted to continue in accordance with law.

6. I have carefully considered the submissions and perused the material available on record.

7. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent No.2, the birth of their minor child on 30.03.2021, and the pendency of several matrimonial and child-custody proceedings between the parties are not in dispute. The gravamen of the present complaint is that, during the pendency of such proceedings, the petitioner allegedly applied for a passport for the minor child before the Regional Passport Office, Bangalore, leaving the father’s particulars blank and allegedly suppressing material information, including the pendency of the matrimonial and child-custody proceedings, with the intention of taking the minor child to Singapore.

8. The petitioner disputes these allegations and contends that she had disclosed her status as “separated”, furnished Annexure-C, and thereafter approached the Family Court at Bangalore in relation to the passport of the minor child. It is her further contention that the essential ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC are absent and that the criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of the process of law, having arisen out of a matrimonial dispute.

9. The rival submissions, therefore, require consideration under three broad heads: (i) territorial jurisdiction and the competence of the police to register and investigate the crime; (ii) compliance with the requirements governing an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.; and (iii) whether the allegations disclose the ingredients of the offences alleged so as to warrant interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

10.1. Insofar as the principal contention regarding territorial jurisdiction is concerned, the petitioner submits that the passport application was submitted before the Regional Passport Office at Bangalore and, therefore, the police at Hyderabad had no territorial jurisdiction either to register or investigate the crime. Section 156(1) of the CrPC empowers the officer in charge of a police station to investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such police station would have power to inquire into or try. At the same time, Section 156(2) of the CrPC expressly provides that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall, at any stage, be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under Section 156(1) of the Cr.P.C. to investigate.

               10.2. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728, held that territorial jurisdiction is ordinarily a matter to be determined during the course of investigation and that an FIR ought not to be quashed at the threshold merely on the ground that the alleged offences appear to have been committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the police station. The Court also noticed the provisions of Sections 178 and 179 of the CrPC, which contemplate situations where the acts constituting an offence or their consequences occur in different territorial jurisdictions. The said principle has subsequently been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

               10.3. In the present case, although the passport application was admittedly made before the Regional Passport Office at Bangalore, the allegations are not confined merely to the physical act of submitting the application. The prosecution alleges suppression of material information and an attempt to obtain a passport for the minor child in circumstances which, according to the complainant, affected his parental rights and interests at Hyderabad. Whether such consequences are, in law and on the facts of the case, sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction is ultimately a matter dependent upon the facts and evidence. Section 179 of the CrPC provides that when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction either such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 4, has explained the principle that, where the consequences of an alleged act ensue at a place different from the place where the act was committed, jurisdiction may arise at the place where such consequence ensued. Therefore, at this stage, this Court cannot hold that the registration and investigation of the crime by Nallakunta Police Station are without jurisdiction merely because the passport application was submitted at Bangalore. The objection relating to territorial jurisdiction, by itself, does not furnish a ground for quashing the proceedings.

11.1. The next contention relates to the application of Section 156(3) of the CrPC and the safeguards laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the safeguards governing an application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC were required to be complied with before the learned Magistrate could direct registration and investigation of the case. There can be no dispute regarding the principle laid down in the said decision. Taking note of the possibility of misuse of the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an application invoking such jurisdiction should be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant. The object of the requirement is to ensure responsibility for the allegations made and, where appropriate, to enable the Magistrate to verify the truth or otherwise of the allegations before directing investigation.

               11.2. However, the material presently placed before this Court does not conclusively establish that the application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC was not supported by the requisite affidavit. Nor does the material demonstrate that the learned Magistrate passed the referral order mechanically or without application of mind. The mere fact that the complaint was filed under Section 200 read with Section 156(3) of the CrPC and was thereafter referred for investigation does not, by itself, establish non-compliance with the requirements laid down in Priyanka Srivastava (supra). Consequently, the said ground cannot be accepted in the absence of material demonstrating a clear and material violation of the safeguards prescribed in Priyanka Srivastava (supra). The petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to seek quashing of the proceedings on this ground.

12.1. The next question is whether the allegations disclose the essential ingredients of the offences under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC. Section 405 of the IPC defines criminal breach of trust. Entrustment of property, or dominion over property, followed by dishonest misappropriation, conversion, use, or disposal of such property in violation of any direction of law or any legal contract, constitutes the foundational requirement of the offence. Section 406 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for criminal breach of trust. On a careful consideration of the allegations placed before this Court, there is no specific allegation that respondent No.2 entrusted any property, or dominion over any property, to the petitioner and that the petitioner thereafter dishonestly misappropriated or converted such property. The allegations essentially relate to the making of passport and identity-document applications, the alleged omission of particulars, and the alleged suppression of information before the passport authority. Even if the allegations are taken at their face value, they do not disclose the basic ingredient of entrustment, which is indispensable for constituting an offence of criminal breach of trust. The existence of a matrimonial relationship between the parties does not, by itself, supply the missing element of entrustment. Consequently, the proceedings insofar as they relate to the offence under Section 406 of the IPC cannot be sustained.

               12.2. The other allegation is under Section 420 of the IPC. The said provision is attracted where cheating results in dishonest or fraudulent inducement to deliver property or to make, alter, or destroy a valuable security. The allegations must, therefore, disclose the ingredients of cheating under Section 415 of the IPC, together with the consequential inducement contemplated under Section 420 of the IPC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168, held that, where the allegation is one of cheating, the intention to cheat must exist at the inception. Subsequent conduct, by itself, cannot establish the requisite dishonest intention at the inception.

               12.3. In the present case, the alleged deception is said to have been practiced upon the passport authority by furnishing false or incomplete particulars in the application relating to the minor child. However, the complaint, as placed before this Court, does not disclose that, by reason of such alleged deception, the petitioner dishonestly induced the complainant or any other person to deliver any property or valuable security, or to make, alter, or destroy any valuable security. The mere allegation of furnishing false or incomplete information in a passport application, without the additional statutory ingredients of cheating and dishonest inducement resulting in delivery of property or valuable security, cannot, by itself, constitute an offence under Section 420 of the IPC. Accordingly, the ingredients of Section 420 of the IPC are also not made out from the allegations as pleaded. Continuation of the proceedings in respect of the said offence would, therefore, amount to an abuse of the process of law.

13.1. The position, however, is different insofar as the offence under Section 12(1)(b) of the Passports Act is concerned. The said provision specifically deals with knowingly furnishing false information or knowingly suppressing material information in relation to obtaining a passport or travel document. The allegations in the present case directly concern the passport application made in respect of the minor child. The prosecution alleges that, despite the pendency of matrimonial and child-custody proceedings, and despite respondent No.2 being alive and available, the petitioner left the father's particulars blank and furnished information and documents without his consent, thereby allegedly suppressing material information before the passport authority. The petitioner, on the other hand, asserts that she disclosed her matrimonial status as “separated”, furnished Annexure-C, and thereafter approached the Family Court at Bangalore, which directed respondent No.2 to appear before the passport authority and render his consent.

               13.2. These rival versions give rise to several factual questions, including, (a) the exact particulars furnished in the passport application; (b) the nature and contents of Annexure-C and Annexure-D; (c) whether the omission of the father's particulars was deliberate; (d) whether any material information was knowingly suppressed; (e) what information was required to be disclosed under the applicable passport procedure; and (f) whether the petitioner acted with the requisite knowledge contemplated by Section 12(1)(b) of the Passports Act. These questions cannot appropriately be determined merely on the basis of the rival assertions of the parties at the stage of exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC.

               13.3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Niharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, has reiterated that, while exercising inherent jurisdiction, the High Court should not conduct a mini-trial or undertake an appreciation of disputed evidence and that investigation into a cognizable offence should ordinarily not be interdicted at the threshold. The petitioner’s reliance upon her own version that she disclosed her status as “separated” and furnished the relevant Annexure essentially raises matters of defence. Unless the undisputed documentary material conclusively demonstrates that no false information was furnished and that no material information was knowingly suppressed, those questions are required to be determined in accordance with law on the basis of evidence. Accordingly, this Court is not persuaded to quash the proceedings insofar as the offence under Section 12(1)(b) of the Passports Act is concerned.

14. The pendency of matrimonial or civil proceedings is undoubtedly a relevant circumstance; however, such pendency does not, by itself, preclude criminal prosecution where the allegations independently disclose the ingredients of a criminal offence. In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370, and Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686, the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised that the existence of a matrimonial or civil dispute does not, by itself, bar criminal proceedings where the allegations otherwise disclose the commission of a criminal offence. At the same time, the Court must guard against giving a criminal colour to a dispute which is purely civil or matrimonial in nature. In the present case, however, the allegation under the Passports Act is founded upon a specific passport application and the alleged suppression of information before a statutory authority. It cannot, at this stage, be characterised as a purely matrimonial allegation having no independent criminal element. The petitioner may ultimately establish, upon evidence, that the information furnished by her was truthful and that the applicable passport requirements were duly complied with. However, such defence cannot be conclusively adjudicated in the present proceedings.

15. It is well settled that the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly. The principles stated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, continue to operate as the governing parameters, particularly in cases where the allegations, even if taken at their face value, do not constitute an offence or where continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

16. In the present case, the allegations do not disclose the foundational ingredient of entrustment necessary for an offence under Section 406 of the IPC. Nor do they disclose the essential element of dishonest inducement resulting in delivery of property or valuable security necessary to constitute an offence under Section 420 of the IPC. To that extent, the case falls within the principle that where the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the alleged offences, the proceedings may be quashed.

17. The allegation under Section 12(1)(b) of the Passports Act, however, stands on a different footing. The complaint contains specific allegations concerning the passport application, the alleged omission of the father’s particulars, and the alleged suppression of material information. Whether those allegations are ultimately established is a matter to be determined by the competent Court upon appreciation of evidence. This Court would exceed the permissible limits of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. if it were to adjudicate such disputed questions of fact at this stage.

18. For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the considered view that the objection relating to territorial jurisdiction does not warrant quashing of the proceedings. The registration and investigation of the crime by Nallakunta Police Station cannot be held to be without jurisdiction merely because the passport application was submitted at Bangalore. Likewise, the objection based upon Priyanka Srivastava (supra) does not warrant interference in the absence of material demonstrating specific and consequential non-compliance with the safeguards governing an application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. However, the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, do not disclose the essential ingredients of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the IPC or cheating under Section 420 of the IPC. The proceedings in respect of those offences are, therefore, liable to be quashed. Insofar as Section 12(1)(b) of the Passports Act is concerned, the allegations disclose a prima facie case requiring examination of disputed factual matters relating to the passport application and the alleged suppression of information. Such matters cannot be adjudicated by conducting a mini-trial in exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. The proceedings for the offence under Section 12(1)(b) of the Passports Act are, therefore, liable to continue.

19. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is partly allowed. The proceedings in C.C. No.8191 of 2023 on the file of IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally, Hyderabad against the petitioner/accused are quashed insofar as offences under Sections 406 and 420 of IPC are concerned. The proceeding insofar as the offence punishable under Section 12(1)(b) of Passports Act shall continue in accordance with law.

20. It is made clear that the observations made herein are confined to the consideration of the petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the allegations under Section 12(1)(b) of Passports Act. The competent Court shall consider the matter independently on the basis of evidence placed before it uninfluenced by any observations made by this Court in this order.

As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.