Muralee Krishna, J.

1. This W.P.(Criminal) is filed by the daughter of the detenue, Kamarunnisa C.V., aged 55 years, C/o. Basheer, Chekrayil Valappu, Konnat, West Hill, Kozhikode, challenging Ext.P1 order dated 17.10.2025 issued under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (‘PITNDPS Act’ for short) by the 2nd respondent Additional Chief Secretary. Apart from a writ of Certiorari to quash Ext.P1 order, the petitioner has also sought a writ of Habeas Corpus commanding the respondents to produce the detenue and set her at liberty forthwith, contending her detention in the Women Prison and Correctional Home, Thiruvananthapuram, as illegal.

2. The pleadings and materials would show that to issue Ext.P1 detention order, the authorities have taken into consideration six criminal cases of peddling or possession of narcotic drugs in which the detenue was involved. The last prejudicial activity among the aforesaid six criminal cases is Crime No.334 of 2025 of Kozhikode Town Police Station, registered under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act, the incident of which occurred on 17.04.2025. In that crime, the quantity of Ganja seized from the possession of the detenue was 4.331 kg. The detenue was arrested in that crime on the very same date and was granted bail on 18.06.2025. The 5th respondent, Deputy Commissioner of Police, submitted the sponsoring report dated 03.07.2025 and additional report dated 13.08.2025 through the State Police Chief to the 2nd respondent Additional Chief Secretary to the Government, which were forwarded by the State Police Chief as per respective letters dated 23.07.2025 and 18.08.2025, seeking issuance of an order of preventive detention under Section 3 (1) of the PITNDPS Act. Thereafter, Ext.P1 detention order was issued by the 2nd respondent. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition.

3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Government Pleader and also the learned Central Government Counsel.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that there is a delay of more than 6 months from the last prejudicial activity and the detention order and also a delay of more than 1½ months from the receipt of the report of the Advisory Board by the Government in issuing Ext.P1 detention order. The said delay is not properly explained in Ext.P1 order and therefore the unexplained delay snapped the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the detention order. In support of the aforesaid argument, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sushanta Kumar Banik v. State of Tripura [AIR 2022 SC 4715] and that of a Division Bench of this Court in Kunjumol P.G v. State of Kerala [2026 KHC Online 2147]. The learned counsel for the petitioner, by relying on the judgment in Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra [(1980) 2 SCC 275], which was relied upon by the learned Government pleader also, but in support of his argument on another point, further argued that the burden of explaining the delay is upon the detaining authority. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the reason for ordering preventive detention without taking steps to cancel the bail granted to the detenue is not reflected in Ext.P1 order and therefore there is no subjective satisfaction from the part of the 2nd respondent while issuing Ext.P1 order.

5. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader argued that the delay in issuing the detention order has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis and whether the delay is fatal or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, there is sufficient explanation for the delay that occurred in issuing the detention order. By relying on the judgments in Frances Coralie Mullin [(1980) 2 SCC 275], L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujaral [(1981) 3 SCC 317], the judgment dated 17.01.2014 in W.P. (Crl.) No.552 of 2013 [2014:KER:2968] and Rahila Nazeer v. State of Kerala [2016 (3) KHC 189], the learned Government Pleader argued that the delay is not fatal in the instant case.

6. We have perused the pleadings and materials on record and appreciated the rival submissions made at the Bar. Based on the pleadings and the arguments addressed at the Bar, the points to be considered in the present writ petition are, (i) Whether there is unreasonable delay in issuing Ext.P1 order after the last prejudicial activity which vitiates the live link between the last prejudicial activity and Ext.P1 detention order? and, (ii) Whether the authorities have exhausted all other remedies, especially the remedy of cancellation of bail in the criminal cases wherein the detenue was granted bail, before ordering the preventive detention, and the non-consideration of the same makes Ext.P1 order liable to be set aside?

7. In Sushanta Kumar Banik [AIR 2022 SC 4715], while considering an appeal filed by the detenue against the judgment passed by the High Court of Tripura at Agartala dated 01.06.2022, confirming his detention under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “20. It is manifestly clear from a conspectus of the above decisions of this Court, that the underlying principle is that if there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the "live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” (Underline supplied)

8. In Kunjumol P.G. [2026 KHC Online 2147], a Division Bench of this Court headed by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, while considering a writ petition filed against the order of preventive detention issued under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act, held thus;

                  “26. At the outset, it is to be noticed that the PITNDPS Act does not prescribe any specific period within which an order of detention is required to be passed from the date of the prejudicial activity. What is required is that the Detaining Authority must arrive at its subjective satisfaction on the basis of the relevant materials that preventive detention is necessary with a view to prevent the person concerned from engaging in illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Nevertheless, it is well settled that the prejudicial activities relied upon must bear a live and proximate nexus with the order of detention. If there is undue and unexplained delay in passing the detention order, such delay may, in a given case, have the effect of snapping the nexus between the prejudicial activities and the purpose sought to be achieved by the detention. At the same time, where the delay is satisfactorily explained by the time consumed in investigation, collection of materials, administrative processing, scrutiny by the sponsoring and screening authorities and consideration by the Government, the detention order cannot be invalidated merely on the ground of lapse of time.

                  27. To ascertain whether the live and proximate link gets snapped, it is pertinent to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in T. A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala [(1990) SCC (Crl) 76] wherein the Apex Court has reiterated the observation in Golam Hussain v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta [(1974) 4 SCC 530] as follows:

                  "10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live - link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case." (emphasis supplied)

9. In Frances Coralie Mullin [(1980) 2 SCC 275], the judgment of which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Government Pleader, while considering the challenge against an order of preventive detention under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “5. We have no doubt in our minds about the role of the Court in cases of preventive detention; it has to be one of eternal vigilance. No freedom is higher than personal freedom and no duty higher than to maintain it unimpaired. The Court's writ is the ultimate insurance against illegal detention. The Constitution enjoins conformance with the provisions of Article 22 and the Court exacts compliance. Article 22(5) vests in the detenu the right to be provided with an opportunity to make a representation. Here the Law Report tell a story and teach a lesson. It is that the principal enemy of the detenu and his right to make a representation is neither high handedness nor mean mindedness but the casual indifference, the mindless insensibility, the routine and the red tape of the bureaucratic machine. The four principles enunciated by the Court in Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal as well as other principles enunciated in other cases, an analysis will show, are aimed at shielding personal freedom against indifference, insensibility, routine and red tape and thus to secure to the detenu the right to make an effective representation. We agree: (1) the detaining authority must provide the detenu a very early opportunity to make a representation, (2) the detaining authority must consider the representation as soon as possible and this, preferably, must be before the representation is forwarded to the Advisory Board, (3) the representation must be forwarded to the Advisory Board before the Board makes it report, and (4) the consideration by the detaining authority of the representation must be entirely independent of the hearing by the Board or its report, expedition being essential at every stage. We however, hasten to add that the time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive. The Court's observations are not to be so understood. There has to be lee way, depending on the necessities (we refrain from using the word 'circumstances') of the case. One may well imagine a case where a detenu does not make a representation before the Board makes its report making it impossible for the detaining authority either to consider it or to forward it to the Board in time or a case where a detenu makes a representation to the detaining authority so shortly before the Advisory Board takes up the reference that the detaining authority cannot consider the representation before then but may merely forward it to the Board without himself considering it. Several such situations may arise compelling departure from the time imperative. But no allowance can be made for lethargic indifference. No allowance can be made for needless procrastination. But, allowance must surely be made for necessary consultation where legal intricacies and factual ramifications are involved. The burden of explaining the necessity for the slightest departure from the time imperative is on the detaining authority.

                  6. We notice that in Narendra Purshotam Umrao v. B. B. Gujral, the detenu made his representation on 4th and 6th of March, 1978, the Advisory Board gave a hearing on 13th March and the detaining authority rejected the representation on 18th March. The Court persued the records of the Government and the Advisory Board and concluded that there was no infraction of the Constitutional safeguard in Article 22(5). It was held, with reference to the records, that the Government had taken a decision uninfluenced by what transpired at the hearing before the Board. The matter was found to have been dealt with by the Government at all levels and the detaining authority had come to independent conclusion of his own by applying his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case.

                  7. We have already expressed our agreement with the four principles enunciated in Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal. We would make one observation. When it was said there that the Government should come to its decision on the representation before the Government forwarded the representation to the Advisory Board, the emphasis was not on the point of time but on the requirement that the Government should consider the representation independently of the Board. This was explained in Nagendra Nath Mandal v. State of West Bengal [(1972) 1 SCC 498] at P. 504. In Sukul's case the Court also made certain pertinent observations (at pages 231-232) :

                  "No definite time can be laid down within which a representation of a detenu should be dealt with save and except that it is a constitutional right of a detenu to have his representation considered as expeditiously as possible. It will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether the appropriate Government has disposed of the case as expeditiously as possible. "

                  8. In Prabhakar Shankar Dhuri v. S. S. Pradhan [(1971) 3 SCC 896 (2)] and Kantilal Bose v. State of West Bengal [AIR 1972 SC 1623] delay of 16 days and 28 days respectively in disposing of the representation of the detenu was considered sufficient to vitiate the detention. On the other hand, the Nagendra Nath Mandal v. The State of West Bengal, a delay of 34 days was held not to affect the validity of the detention as part of the delay was explained by the circumstances that the records of the case had been sent to the Advisory Board and part of the delay was explained by the enquiries which the Government had to make. The Court observed :

                  "That fact is not disputed before us and so also the fact that those records showed that on June 7, 1971, Government had sent the files in connection with the petitioner's case and his representation to the Advisory Board. As soon as the representation was returned to it, Government considered it and rejected it but that was before the Board made its report and sent it to Government. But counsel urged that this fact may explain the lapse of time from the date that the records were sent and the date when they were returned, but not the delay between May 27, 1971 and June 7, 1971, during which Government could have arrived at its decision. That argument has not much force, because in a given case Government may not be able to reach a proper conclusion within a short time especially, in a case where another authority, in this case the District Magistrate, has passed the questioned order. It might have to make inquiries as to the situation in the locality, the nature of and the circumstances in which detention was found necessary, the previous history of the person detained etc. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with counsel that Government should nave reached its conclusion during the said period. There can be no hard and fast rule with regard to the time which Government can or should take, and that each case must be decided on its own facts".

                  9. We may now consider whether the facts here disclose a disregard to the petitioner's constitutional right as claimed by his counsel in his second and third submissions. The petitioner's request for copies of statements and documents was received by the detaining authority on December 3, 1979, and at the instance of the detaining authority, the Director of Revenue Intelligence furnished the copies sought on December 7, 1979. The authorities who laid the information before the detaining authority and who were primarily concerned in the matter were the Customs authorities via the Director of Revenue Intelligence. So the detaining authority directed the Director of Revenue Intelligence to furnish copies of the documents and it was so done. There was no delay in furnishing of documents and no legitimate complaint could be made on that score. The detenu's representation was received by the detaining authority on December 26, 1979. Without any loss of time copy of the representation was sent to the Customs authorities for their remarks. That was obvious necessary because the information leading to the order of detention was laid by the Customs authorities. The facts were undoubtedly complex since the allegations against the detenu revealed an involvement with an international gang of dope smugglers. The comments of the Customs authorities were received on January 4, 1980. The Advisory Board was meeting on January 4, 1980 and so there could be no question of the detaining authority considering the representation of the detenu before the Board met, unless it was done in great and undue haste. After obtaining the comments of the Customs authorities, it was found necessary to take legal advice as the representation posed many legal and constitutional questions. So, after consultation with the Secretary (Law and Judicial) Delhi Administration, the representation was finally rejected by the Administrator on January 15, 1980. These facts are stated in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Delhi Administration and are substantiated by the records produced before us. If there appeared to be any delay, it was not due to any want of care but because the representation required a thorough examination in consultation with investigators of facts and advisers on law. We have ourselves examined the records and we find that though the Administrator considered the representation of the detenu after the hearing by the Board, the Administrator was entirely uninfluenced by the hearing before the Board. The application for the issue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus is therefore dismissed”.

                  (underline supplied)

10. In L.M.S. Ummu Saleema [(1981) 3 SCC 317], in a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India against the order of preventive detention under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “7. Another submission of the learned Counsel was that there was considerable delay in the disposal of the representation by the detaining authority and this was sufficient to vitiate the detention. The learned Counsel submitted that the detaining authority was under an obligation to adequately explain each day's delay and our attention was invited to the decisions in Pritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India [(1980) 4 SCC 525] and in Shanker Raju Shetty v. Union of India [ Writ Petition No. 640 of 1980, decided on June 26, 1980] . We do not doubt that the representation made by the detenu has to be considered by the detaining authority with the utmost expedition but as observed by one of us in Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra [(1980) 2 SCC 275] “the time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive”. The occasional observations made by this Court that each day's delay in dealing with the representation must be adequately explained are meant to emphasise the expedition with which the representation must be considered and not that it is a magical formula, the slightest breach of which must result in the release of the detenu. Law deals with the facts of life. In law, as in life, there are no invariable absolutes. Neither life nor law can be reduced to mere but despotic formulae. Considered in that light, can it be said that there was any unreasonable delay in the present case? The representation was despatched on February 5, 1981 and was received in the office of the detaining authority on February 13, 1981. Apparently it was in postal transit from 5th to 13th . It was put up before the detaining authority on February 19, 1981 and disposed of that very day. From the records produced before us we notice that the detaining authority, Shri. B.B. Gujaral, was not available from 13th to 16th as he had gone abroad. He returned on 16th and considered the matter on 19th. The learned counsel for the detenu urged that the absence of the detaining authority from India cannot be allowed to violate the fundamental right of the detenu to have his representation considered with the utmost expedition. We agree that in such cases appropriate arrangements must be made for considering the detenu's representation. Apparently, it was not thought necessary in the present case as Shri Gujaral was returning on 16th, that is, within a few days. After the 16th the delay, if any, was for a period of three days only. It can hardly be described as delay though one wishes there was no room even for that little complaint. We are of the view that there has not been any unaccountable or unreasonable delay in the disposal of the representation by the detaining authority.”

                  (Underline supplied)

11. In Rahila Nazeer [2016 (3) KHC 189], a Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with a writ petition filed against the preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007, held thus;

                  “12. It is not the delay alone that matters. If the delay in passing the order of detention is unexplained and inordinate, it could be said that the live link between the prejudicial activity and the order of detention is snapped. It is not a mechanical test that can be applied in the matter of ascertaining whether the live link is snapped. If the delay is satisfactorily explained, it cannot be held that the live link is snapped. The KAA(P) Act does not provide that if the period of six moths from the last prejudicial activity expires, no order of detention can be passed. The Legislature in its wisdom did not think that an order of detention cannot be passed after the expiry of the period for which a person can be detained under Section 3, reckoning the period from the date of the last prejudicial activity to the order of detention. The period of detention under Section 3 as such cannot be a determining factor to assess whether there is inordinate and unexplained delay. The facts and circumstances of the case are relevant in each case. Reasons may be varied as to why the order of detention is passed after several months of the date of the last prejudicial activity. If the person concerned is in judicial custody and there is no likelihood of his being released shortly, the detaining authority may stay its hands for a short while and think of passing an order of detention subsequent to the release of the person concerned. It is not necessary that the person concerned should commit another crime after the expiry of his judicial custody (in the crimes already registered and pending investigation) in order to enable the detaining authority to pass an order of detention. In short, the facts situation in each case makes it relevant the question whether the delay is inordinate so as to vitiate the order of detention on the ground of lack of live nexus between the prejudicial activity and the order of detention.

                  13. In the present case, the order of detention specifically refers to the reasons why the order of detention was passed after a lapse of few months from the date of the last prejudicial activity. Apart from stating that the investigation of the last crime was pending and the charge - sheet in that case was filed on 16.04.2015, the detaining authority also referred to the judicial custody of the detenu and his release on bail on 07.08.2015. We are of the view that the detaining authority has satisfactorily explained the delay in passing the order of detention”.

                  (Underline supplied)

12. In the judgment dated 17.01.2014 in W.P.(Crl.)No.552 of 2013 [2014:KER:2968] in a writ petition filed against the order of preventive detention under the Kerala Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007, a Division Bench of this Court held thus;

                  “11. A close reading of the judgments referred to above would show that even if delay has occurred, it can be fatal to an order of detention, only if the delay is unexplained. Therefore, the question to be considered in this case is whether, on facts, it can be held that any delay has occurred and if delay has occurred, whether it has been explained or not.

                  12. In so far as this case is concerned, it is true that the last prejudicial activity alleged against the detenu was on 26.05.2013 and Ext.P1 order of detention was passed only on 25.09.2013. However, while examining this issue, the peculiarity of this case that 9 criminal cases relied on by the detaining authority in Ext.P1 order were allegedly committed by the detenu within the jurisdiction of six police stations, viz., Puthukkad, Peechi, Ollur, Cherppu and Thrissur East Police Station. It was relying on these cases that the Sub Inspector of Police, Ollur Police Station, within whose jurisdiction also cases are registered, made the preliminary report dated 10.08.2013, based on which, Ext.P3 report under Section 3(1) of the Act was made by the sponsoring authority to the detaining authority.

                  13. Admittedly, to attract section 2(p)(iii) of the Act, the person concerned must be alleged to have committed at least three offences of the nature specified in the section within a period of 7 years. Therefore, the Sub Inspector of Police, Ollur Police Station could have made the preliminary report on 10.8.2013 only after collecting details from the other 5 Police Stations. We cannot expect him to have completed this process within any unrealistically short period and in the process if he has taken a reasonable time, we cannot find fault with him for having delayed his report. On receipt of the report dated 10.08.2013, the third respondent made his report under Section 3 of the Act on 17.08.2013. Similarly, the second respondent could not have mechanically acted upon the report and passed Ext.P1 order and could have passed the order only after due application of mind and on evaluating the entire materials made available to him. If that be so, Ext.P3 report dated 17.08.2013 made by the third respondent to the second respondent or Ext.P1 order passed by the second respondent on 25.09.2013 cannot be said to be vitiated by delay. For these reasons, on the facts of this case, we are not in a position to hold that in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court or this Court in the judgments referred to above, Ext.P1 order is illegal on the ground of delay”. (Underline supplied)

13. In the instant case, the last prejudicial activity in which the detenue was involved occurred on 17.04.2025. She was arrested on the very same day and released on bail on 18.06.2025. The sponsoring report submitted by the 5th respondent was on 03.07.2025, after the release of the detenue on bail in the last prejudicial activity. It can also be discerned from Ext.P1 order that an additional report was also filed by the 5th respondent on 13.08.2025 before the 2nd respondent and on receipt of the reports and records, the Government examined the proposal and placed the same before the screening committee headed by the Law Secretary. The report of the screening committee, on receipt, was sent to the sponsoring authority for authentication, and it was received back in the Government on 08.09.2025. However, the period from 08.09.2025 till Ext.P1 order dated 17.10.2025 is not explained in Ext.P1 order. From the principles stated in the aforementioned judgments regarding delay, it can be seen that the delay has to be considered on a case-to-case basis. Whether the delay is unreasonable or not depends upon the facts of each case. If there is sufficient explanation, the delay is not fatal. But in the instant case, there is no explanation for the delay from 08.09.2025 onwards. Mere mention of steps taken till the date of issuance of the detention order is not sufficient, since preventive detention is the curtailment of the liberty of a citizen without trial. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the Ext.P1 detention order snapped in the instant case, due to unexplained delay.

14. As far as the next argument regarding non-exhaustion of the steps for cancellation of bail before issuing Ext.P1 detention order raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is relevant to note some of the judgments on this point.

15. In Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2011) 5 SCC 244], in the case of detention order passed under the provisions of the of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, and Slum Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 , on the allegation that the detenue therein was selling expired drugs after tampering with the labels and printing fresh labels showing them as non-expired drugs, the Apex Court held thus:

                  “30. Whenever an order under a preventive detention law is challenged one of the questions the court must ask in deciding its legality is : Was the ordinary law of the land sufficient to deal with the situation? If the answer is in the affirmative, the detention order will be illegal. In the present case, the charge against the detenu was of selling expired drugs after changing their labels. Surely the relevant provisions in the Indian Penal Code and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act were sufficient to deal with this situation. Hence, in our opinion, for this reason also the detention order in question was illegal”. (Underline supplied)

16. In Jancy Joseph v. State [2022 KHC Online 5717], a Division Bench of this Court, while considering a writ petition filed by the mother of the detenue therein against the detention order issued under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act, held thus;

                  “26. After hearing both sides, we see that the only case involving non bailable offences is the first case, which has been committed on 14.02.2019. Therein, the detenue has been granted bail, as per Ext.P5 bail order dated 09.04.2019. The second and third cases are both bailable offences. The second case has been committed on 23.12.2019. The third crime, which also involves bailable offences, is said to have been committed on 07.03.2022. Going by the nature of the three cases, more particularly the second and third cases, it can be seen that the aspects regarding consideration of the option of bail cancellation of the first case is certainly relevant, in the facts and circumstances of this case. This is all the more so, since this is the first detention order involved in the detenu's case and only 3 cases are alleged against the detenu, in which the last 2 are bailable offences. Hence, in the light of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the detaining authority should have, at least, considered as to the viability and feasibility of the option of bail cancellation, in respect of the bail granted in the first case, and considered as to whether recourse to such ordinary process of criminal law would have been sufficient to meet the scenario in hand, instead of proceeding with the extreme measure of preventive detention. We are only saying that, in the facts of this case, the consideration of such an option was highly relevant and crucial, and the detaining authority should have pointedly considered the said option, and if, after due consideration, the detaining authority had come with the same conclusion, as the one now urged before us by the learned Prosecutor, and had held that the said option was not feasible at all to meet with the objective of preventing the detenu from committing further prejudicial acts, then, certainly, the scenario would have been entirely different. Since, consideration of such an option was relevant and crucial, in the facts and circumstances of a case of this nature, for the abovesaid reasons, and as the said aspect has not been considered at all, we are of the view that non consideration of such a crucial and relevant aspect has to be held as fatal to the decision making process, which has led to the impugned Ext.P2 detention order.

                  27. The scenario would have been entirely different if the detaining authority had considered these aspects of feasibility and viability of the option of bail cancellation, and after such pointed consideration, the detaining authority had come to the present conclusion that, such an option was not feasible and viable to meet with the imperatives of the situation, then the matter would have been, certainly, beyond the province of judicial review interdiction. Such is not the instant case. We are not, for a moment, saying that in all cases, such option should necessarily be mechanically pursued. All what we are saying is that, going by the material particulars of the present facts before us, which we have delineated above, consideration of such an option was highly crucial and relevant, and total non consideration of that aspect would disclose a non application of mind in that crucial area, which was, as far as the present case is concerned, fatal and therefore, the decision making process, which led to Ext.P1 detention order, has to be held as being vitiated.

                  28. We have to bear in mind that, at the end of the day, what is involved is the curtailment of the personal liberties and freedoms of the detenu, which are guaranteed in terms of the safeguards contained in Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution of India. Hence, in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case and in view of the non consideration of the said aspects, we are of the view that the impugned detention order is liable to be interdicted on that sole ground and hence, the impugned Ext.P 2 detention order is liable for quashment”. (Underline supplied)

17. In Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala [2025 (4) KHC 637], the Apex Court, while considering an appeal filed against the judgment of this Court, affirming the preventive detention of the detenue therein issued under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act held thus;

                  “21. This Court in Shaik Nazneen v. State of Telangana [(2023) 9 SCC 63], had observed that the State should move for cancellation of bail of the detenu, instead of placing him under the law of preventive detention, which is not the appropriate remedy. Similarly, in Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana [(2023) 9 SCC 587], this Court observed :

                  "59. ... It is pertinent to note that in the three criminal proceedings where the detenu had been released on bail, no applications for cancellation of bail had been moved by the State. In the light of the same, the provisions of the Act, which is an extraordinary statute, should not have been resorted to when ordinary criminal law provided sufficient means to address the apprehensions leading to the impugned detention order. There may have existed sufficient grounds to appeal against the bail orders, but the circumstances did not warrant the circumvention of ordinary criminal procedure to resort to an extraordinary measure of the law of preventive detention."

                  60. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar (Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [(1984) 3 SCC 14], Hon'ble E. S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) observed:

                  32. It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.

                  (Emphasis supplied)”

                  22. Keeping in view the above expositions of law, we have no doubt that the order of detention cannot be sustained. The circumstances pointed out in the order by the detaining authority may be ground enough for the State to approach the competent Courts for cancellation of bail, but it cannot be said that the same warranted his preventive detention. We clarify that if such an application for cancellation of the detenu's bail is made by the respondent - State, the same must be decided uninfluenced by the observations made hereinabove”. (Underline supplied)

18. Later in Sujodh K v. State of Kerala [2025 KHC Online 648], a Division Bench of this Court, while considering a writ petition filed challenging an order of preventive detention passed under Section 3 (1) of the KAA(P) Act, held thus;

                  “10. We are not oblivious of the fact that detention under the KAA(P) Act or similar detention laws is a drastic measure against a citizen, especially when it heavily impacts their personal as well as fundamental rights. When an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to detention under such laws is neither warranted nor permissible. However, merely because there is a provision for cancellation of bail under the ordinary criminal law, it cannot be said that an order of detention under the KAA(P) Act cannot be passed. When there is an imminent danger of repetition of criminal activities by a person who can be classified as 'known goonda' or 'known rowdy', cancellation of bail orders already secured by him would not be sufficient to deter such a person from indulging in criminal activities. The reason being, first of all, the purpose and scope of an application for cancellation of bail are different. That apart, since the procedure prescribed for cancellation of bail, having regard to the ground realities is time consuming, there is no assurance that an order of cancellation of bail could be secured before the person concerned indulges into another criminal activity. Preventive detention laws are enacted to address such exigencies. It is on account of these reasons that it has been held by the courts consistently that the authorities under the preventive detention laws need not have to wait till orders are passed on the application for cancellation of bail, for passing an order of detention. If it is held that, if there is an option for cancellation of bail, a detention order cannot be passed, it would render the preventive detention laws ineffective. In other words, it cannot be said as a general proposition of law that if there is an option for cancellation of bail already granted to a person, an order of detention cannot be passed against him, although there could be exceptions to this position.

                  11. We have meticulously perused the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala [2025 (4) KHC 637] and it cannot be inferred from the judgment that the Honourable Supreme Court has held in the said case as a proposition of law that an order of detention cannot be passed, if an option is available for cancellation of bail already granted. A reading of the judgment in Dhanya's case only indicates that the observation in paragraph 20 of the judgment regarding the application for cancellation of bail is one made on the facts of that case.

                  12. That apart, in Dhanya M. [2025 (4) KHC 637], the preventive detention order was passed based on the detenu's involvement in four cases, and in all the said four cases, the offences alleged was under S.17 of the Kerala Money Lenders Act and S.3 of Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2012. The Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the order of detention mainly on a finding that the offences attributed to the detenu in those cases did not affect the maintenance of public order. Moreover, reiterating the observations in Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana and others [2024 SCC OnLine SC 367], the Hon'ble Supreme Court had drawn a clear distinction between the realms of law and order and public order. In paragraphs 19 and 20 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:

                  "19. In consonance with the above expositions of law, in our view, the attending facts and circumstances do not fall under the category of a public order situation. The observations made in the detention order do not ascribe any reason as to how the actions of the detenu are against the public order of the State. As discussed above, given the extraordinary nature of the power of preventive detention, no reasons are assigned by the detaining authority, as to why and how the actions of the detenu warrant the exercise of such an exceptional power.

                  20. Moreover, it has been stated therein by the authority that the detenu is violating the conditions of bail, imposed upon him in the cases that have been considered for passing the order of detention. However, pertinently, no application has been filed by the respondent - State in any of the four cases, alleging violation of such conditions, if any, and moreover, have not even been spelt out here."

                  13. Essentially, the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the detention order in Dhanya M. [2025 (4) KHC 637] on a finding that the facts and circumstances were insufficient to classify the detenu's action as harmful for the maintenance of public order. Notably, the said detention order was passed based on the cases alleging offences under the Kerala Money Lenders Act and the Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2012 were alleged. It was mainly by taking note of the fact that the facts and circumstances in the said cases did not fall under the category of public order, the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the order of detention and made a finding that the State could approach the competent court for cancellation of bail.

                  14. However, in the case at hand, the cases considered by the detaining authority to pass the impugned order of detention are not cases registered alleging offences under the Kerala Money Lenders Act or Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2012. Rather, the impugned order of detention has been passed based on cases registered alleging offences under the NDPS Act and the IPC, which are certainly harmful for the maintenance of the public order, or will fall under the definition of anti - social activities. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that instead of passing the impugned order of detention, the remedy was to file an application for cancellation of bail”.

                  (Underline supplied)

19. In the judgment dated 14.08.2026 in W.P.(Crl.) No.590 of 2026 [2026:KER:62707], a Division Bench of this Court, headed by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, while considering a writ petition filed by the father of the detenue therein, challenging the order of preventive detention issued under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act, held thus;

                   “30. The materials placed before this Court further reveal that the detaining authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu had already been enlarged on bail. The question, therefore, is not whether the detenu was in custody on the date of the detention order, but whether the detaining authority had arrived at a genuine subjective satisfaction that the ordinary criminal law and the conditions imposed while granting bail were inadequate to prevent the detenu from indulging in further prejudicial activities.

                  31. Although it was open to the authority to apply for cancellation of the bail on the ground of violation of the earlier bail terms and conditions, it appears that the authority concerned has practically abandoned the application for cancellation of bail until an order was passed on 2nd July 2026 from the production of the said application. The application for cancellation of bail when considered in the context of the detention order, it shall be presumed that the authorities wanted to pursue an ordinary criminal law to prevent the alleged detenue from enlargement on bail. There is no consideration of that aspect of the matter either in the order of detention or in the final order of confirmation. The detaining authority observed that the present bail conditions in the order dated 13th November 2025 are not sufficient to curb his criminal activities since he has violated similar bail conditions that have passed which did not reflect upon the fact that the application for cancellation of bail was filed and whether the authority should wait till the outcome of the said application. In the event the authority is of the view that the application for cancellation of the bail would require some time to be considered and the alleged detenue if not detained in the meantime would be a threat to the society, then that should be reflected from the order of detention. In this regard reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adishwar Jain v. Union of India [(2006) 11 SCC 339] in which it was held as under:-

                  “15. Delay, as is well known, at both stages has to be explained. The court is required to consider the question having regard to the overall picture. We may notice that in Sk. Serajul v. State of W.B. [(1975) 2 SCC 78: 1975 SCC (Cri) 425] this Court opined: (SCC p. 80, para 2)

                  “There was thus delay at both stages and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Burdwan recited in the order of detention. It would be reasonable to assume that if the District Magistrate of Burdwan was really and genuinely satisfied after proper application of mind to the materials before him that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner, he would have acted with greater promptitude both in making the order of detention as also in securing the arrest of the petitioner, and the petitioner would not have been allowed to remain at large for such a long period of time to carry on his nefarious activities.

                  32. The detention order is conspicuously silent as to the filing of the cancellation application. Equally absent is any consideration as to why statutory remedy for cancellation of the bail would either be unavailable or inadequate to prevent the detenue from indulging in further prejudicial activity. The very fact that the application for cancellation of bail has been filed would show that the authority concerned was satisfied that ordinary criminal law would be sufficient in the instant case. ” (Underline supplied)

20. Again, in Sulaiman M.V v. State of Kerala [2026 KHC Online 1994], a Division Bench of this Court headed by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, while considering a writ petition filed challenging the detention order issued under Section 3 (1) of the PITNDPS Act, held thus;

                  “52. Coming to the next ground that the proper course available to the authorities was to seek cancellation of bail rather than to invoke the drastic provisions of the PITNDPS Act, it is contended that the failure to adopt such a course demonstrates non - application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. However, it has to be seen that the detention order cannot be quashed on this ground alone, as the authorities concerned have specifically recorded that the continued detention of the detenu was necessary with a view to prevent him from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. At this juncture, we refer to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Anandhu Shaji v. State of Kerala and Others [2025 SCC OnLine Ker. 14487], wherein it was held as follows:

                  "11. We are not oblivious to the fact that when an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to detention under preventive detention laws is neither warranted nor permissible. However, merely because a remedy of bail cancellation is available, it cannot be said that a detention order under the PITNDPS Act cannot be passed. When there is an imminent danger of repetition of criminal activities by a person who indulges in drug peddling activities, cancellation of bail orders already secured by him would not be sufficient to deter such a person from indulging in criminal activities. The reason is that, first of all, the purpose and scope of an application for cancellation of bail and preventive detention are different. That apart, the bail cancellation procedure, having regard to the ground realities, is a time - consuming one. There is no assurance that an order of cancellation of bail could be secured in time before the person concerned indulges in another criminal activity. Preventive detention laws are enacted to address such exigencies. It is on account of these reasons that it has been held by the courts consistently that the authorities under the preventive detention laws need not have to wait till orders are passed on the application for cancellation of bail, for passing an order of detention. If it is held that, if there is an option for cancellation of bail, a detention order cannot be passed, it would render the preventive detention laws ineffective. Moreover, even after the cancellation of bail, there is no legal impediment to granting bail subsequently. Therefore, it cannot be said that cancellation of bail is an effective alternative remedy, and when such an alternative remedy is available, a detention order is not at all necessitated." (emphasis supplied)

                  53. On a perusal of the materials placed before us, it can be deduced that the authorities were fully conscious of the bail orders and the conditions imposed therein, but were nevertheless satisfied that such conditions had failed to act as an effective deterrent against the detenu's continued involvement in prejudicial activities. Having regard to the antecedents of the detenu, the repetitive nature of the offences alleged against him, and the likelihood of his persisting in similar activities in future, the authorities rightly concluded that recourse to ordinary remedies under the criminal law would not be sufficient to achieve the object of the preventive detention law”. (Underline supplied)

21. From the principles stated in the aforementioned judgments regarding the necessity of the exhaustion of the ordinary criminal law remedy of cancellation of bail, before initiation of the proceedings for preventive detention by the Division Bench of this Court as well as by the Apex Court, it can only be said that such a course would depend upon facts of the case concerned and it cannot be accepted as a general proposition. Whether it is necessary to initiate the steps for cancellation of bail before initiating steps for ordering preventive detention depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. When there is imminent danger of repetition of criminal activities by a person who can be classified as 'known goonda' or 'known rowdy', or a person indulges in drug peddling activities, cancellation of bail orders already secured by him would not be sufficient to deter such a person from indulging in criminal activities. Moreover, the conclusion of such steps is a time-consuming process since the concept of cancellation of bail order or preventive detention is entirely different. Cancellation of bail generally requires cogent and overwhelming circumstances, such as interference with the administration of justice, absconding of the accused, witness intimidation or evidence tampering by the accused, abuse of liberty granted to him by the accused, a fundamentally defective bail order, etc. But in the case of preventive detention, even if the bail cancellation is not available, the detention authority must independently satisfy the statutory conditions governing preventive detention and comply with the constitutional safeguards. The matters to be taken into consideration for ordering cancellation of bail are distinct from the matters to be considered for ordering preventive detention. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the aforesaid argument of non-taking of steps for cancellation of bail raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner as a ground to challenge Ext.P1 order in the present writ petition holds no merit. Therefore, we find no merit in the contention of the petitioner that Ext.P1 order is vitiated due to non-consideration of alternative remedy of cancellation of bail granted to the detenue in the previous criminal cases.

22. The upshot of the above discussion is that the Ext.P1 order of detention is liable to be set aside on the ground of unexplained and inordinate delay in issuing the same.

In the result, the writ petition is allowed by setting aside the impugned Ext.P1 order under challenge in this writ petition. The 7th respondent Superintendent, Women Prison and Correctional Home, Thiruvananthapuram, is directed to release the detenue Kamarunnisa C.V forthwith if her detention is not required in connection with any other case. The Registry shall communicate this order to the 7th respondent by e-mail at once.