1. Heard Mr. J. B. Kasat, learned Counsel for the Petitioners and Mr. N. R. Saboo, learned Counsel for the Respondent.

2. The Petitioner/Zilla Parishad, who is the statutory Corporation, challenged the Judgment and Award dated 29/10/2012 passed by the Labour Court, Amravati in IDA No. 6/2003, whereby the learned Labour Court has directed the Petitioners to reinstate the Respondent/Employee with continuity in service, but without back wages.

3. The facts giving rise to the present case can be summarised as under :

The Respondent/Employee, who claimed to have worked with the Petitioner/Corporation for a period from 1/8/1991 to 30/6/1996, has raised a grievance before the Additional Commissioner of Labour, Nagpur and as the said dispute was not resolved, the same was referred by the Authority for adjudication under the Industrial Dispute Act to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Amravati, who in turn, registered the said reference as Reference IDA No. 6/2003.

According to the Respondent/Employee, though he has rendered continuous service from 1/8/1991 to 30/6/1996 i.e. almost five years, his services were illegally terminated with effect from 30/6/1996 in violation of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

4. According to the Respondent/Employee, an Irrigation Department, run by the Zilla Parishad, is governed by the provisions of Kalelkar Award. After completion of five years of service, the Employee is required to be transferred to CRT and then he get the benefit of service. However, in order to deprive the Respondent/Employee from getting benefit of Kalelkar Award, his services were terminated. He has also stated that under Section 2-A of the Industrial Dispute Act, there is no provision of limitation. He further stated that dispute raised by him before Conciliation Officer was within a reasonable period. Considering this fact, conciliation proceedings were referred to the Labour Court, Amravati.

5. Before the Labour Court, the Respondent/Employee, in order to prove his case, has given the notice to the Petitioner to produce and call the documents as per the statement of the Petitioner/Zilla Parishad. According to the Respondent/Employee, the entire record in respect of his attendance and payment made to him was available in the office of Petitioner/Zilla Parishad and maintained the same, which can demonstrate that Respondent/Employee has rendered continuous service of five to six years with the Petitioner.

6. The learned Labour Court, in response to the application filed by the Respondent/Employee for production of document, has directed the Petitioner to produce Muster Roll, for the period, which is alleged by the Respondent/Employee to have worked in the Petitioner/Zilla Parishad. However, though the directions were issued by the Labour Court, documents were not produced by the Petitioner. As a result, the learned Labour Court has drawn adverse inference against the Petitioner for non-production of documents on record. The Labour Court has concluded that the Respondent/Employee has worked for more than 240 days preceding the date of his termination i.e. the period mentioned in the statement of claim before the Labour Court.

7. The learned Labour Court also recorded the finding that there is a violation of Section 25-F, as no retrenchment compensation was offered to the Respondent/Employee before his termination.

8. The Respondent/Employee has further pointed out from the order of Labour Court that junior persons namely, Gajanan Maldhure, Raju Kokate and others are retained by the Petitioner after termination of the Respondent/Employee. This fact is not denied by the Petitioner during the course of cross-examination of Petitioner’s witness.

9. The learned Counsel for Respondent, by pointing out all factual aspects, has stated that the learned Labour Court has rightly appreciated the controversy in the matter and answered the reference in affirmative by directing the Petitioner to reinstate the Respondent/Employee with continuity of service, but without back wages.

10. The learned Counsel for Petitioner has stated that in the present matter, though it is admitted that the Respondent/Employee has worked from 1/8/1991 to 30/6/1996, he approached to the Conciliation Officer in the year 2003. As such, there is a huge delay on the part of Respondent/Employee to approach before the Conciliation Officer, and hence, considering the delay caused in filing the proceeding he is not entitled for any relief as directed by the Labour Court.

11. The Petitioner further pointed out that he has rendered services only for the period of five years i.e. from 1/8/1991 to 30/6/1996, therefore, in such cases, compensation can be awarded in lieu of reinstatement and this matter can be disposed of accordingly.

12. In view of the submissions of both the parties, first issue, which arose in the matter is, ‘whether the proceeding filed by the Respondent/Employee are barred by limitation?’ It would be relevant to refer the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ajaib Singh V/s Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-Cum-Processing Service Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 Supreme Court Cases 82, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and that the relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. The relevant findings recorded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 10 of the Judgment are as under :

                    “10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages. Reliance of the learned counsel for the respondent management on the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander Morya v. State of Haryana is also of no help to him. In that case the High Court nowhere held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act were applicable in the proceedings under the Act. The Court specifically held "neither any limitation has been provided nor any guidelines to determine as to what shall be the period of limitation in such cases". However, it went on further to say that

                    " reasonable time in the cases of labour for demand of reference or dispute by appropriate Government to labour tribunals will be five years after which the Government can refuse to make a reference on the ground of delay and laches if there is no explanation to the delay".

                    We are of the opinion that the Punjab and Haryana High Court was not justified in prescribing the limitation for getting the reference made or an application under Section 33-C of the Act to be adjudicated. It is not the function of the court to prescribe the limitation where the legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding over the Court cannot be stretched to authorise them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the legislature. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has completely ignored the object of the Act and various pronouncements of this Court as noted hereinabove and thus is not a good law on the point of the applicability of the period of limitation for the purposes of invoking the jurisdiction of the courts/boards and tribunal under the Act.

13. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in my considered opinion, the impugned Judgment passed by the Labour Court cannot be rejected merely on the ground of delay, which is alleged by the Petitioner/Zilla Parishad without showing the real prejudice caused to them in the matter.

14. In the present matter, learned Counsel for the Respondent/Employee has relied upon the case of identical employee, who was also having same grievance as like the Respondent/Employee in the present matter and approached before this Court vide Writ Petition No. 7880/2017 (Ramsingh Dhande V/s CEO, ZP, Amravati) Decided on 14/8/2022. This Court, by considering the factual as well as legal position in the said matter, has recorded that the Employee therein was covered by Kalelkar Award, and therefore, was required to be brought on CRT after five years. It is observed that in case the junior persons were allowed to continue in service, then termination of Petitioner therein was in breach of Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, the Labour Court was not justified in directing payment of compensation instead of reinstatement.

15. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has relied upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited V/s Bhurumal, (2014) 7 Supreme Court Cases 177, more particularly, the observation recorded in paragraph 35, which reads as under :

                    “35. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground that it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go, viz – while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularised under some policy but the workman concerned terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied.”

16. The learned Counsel for Respondent/Employee, therefore, states that applying the same principle, as made applicable by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 7880/2017 stated that the Respondent/Employee is entitled for the same relief and the Petition filed by the Zilla Parishad deserves to be dismissed.

17. The learned Counsel for Petitioner/Zilla Parishad has strongly relied upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K. V. Anil Mithra and Another V/s Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and Another, (2022) 17 Supreme Court Cases 505. The submission of the Petitioner is that in case of retrenchment of regularly appointed daily wager and non-compliance of Section 25-F, in that case the relief can be moulded by granting monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement/back wages. Paragraph 46 of the said Judgment reads as under :

                    “46. In the facts and circumstances of the instant cases and looking into the nature of service rendered by the appellants as daily wager for a short period, while uploading the termination of the appellants being in violation of Section 25-F of the 1947 Act, we consider it just and reasonable to award a lump sum monetary compensation of Rs.2,50,000 (Rupees two lakhs fifty thousand) to each of the appellants workmen in full and final satisfaction of the dispute in lieu of right to claim reinstatement with 50% back wages as awarded by the Tribunal.”

18. In the present matter, considering the submissions of both parties and the case laws, which are relied upon by both the parties, in my considered opinion, it is clear from the record that junior persons to the Respondent/Employee has been regularised or continued in service by the Petitioner/Zilla Parishad. The said fact was not denied specifically during the course of evidence by the Petitioner/Zilla Parishad. The law laid down in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (supra), it is made clear that if the junior persons were regularised under some policy and the concerned workman has been terminated, in such case, the course of paying compensation in stead of reinstatement cannot be granted. Rather it is held that reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing such a relief can be denied.

19. In the light of above, Petitioner/Zilla Parishad failed to point out any perversity or illegality in the impugned Judgment passed by the learned Labour Court, and therefore, the present Petition being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.

20. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.

21. Since the Writ Petition is dismissed, pending Civil Application No. 1141/2025 does not survive. The same stands disposed of accordingly.